



THE CHALLENGES OF  
**YOUTH** RESTIVENESS,  
VIOLENCE AND PEACE  
IN NORTHERN NIGERIA

CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS

*Two-Day Summit on Youth Restiveness, Violence, Peace & Development in Northern Nigeria  
undertaken with the financial support of the Government of Canada provided through the Canadian  
International Development Agency (CIDA)*



Canadian International  
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Agence canadienne de  
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The mission of CLEEN Foundation is to promote public safety, security and accessible justice through empirical research, legislative advocacy, demonstration programmes and publications in partnership with government and civil society.



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## Acknowledgement

Several organisations played significant and collaborative roles at different levels for the successful implementation of the “Two-Day Summit on Youth Restiveness, Violence, Peace & Development in Northern Nigeria”. First is the Canadian Fund for Local Initiatives (CFLI) managed by the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) for providing support for the project implementation and the production of this publication.

We appreciate the Bauchi Human Rights Network for their conscientious efforts in coordinating the several activities within the state that led to the success of the project activity.

The Bauchi State Commissioner of Police deserves our commendation for his commitment and efforts in bringing to bare youth unrest and violence in the state. This was further demonstrated by the participation of some senior police officers of the State Command who played significant roles at the summit and for ensuring that the venue of the programme was secured and safe for the participants.

We are grateful to our resource persons whose presentations led to the discussions, observations and recommendations made at the programme, inclusive are serving senior police officer of the Bauchi State Police Command, DCP Femi Oyeleye, Mr. Simon Karu, Ms Dibal Rachel Abdullahi, Mr Sylvester Yibis (Bauchi Human Rights Network), Mr Chinedu Nwagu, the Islamic cleric, Mr. Mahmood Jammal and the

Christian Leader, Reverend Josiah Bala.

Finally, we thank the staff of CLEEN Foundation's Abuja office, particularly Ms Chigozirim Okoro, Napoleon Enayaba and Ethelbert Obasi, who worked tirelessly at the different stages of the project and contributed to its successful implementation.

## Preface

**Y**outh restiveness and violence has become a recurring decimal in northern Nigeria particularly in Jos Plateau, Borno, Bauchi, Taraba, Gombe, Kano and Kaduna states. In some instances, it has taken the form of terrorist attacks and has become one of the critical problems the nation is facing at the moment. Several attacks have been carried out and serious damages recorded in this regards, leading to several deaths and loss of properties. The most recent attacks include the robbery at a bank in Bauchi state that resulted in several loss of life, the attack in Damaturu, Yobe state capital that claimed several lives, the attack on a police station in the outskirts of Gombe state where four persons were killed (two police officers and two civilians), and the 7<sup>th</sup> December, 2011 attack in Kaduna state where over twelve persons lost their lives including a three-year-old baby. The region has experienced recurrent violent conflicts, particularly since the early 1980s, caused by historical grievances, political manipulation and ethno/religious rivalries.

The most famous conflicts have been between Muslims and Christians. Long existing tensions, especially between Christians and Islamic groups, were aggravated by the reintroduction of Sharia law in northern Nigeria, with further outbreak of violence in Kaduna State where thousands of people were killed in the February and March 2000 conflicts. There have also been conflicts between opposing Islamic sects;

between anti-establishment Islamic groups and the Nigerian state, and between long established indigenous communities and “settlers” in northern Nigeria. These attacks and their aftermath call for concern and sober reflection.

It is against this background that CLEEN Foundation conceptualized and implemented a project titled: “Reinventing Youth Restiveness and Violence, an instrument for Peace & Development in Northern Nigeria”. The overall objective of the project is to mentor and empower young people in the region to become change agents and instruments of peace in their communities. It further seeks to redirect their strengths and energies into more productive use. This publication is a compilation of the proceedings of the two day youth summit. It is divided into three parts. Part one has the opening session and the welcome remarks which set the tone for further discussions. Part two provides the paper presentations made at the summit while part three captures the final report and Communiqué issued at the end of the summit which summarises the discussions, observations and recommendations made by the participants for urgent intervention and further engagement with the youths in northern Nigeria.

**Ms Chigozirim Okoro**  
**Programme Officer**  
**CLEEN Foundation**

# Part One

## Opening Remarks



# Welcome Remarks

**By Mr. Chinedu Yves Nwagu**

Manager, Accountability & Justice, CLEEN Foundation

**O**n behalf of the CLEEN Foundation, I warmly welcome you all to this Summit being organised by the CLEEN Foundation with support from the Canadian Fund for Local Initiative (CFLI), managed by the Canadian International Development Agency.

This Summit is a significant part of a project aimed at our reinventing youth restiveness, redirection their energies constructively, opening up better channels for dialogue, formulating better strategies for youth participation in governance and ultimately engaging the youth as instruments for peace and development in Nigeria. This objective is summed up in the theme of this summit: Youth Restiveness, Violence, Peace and Development in Northern Nigeria.

## **Why this Summit**

This programme is organised in recognition of the significant role of young people in nation building and the many challenges they confront in trying to gainfully engage the socio-political and economic structures in the Nigeria. With the recent surge in reported incidents of violence and youth restiveness in northern Nigeria, it has become imperative to open up dialogue between various actors in the society in order to review the plight of young people, who unfortunately are the major victims of the conflict and social unrest.

Nigeria has a teeming population of eager, energetic and enterprising

young people. Most of these young persons are living without any tangible facilitation of the government and cannot seem to lay claim to any of the vast resources of Nigeria. They yearn to participate in the society, to be gainfully employed, to contribute to social cohesion, to raise families, enjoy good health in good environment and lead meaningful lives. Without finding a way to fulfil these common aspirations, and veritable channels to express their frustrations, most young people become restive and resort to violence.

More so, the absence of formal, inclusive and constructive engagement of these young people in the development processes of the state and society would therefore only breed more restiveness. The prevailing economic disempowerment, political disconnects, social decay, educational deprivation and widening wealth disparity in Nigeria are all factors that militate against development.

The broad expectations of this programme are:

1. To direct young people away from behaviour that engenders conflict by changing their perception of issues that could breed resentment and conflict.
2. To create an enabling environment for development and good governance.

We hope that the deliberations here would be useful in understanding the challenges of young people within the region, identifying the push factors of youth restiveness, proffer practicable solutions to the youth involvement in violence and other ways to empower, mentor and direct these young people to become role models and instruments of peace.

## **Compliments**

We thank the government of Canada through the Canada Fund for Local Initiatives (CFLI) managed by the Canadian International Development Agency, for the generous support towards this initiative.

We thank the various resource persons at this summit, who, at very short notice, accepted our invitation to contribute to and enrich this discourse. We also thank all the participants for being a part of this event. Everyone here is a significant stakeholder in the peace and development

of this region. We look forward to the anecdotal value and insight you would bring to this discourse and wish you fruitful deliberations.

## Opening Remarks

By Mrs Atinuke Taiwo

Coordinator, Canadian Fund for Local Initiatives

**I**t is a pleasure for me to be here on behalf of the Canadian International Development Agency and the High Commission of Canada in Abuja at the opening ceremony of the training programme to commence the project, "Reinventing Youth Restiveness And Violence: An Instrument for Peace and Development in Nigeria."

We commend CLEEN Foundation for their work in development at the community level. CIDA's focus in Nigeria is securing a future for children and youth, and stimulating sustainable economic growth. CIDA's focal states in Nigeria are Cross River and Bauchi.

The Canada fund for local initiatives supports locally based, self sustaining projects. It provides a funding mechanism that enables CIDA respond to local development needs especially outside its focal sectors and states. The current programming priorities of the CFLI include: maternal and child health; women and youth empowerment; environmental health advocacy; and environmental protection against deforestation.

The focal states for the 2011/12 are the FCT, Lagos, Taraba, Cross River, Gombe, Yobe, Adamawa, Bauchi and Borno states. The Canada fund focuses on social, economic/technical development. The general objective of the Canada fund is to enhance the economic, cultural and social life of the people of eligible developing countries. To achieve this, small scale

projects are supported to undertake initiatives that involve technical, educational, cultural, economic and social development assistance to the local populations.

With diverse and significant programming, CIDA is committed to helping Nigeria achieve equitable and sustainable livelihoods by improving the country's ability to use its own resources for development. CIDA efforts to support sustainable economic, social growth focus on working with Nigerian non-governmental organisations, civil society organisations and government bodies to improve how the country manages its natural resources. Recognising these is key to long term sustainable economic growth.

This includes adapting to climate change, setting up ways for local groups to monitor use of natural resources and reducing environmental degradation where it directly affects people's livelihoods and food security. While I have the opportunity, I would like to thank CLEEN Foundation for collaborating with Canadian government through the CFLI to implement this project

Also I would like to thank the organisers; I know it takes a lot of effort to coordinate an event of this nature. Finally I wish you every success with the implementation of this project. Thank you.

## Keynote Address

**By Mr Ayo Aduba**

Commissioner of Police, Bauchi State Police Command

**I**t a great pleasure for me to be here to deliver his keynote address on the first day of this two-day training programme on Youth Restiveness and Violence: an Instrument for Peace and Development.

Policing over the years has been perceived by the public as a tool in the hand of few in power to marginalise the majority who are poor. This perception has created a divide between the public that the police serve and the police institution itself. Consequent upon this is the broken connect between the police and the public which has directly and indirectly affected the effectiveness of the police even in the face of other challenges bedevilling the discharge statutory responsibilities. This alienation which the police has suffered for over 80 years of its existence has left the police all alone helpless in the face of increasing crime, arson, violence and restiveness without the public cooperation needed to effectively minimise them.

Though the police as a government agency have been established to ensure security of lives and property but security is not the work of the police alone but a collective work of both the police and private citizens of Nigeria. Perhaps at this juncture, it is pertinent to clarify that the police do not have eagle eyes that see everything from top instead, they depend on the public for effective discharge of their statutory responsibility.

Again, the police are not unaware of the erroneous impression among the public that classifies them as betrayers of public trust. Just like any

other public or even private institutions, we have not denied the fact there abandons some saboteurs but measures are already in place to mitigate these unpatriotic agents among the Nigerian Police Force.

Permit me at this moment, to use this opportunity once more on behalf of the Nigeria Police Force, to solicit your cooperation. It my wish that at the end of this training, you all seated here would have been mentored and empowered enough to become agents of peace for the purpose of national stability and development.

# **Part Two**

# **Paper Presentations**

# Youth Restiveness and Violence in Northern Nigeria: A Critical Analysis

By **Karu Simon**

Coordinator, Young Men Christian Association of Nigeria (YMCA), Bauchi

## Introduction

**N**igeria was created under the British colonialism, joining diverse people and regions in an artificial political entity. It was not unusual that the nationalism that became a political factor in Nigeria during the interwar period derived both from an older political particularism and broad pan-Africanism rather than in the spirit of one Nigerian nationality. Its goal initially was not self-determination, but rather increased participation in the governmental process on a regional level.

Before the creation of "Nigeria in 1914", the people in what is today known as "Nigeria" consisted of 4 different 'empires', some of them extending into parts that are not part of current-day Nigeria, like Ghana and Cameroon.

THE NORTHERN EMPIRE was composed of the Borno empire, some Hausa states (Zazzau, Gobir, Kano, Katsina, Birori, Daura) and some other groups (Gwari, Kebbi, Nupe, Yelwa).

THE CALABAR KINGDOM is the oldest kingdom, had the oldest contact with the Europeans. It is believed to have been founded around 1000 A.D., and has the oldest church built in the country dating back to 1850. The belief is that this kingdom was founded by twins, and it stretched into parts of current-day Cameroon.

THE ODUDUWA EMPIRE consisted of two main groups. One of them was the indigenous people, whose central religious and cultural center was Ile-Ife, who now make up the Yoruba people. The other group were the Berbels, who eventually formed the Hausa states and the Borno states. (This empire has a lot of interesting stories and legends attached to it. For instance, Oduduwa is considered the creator of the earth, and the ancestor of the Yoruba kings. According to myth, Oduduwa founded the city of Ife and dispatched his sons to establish other cities, where they reigned as priest-kings and presided over cult rituals.)

THE BENIN EMPIRE was also powerful, and stretched to reach some of current-day Ghana. It was very well known for its African sculpturing. In the 1800s, the British started to reside in parts of these kingdoms and empires. In 1914, Nigeria was formed by combining the Northern and Southern Protectorates and the Colony of Lagos. For administrative purposes, was divided into four units:

- The Colony of Lagos
- The Northern Provinces
- The Eastern Provinces
- The Western Provinces

Some parts of current-day Cameroon were still considered part of Nigeria at that time.

Inconsistencies in British policy reinforced cleavages based on regional animosities by attempting simultaneously to preserve the indigenous cultures of each area and to introduce modern technology and Western political and social concepts. In the north, appeals to Islamic legitimacy upheld the rule of the emirs, so that nationalist sentiments there were decidedly anti-Western. Modern nationalists in the south, whose thinking was shaped by European ideas, opposed indirect rule, which had entrenched what was considered to be an anachronistic ruling class in power and shut out the Westernized elite.

Nigeria is usually characterised as a deeply divided state in which major political issues are vigorously some would say violently contested along the lines of the complex ethnic, religious, and regional divisions in the country (cf. Smyth and Robinson 2001). The issues that generate the fiercest contestation include those that are considered fundamental to the

existence and legitimacy of the state, over which competing groups tend to adopt exclusionary, winner-take-all strategies. These include the control of state power, resource allocation, and citizenship. As a consequence, deeply divided states tend to be fragile and unstable because almost by definition, there are fewer points of convergence and consensus among the constituent groups than are required to effectively mitigate or contain the centrifugal forces that tear the society apart.

A lot of the literature analysing the failure of the Nigerian project has traced the crisis of democracy and the causes of ethno-religious conflicts to misrule by the three regionally based elites Hausa-Fulani, Yoruba and Igbo (WAZOBIA in Nigerian language parlance). The argument is that this elite has devised effective methods for subjugating the minorities to their hegemonic hold. Some of the most vociferous critics of these oligarchies are the intellectuals from the Middle Belt who complain about the hegemonic stranglehold of the Hausa-Fulani elite over them. The usual arguments are:

- 1) The political problem of Northern Nigeria is that the majority Hausa-Fulani ruling class has maintained its hegemonic hold over the ethnic minorities of the Middle Belt.
- 2) In so doing, it has used effective administrative structures to maintain this hegemony.
- 3) The effect of this history of domination is that the people of the Middle Belt have been deprived of access to political power and they have been constantly threatened with the violation of their religious rights by attempts to impose Islam and the Shariah on them.

Similar arguments have been made concerning the ruling oligarchies of the other two majority groups. Analysts and pundits continue to make these arguments although they describe a reality that has significantly changed over the years. Since the creation of states in 1967, the structural basis for political domination by the majority groups has been eroded and multiple power elites from both majority and minority groups have been jostling for power using numerous and constantly changing ethno-religious combinations. In the process, a new reality has emerged in which former minorities are emerging as new majority groups. Indeed, a more accurate depiction of the current political situation is that we are

witnessing the subjugation of minorities by other larger minorities who have become 'majorities':

(1) The process of state creation has produced new majority groups out of former minority groups who have created new patterns of hegemonies over their smaller neighbours. The category of subjugation then becomes that of 'marginal minorities';

(2) This process has created a mentality that favours the constant search for hegemonic possibilities among dominated minorities who seek to transform themselves into majorities' vis-à-vis their 'marginal minority' neighbours.

This new reality can be presented in the form of three theses about Nigeria's political trajectory:

(1) The categories majority/minority is fluid and constantly changing. Nigeria is a country in which constantly changing minorities have been the majority of the population and their numbers as distinct groups are increasing while their population sizes are reducing;

(2) The character of the Nigerian state and society is such that there is a constant attempt by emerging majorities to suppress created minorities and throw them further into the margins;

(3) This process of a fissiparous tendency in the creation of political and administrative units is multiplying rather than reducing the problem of political domination.

This reading of transformations in the ethnic equation has serious consequences for the Nigerian project. It represents a call for a more analytical approach rather than a focus on discrete ethnic groups in understanding the country's political trajectory and the process of conflict generation.

## **Northern Nigeria and the Emergence of Restiveness and Violence**

To better deal with conflicts in northern Nigeria, it is vital to understand the histories of the region's ethnic and religious communities. In particular the "centre-periphery" model of the Sokoto Caliphate has had a profound impact on Community relations and debates on the position of

religion in the region's politics. The region has experienced recurrent violent conflicts, particularly since the early 1980s. These are the product of several complex and inter-locking factors, including a volatile mix of historical grievances, political manipulation, ethnic and religious rivalries. However, the region has historically shown much capacity for peaceful coexistence between its ethnic and religious communities. Local conflicts are sometimes taken to represent the whole of northern Nigerian society, particularly by outside observers, which is far from the case. Traditions of peaceful coexistence show that conflict is not inevitable, and the right mix of social and political measures can alleviate the risks. The most prominent conflicts have been between Muslims and Christians. Adherents of these religions generally live peacefully together in many parts of the region. But longexisting tensions, especially between Pentecostal Christians and Islamic groups, were aggravated by the reintroduction of Sharia and came to a head in Kaduna, where hundreds if not thousands of people were killed in February and March 2000. There have also been conflicts between opposing Islamic sects; between anti-establishment Islamic groups and the Nigerian state; and between long established indigenous communities and the most recent "settler" groups. The latter conflicts, fuelled by competition for communally-distributed public resources, are common across the country.

## **Causes of Conflict from an Economic Perspective**

The economic transformations of the 1970s and 1980s had far-reaching impacts on economic and social relations in the region. As the national economy shifted from agriculture to heavy dependence on oil, services and importation of finished products, cash-crop production, which had been the region's mainstay, declined. For instance, across the cotton-producing states (eleven of the thirteen are in the far north), the decline of cotton production led to mass closures in the textile sector, collapse of rural economies, massive unemployment and increased rural-urban migration. Kano, once the centre of a thriving textile industry, has been particularly badly hit and now has acres of disused factory space. The federal government's Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP),

inaugurated in 1986, and other economic policies through the 1990s, including import liberalisation and lack of protection for local industries, aggravated agricultural ruin and rural impoverishment. The acute dearth of electrical energy continually impedes industrial development. Regional poverty, always widespread, became more severe. In July 2008, the then governor of the Central Bank of Nigeria, Chukwuma Soludo, observed that persistently high level of poverty in the country had become “a northern phenomenon”: of the ten states with the highest incidence of poverty, eight were in the far northern zone. Jigawa topped the list, with 95% of its people classified as living in poverty. A recent study found that as many as 76% of northerners are “earning daily income of less than the equivalent of one American dollar” 44% Unemployment for agricultural workers is often seasonal, leading to frequent movements of people and a fluid urban population 45%.

With virtually no modern industries, there is a high dependence on government as the sole source of improved livelihood and dispenser of patronage, intensifying the contest between ethnic and religious groups for control of public office. The region's economy is particularly affected by lack of skilled manpower. In terms of Western education, it still has the worst indicators in Nigeria, with high literacy, enrolment rates and success levels in national examinations decreasing as one advances farther north. Female literacy is as low as 21% in the north east and northwest. Under-funded by federal and state governments, dilapidated educational institutions are producing graduates who are virtually unemployable. A growing number of young people, unable to find jobs, face a bleak future. The troubles of the educational system are reflected in the region's Quranic schools. Many parents have long preferred such institutions, which include a moral content lacking in the Western-style public schools. In Kano state, for instance, over 80% of the 3.7 million persons between ages 5-21 years are estimated to attend some form of Islamic school, either exclusively or in addition to a state school.

Many of these neither live up to parents' moral expectations nor impart the skill necessary for developing the region. With urbanisation, more and more children are sent to schools far from their families, and millions of Almajiri children are required to beg for alms (almajiranchi) to

pay for their upkeep. While this system is ostensibly designed to prepare them for some of the hardships they may encounter later in life, in a context of urbanisation and increasing poverty, it is open to abuse and fosters criminality.

In cities like Kano and Kaduna, many of the alms-begging street children have graduated into Yandaba, adolescent groups that once served to socialise teenagers into adulthood but have now, in many cases, transformed into gangs. In 2005, the National Council for the Welfare of the Destitute estimated there were 7 million Almajiri children in northern Nigeria, mostly in the far northern states. In recent years however, there have been considerable efforts in some northern states to correct some of the failings of the Quranic schooling system, for example by introducing a dual curriculum (as in Kano) and paying the teachers' salaries, hence, in theory at least, relieving the pupils of the obligation to beg for their upkeep.

Since 1999, through the monthly federal allocations to its twelve states and numerous local governments, the region has attracted more federal revenue (in absolute terms) than any decade in its history, due largely to favourable oil prices. While many in the region had expected infrastructure to develop as a result, they have seen little benefit. Instead, economic stagnation is deepening. The general decline in agriculture and unfavourable international markets since the late 1980s has put an end to the groundnut and cotton products for which the region was once famous.

In the absence of foreign investments, and with domestic investments concentrated in the south, there are no new industries. The failure of rural economies has led to large-scale drift of youth from rural to urban areas, part of population movements that also include the arrival of many people from the landlocked and drought-affected countries to the north (Niger and Chad). This exodus has destabilised community life in villages, as many are now left mostly with the very young, the very old and the infirm. In the cities to which the youth are flocking, urbanisation has brought together people of diverse backgrounds. While this has generated much positive social interaction, the crowded environment, with little or no economic infrastructure or social amenities, also

produces frequent tensions. Most of the growing urban slums, as new settlements, lack both formal and informal authorities that can regulate public conduct, mediate conflicts and guarantee security. Tensions have been exacerbated by policies favouring indigenous groups. In all parts of Nigeria, those who can claim to be original inhabitants have a disproportionate share of public resources, an exclusive right to buy and sell land and various other privileges. This generates a huge number of disputes and often violent conflicts over competing claims, as well as over the validity of the “indigeneity certificates” issued by local government authorities, especially in the context of internal migrations.

## **Conflict Within Political Lines**

Independence in 1960 marked a fresh beginning in all parts of the country. The NPC, led by Sardauna Ahmadu Bello, ruled the Northern Region (one of three regions, the others being Western and Eastern) and was the dominant force in the coalition running the Nigerian federation. The first republic was characterised by squabbling and intense competition between regions. Northerners wished to enhance their influence relative to the more developed south and preserve their religious and cultural identity, inherited from the caliphate era but disrupted by colonial rule. Thus, the Sardauna and the NPC aimed both to unify the people of the region as a single bloc that would maintain a dominant influence on national affairs, restore the north's religious heritage and cultural identity. Proclaiming a principle of “One North, One Destiny”, Ahmadu Bello pursued a “northernisation” policy favouring northerners (of all religious persuasions) in employment in regional and local administrations.

This policy, which dated back to 1954, was informed by fears that migrants from the south, with the advantage of their Western education, would continue to establish themselves in the administration and economy. It “worked to replace non-northern employees in the regional and provincial civil services with northerners”. To achieve this, he introduced crash training programs to equip northern civil servants with skills to assume greater control of their government, at regional and federal levels.

This policy was designed to foster solidarity among all people across the region. Christian minority groups benefited from it very well due to their high involvement and participation in the activities of missionary schools, thus giving them a sense of belonging. Many people now see 1960s as a period of exceptional northern unity, when religious differences were minimised. However, the Sardauna did not undertake any major administrative reforms to respond to the long standing fears of the region's minorities and their demands for local autonomy from emirate rule. Instead, the suppression of the opposition parties that served as rallying points for the minority groups, such as the Middle Zone League (MZL) and subsequently the United Middle Belt Congress (UMBC), undermined the sense of regional unity that the ruling party and aristocracies were seeking to sustain. The second priority of Ahmadu Bello and northern leaders was to promote Islam, both as a unifying instrument and as a means of preserving the region's cultural identity.

In 1962, Bello established Jama'atu Nasril Islam (JNI, "Victory for Islam") as an umbrella body to unite the Muslim sects, propagate Islam and provide an ideological base for the NPC. However, in terms of forging Muslim unity, his efforts achieved limited results. Violent confrontations between adherents of rival Sufi orders continued. More successful were the campaigns intended to convert "pagan" minority groups to Islam. Supported by state resources and sometimes led by Bello himself, these led to the conversion of over 100,000 non-Muslims, particularly in Zaria and Niger provinces. Bello was also a frequent participant in collective pilgrimages to Mecca and used the networks of the region's Sufi orders to bolster his power. Predictably, these efforts at boosting the dar alIslam (House of Islam) drew strong support from the Muslim majority; but among non-Muslim minorities and Christian migrants from the south, Bello's campaign and his election as vice president of the World Muslim League in 1963 raised fears of Islamic hegemony. This alarm, whether reality or merely perception, affected community relations and contributed to the first military coup against the Northern Region-dominated federal government, in January 1966.

## Ethnic Perspective of Conflict in Northern Nigeria

The British conquest of the Sokoto Caliphate and of the area that later became Northern Nigeria has been narrowly seen by some commentators as a mere imposition of colonial domination on indigenous populations and, in some extreme cases, the replacement of one form of rule with another. Contemporary events and scholarship, however, draw attention to the wider implications of that conquest and especially to the spatial, cultural and political spaces it created that were contained or bounded in colonial imageries that very closely resemble the Bantu homelands of apartheid South Africa.<sup>5</sup> As with Bantustanization, a critical, if not *the* critical pillar of colonial power was the fragmentation of colonial people and their projection as discrete, separate and self-contained people governed by a 'native' rationality on the one hand and their centralization or unification as *colonized people*, sharing a common colonial rationality on the other.<sup>6</sup> Both were essential in fashioning out the new form of power: the one was critical in de-legitimizing, or at least mortally weakening the old pre-colonial order; the other in forming the basis of the selective reconstitution of colonially defined 'compatible people and groups.' This was the basis of the attempt at the redefinition of old and imposition of new cultural and spatial boundaries.<sup>7</sup>

In Northern Nigeria, the creation of bounded cultural and spatial areas 'homelands' began much earlier than the imposition of formal colonial conquest. It was manifest in the way some states were projected as self-bounded entities that had little or no relations between them. It is no surprise that the colonial interpretation of the history of the North and Nigerians at large went beyond tracing the genealogies of 'tribes' *the purpose of which was to enhance the surveillance capabilities of the colonial state.* It is on the basis of the spurious identification of such 'tribes' as 'natives' and on the limited understanding of their 'progress' (understood from the colonizer's standards of rationality) in social organisation that Nigerians were ranked. From this ranking emerged subordinates and super-ordinates: those that had fashioned out centralized social and political organisations at the time of colonial conquest were superior; others were considered subordinate. On this erroneous but powerful

footing that Nigerian carved village units, districts, divisions, and provinces, on these were specific 'customary' practices that formed the backbone of the colonial and postcolonial political and juridical systems.<sup>8</sup> Together with the violence with which the whole area was brought under British rule formed the first layer of the colonial state.

However, the production and reproduction of bounded spatial and cultural areas required another layer which requires the unification and *re*-presentation of the various 'homelands' as one homogeneous unit against another imagined and separate larger unit (the unification of the people, states and societies in this part of the country and their reconstitution as "*Northern Nigeria*" versus another imagined and separate unit "*Southern Nigeria*" is a classic example, a divide that exists in various forms throughout the colonial world). Such 'homelands' were further constituted into larger units until they formed regions which faced each other as essentially *different entities*, much in the same way the 'homelands' faced each other as different entities within the regions.

Scholars have indeed drawn attention to how these processes work especially in the past before independence.<sup>9</sup> In this case, 'Northern Nigeria' was constituted by at least two imaginaries: an internal imaginary whose main purpose was the reproduction of 'homelands' through specific political and juridical mechanisms, only to *re*-present them as 'one' within a larger colonially constructed territorial structure. Externally however, this 'united' colonially constructed structure is pitted against a larger entity, in this case 'Southern Nigeria' which serves to reinforce the structure and the underlying power it supports. Thus in the first instance, 'homelands' faced each other as 'enemies' within regions; in the second such 'homelands' were bound together in the face of a common 'external enemy.' Internally, 'Munshi' (Tiv), Kadera, Hausa, Jukun, Sayawa and Kataf (Atyap) and so many other cultural groups faced each other as 'enemies' in their colonially imposed separateness, in much the same way, for example, as Igbo, Urhobo, Ijaw and Itsekiri face each other in the East. To these separate homelands is counterpoised a larger 'united' imaginary region supposedly without *internal differences* as in, for example, a Northern versus a Southern Nigeria. The underlying

assumption all the while, internally and externally, is an implicit ranking or classification of the colonised: civilisation versus barbarity, progress *versus* backwardness, and rationality *versus* nativity.

These colonial imageries are not merely abstract constructs; they possess a concrete materiality reproduced through colonial schools, customary laws, administrative and spatial maps, as well as in the strengthening of specific pre-colonial forms of power.<sup>10</sup>

There are mechanisms, structures, and identities that support them. These include how British policy on non-emirate areas insisted on developing and administering them along some form of emirate rule. Thus, in administering these territories, the twin mechanisms of fragmentation and centralisation were deployed throughout northern Nigeria.

However, these newly constituted communities had to be supported by new discourses and ideologies of power that formed not just the basis of new identities. In certain cases, they heightened the range and expanded the dynamics of existing conflicts while at the same time constituting a source of new conflicts. The communities that arose from the new territorial and administrative demarcations required different forms of inter-group relations. While Caliphal authority extended to, and was exercised on some of its non-Muslim neighbours on trust, the imposition of colonial territoriality effectively foreclosed this option, replacing it with colonial domination.<sup>11</sup> These new communities and identities reflected a specific pattern of rule imposed by colonialism: the selective fragmentation of states, peoples and social categories into smaller administrative and social units, the excision of some other areas that were part of the states and empires conquered, or the internal re-mapping of territorial and political boundaries. The selective expansion and contraction of the territorial, social and political spaces and boundaries (internal and external) were but one aspect of this general trend. Thus creating emirate-type settings where the emirate system was non-existent, slicing areas under the control of certain emirates and merging them with others, or imposing certain cultural groups that have historically been struggling for dominance over rivals became some of the major mechanisms through which colonialism reorganised pre-colonial

territorial, political and social spaces. This was the basis of colonial power, and of the geography of most of the conflicts in contemporary northern Nigeria. A graphic demonstration of the operation of this form of power is to be seen in the first major regional reorganisation of northern Nigeria that took place in 1925.

Many scholars have drawn attention to the relationship between mapping, territory and the exercise of power. Mapping and territorialisation classify, and on this basis create identities and images of membership and belonging, establish communities, enable the collection of taxation, impose juridical and other forms of control, and effectively delineate the boundaries, identity, power, and strength of a specific state.<sup>12</sup> The reorganisation of the territories of the northern part of Nigeria was integral to the formation and exercise of colonial power. Territorial reorganisation or mapping was both the cause and effect of the fragmentation and reorganisation of pre-colonial peoples, states and empires. Yet at the same time, it represented and pitted these separate identities as homogeneous entities against one another across the colonial world and in Nigeria in particular. In northern Nigeria, the manifestation of these could be seen since the beginning of colonial contact, but more graphically as from 1925. The process of differentiation could be seen in the way colonialism constructed differences such that as late as 1958, the Willink Commission could observe a separate and bounded 'system' different from any other:

*In the northern region, to-day, this Islamic society has its home in the great Islamic Emirates of the northern part of the region and extends in various degrees towards the south and east. There is the faith and the law of Islam; there is a tribal grouping, the combination of the Fulani, the Hausa, the Nupe and the Kanuri, all formerly ruling tribes, most of whom have long been adherents of Islam; there is the Hausa Language, widely used as a lingua franca; there is a system of administration based on the Emir and a feudal pyramid below him all these elements fusing to make what may be called the Northern System (my emphasis).<sup>13</sup>*

This Northern System, and therefore an exclusively northern identity, is a colonial construction. Notice that this 'system' has excluded over 200

other cultural groups within the geographical area in question. The construction of both the system and its supporting identity went hand in hand with conquest, for the record of the imposition of formal colonial rule demonstrates an administrative pattern based on ethnic and other divisions. The creation of administrative units across northern Nigeria followed this pattern throughout the colonial period and beyond. In the early phases of colonial rule, this pattern initially took the form of territorial and administrative mappings and the imposition of pro-British chiefs and emirs, or the deposition of anti-colonial chiefs. In the case of territorial and administrative mappings, peoples and societies defined as 'rebellious' or that 'lacked civilisation' were carved out and placed under greater scrutiny or merged with those that had more centralised political systems. Thus, the Idoma were in general seen as 'ungovernable' and at the lower rungs of civilisation which informed the specific administrative mechanisms deployed by the British in Idomaland.<sup>14</sup> This pattern of administrative, spatial and cultural differentiation continued from 1900 up until 1924.<sup>15</sup> From the mid 1920s this process became more organised and intensified.

Towards the end of 1925 the colonial state began a major regional reorganisation of a greater depth beyond what had been attempted thus far. The plan for reorganisation was contained in a proposal from the then Lieutenant Governor of the Northern Region to the Secretary of Colonies.<sup>16</sup> This reorganisation affected Kano, Bornu, Bauchi, Plateau, Yola, Munshi (Benue), Kabba, Zaria and Niger provinces. Katsina and Katagum divisions were excised from the Kano Province, leaving the Kano emirate with two divisions Kano itself and another consisting of Hadejia, Gumel, Kazaure and Daura emirates. Excised from Kano, Katagum division was merged with Bauchi province. The Muri province that included mandated areas in the Cameroons was partitioned, a large chunk of which was then merged with the Yola province. The Ibi division that was part of the reconstituted Muri province, the Lafia emirate and the Keffi division of the Nassarawa province were brought under the Munshi province. With this measure, Nassarawa province ceased to exist. Similarly, the Shendam division in the Muri province was merged with the Plateau province.<sup>17</sup> Finally the Idah division of the Munshi province

was merged with the Kabba province. These were the major territorial reorganisations.

The state kept making minor reorganisations and adjustments within this period and beyond. Some of these included the re-transfer of the Shani "enclave" from the Shelleng division of the Yola province to the Biu division of the Bornu province; the re-transfer of the Gwani "enclave" from the Akko district of the Gombe division in Bauchi province to the Tera district of the Biu division in Bornu province; the transfer of Wase from the Shendam division of the Muri province to the Bauchi emirate of the Bauchi province as a separate district under the emir of Bauchi; and the transfer of the Kentu district of the Cameroons' Southern province to a newly created Gashaka division of the Yola province.

Besides the territorial and administrative reorganisation of 1925, there were other minor (re)adjustments and (re)transfers throughout the colonial period.<sup>18</sup> These changes represented concrete mechanisms in the formation of colonial power. The reasons underlying this reorganisation are revealing including: the provision of a better administrative and communications coverage, particularly for Kano province; the recognition of Yola as the centre of Adamawa and the restoration, as far as possible, of its former (i.e. pre-colonial) importance; the disintegration for economical reasons of the Muri Province (since "Ibi has long ceased to have any political importance, if indeed it ever possessed any"); the elimination and partition for economical reasons of the Nassarawa Province; the improved administration of the Bauchi Province, greater facilities of communication, improved boundaries and the elimination of discordant elements; to unite as far as possible tribes speaking the same language and using the same customs; and to improve economic facilities in the Katsina-Zaria cotton growing areas.<sup>19</sup>

On this basis, the administrative structure of the region moved downwards from the central government in Lagos, to the regional government at Kaduna, and then down through provincial, divisional, and district administration. This command structure fully utilised the pre-colonial governmental structures of the caliphate and relied on emirs and the emirate government to subordinate and control the peasantry. Through these structures was organised cheap labour on colonial

projects, cash crop production targets, labour in the mines, in addition to unpaid for services and goods requisitioned by emirs and the emirate administration.

## **The Reorganisation of the Jarawa**

Besides the overall territorial and cultural reorganisation of the Northern Regions, the deployment of this pattern of rule could also be seen in respect of specific communities and peoples. One of such reorganisations was that of the Jarawa community located in both Bauchi and Plateau Provinces. Many of such instances have been discussed in some of the conflicts across Nigeria such as those in the Southern parts of Kaduna<sup>20</sup> and those in the present day-Taraba, Adamawa and Benue States.<sup>21</sup> The reorganisation of the 'Hill Jarawa' of Toro District in the Bauchi emirate that began in 1949 was one of the most interesting.

The Jarawa as earlier alluded to, were spread in settlements in the western half part of the Toro District in Bauchi Province. Through migration, some of them came to settle in small villages in Jama'a and Lere Districts, and in the 'Dass Independent District' down to Bula, Zungur and Duguri Districts. The immediate 'problem' that necessitated their reorganisation was an incident on 15 October 1949 in which the then District Head of Toro lost their confidence. Thereafter they threatened to bypass the District Head and pay their tax directly to the Emir of Bauchi as well as demanding the immediate appointment of their own Chief. The confidential report of 27 October to the Secretary, Northern Provinces, by the Resident, Bauchi Province, states "the Hill Jarawa have continued intransigent about the immediate appointment of a Chief of their tribe and the payment of tax direct to the Emir instead of to the District Head, Toro." Neither of these could have been allowed by the colonial administration since, the Resident continued, "the even larger block of Sayawa nearby might learn from the Hill Jarawa the lesson that intransigence pays".<sup>22</sup>

The subsequent reorganisation of the Jarawa was far-reaching. It included the abolishing of the Toro district as constituted after the advent of British rule. Toro and Tilden Fulani villages were amalgamated with Lame district under the *Sarkin Yaki* of Bauchi. What remained of the old Toro district formed the new Jama'a district that included Zaranda and

Rimin Zayam which were excised from the former Lame district. This is closely followed by the reappointment of the *Santuraki*, former District Head of Fali, as the District Head of Jama'a, and the appointment of *Sarkin Kudu* as the District Head of Fali. As in previous re-organisations, these too created new tensions and conflicts between groups. In addition, they further strengthened the structures of power colonialism was then establishing by reinforcing the processes of the fragmentation of these societies. °

## **The Jukun-Tiv Conflict**

Although the Jukun-Tiv conflict is found in many of the states in the Middle Belt Region, the specific conflict of interest considered here is that in the Wukari Local Government Area of Taraba state. There is scanty evidence of the nature of Jukun-Tiv relations in pre-colonial times besides indications that relations were fairly cordial until the advent of colonial rule. There is however, little doubt as to the impact of colonization, for by 1906 the process of othering characteristic of colonization had begun manifesting in Tiv-Jukun relations. This became increasingly obvious in the creation of difference through a deliberate construction of culturally bounded and distinct areas termed 'Jukun' and 'Munshi' spheres by British colonial officials. By 1918, J. M. Freemantle further deepened this process by ejecting and destroying the houses and farms of all Tiv who had for years settled to the east of the Wukari-Akwana road, ordering them to return to their 'own' Munshi sphere.<sup>23</sup> In furtherance of this policy, Richard Palmer pushed for the entrenchment of the imaginary colonial boundary between the Tiv and Jukun in 1923 which sought to promote Jukun dominance over the Tiv with the wry comment, in reference to the Tiv decentralised political system, that "it was useless to preserve a governing caste unless it had something to govern."

This policy was vigorously pursued so much so that by the mid to late 1950s, intergroup relations between the major cultural components of the Wukari division were determined in the main by this policy. But by then, population movements and pressures on farmland had influenced migratory pressures in the Middle Belt region in such a way that there was

a radical re-composition of the demography of the division. Thus, by 1946 the Tiv constituted about 37% (40,400) of its population; the Kuteb 19% (20,284); the Jukun 10% (867); the Ichen 6% (6,775); the Hausa 5% (5,287) and the Chamba 4% (4, 500).<sup>25</sup> These have continued to influence the conflicts and crises in the area throughout the colonial period and in recent times.

## **Religious Perspective Of Conflict In Northern Nigeria**

The majority of Nigeria's Muslims are Sunni, estimated at 95 per cent, and belong to the Qadiriyya and Tijaniyya Sufi orders. These orders are represented by a number of organisations that have been important actors in the region. Jama'atu Nasril Islam (JNI), based in Kaduna and established in 1961, is the largest umbrella Islamic organisation in the country,<sup>26</sup> supporting a network of activists across the region. It is closely associated with the Nigerian Supreme Council for Islamic Affairs (NSCIA), headed by the Sultan of Sokoto, and with the Supreme Council for Sharia in Nigeria. A small but growing Shiite minority is estimated at just less than 5 per cent of the Muslim population, though in some cases the label Shiite refers as much to a radical political attitude, and particularly admiration for the Iranian revolution, as to doctrinal differences.

Due to the high concentration of Muslims, as well as historical ties with the Arab world, the dominant world view in northern Nigeria is pan-Islamic. Much thought is given by the population to its place in the global Islamic community. Most Muslims in the region have a strong sense of solidarity with co-religionists' causes, from Iraq to Afghanistan.<sup>27</sup>

There is wide support for Arab positions on Israel and the Palestinian demand for a state. Links between Muslims in the region and the wider Islamic world date back to early trade and missionary activities. They have been reinforced by Nigeria's solidarity with the Arab world on several international issues, its membership of the OIC and numerous pilgrimage visits to Saudi Arabia. Equally, Islamic education and scholarship, which confers considerable status, is often associated with time spent at a centre of Islamic learning abroad. Much informed discussion takes place about the political systems of Islamic countries.

Violence in northern Nigeria has flared up periodically over the last 30 years. Mainly in the form of urban riots, it has pitted Muslims against Christians and has seen confrontations between different Islamic sects. Although there have been some successes in conflict management in the last decade, the 2009 and 2010 troubles in Bauchi, Borno and Yobe states involving the radical Boko Haram sect show that violence still may flare up at any moment. If the situation were to deteriorate significantly, especially on Christian-Muslim lines, it could have serious repercussions for national cohesion and the nation's sovereignty.

The aftermath of the elections in April 2011 has proved a lot of analysis by experts on the fate of the Nigeria state. To deal with the risks, community-level initiatives need to be reinforced, a more subtle security response should be formulated and the management of public resources improved. While some in the West panic at what they see as growing Islamic radicalism in the region, the roots of the problem are more complex and lie in Nigeria's history and contemporary politics. Just as the Muslim community has created bodies to support its interest, so have Christians, the most prominent being the Christian Association of Nigeria (CAN), formed in 1976. This is an umbrella organisation with a strong national network, representing the common concerns of all churches nationwide. CAN and its members engage in a variety of different roles, in many cases reaching out to Muslim organisations and doing grassroots peacebuilding. However, in the mid-1980s, the CAN started to take a more militant and political stance. It has since become more active in contentious issues, such as planning permission for churches. In many ways it now buys into a simplistic vision of "them" and "us", for example by actively monitoring the religious balance in government appointments. It portrays itself as the defender of a besieged Christian community against an increasingly dominant Islam, often within a framework of a call for moral "revival". This reflects a wider belief among Christians in the north that they are under threat from militant Islam.

## **Conclusion**

Communal or religiously-motivated violence in the far north has to some degree abated in the last ten years. The possible causes for this vary from

place to place. Peacebuilding strategies of state governors and civil society groups have likely played a role. It is also possible that the return to civilian rule and a very imperfect form of democracy led political and religious actors to use violence in an early game of positioning that has settled over time. However, there are clearly on-going risks. These span the range of different conflict types identified in this report. Few of the underlying causes described in the preceding section have been properly dealt with.

At a minimum, the region faces the prospect of periodic outbursts of violence. If the situation were to deteriorate significantly, especially on Muslim-Christian lines, it could further undermine Nigeria's fragile nation-building project, particularly to the extent that events in the north are read in the south as having a direct negative impact on relations between the country's communities. There is little doubt that the imposition of the colonial state radically altered inter-group relations in Nigeria. Such power then and now is reproduced through the fragmentation of peoples and communities into separate entities bearing different identities and then their forced unification into colonially constructed spatial and cultural boundaries. On the basis of this fragmentation, discourses, ideologies and practices of power through schools, laws, symbolic representations and policy decisions that serve to produce and reproduce group boundaries are established. Such identities span a wide range of issues and may be related, though not necessarily limited to ethnicity, religion and cultural essentialism. At the same time, these were unified into larger units that constituted regions so that so many separate homelands formed a colonial imagery of 'Northern' 'Southern', 'Western' or 'Eastern' Nigeria. Conflict is embedded in the processes of the reproduction of such power itself. The reproduction of such form of power is itself problematic, particularly in the current context of heightened global expansion of capital. From all indications, the reproduction of this form of power is indispensable to the continued existence of the post-colonial state as currently constituted. Therefore, an escalation and intensification of these types of conflicts is most likely in the near future.

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# The Causes of Youth Restiveness and Violence in Northern Nigeria

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## Introduction

Nigeria is said to have hit a hundred and sixty million in population as at October 2011. In 2006, the youth cohort was said to constitute 34 percent (45.4 million). Recently, records show that it constitutes 40 percent of the nation's total population. The country also houses over 250 different ethnic groups. Heterogeneous characteristics could either make or mar this population, depending on their choice to respond to the challenges therein. Many people have used this character to justify the incessant unrest in the nation which should not be a basis for inter group conflict and violence. All human societies have had to deal with one form of conflict or the other whether developed or underdeveloped, it doesn't matter the race or colour, nor religious background, ethnicity and any other aspects of human culture. In the normal day-to-day interaction of individuals there is an acceptable level of conflict which is said to help members of society to understand themselves and learn to cope with one another's strengths and weaknesses as they cohabit; but where conflicts deteriorates to the level of wanton destruction of lives and properties, this calls for concern and a striking level of alarm. Peaceful coexistence is a plight of any well-meaning citizen, leader and member of any society, young or old, and no matter the stakes.

The northern part of the Nigeria has dealt with religious, ethnic, and socio-political conflicts dates back the pre-colonial era. The youths have remained at the fore front of these conflicts; seen at the battle front, carrying out the 'most' despicable of all offences- eliminating lives and destroying properties worth millions of naira. It used to be considered the less developed, socially, economically and educationally, in comparison with the Eastern, Western and Southern parts. But the situation is gradually changing and improving by the day.

According to The National Youth Development Policy (2001), a Youth is any person within the age of 18 to 35 (cited in Anasi, 2010). Youth is the part of life that succeeds childhood; the period of existence preceding maturity or the whole part of life from infancy to manhood. Youth Restiveness has been defined by Elegbeleye (2005) as:

*A sustained protestation embarked upon to enforce desired outcome from a constituted authority by an organised body of youths.*

Violence, according to Encarta Dictionary, is “*the use of physical force to attack, or injure another person or damage something.*” There exist two levels of any crisis, especially those that eventually turn violent: The 'Remote cause' which is often the main reason for the outburst, while the 'immediate cause' is the incidents that spark up response to the remote cause. The latter is, in most cases, inconsequential and flimsy. Although often times people tend to focus more on the immediate rather than the remote cause, which ideally, should call for concern. This paper will lay focus on the remote causes of violence in northern Nigeria.

## **Historical Overview**

Youth restiveness is a societal peril that dates back the pre-colonial era. The northern part of the country has witnessed various forms of ethno-religious and socio-political crises and in every case the pawns, as in a chess game, are the youths.

*Some of the conflicts that have ensued in the country have remote origins in the patterns of pre-colonial migration, conquest, and control. For example, the contemporary ethno-religious turbulence in Kaduna state, including the February-May 2002 Sharia mayhem, can be traced back to the mid-nineteenth century when Kaduna's southern*

*non-Muslim communities were raided, enslaved and eventually inequitably incorporated into the emirate structure by the Hausa-Fulani Muslims (Kazah-Toure 1995, cited in Osaghae and Suberu 2005).*

These conflicts exhibit different expressions with different quarters pursuing a course, which in some cases is twisted, either by the group itself or others. 1970s, recorded a number of youth unrest that began in universities by the students in the region. Most of which was in a bid for improved living conditions and justice. This has led to several deaths recorded and numerous injuries. Their grievances are usually attended to after all the damages made.

Osaghae and Suberu (2005) explained that youth identities have grown in importance over the last two decades, partly due to the strategic roles they play in the democratization struggles, and the expansion of political space. Some emergent youth identities, however, is rooted in ethnicity and communalism, having emerged from redress-seeking struggles by aggrieved groups. This is evident in the activities of new militant youth groups like the Odua Peoples' Congress, the Arewa Peoples' Congress, the Ijaw Youth Council, the Egbesu Boys of Africa, the Niger Delta Peoples Volunteer Force, the Bakassi Boys, the Movement for the Actualisation of the Sovereign State of Biafra, the Hisba or Sharia Vigilante groups in the Muslim north, and the militias of the Tiv, Jukun and other ethnic groups in Nigeria's many conflict zones (pg13, CRISE Working Paper No. 6). The most recent of these groups being Boko Haram (meaning 'Western education is sinful'), which has attracted national and international attention. According to Osaghae and Suberu (2005):

*This militarization of Nigerian youth culture has been promoted significantly by widespread socio-economic frustration and alienation (including relatively high levels of youth unemployment and underemployment); the legacy of state repression and impunity since 1984; and the sheer failure or inability of the national police and security agencies to fulfil their basic obligations to maintain law and order or protect lives and properties. (Pg13, CRISE Working Paper No.6).*

It can be asserted that youth restiveness is not an eccentric

phenomenon. Its recent popularisation is as a result of the purely violent expression it assumes. The call for concern, on one hand is whether violent methods and expressions are the best way to let their grievances known to the state or explore dialogue and non-violent protest for peace for the long awaited peace to reign in the country. Nigeria's leaders, those who are at corridors of power should urgently attend to the plight of the common man. This is by responding more swiftly to non-violent protests; rather than wait until damages including loss of lives and properties have been annihilated, then heat the polity in search of support and fight perpetrators as though they were external enemies.

## **Theoretical Framework**

Youth Restiveness can be classified as deviant behaviour, since the actors would usually go against the acceptable norms and laws of the land in order to be heard. There has been wide range of explanations by scholars on the motivation for violence. Although they have had to deal with criticisms from other quarters, which are typical of theoretical perspective; this paper focuses on two major perspectives.

The first is the Psychological Elucidation, where John Bowlby in his book titled *Forty four Juvenile Thieves* published in 1946 maintained that deviance can be explained in terms of a child's early socialisation. Children are in need of emotional security during the first seven years of their lives. "This could be provided most effectively by close, intimate and loving relationship with their natural mother. " where the child is denied such level of interaction, especially in the early years of life, they could grow up to become psychopathic in personality. They tend to act impulsively with little regard for the consequences of their actions. He believed that this group of people suffer from chronic recidivists and that most of them do not grow up in an intimate relationship with a mother and his environment. (Haralambos and Holborn, 2000)

Sigmund Freud, on another note, attributed destructive behaviour among people *to a death instinct that occasionally becomes dominant and results in violent behaviour rather than death. To an orthodox Freudian, protests and demonstrations become attributable to uncontrolled death wish.* (Cited in Ujo, 1994: pg. 64-5)

According to Freud (1973) the personality consists of three parts, the id, the ego and the super ego. The id contains biological urges (e.g. sex drive, desire for food and water, desire to keep warm). The ego is a conscious part of the mind which makes decisions. Sometimes it is able to restrain the desires of the id because it has learnt that the unrestrained pursuit of pleasure can lead to problems. For example, pursuing sexual pleasure without restraint might lead to danger and punishment. The super-ego consists of the conscience which develops as a result of socialisation. It is partly unconscious and it restricts the unrestrained pursuit of pleasure by producing feelings of guilt in people who want to do things that they have learnt to believe are wrong (Haralambus and Holborn, 2000: pg. 351-2).

By implication, can it be asserted that the super-ego of youths who engage in violent behaviours is not developed or properly developed? If the feeling of guilt does not exist to suppress even the thoughts of violent behaviour, there is a shift from normal behaviour (as defined by the society) resulting from improper socialisation. The consequences of this flaw do not only affect those involved or their immediate environment, it becomes broad-based and leads to the destruction of lives and property, as experienced in some parts of northern Nigeria.

The second is the Structural Functionalists' perspective, where the proponents view society as a system; a set of interconnected parts which together form a whole. This discussion focuses on the views of two of its proponents as put forward by Haralambos and Holborn (2000).

Robert K. Merton argued that deviance results not from 'pathological personalities' but from culture and structure of society. According to Hughes et al (1999) antisocial behaviour generated, when a society extols common symbols of success for the entire population, while structurally restricting the access of large number of people to the approved means for acquiring these symbols.

Merton (1968) identifies five responses to the success goals; (i) *Conformity*- this is common in a society in which people accept cultural goal of material success by means of accepted channels. (ii) *Innovation*- where members of society hold fast the culturally emphasised goals of success, but because the institutionalised means to achieve the goals are not available, they pursue their goals in innovative ways. Possibly through

deviant means like prostitution, drugs, embezzlement, theft and robbery, extortion, violence. *iii) Ritualism*- this involves losing touch with success goals while abiding compulsively by the institutionalised means. For example, the end of the organisation becomes irrelevant for many zealous bureaucrats. Instead, they cultivate the means for their own sake making a fetish of regulations and boundaries. *iv) Retreatism*- in this case, individuals reject the cultural goals and the institutionalised means without replacing new norms. For instance, drug addicts, alcoholics, have dropped out of society and as Hughes (1999) puts it, 'they are in society but not of it'. Such people are easily lured to crime and criminal activities; including killing of human beings because of lack of value and disrespect for the dignity of human person, *(v) Rebellion*- they reject both the cultural goals and the institutionalised means and substitute new norms for them. Such withdraws their loyalty and allegiance from existing social arrangements and transfer them to new groups with new ideologies. Radical social movements like Boko Haram in northern Nigeria, is a typical example of this adaptation.

Talcot Parsons: He viewed society as a system and argued that the social system has four basic functional prerequisites which can be seen as problems that society must solve if it is to survive. Solutions to the four survival problems must be institutionalised (so as to persist through time) if society is to continue in existence.

*(i) Adaptation*- Relationship between a system and its environment. Social systems should have a degree of control over their environment, in order to survive at least; food and shelter should be made available, meeting physical needs. Economy has a role to play.

*(ii) Goal Attainment*- The need for all societies to set goal through which social activities are directed. The procedures for establishing goals and deciding on priorities between goals are institutionalised in the form of political systems. Government not only set goals but allocate resources to achieve them.

*(iii) Integration*- The adjustment of conflict from the coordination and mutual adjustment of parts of the social system. The law meets this need

legal norms define and standardise relations between individuals and between institutions, and so reduce the potential for conflict and where conflict does arise the judicial system settles it to avoid the disintegration of the social system.

(iv) **Pattern Maintenance**- The maintenance of basic pattern of values, institutionalised in the society. The family, educational system and religion are responsible here. In Parson's opinion, the values of society are rooted in religion that provides the ultimate justification for the values of the social system. Going by Parsons View, the Nigerian society should maintain a moving equilibrium (embracing social change) in achieving the four prerequisites; but in a system where there is crack in the functions of social systems, little wonder the social disorder and lawlessness.

## **The Grounds for Youth Restiveness in Northern Nigeria**

The reason for and intensity (as perceived by perpetrators) of any form of protest is usually the deciding factor of its form of expression. Little actions could spark up highly destructive strife but the focus here is the remote causes of youth unrest and violence.

According to Anasi (2010) several factors can be identified, but she spelt out three major ones as revealed by Elegbeleye (2005):

- The peer motivated excitement of being a student;
- The jingoistic pursuit of patriotic ideas; and
- Perceived victimisation arising from economic exploitation.

A study in the Niger Delta region by Ofem and Ajayi (2008) brought out the reasons for ceaseless youth restiveness to include:

- Lack of humanitarian and social welfare;
- Poor governance;
- Corrupt practices by government officials;
- Inadequate recreational facilities;
- Lack of quality education;
- Poverty;
- Unemployment.

Other key causes in Ogba ()'s view are;

- Youthful exuberance;

- Marginalisation;
- Availability and accessibility of drugs on streets;
- Disgruntled leaders, elders and politicians recruit youths, to use them against perceived enemies, from this, they become uncontrollable.

The list could go on and on, as it affects various regions of the nation, over a relentless period of time. In northern Nigeria, the causal factors are hydra-headed and mostly embedded in the system. It draws from the lapses of the entire system, and makes every individual in the region both victims and perpetrators of the menace.

**The Breakdown of Value System:** In the past, children born were socialised by the family, community and other agents of socialisation, social control was also maintained in this pattern and before a youth misbehaves- defying the norms of the society, they have had to weigh and make sure they were up to the consequences. There was no doubt that all misconduct had a penalty that will always be served, no matter the personality and socio-economic background of the offender. This ordeal served as deterrence for the younger ones and any other person contemplating the breach of norms and mores. Every member of the community stayed alert and notices any misbehaviour whether gross or in the most minute sense. There are clearly spelt out order of reporting questionable behaviour or any grievances there might be, every member had this knowledge and is also aware of the outcome of any form of disobedience. Mothers were significant in the socialisation of children, who grow in warmly close relationship with them also guiding them diligently.

Such principles helped maintained social order and the slightest form of protest kept every member of the community edgy. Theodore Roosevelt once said "To educate a person in mind and not in morals is to educate a menace to society."

Today, as society grows increasingly complex, this phenomenon is almost extinct, children scarcely learn the norms of their environment, and with their parents, there is increasing preference for foreign lifestyles, the feminist movement pushed women away from the home-front and offenders rarely or never face the consequences of their action. There is a

cultural anarchy, where indigenous culture is mixed with foreign culture, plus individuals' personal choices and the parameter to weigh right and wrong have become controversial and confused. These give room for all forms of deviant behaviours.

**Poor Education and Illiteracy:** A significant population of those educated in northern Nigeria gained knowledge through a system of education achieved through "thinking within the box". It was John Dewey who once said "True learning is based on discovery guided by mentoring rather than the transmission of knowledge."

So many youths have grown to believe that they are expected to only be like their teachers and the teachers will not, in many cases accept creativity from their students. They insist on a particular pattern and present it to their students as hard-and-fast expecting the same or similar idea in return during evaluation. Meanwhile if there is a need for adaptability as social change emerges, there should be room for adjustments of processes. The educational system lacks modern day innovations particularly within the technological world, knowledge is dynamic, and the sector will only thrive if it accepts change.

Emphasis has been on conventional education which is obtained through a rigorous process. They fight hard to cope while some others fail, the society has not provided employment and basic social amenities for the common good of all at such they are easily lured in crime and deviant behaviours like violence, prostitution, drugs, alcoholism and other social vices.

**Social Injustice:** Nepotism, poor governance, lack of respect for human rights and rule of law discourages youths and force them into deviant behaviours. Some youths pass through tempestuous situations in order to achieve success in life. They become stuck at some point and later raise their heads to observe what's going on at the top, in a bid to adjust properly and face the challenges ahead only to discover that a small group of people who control resources, enrich themselves overnight and where they agree to step aside for the younger generation to take over or work towards bettering their lives, opportunities are left in the hands of few leading to dissatisfaction and grievances.

**Migration and Settlement:** Some parts of northern Nigeria have experienced territorial disputes which the youths are usually at the forefront. Territorial conflicts in the region are caused by the belief that some people are natives of some parts of northern Nigeria while others are migrants'. The underlying factor and bone of contention is the fear of domination which brought about hostility and intolerance of others resulting in violence perpetrated by aggrieved youths in the affected communities.

**Socio-Economic Collapse:** Poverty, unemployment/ under-employment and lack of basic infrastructural facilities. The level of corruption in the country further compounded the problem leaving in the hearts of aggrieved youths doubt that their grievances and interest is being taken care off. Living under poverty, several Nigerians wake up daily without any idea of how their daily bread will be provided. Youths graduate from tertiary institutions in their thousands attain the mandatory one year national service and return home waiting for long without employment. With the exception of a few whose parents are in high places, some that are employed are dissatisfied with the nature of their work, going home daily humiliated, frustrated and exploited. The form of education acquire by youths today provide them with little or no preparation for the real life after graduation. For instance, there are many universities and polytechnic graduates who cannot write well. Some youths who have the zeal and skill for entrepreneurs do not have access to capital to enable them start up.

**Religious Extremism:** Every human being has a right to religion as enshrined in the 1999 constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, and should not for any reason whatsoever be forced on any religion. Religion plays a major role in social movements; a typical African carries along religion where ever they go. Many would give their lives to promote and protect their religion whether (Traditional, Islam or Christianity). The religions that exist in the north make emphasis on value and dignity of the human person. If youths are so ardent in service to God, whom they honour and respect where do they learn killing of fellow human beings from? If they can allow themselves to be deeply indoctrinated, making them sensitive to religious teachings, why do they get involved in

abominable violent practices of such? Where exactly does religious extremism, with violent expression stem from?

**Substance Abuse:** The abuse of prescribed and/or un-prescribed drugs has become a serious trend among youths in northern Nigeria. From alcohol to illegal drugs like Indian-hem, heroin, marijuana, cocaine and legal drugs like nicotine, morphine, cough syrup, pain killers, gutter and gum, have been added to the long list of abused drugs. These could lead to physical and psychological dependence and may cause damage to the heart, liver, kidney and brain. It may also lead to violent behaviour as the thought process of young people is altered under the influence. Drug abuse is a contributory factor to why youths engage in relentless violent conflicts in northern Nigeria. For instance the mayhem caused by youths during the Jos Crisis was as a result of this factor.

## Conclusion

The damages done by youth restiveness and violence in northern Nigeria are unquantifiable and incomparable with the grievances of these youths against the government. Cases of children, less privileged and others who lost their lives in the cause of these conflicts remain unforgettable in the hearts of their families and love ones. Failure to identify and prosecute the perpetrators in a competent law of jurisdiction adds to their pain in a judicial process whose integrity is questionable. The difficulty to forgive will linger for a long time and may lead to reprisal attacks to the former causing more damages and vicious cycle of the problem.

*Why should we repeatedly place our right hands on our chest, taking the oath, I pledge to Nigeria my country, to be faithful, loyal and honest, to serve Nigeria with all my strength and uphold her honour and glory even asking God for help, if we do not seek to redress?*

We cannot pretend or deny the reality on ground that is embedded in our heterogeneous nature, but as Sir Ahmadu Bello once said:

*“Let us understand our differences, so that we can tolerate one another and learn to live in peace and unity. It is only through tolerance and sincerity that we can learn to forgive and gradually rebuild trust, so that together we can hold hands to build our dear nation thus fulfilling*

*the dreams of our fallen heroes, those who fought selflessly and with their blood struggled to found the nation we now occupy and today call Nigeria”.*

## **Recommendations**

The following recommendations were proffered by the writer in urgently responding to the problem of youth restiveness and violence in the north for a better Nigeria:

- i. Nigerians should learn to respect boundaries and tolerate one another as nature has provided differences that should spice up life and unite, rather than divide and destroy. Let us accept our differences and turn them into strengths for a better Nigeria;
- ii. Government should address the issues of poverty, unemployment and basic structure more squarely;
- iii. Religious leaders are responsible for the general well-being of their followers; thus they should ensure that the youths who sit under their teaching are properly guided to understand their doctrines clearly and follow them correctly;
- iv. The nations educational lapses should be addressed immediately and like holding the bull by the horn, teachers, lecturers and all those who impact knowledge should employ the mentorship method to help and instil in younger generation good practices that have evolved within the sector over time, discover innovative ways of inculcating fear and respect for the dignity of human person in them and moral teachings integrated in school modules from primary to tertiary institution;
- v. Although growth and development of the nation is the plight of Nigerians, however, there are parts of our culture that we do not have to dump in the bid for civilisation; those that fit into the modern world should remain;
- vi. Agents of socialisation should identify those aspects and institutionalise them in day to day life, so as to build moral bedrock;
- vii. Laws against substance abuse should be enforced by government; vendors of abused substances should be prosecuted;
- viii. Awareness creation should be intensified on the dangers of drug

abuse and efforts made at restructuring rehabilitation homes. They should be empowered to meet the increasing demand that would enable victims of drug abuse access help easily;

ix. Nigerian leaders should be sensitive to non-violent protests, tolerate them and respond swiftly to peaceful demonstration of youths. They should be sincere in preventing and reducing the prevalence of conflict caused by youths in Nigeria.

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# State Response to Youth Restiveness in Nigeria

By DCP Femi Oyeleye  
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## Introduction

It was Alhaji Maitama Sule, the *Dan Masani* of Kano, in his address at the occasion of commissioning of operational vehicles for security agency in Kano State recently, who stated that “*people cannot be ruled by force or by fear or by power but through their minds and then ever before they can be conquered by their spirit*”.

The wisdom of this quotation presupposes that a group of people, association, state or Nation can only exist peacefully together when they have a common destiny, goal, dream, aspiration, wishes, desire and will. All of which are premised on tradition, values, norms, laws, codes, conduct, behaviours, rules and regulations.

Domestic order, peace and security are essential elements not only for good governance, but also enables each law abiding citizen go about his or her normal business on a daily basis in pursuit of his daily bread, and vocation or professional calling. But the fact that there are individuals and gangs that tend to negate this fundamental tenet of social life makes it necessary for each independent state to establish and maintain an organised body of men and women for the maintenance of public order, prevention and detection of crime, prosecution of offenders and enforcement of laws and regulations of the land. This organised body which is usually civil in character is called the police (Force). In Nigeria, the police have been charged with the specific tasks of:

- a) Protection of life and property.
- b) Prevention, detection and combating of crime.
- c) Apprehension of offenders
- d) Preservation of law and order.
- e) Enforcement of laws and regulations with which is charged.
- f) Preservation of the peace of the nation.
- g) Safeguarding the rights and freedoms of individuals
- h) Performance of such military duties in and outside Nigeria as may be required of it.

One of the most critical challenges of any modern nation is the creation of peace, stability and security. The realisation of peace and security is a basic concern of every well meaning person. This is because peace and security are the fundamental issue for the survival of the human person. It is only in a secured atmosphere that individuals can engage in productive activities. A safe and secure environment nurtured by political stability is essential for progress. A secured state is one that is able to protect and develop itself unhindered and promote its core values, meet the needs of its people and provide them with the required atmosphere for their self development.

It is the duty of any good government to ensure the security of lives and property of its citizens. The constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 S. 14 (1) (b) provides that “The security and welfare of the people shall be the primary purpose of government”.

However, while it is the duty of the state to provide adequate security and welfare for the people, the citizens also have a constitutional responsibility to respect their own dignity and the rights and legitimate interest of others, live in unity and harmony and in the spirit of common brotherhood render assistance to appropriate and lawful agencies in the maintenance of law and order. See Section. 24 (e) of the 1999 Constitution. One of the organs of government charged with the responsibility of maintenance of law and order is the Nigerian Police Force. It is the oldest and principal law enforcement agency of the nation and is close to 80 years of existence metamorphosed into an organisation on which the nation depends for her unity and cohesion. It plays the role of crime prevention

and crises management organ, apart from investigating offences and prosecuting offenders for the overall purpose of maintaining domestic peace. It is a civil force, the hub of Nigeria national civil life and the legal means of societal behavioral control. The police have a professional approach of controlling the behavior pattern of members of the public whenever they are restless. It is titled crowd control methodology.

### **Appraisal on State Response to Youth Restiveness in Nigeria**

Youth restiveness is responded to by government through the intervention of security agencies, principally the police, the Army and the State Security Service agencies. Let us review state response to the problem in some developed countries. The city of London recently was on fire when the youths went on rampage. Initially the Police were called to restore law and order which resulted in the death of a black citizen. Thereafter the fire caught up with other cities in United Kingdom and the state had to deploy not less than 16,000 thousand Policemen to quench the fire. Within 24 hours sanity was restored and a scientific study of the situation by the British government revealed the following:

1. That the principal cause of the youth restiveness was classical demonstration of a broken society;
2. That there are many children without homes;
3. Schools without discipline;
4. Reward without effort;
5. Crime without punishment;
6. Rights without responsibility;
7. Communities without control.

The recommendation of the panel of Enquiry was that the **'Family Test'** should be applied to Domestic government policy. Also recently in the United States of America, a group of youths took over the Wall Street Park and camped there for over 4 weeks protesting the Stock Exchange Policy of government. The Police were called in and the operation only took 6 hours to complete in the middle of the night. The outcome was that the communities and other stake holders endorsed the police action to checkmate the excesses of the youths.

Equally for close to 10 months now the Arab spring protesters have succeeded in uprooting the age long monarchies in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya and we are still counting. The difference is that these have been achieved with loss of lives and property. Extreme uses of force and violence have been displayed with the consequences that will take millions of Dollars and time to repair.

A careful appraisal of the Nigeria problems reminds one of the Indian statesmen, humanist and philosopher, 'Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi (1969-1948) where he stated that there were seven blunders of the modern world. These include:

- a. Politics without principles.
- b. Knowledge without character.
- c. Pleasure without conscience.
- d. Wealth without work.
- e. Commerce without morality
- f. Science without Humanity
- g. Worship without Sacrifice.

To these his grandson Arum Gandhi added "Rights without Responsibilities".

## **Recommendations**

It is indeed very certain that Nigeria will benefit a great deal from adopting a comprehensive policy on Police community partnership. It can be standard weapon of choice against cultism in our higher institutions, ethic militias' anointer ethnic quarrels and communal crises involving people of different religious, juvenile delinquency and other social ills. Police community partnership underscores one of the most neglected principles of policing, "that the police are the public and the public are the police". The only difference of course is that the Police are "paid for the services the render which are incumbent on every citizen in the interest of community welfare and existence.

Since domestic security is the concern of all, I believe the time has come for certain categories of citizens, corporate and business bodies to be mobilised to contribute to the growth, development and transformation of the Nigeria Police for the good of all. After all an American soldier who

served in Iraq and Afghanistan relayed his experience thus “It is true that winning peace is much more difficult task than winning war, and more than ever before it is equally true that some victories are actually costlier than defeat”.

We cannot sever ourselves from the global democratic environment and norms nor shy away from our statutory duties of protection of lives and properties (human rights inclusive) hence, our open hand of fellowship and cooperation with all stake holders to ensure absolute and effective preservation of rule of law and the fundamental human rights of every citizen. Without the public cooperation with the law enforcement agencies, in properly securing Nigeria, there can be no law and order. As Robert McNamara right observed as it concerned the military:

*Military Force can help provide law and order, but only to the degree that a basis for law and order already exist. A basic willingness on the part of the people to cooperate. The law and order is the shield behind which the central fact of security and development can be achieved.*

For Nigerians to be secure therefore, they must be saved from criminal, political and religious violence including ethnic/tribal, state sponsored and sectarian violence etc), they must be free as a people, their environment must be clean and there has to be development in all directions.

Security is a matter that concerns all citizens, associations, groups and business community. It is not meant for government and the law enforcement agents alone. It is unfortunate that the latter impression has been made in people’s mind since the colonial times, but there has to be new thinking today. As Robert McNaneral, the former World Bank President, noted.

*Security is not military hardware, though it may include it. Security is not military force, though, it may involve it. Security is not traditional military activity, though it may encompass it. Security is development upon which the progress of a nation is measured. He added that as development progresses, security progresses.*

Thank you and God bless Nigeria.

# **The Role of Religion in Peacemaking - Christian Perspective**

**By Rev. Balafre Deshi**

**I**n recent years in the country, tens of thousands of Christians and Muslims have been killed in violent conflicts. The country's Plateau State has been particularly hard hit. In Yelwa-Nshar, in the Shendam local government area, almost 1,000 individuals were killed within a month alone, provoking reprisals in both Kano State and South-Eastern States.

Many factors are important in this conflict, including ethnicity, economic differentials, land ownership, migratory patterns and political power. At the same time, substantial tension between Muslim and Christian faith communities has contributed to the violence, and the conflict has often been characterised as a religious one.

## **Interfaith Dialogue**

Faith communities have made substantial contributions to peace. For over a decade, a community based evangelical pastor, James Wuye, and a Imam, Mohammed Ashafa, have contributed immensely to peace-building efforts throughout Nigeria. In 2004, they brought together for the first time key leaders from the Muslim and Christian communities in Yelwa-Nshar.

In intense, emotional meetings, they used a combination of interfaith dialogue and conflict resolution techniques to promote reconciliation.

Their work resulted in a peace agreement between the two communities that has been supported by the governor of Plateau State and celebrated by people throughout the region. With peaceful interactive sessions and meetings, Wuye and Ashafa took their peace project to the city of Jos, the Plateau State capital, where a similar peace accord was reached and signed. Their work continues till date.

## **Religion and Peacemaking throughout the World**

These two examples show how faith-based conflict resolution efforts have played out and helped to bring peace in two of the world's most difficult conflict zones, one on a local level and the other on a national level. There are many roles that faith-based communities can and do play in conflict resolution. Consider the following:

- A mosque in Virginia, USA, has been spray-painted with hate-inspired slogans, such as "terrorists" and "Islam is evil." The imam gathers the congregation for Friday prayers. A local newspaper carries the story on the front page.

How might the community respond to this, especially Christian and Jewish religious groups?

- Following the Israeli-Arab war in 1948 and the establishment of the State of Israel, Palestinians living in towns around Haifa and Tel Aviv were forced to move to refugee camps on the West Bank and Gaza. Their homes were either destroyed or taken over by Jewish immigrants who had fled the Holocaust and persecution in other countries.

How might the intense, lasting bitterness between Israeli Jews and both Muslim and Christian Palestinians be overcome?

- In Mozambique an extremely brutal civil war was waged for decades between the ruling FRELIMO party and the rebel RENAMO. The conflict resulted in tens of thousands deaths and severe casualties.

In the face of this history can there be any chance for peace, reconciliation and the building of a single, unified country? Is there a role for faith-based groups to play in achieving this reconciliation?

○ In Iraq following the overthrow of Saddam Hussein and the rise of insurgency movements, long-standing rivalries between Sunni and Shi'a sects have spawned a bloody struggle for power and influence. There is a heavy toll in civilian casualties in Baghdad and throughout the country.

How can the vicious circle of violence be broken? How could the religious communities help in realising this?

These examples are very real. Some are relatively small in scope; others have convulsed entire countries and regions of the world. Some have been resolved; others continue to rage.

These conflicts may have to do with economic and political power, with real and perceived injustices, or with disagreements over land, water, energy sources, and the like. But all these conflicts have religious element, if only because religion frequently provides the ultimate source of group's identity and reason for being. Religious leaders can play a significant role in advancing the cause of peace and conflict resolution.

## **Perspectives**

There are two aspects to religious peacemaking; one is where religion is a source of conflict and so it's particularly incumbent upon religious communities and leaders to play a role in addressing the conflict. But even in those situations, almost universally, where a conflict is perceived to be caused by religion it's usually not the case. Religion may be a surrogate for other factors; whether it's ethnic conflict, and the ethnic divisions may overlap with the religious divisions; whether it's that one religious group is better off economically and there is resentment against that group; whether it's in places in Africa where it's conflict between pastoralists and settled agriculturalists and the pastoralists may be Muslims and the agriculturalists may be Christians. Religion may be used as a means of mobilizing a movement against the other group, but it's very frequently that is motivating the conflict or what lies behind the conflict. So, even where there is religious conflict, it is much more than religious conflict or religion is much less a driving force than is often thought to be the case.

But the other role that religion can play in peacemaking is where religion is not a source of conflict. South Africa is a good example here, where in the struggle against apartheid, it was religious leaders

(particularly in the black community, in the African community but also in the white community, among some liberal whites) were at the forefront of nonviolent protest, of pushing for change, of trying to break the conscience (the Christian conscience) of those who were underpinning the apartheid system. Or in the case that we have highlighted in this course, in Central America, where conflicts have not been religiously motivated, not divided along religious lines, but where religious leaders have played a part in bringing about peace. Mozambique is another good example in Africa where most of the population was Christian and it was Christians who played a role in bringing the civil war to an end in 1991. It wasn't a religious conflict, but religious organisations and religious leaders were at the forefront in bringing about peace in the country.

## **David Smock**

Interfaith dialogue has traditionally been viewed as work done by clerics when they have free time, on their spare time, to foster a dialogue between communities and get to know each other. Traditionally its been that way, especially in the west, the United States, Western Europe and some parts of Eastern Europe. Essentially it's a way communities move beyond superficial understanding of each other as well as understand each other's histories and concerns during conflict. We often think of interfaith dialogue as an avenue where communities get together in time of peace, but we find that it's very much needed in times of war and conflict, because that's when you need collaboration and cooperation between faith-based communities to understand their roles in "Early Warning System", "Conflict Resolution and Management". Interfaith dialogue is not necessarily about understanding each other's scripture during conflict but the provision of the different traditions about peace in all its ramifications?

Qamar-ul Huda although religion plays significant role during conflicts around the world, and the important role religious leaders play in promoting peace and peaceful coexistence recognised by all, gap still exist in clearly understanding the specific roles they are expected to play. It is pertinent to note that religious leaders have been marginalized from peace processes and negotiations particularly at the grassroots.

## Challenges and Opportunities

**Difficulties in Religion and Peacemaking:** It is clear that religious leaders can play important roles in peacemaking; this remains a daunting task particularly in delving into cases that involves religion extremists. There are substantial challenges in incorporating religion into peacemaking effort, several of which are listed below:

- (1) Religious doctrines and provisions are often perceived to be incompatible with one another;
- (2) Even when religion is not the primary cause of conflict, religious cleavages often reinforce or complicate other causes, such as ethnic-racial identities and/or economic-power differentials;
- (3) Religious institutions seriously exacerbate conflicts, especially in post conflict countries;
- (4) Some groups will not engage in interfaith dialogue, because they believe either that such encounter is unacceptable by their faith or hold animosity towards other faith groups;
- (5) Governments may frown at and be nervous about engaging with religious institutions in nation building and certain matters that requires their expertise and intervention;
- (6) Interfaith dialogue and other forms of religious peacemaking processes and programmes may open old wounds.

Those who would attempt to incorporate religion into peacemaking efforts are advised to proceed carefully. In the words of David Smock, —The depth of passion that accompanies interfaith dialogue and religious peacemaking also carries with it liabilities. Sharing at the deep level of religious conviction can generate resistance and defensiveness.

### **Opportunities in Religion and Peacemaking**

For all these challenges there are more reasons why religious leaders can be effective as emissaries for peace. Consider the following:

- (1) Interfaith dialogue and other forms of religious peacemaking may reveal that religion is not a primary cause of conflict, even if it has been

purported to be; (2) In most societies, there is a general expectation that religion can and should contribute to peacemaking, an expectation that have open doors for religious peacemakers; (3) In religious traditions, peacemaking is considered a sacred duty, and the peacemaker holds an exalted position. Appealing to these traditions, various methodologies, including interfaith dialogue and religiously inspired third-party efforts, have been developed to revolutionize conflict and advance reconciliation.

Religious leaders can be role models to this end;

(4) Religions often have pre-existing structures and processes to resolve conflict and promote peace. As Renee Garfinkel notes —Most religions are committed to working for justice and peace, and have well-established structures and processes for doing so. Religious traditions typically have guidelines and strategies embedded in prayers for reconciling relationships; these may apply across religious boundaries;

(5) Religious traditions and beliefs tend to encourage adherents to look beyond self-interest to a greater good, a tendency that can encourage conflicting parties to seek common ground;

(6) In some cases, different faiths or sects share sacred texts. For example, Islam, Judaism and Christianity share certain sacred texts, and the study of them can be particularly helpful in understanding and identifying shared values; (7) Interfaith dialogue carries with it the benefits of other types of dialogue, but as Smock states, it also has —the potential for deeper and more meaningful engagement because of the possibility for spiritual encounter. This in turn may enhance the participants' commitment to peace work and social change.

Progress made in interfaith dialogue can have implications in the wider society. In Smock's words, it is sometimes —more productive for religious leaders to consider emotionally divisive issues than for them to be debated in secular/political contexts. This may be particularly true in societies where there is an officially sanctioned faith commitment, even if the faiths themselves differ.

## Phases in Successful Interfaith Dialogue

Before we begin, we will provide some basic definitions relevant to our subject matter.

In this course, the term "religion" will be used to express the following dimensions of the religious phenomenon:

- Institutional, i.e., the teachings and activities of synagogues, churches, mosques and other places of worship;
- Experiential, i.e., the life of faith, the sense of transcendence, the role of confession, love and forgiveness;
- Metaphysical, i.e., the primordial structures of meaning that are common to human experience, expressed in myths, stories and rituals.

The following are the characteristics of conflict and principles of conflict resolution:

●●At the heart of every conflict, justice is brought to fore because of the feeling that some people have been wronged, dealt with unfairly, discriminated against, violated, or denied of their legitimate rights;

●●Conflicts at every level involve people. Whether we are dealing with ideological or geo-political conflicts, with disagreements over territory or with diverging ethnic, religious or racial claims, we are dealing with people, human beings with fears and anxieties, hopes and dreams;

●●Behind the slogans "positions and claims of every party involved in conflict there are interests and needs". The challenge is to discover what these interests and needs are and which ones might be shared by both sides in the conflict;

○Most violent conflict ends in a vicious cycle of recrimination, retribution and revenge. The cycle can be broken when one party is willing to admit its faults, genuinely embrace change and work towards the realisation of the agreements reached by parties in conflict for peacemaking. This is rare but when it does, a new dynamic can take place, one that is able to break the vicious cycle and heal wounded souls;

○For total healing of aggrieved persons, honesty about the root cause of

the conflicts must be ascertained and told by the parties in conflict. This is a daunting task because of fear of prosecution and other legal implications, but public disclosure of what happened in the past (facts) is a step in the right direction in peacemaking and reconstruction processes.

## **Laying the Ground Work**

**The Importance of Clear Goals and Objectives :** The foundation for interfaith project/dialogue must be strong for it to stand the test of time and last. In doing that the following factors must be considered for implementation: Setting of goals and objectives that the programme intends to achieve in short and long term. In general, the overarching goal of interfaith dialogue is having a clear understanding of those underlying issues causing the problem and reconciliation among the groups involved. Within this broad aim, interfaith dialogue can serve a wide range of purpose with specific objectives. A clear definition of purpose enables the facilitators better prepared for the programme; strategically design agenda that would meet the objectives of the project. Merely bringing different religious communities together to discuss the problems will rarely achieve tangible result.

**The Varieties of Interfaith Dialogue:** There are several types of interfaith dialogue, and it is critical for participants who are involved in this endeavour to distinguish the varieties of dialogue. In the words of Stanley Samartha, "Dialogue is part of the living relationship between people of different faiths and ideologies as they share in the life of the community."

He identifies four primary modalities of interfaith dialogue.

(1) **Dialogue of Life:** In this dialogue participants are more concerned with issues that pertain to daily living, common interests in the community and the common values that bind each of the participants. Participants want to explore how common values, such as education and civic responsibility, can bring a better understanding.

(2) **Dialogue of Action:** This dialogue involves a greater emphasis on social justice and the value of working together on a common project in order to make a contribution to the community. For instance, participants in the

dialogue for action model will collaborate together to fight poverty, homelessness, HIV/AIDS and poor health care. Participants in this dialogue assert that action against injustice is the strongest expression of faith.

(3) **Dialogue of Experience:** The dialogue of experience stresses how faithful people experience their faith on a daily basis. Participants in the dialogue are interested in the human expression and experiential aspect of a faith, and how an individual of another faith understands the holy in his or her life. There is a desire to understand a personal interpretation of faith instead of a textbook version of conviction.

(4) **Dialogue of Experts:** This dialogue is called the "experts dialogue" because it involves participants interested in theology and philosophy of the faith traditions. Participants will centre their dialogues in texts and doctrines, and the dialogue often reflects a process of mutual theological inquiry.

# **The Role of Youths in Restoring and Building Peace in Nigeria**

**By Mr. Yibis Sylvester**

Coordinator, Bauchi Human Rights Network

## **Introduction**

Some states are currently the main site of ethnic and religious violence in northern Nigeria. In the past some states within the region has witnessed recurrent crises particularly in the rural communities. Thousands of lives have been lost as a result of these violent conflicts, there has been extensive damages done including loss of human lives to property, and the development prospects of these states have been set back. The violence has mainly been along religious lines, between Muslims and Christians, but ethnicity also has a central role in the conflicts and there are considerable political interests at stake. Jos, Bauchi, Kaduna, Maiduguri, and Yobe states are some northern cities with a population of millions inhabitants, is the epicentre of much of the insecurity in northern State and has been the site of some of the worst of the violence. Episodes of mass killing and destruction have occurred in 2001, 2002, 2008, 2010 and 2011. The violence has also affected other parts of the states, in rural areas outside of Cities particularly in 2001-2 and 2011, when hundreds of people were killed in villages, in their fields, or while tending cattle. There have been massacres in the old settlements on the States, notably in 2001 and 2010.

In rural areas there has also been widespread violence between Berom farmers and Fulani pastoralists in plateau state, Sayawa and the Fulani in

Bauchi. This is generally framed as a conflict over land, but contrary to media reports, many of those involved tend not to think the conflict is about a struggle for grazing land or farmland. In some areas valuable dry-season farmland has changed hands, with Hausa and Fulani farmers being forced off the land (Blench, 2004).

Youth is that spark which needs no ignition, the clay which can be moulded in either shape one wants, or the backbone of any society. This is the sole reason for both exploitation and utilisation of youth in the destruction and construction of any nation respectively.

Youths has not been given chance to prove their potentials in peace building in Nigeria, according to Pearl S. Buck, (a Nobel Laureate in literature) “do not know enough to be prudent, and therefore attempts the impossible, and achieves it, generation after generation”.

Do we need motivational quotes like the one above to be reminded of our potentials and strategically work towards building peace in Nigeria? It's surprising however that, Nigerian youths have refused to show case their God given talents in nation's building and restoring peace in the country. This paper calls for a reflection of our responsibilities and collective efforts to ensure that peace is restored in Nigeria.

Poverty is the main reason why youths resort to restive activities but politicians and religious extremists has been found wanting in promoting and encouraging youth restiveness and violence in northern Nigeria. This Summit calls for sober reflection on the fundamental issues leading to the problem such as:

- Why is youth restiveness and violence common in northern Nigeria;
- What are the causes of the problem;
- Who are the perpetrators, their mission and vision statements;
- Who are the direct and indirect beneficiaries of their activities;
- What is the way forward in curbing the trends and pattern it has assume recently.

### **Durable Peace**

Durable Peace is the first phase on the curve. As its name implies, durable peace is lasting. Plotted over time, it is represented as a relatively long, flat

line. Lund explains, *Durable (or Warm) Peace involves a high level of reciprocity and cooperation, and the virtual absence of self-defense measures among parties, although it may include their military alliance against a common threat. A 'positive peace' prevails based on shared values, goals, and institutions (e.g. democratic political systems and rule of law), economic interdependence, and a sense of international community.*

### **Stable Peace**


The term Stable Peace describes a state of relations that is higher in its degree of tension than that of durable peace. As Lund explains, *Stable (or Cold) Peace is a relationship of wary communication and limited cooperation (e.g. trade) within an overall context of basic order or national stability. Value or goal differences exist and no military cooperation is established, but disputes are generally worked out in nonviolent, more or less predictable ways. The prospect for war is low.*

### **Unstable Peace**

If disputes remain unresolved and tensions continue to rise, the conflict may over time enter a phase known as Unstable Peace. Lund states, *unstable Peace is a situation in which tension and suspicion among parties run high, but violence is either absent or only sporadic. A 'negative peace' prevails because although armed force is not deployed [or employed], the parties perceive one another as enemies and maintain deterrent military capabilities. A balance of power may discourage aggression, but crisis and war are still possible.*

### **Peace Process**

The term "peace process" is sometimes used to suggest the complexity of this undertaking. John Darby uses the term to indicate "that the cycle of activities necessary to produce a just and lasting agreement stretches both backward and forward from the actual period of negotiations, and that the steps involved are not linear but often occur simultaneously and at different speeds." He notes that peacemaking tends to be a "protracted business" and that "negotiators must be committed to a sustained process."<sup>12</sup> It is easiest to understand the interlinking activities of Track I, II, and III leaders within the context of a peace process.



## The importance of Peace Process


Why so much focus on process? Not all negotiations will follow a series of steps as complex as those described by Saunders, but for maximum illustration, we have chosen to illustrate a highly detailed process in order to show users of this process the wide variety of roles that actors at different levels can play.

## Conflict Analysis

In conflict analysis, we presented the *Curve of Conflict*,<sup>4</sup> which shows how the use of force in violent conflict tends to rise and fall over time, how to recognise different phases of conflict, and how to characterise conflict management and peace-building efforts used in different phases.

Negotiation is

- A process of communication;
- Aimed at achieving specific goals
- Where parties in conflict undertake to work together to shape an outcome that meets their interests better than their best alternatives.



Negotiation is a principal tool used in conflict management and resolution. Negotiation can be used to prevent violence before it has taken hold (upward slope of the curve), to stop violence once it has begun (top of the curve), and to prevent its recurrence and create conditions for a lasting peace in the aftermath of violence (downward slope of the curve). In this course, we will discuss how the context for negotiation can vary depending on a conflict's phase.

In the conflict analysis course, we also introduced a framework to help dissect a conflict into fundamental component parts, including its *actors, issues, root causes, scope, resources, relationships, and history of peacemaking efforts*.<sup>5</sup> In this course, we'll show how each of these can affect and be affected by efforts at negotiation.

### **Mediation**

For all their efforts, negotiators often do not succeed. In some cases, primary actors won't even come to the table without the help of an actor who is not a party to the dispute. This is particularly true for the kind of existential conflicts previously described by Kelman, Saunders, Freeman and others.

This outside actor is often called a “mediator,” although mediation is just one type of intervention that may be appropriate; alternatively, the outside actor might play another role, such as conciliator, facilitator, arbitrator, etc. The general term for such an actor is “third party.” Third parties help disputants reach agreement when they cannot come to terms on their own. Many of the examples that we use in this course and many of the principles apply to them will come from negotiations that were conducted with the help of a third party. Our next course will focus specifically on how third parties can assist in negotiation and will draw substantially on elements from this. Mediation and other third party roles are often highly complex and require full separate treatment. First and foremost, though, a mediator must have a thorough grounding in the principles, processes, and best practices of effective negotiation.

## Purposes of Negotiation

**Long-Range Goals:** It's fair to ask how these skills will help you, particularly in the context of conflict management and peace-building. What kinds of aims, long- and short-range, will this help you achieve?

Depending on the subject of the negotiation, these aims will be defined in various ways. When focused on conflict management and peace-building, negotiators generally come to the table with a few broad goals in mind:

o**Preventing or Stopping Violence.** When a conflict escalates, negotiators try to prevent potential violence or stop actual violence, either through preventive or crisis diplomacy, often resulting in cease-fires or other rapidly negotiated agreements. When successful, such agreements are substantial accomplishments that immediately start saving lives. However, by themselves these agreements generally do not address the root causes that led to violence in the first place;

o**Advancing and protecting interests.** Thus, another motive for negotiators is to accomplish around a table what they might have otherwise tried to gain on the battlefield. In Kelman's words, “each party seeks to protect and promote its own interests by shaping the behaviour of

the other.” To illustrate, he describes U.S./Soviet relations during the Cold War, where for several decades negotiators for both sides angled to advance their various interests;

- Parties also negotiate to reduce their exposure to risk or to limit damage. The NPT described earlier is a good example of a treaty aimed at mutual risk reduction, in this case by enhancing overall international stability;

- **Building durable peace.** To the extent that negotiators are successful in advancing and protecting their interests by talking through problems, their efforts put them in position to build the kind of long-term durable peace that we described in our conflict analysis.

## Perspectives

The purpose of negotiation is to try to reduce differences between parties. If differences between parties are increasing, if, in the curve of conflict (which we address in the conflict analysis course) the conflict is moving up that curve on the left hand side, so that you might be going from the situation of unstable peace to one of crisis or even from crisis to war, that is clearly a time in which negotiation certainly needs to be considered and needs to move forward as fast as possible, if the differences are going to be resolved in a way which produces a peaceful outcome rather than a violent one.

That isn't to say that negotiation is guaranteed to succeed because obviously it is not. There's no guarantee a negotiation will succeed. Nor is it to say that any negotiated outcome is better than none. The negotiated outcome at the Munich conference in the 1930s was clearly a failure on its own terms. It did not bring peace in our time as was proclaimed, but negotiation can be tried. It has to be tried with a very cold-eyed and clear sense of what you're trying to achieve, what your objective is, and what you have to bring to bear, what leverage you have to bring to bear in the process. So, everyone will say it's the time for diplomacy when an agreement is necessarily going to produce the result that people hope for.

-Mike Lekson

Why are you negotiating? It's the first basic question you have to ask yourself. Can I achieve my goal without negotiation? Do I need something from the person I'm thinking about negotiating with? Do they have something that I want? Can they block me from getting something I need? Do I want them to legitimise something that I can achieve by myself but I want them to legitimise my getting it?

-Ted Feifer

**Tactical Objectives:** To accomplish these broad, general goals, negotiators may start with a range of more specific objectives:

- **Changing Attitudes and Behaviours.** Negotiation can help to change attitudes and behaviours, for example to break down false stereotypes.
- **Defining a Process.** Through the course of a negotiation, parties may at times focus on procedural achievements.
- **Jointly Solving Problems.** If negotiators are particularly insightful and creative, they will find ways of advancing interests that seem, at least at first, to be divergent or incompatible.
- **Building Relationships.** Joint problem solving usually helps improve the relationship between parties. Because an improved relationship can often lead to continuing achievements, this improvement can be as important as any single specific agreement.

## Conclusion

All hands are on deck and we must give peace a chance for any meaningful and sustainable development in the country. The Youth have an important but complementary role to play in peace building (see Orjuela, 2003). Much of their work, e.g., efforts to build peace constituencies and raise awareness of the roots of conflicts and need for resolution, bridge ethnic cleavages, lobby political leaders and the international community, as well as relief and development work in the war areas, has been made possible through foreign aid. But what can be done about the dilemmas

involved in the foreign support for such civic efforts; with the difficulties to define and support 'civil' actors, the unequal aid relationship and the risk of exacerbate conflicts within the recipient society? The dilemmas analysed in this article are relevant not only to the case of Nigeria, but is part of a global pattern of post-colonial relations between rich and powerful donor agencies and poorer governments, organisations and peoples. It is easy to see how donors, being in control of the money, are in charge of setting the agenda, designing the rules and initiating changes in the societies they intervene in. However, the power relations are not as simple as those of dominator and dominated. A multiplicity of interests is involved and make up the field of interaction.

## **Recommendations**

A review on the role of youth in restoring and building peace in Nigeria goes hand in hand with the Golden Rule which says "Treat others the way you would want to be treated". This is a common principle of different religions, indigenous cultures and secular philosophy, a fundamental principle that addresses and enhances mutual respect, human right, trust building, harmony and peaceful co-existence;

1. The youth, should be committed to the clamour for peace and non-violence and agree to work together to bring positive change in our personal lives, families, communities and country at large;
2. Youths should be deeply concerned about the religiously motivated violence in most parts of northern Nigeria which has led to several loss of lives and valuable properties and be committed to resolving the conflicts in the region;
3. Religious leaders in the region should be actively engaged with their followers in peace and reconciliation processes and work together to heal the wound in the hearts of people who have lost loved ones in the conflicts;
4. We call on stakeholders particularly elders, traditional leaders, the media and women of both faith (Muslims and Christians) to work actively

in the process of reconciliation, and peace building within the communities;

5. We also appeal to youths who transformed the religious motivated violence in their communities to peace and peaceful co-existence to share their rich experiences and good practices on the work of interfaith dialogue and mediation with their counterparts in the other part of northern Nigeria;

6. Well meaning Nigerian youths should stand firm and say no to violence, restiveness and other social decadence which has pervaded the country for decades now, have respect for our dear country, value system and dignity of the human person;

7. The Ministry of Education should reform the sector and integrate peace education in the educational curriculum from primary to tertiary institutions;

8. The youths in northern Nigeria should show good examples, act as agents of positive change in their communities and refrain from taking part in any violent action;

We pray for the vicious cycle of violence in the region to end immediately and for the wounds to heal, reconciliation to take place, followers of different religions to live together in harmony and a new chapter of peaceful- coexistence, and a culture of peace to prevail in northern Nigeria.

# Youth Restiveness and Violence in Northern Nigeria from the Islamic Perspective

By Mr. Mahmood Jammal

Rahama Women Development Programme, Bauchi state

## Background

Islam in northern Nigeria has a long history which dates back 16-17 century. Islam means peace in Arabic language, as the religion of peace, followers suppose to demonstrate practical example of peace and peaceful coexistence where ever they find themselves particularly in their relationship with people from other religions. The holy prophet Mohammed, may peace be upon him said that "the devil likes the young and dislikes those that are righteous.' That explains the power of the young minds.

The north in the last two decades has experienced a period characterised by violence, fighting, mayhem and killing of both the Muslims and Christians. The problem is common in Bauchi, Kano, Jos, Kaduna, Maiduguri and some other parts of northern Nigeria. It has been alleged that most of this violence has religious interests which in my opinion is wrong. Youths have been responsible and at the forefront of this problem. Religious issues can be complicated and tempered with in sensitive issues of this nature. Islam does not preach or encourage violence in any way, meaning that most of this violence is caused by personal motives: culturally, political or personal.

## Acting Together

On the final day, the two sides worked through all the remaining issues, either agreeing on a resolution or a process to find a resolution ultimately acceptable to both sides. They drafted a peace affirmation, which was subsequently shared with the two communities, an excerpt of which follows:

*Peace Affirmation In the name of God, the Almighty, Merciful and Compassionate, we the representatives of the Muslims and Christians of various ethnic nationalities in Shendam Local Government Area of Plateau State who have gathered here pray for true peace in our community and declare our commitment to ending the violence and bloodshed that deny the right to life and dignity.*

**Leadership:** *We the representatives of this community hereby acknowledge the paramount and ruler ship of His Royal Highness the Long Goemai of Shendam. We condemn the use of derogatory names to the paramount ruler by anybody within the community. We hereby resolve that His Royal Highness the Long Goemai of Shendam be addressed by his title and be acknowledged and respected as such. We acknowledge that lack of central leadership in Yelwa had contributed to the disharmony in the community. We resolve that the issue of chieftaincy of Yelwa be referred to Shendam traditional council for urgent steps to be taken, without prejudice to the accepted and approved method of the government.*

**Religion:** *We hereby affirm our belief and faith in the sanctity of all religious places of worship, whether it is Mosque, Church or Shrine. We condemn in strong terms the desecration of all places of worship, killings in the name of God, and call on all to refrain from incitement and exhibition of religious sentiments and or the instigation of such sentiments for selfish reasons.*

*We resolve to create an atmosphere where present and future generations will co-exist with mutual respect and trust in one another.*

*We pledge to educate our young ones to embrace the culture of respect for these values.*

***Ethnicity:*** *We acknowledge our ethnic and tribal diversity. We condemn in strong terms their negative application in our day-to-day life. We resolve that our ethnic and tribal diversity should be a source of our unity, strength and also a source for economic and social development.*

***Provocation:*** *We acknowledge the existence of the use of derogatory names toward each other in the past and condemn in strong terms its use now. We resolve to collectively respect and trust each other, and call upon all to refrain from this. We resolve to collectively respect and trust each other, and call upon all to refrain from the use of such derogatory names like 'Arna', 'Falak Muut', Jaap nhaat Yelwa, Gampang', etc. as perceived to be derogatory by groups concerned or affected. We resolve to refrain from the use of the media to cast aspersions and give incorrect and misleading information about our community. We call on the media to always cross check and balance information they publish in relation to our community.*

***Intimidation:*** *We acknowledge and condemn the unruly behaviour of our youth due to high rate of illiteracy, unemployment and their exploitation as thugs by politicians. We call upon all stakeholders, i.e. religious, community and political leaders, to put hands on deck to reverse this trend. We also resolve that the use of parallel markets in Yelwa-Nshar and the conversion of houses into market square in Yamini be referred to the local government council.*

***Injustice:*** *We acknowledge and condemn the conversion of residence and places of worship into markets and other uses. Having so observed we are appealing to the parties concerned to in the name of God vacate those places for their rightful owners.*

*Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs)/Missing Persons: We note with concern that some of our brothers and sisters are still at large having been displaced. We therefore appeal to the authorities to take adequate steps to ensure their return and necessary rehabilitation. We also resolve that a joint search committee be constituted between the local government council, the Shendam traditional council and the law enforcement agents for the search of the missing members of the community.*

## **Opportunities in Religion and Peacemaking**

In all these challenges there are even more reasons why religious leaders can be effective as emissaries for peace.

Consider the following:

- 1) Interfaith dialogue and other forms of religious peacemaking may reveal that religion is not a primary cause of conflict, even if it has been purported to be;
- 2) In most societies, there is a general expectation that religion can and should contribute to peacemaking, an expectation that often helps open doors for religious peacemakers.;
- 3) Within most religious traditions, peacemaking is considered a sacred duty, and the peacemaker holds an exalted position. Appealing to these traditions, various methodologies, including interfaith dialogue and religiously inspired third-party efforts, have been developed to ameliorate conflict and advance reconciliation. Religious leaders can be great role models;
- 4) Religions often have pre-existing structures and processes to resolve conflict and promote peace. As Renee Garfinkel notes, —Most religions are committed to working for justice and peace, and have well-established structures and processes for doing so.

## **Government Role in the Development of Northern Nigeria**

In view of the prevailing circumstances existing in our community, i.e. the non-functioning government structures and organisations like NITEL, Ministry of Agriculture (M.O.A.), Plateau Agricultural Development

Project (PADP), Water Board, electricity, schools and Primary Health Care (P.H.C.), we passionately call on the government to resuscitate these institutions as they were prior to the crises in the communities. We resolve to work collectively with the security agencies to maintain law and order in our communities.

## **Conflicts in Plateau State**

The worst of the violence has occurred in the country's Plateau State. Recent Christian-Muslim conflict in Plateau State occurred in Yelwa-Nshar, in the Shendam local government area, where nearly 1,000 were killed in May 2004. The killings in Yelwa-Nshar provoked reprisals in both Kano State and South-eastern State. To subdue the unrest in Plateau State, 25,000 soldiers and security personnel were deployed. The administrator of Plateau State convened a peace conference that resulted in recommendations for resolving the conflicts, but the Muslim community rejected them. As in other parts of Nigeria, to characterise these conflicts as Christians versus Muslims is partially accurate. Other sources of tension include land ownership and use, cattle rearing, and political power. Religious identities frequently overlap with identities of ethnic groups, local people (primarily Christian), and migrants (primarily Muslim). In addition, Muslims in Plateau State tend to be better off economically than Christians, generating class conflict. Yet as in other parts of Nigeria, even when religion is not the main cause of conflict, it is frequently used to incite one or both sides for violence to erupt.

## **Principles of Interfaith Dialogue**

While retaining its own unique characteristics, the product of years of experience, Pastor Wuye and Imam Ashafa's work with groups such as those at Yelwa-Nshar illustrates many principles of interfaith dialogue that we discussed in the previous chapter.

**Meeting Separately:** Wuye and Ashafa have developed a very effective technique of meeting separately with Christian and Muslim participants before bringing them together. In the separate sessions the participants

are able to talk in a more unrestrained manner without offending the other side. After expressing themselves, the participants are usually better prepared to listen to the other community rather than just make accusations.

**Learning about the "Other."** In some cases, facilitators of interfaith dialogues avoid history because it can be divisive; however, the opposite has been the case for the pastor and the imam. They quote with favour the first premier of northern Nigeria, Sir Ahmadu Bello, who addressed the first Nigerian president, Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe, as follows:

*Let us forget our differences. No, let us understand our differences. I am a Muslim and a Northerner. You are a Christian and an Easterner.*

*By understanding our differences, we can build unity in our country.*

In order to bring these differences into the open and test mutual perceptions for accuracy, Wuye and Ashafa typically ask the participants from their respective faith communities to articulate the perceptions that each faith group has of the other. They then offer perspectives to rebut negative stereotypes. They conclude: Many of these erroneous perceptions have been immediate causes of the various intra-religious and inter-religious conflicts that have culminated in devastating wars, threatening the very foundation of human existence.

**Sharing Sacred Texts.** The most remarkable feature of their process is the pastor's frequent quotes of the Qur'an and the imam's references to the Bible. Our society can change if we put in place all the basic amenities required, to keep the youth away from restiveness and violence, such as: schools, skills acquisition centres, factories for productivity and agriculture. Most of the violence is operated by out of school and jobless young persons, 75-80% of youths in northern Nigeria are jobless.

## Conclusion

Peace can be brought by creating an enabling environment for productivity, which is also advantageous for building the nation's economy.

# Findings of CLEEN Foundation 2011 National Crime Victimization Survey on Youth and Violence in Nigeria

By Chinedu Yves Nwagu

Manager, Accountability and Justice, CLEEN Foundation

## Introduction

**N**igeria, the most populous black nation in the world, is blessed with a teeming youth population. The term “Youth” has been described as the “quality of being young” and also refers to “young people considered as a group.” Of this enormous population of young people within the territorial boundaries of Nigeria, many if not most are marginalised, uneducated, and unemployed. Caught in the complex web of social disorder, economic disempowerment, political alienation, ethno-religious strife and the general corruption, decay and disconnect that characterises the relationship of the Nigeria state, its political class and the people, the Nigerian youth has had to grapple with many challenges as they seek to constructively engage the state and enjoy the basic benefits of being citizens of the federal republic of Nigeria.

The Nigeria Constitution clearly spells out that “the security and welfare of the people shall be the primary responsibility of government.” The youth form a majority of these Nigeria people and also deserve to be secured and provided for by the state. But reality is far from this. The decay in the educational system, leave most of the youth without marketable skill with which to seek gainful employment or create jobs for themselves. The economic system is also not conducive for entrepreneurship to thrive and systemic corruption creates more gaps

between the youth and state. These realities have produced a frustrated and sometimes disillusioned crop of young people who turn to violence as both an outlet for their frustrations and a means of survival. Perhaps, underscoring this on a broader theme, the African Youth Charter, in its preamble, noted

*with concern the situation of African youth, many of whom are marginalised from mainstream society through inequalities in income, wealth and power, unemployment and underemployment, infected and affected by HIV/AIDS pandemic, living in situations of poverty and hunger, experiencing illiteracy and poor quality educational system, restricted access to health services and to information, exposure to violence including gender violence, engaging in armed conflicts and experiencing various forms of discrimination.*

This paper seeks to examine the interaction between youth and violence in Nigeria based on the findings of the 2011 National Crime Victimization survey conducted by CLEEN Foundation. It also presents the perceptions of persons within this age category particularly in relation to violence, crime and security as captured in the survey. For the purpose of this paper, the term youth would be used to refer to persons between the ages of 18 and 35 years. This presentation is broken into four parts. Part one covers the general introduction. Part two provides information on the design and methodology used for the survey. The third part discusses the findings of the survey. The recommendation and conclusion is contained in the last part.

## **Research Design and Methodology**

The aim of the survey was to obtain information regarding the perception and views of Nigerians on the extent, trend and patterns of criminal victimisation in the country. The study was conducted in the 36 states of Nigeria and the Federal capital territory (FCT) Abuja, between June and July 2011. A total of 11,518 respondents were interviewed for this survey, with a gender balance of 50% male and 50% female of 18 years and above. The methodology deployed for the data collection was the in-home, face to face personal interview, using a stratified multi-stage random selection

procedure in order to achieve a national representative sample. The field interviews were conducted by Practical Sampling International, a reputable social research company based in Lagos.

## **Findings of the Survey**

The key findings of the survey are highlighted and discussed here particularly in relation to household related crimes, personal victimisation, where the violence/crime occurred, fear of crime and perceptions of safety and elections related violence.

### ***Household Related Crimes***

The first line of findings from the survey sought to gather data about the level of crime and violence young people are exposed to in their respective households. The data covered those crimes suffered by members of their households other than themselves. The crimes and incidents of violence covered under this include murder, attempted murder, robbery, rape, attempted rape, theft of car, theft of motorcycle, domestic violence, forced same sex intercourse, physical assault, mobile phone/GSM theft and burglary.

The survey findings show that only 1% of the youth confirmed having knowledge of any incident of murder or attempted murder suffered by any member of their household whereas 2% of older persons (36 years and above) responded in the affirmative regarding these two crimes. However, about 7% of the youth reported to have seen incidents of robbery suffered by family members. This was in consonant with other age grades except persons 51years and above that reported a slightly higher figure of 9%.

Incidences of rape against family members were also reported by only 1% of almost all the age brackets including the youth. However, persons between 31-35 years reported a slightly higher figure of 2%. Incidents of attempted rape also stood at 1% but at 2% for persons between the ages of 18-30 years. 2% of the youth also reported incidents of forced same sex intercourse suffered by members of their household.

Issues of domestic violence against household members were

witnessed by 14% of the youth. Also another 11% of the Youth reported that members of their households had suffered physical assault. 22% reported loss of household member's mobile phone to theft while 9% reported on incidents of burglary suffered by members of their household. 2% of respondents both youth and elderly reported having knowledge of incidents of car theft and 4% of motorcycle theft.

**Table 1: Summary of Findings of Youth Perception of Household Related Crimes**

Household Related Crimes Reportedly suffered by household members of Youths	Frequency /Percentage	Comparison/Comments
Murder	1%	2% for ages 36 and above
Attempted Murder	1%	2% for ages 36 and above
Robbery	7%	However, 9% in 51 years plus
Rape	1%	However, 2% in 31-35 years
Attempted Rape	2%	More prevalent between ages of 18-30
Theft of car	2%	Same thing across the age brackets
Theft of Motorcycle	4%	5% by 36-40 and 3% by 31-35 years
Domestic Violence	14%	15% between ages 36-40 and decreases from ages 41 onwards
Forced Same sex intercourse	2%	1% in 41-50 years bracket
Physical assault	11%	Higher at 12% between 36-40 and lower at 9% between 41-50
Mobile Phone/GSM theft	22%	Between 18-24 reported 24%, whereas between 34-40 years recorded 19%
Burglary	9%	Between 25-30 years reported 10%

### **Personal Victimisation**

The second set of survey questions addressed the personal encounters and experiences of young persons with crime and violence. It also covered the same broad range of crimes as highlighted above. From our survey, youth reported having been victims of crime slightly above the average adult. For instance, in response to the question "Have you been a victim of

any type of crime during the year?" 24% of the youth answered in the affirmative as opposed to 23% of persons 35 years and above.

The findings show that 2% of the youth had been victims of attempted murder and 12% had also been victims of one form of robbery. 6% of the youth reported to have survived attempted robbery while the statistics for theft of car stands at 2% and motorcycle at 5%. On the question of rape, only about 1% admitted to having been raped while 2% reported to having suffered attempted rape. Another 3% reported to have suffered forced same sex intercourse.

The figures for the youth that admitted having suffered domestic violence was 21% and 20% said they have suffered physical assault. However, victims of theft of mobile phones threw up the highest figure at 52% whereas those who suffered had suffered some form of burglary (breaking and entering) were 14%. These statistics, as shown in the table 2 below and when compared to table 1 above, evidence that more youths are more likely to be personal victims of violence and crime than members of their respective households.

**Table 2: Summary of Findings of Youth Personal Victimization**

<b>Crimes Reportedly suffered by Youths Personally</b>	<b>Frequency/ Percentage</b>
Attempted Murder	2%
Robbery	12%
Attempted Robbery	6%
Rape	1%
Attempted Rape	2%
Theft of car	2%
Theft of Motorcycle	5%
Domestic Violence	21%
Forced Same sex intercourse	3%
Physical assault	20%
Mobile Phone/GSM theft	52%
Burglary	14%

### **Where did the incidents of violence and Crime occur?**

The survey presented youth with options to indicate where most crimes occurred. The options included at their own home, near their home, at work place or school, elsewhere in the state and lastly, outside the state of

residence. In their response, 53% of youth reported that their experiences of robbery occurred at their own home. However, in the case of attempted robbery, 37% indicated it happened at their homes while another 35% indicated that it happened near their home.

On the question of rape, the answers also showed that most youth (35%) that reported having suffered from this act of violence encountered it at home. Only 26% said it had occurred near their home. A more interesting response was given to the question of attempted rape. 100% of all the respondents between the ages of 31-35 years indicated that incidents of attempted rape occurred near their homes and within their neighbourhoods. Whereas 39% of persons between ages 18-30 years supported this. Only 20% of the youth said that attempted rape occurred at home.

41% of those who also were victims of car theft reported that it occurred at home. 31% said it occurred near their homes while 17% said it occurred elsewhere in the state. Likewise, a greater percentage (53%) of motorcycle thefts were said to have occurred at home. Only 21% occurred near the home and 17% occurred elsewhere in the state.

The questions about their experiences of kidnapping and attempted kidnapping also threw up curious figures. Whilst 45% of kidnapping is said to happen at home and 25% near the home, incidents of attempted kidnapping experienced by the youth were higher at 37% near home and only 31% at their own home and 30% elsewhere in the state.

As expected, incidents of domestic violence was reported by the youth to have occurred mostly (58%) in their own home. Only 28% is said to have been experienced in the neighbourhood or near their home. However, physical assault was higher at 39% near the home than in their own homes (34%). Youth also experience varied degrees of physical assault at work/school (16%) and elsewhere in the state (11%). Issues of Forced same sex intercourse was also highest in the home at 49% and only occurred 27% of the times near the homes.

Theft of mobile phones/GSM also followed the high trend of crime either at home or near the home. Thus 38% of mobile phone thefts were reported to have occurred at home, 28% near the home, 21% at work or in school and 12% elsewhere in the state. The statistics for burglary are also

strikingly similar albeit higher. Thus 60% of burglaries (breaking and entering) reportedly occurred at home whereas 21% occurred near the home and 14% at work.

**Table 3: Summary of Where the Crimes and Incidences of Violence Occurred**

<b>Crime experienced by the Youth</b>	<b>Occurred at own home</b>	<b>Occurred near the home</b>	<b>Occurred in other places</b>
Robbery	53%	19%	9% at work/school and 12% elsewhere in the state
Attempted Robbery	37%	35%	9% elsewhere in the state
Rape	35%	26%	28% elsewhere in the state
Attempted Rape	19%	26%	15% elsewhere in the state
Theft of Car	41%	31%	17% elsewhere in the state
Theft of Motorcycle	53%	21%	17% elsewhere in the state
Kidnapping	45%	25%	23% elsewhere in the state
Attempted Kidnapping	31%	37%	30% elsewhere in the state
Domestic Violence	58%	28%	28% near the home and 9% at work/school
Forced Same sex Intercourse	49%	27%	13% at work/school and 11% elsewhere in the state
Physical Assault	34%	39%	16% at work/school, 11% elsewhere in the state
Theft of Mobile Phone / GSM	38%	28%	21% at work and 12% elsewhere in the state
Burglary	60%	21%	14% at work

### ***Fear of Crime/ Perception of Safety***

The survey examined how safe the youth felt in their immediate environs are. Our findings revealed that 4% of the respondents did not feel safe at home and in their neighbourhood by day while 93% felt safe. But at night, 10% felt unsafe at home and 14% felt unsafe in the neighbourhood, whereas 83% felt safe at home by night and 78% felt safe in the neighbourhood.

Also, 88% felt safe in their work place compared to 5% which felt unsafe. And in public places, 83% felt safe compared to 9% that felt unsafe. From their response, 58% were afraid of being victims of unlawful arrest and detention by security agencies whereas 40% were not afraid. About 62% were also afraid of being victims of violent political, ethnic and religious conflict whilst 35% had little or no fear of this.

Their perceptions of the level of crime in the community also showed that 25% of the youth thought it is high, 21% think the crime level is average whilst 44% think it is low. The following were identified as the most prevalent in the various communities: Armed Robbery 16%, Domestic violence 14%, Theft of phone 13%, Burglary 11% and Drug abuse 7%.

### ***Elections related Violence***

17% of the youth interviewed said they witnessed incidents of violence and intimidation before, during or after the elections. Equally, about 17% of the youth reported to either having been victims themselves or some member of their household were victims of electoral violence and intimidation.

Enquiries as to when these incidents of violence or intimidation occurred revealed that 38% reportedly experienced the violence during campaigns, 18% before voting commenced, 32% during voting and 21% after voting. Regardless of these incidents, 71% reported that they were still very willing to vote in future elections in Nigeria, 20% were somewhat willing, 4% were not very willing and only 2% were not willing at all.

## **Recommendation and Conclusion**

These findings reveal that most of the violence experienced by the youth can be traced primarily to their homes and then secondarily to the rest of society. This brings to the fore the gradual decay in the family unit in Nigeria. The African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights recognises the family as “the natural unit and basis of society” and as the “custodian of the moral and traditional values recognised by the community”. It therefore places a responsibility on State parties to protect the family unit and to “take care of its physical health and moral”. There is therefore need to pay special attention to the peculiar challenges of young people within the Nigeria Society. This would require an integrated approach. First, the family unit must be strengthened. The statistics show that youth violence is prevalent because the family unit and home fronts are disintegrating and do not provide required moral and disciplinary background for young people. Second, the state must take urgent step to address the socio-economic challenges of the youth. Quality education and job creation for

the youth should become high priority for the government. Unless, a reasonable standard of living is guaranteed for the youth, they will continue to tend towards violence and crime. Social order can only be promoted in Nigeria when “children, young persons and the aged are protected against any exploitation whatsoever and against moral and material neglect.” Only by squarely providing the necessary economic, social and political support for the youth and by gainfully engaging them in nation building can we begin to break the link between youth and violence in Nigeria.

## References

1. Oxford Advanced Learners Dictionary, 6<sup>th</sup> Edition
2. Sec 14 (2) (b) of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal republic of Nigeria
3. African Youth Charter adopted in Banjul, the Gambia on 2 July 2006.
4. Article 18 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights
5. Sec 17 (2)(f) of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria.

# **Part Three**

# **Appendix**

# Final Report of the Summit on Youth Restiveness, Violence, Peace and Development in Bauchi, Northern Nigeria

## Background

**T**he endemic security challenge in Nigeria caused by political decadence in the country particularly failure of the state in delivering its constitutional duties and ensuring that basic life amenities are made available for the wellbeing of the citizenry coupled with state inability to continue the implementation of past policies and social services for the common good of Nigerians. This led to youth restiveness and violence and degenerated to terrorism in the country. Other reasons that gave rise to the project conceptualization, development and implementation are: **The Rising Population of Vulnerable Youths in Nigeria, Recurring Threat to Human Security, Disruption of Economic Activities by young people across the country and Integrated Approach to Peace-Building**, CLEEN Foundation under its conflict prevention programme conceived a project aimed to redirecting the energies of youths constructively, opening up better channels for dialogue, formulating better strategies for youth participation in governance and ultimately engaging youths as instruments for peace and development in Nigeria in conformity to the declaration by the United Nations General Assembly of the International Decade for a Culture of Peace and Non-violence for the Children of the World. CLEEN Foundation implemented the activity with support from

the Canadian Fund for Local Initiatives (CFLI) managed by the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA).

## **Implementation of the 1<sup>st</sup> Project Activity: 2-Day Northern Youth Summit on “Youth Restiveness, Violence, Peace & Development in Bauchi, Northern Nigeria”**

The project implementation commenced with a Two-Day Youth Summit on “Youth Restiveness, Violence, Peace & Development in Northern Nigeria” held at the Development Exchange Centre, Bauchi State, northern Nigeria, from Tuesday 22<sup>nd</sup> through Wednesday, 23<sup>rd</sup> November, 2011. The summit had in participation undergraduates, youth leaders, academicians, media, policy makers, politicians, ministries, the police state and zonal commands, civil society organisations, women leaders, government agencies, religious leaders, Bauchi State House of Assembly and youth groups.

### **Presentations/Discussions**

Six papers were presented at the conference covering: The findings of CLEEN Foundation 2011 National Crime Victimization Survey on Youth and Violence in Nigeria by Mr. Nwagu Chinedu (Programme Manager, Accountability & Justice, CLEEN Foundation). This paper provided participants with crime trends, pattern & violence in Nigeria with emphasise on areas where youths have been found wanting in this regards. Data analysis on Crime Rate, Youth & Violence in Nigeria was reiterated and provided audience with insight into the damages done by youth restiveness & violence in the country.

The second paper exhaustively dealt with “Youth Restiveness and Violence in Northern Nigeria: A Critical Analysis” by Mr. Simon Karu (Coordinator Young Men Christian Association of Nigeria). His paper took participants through memory lane on the theme providing them with vital information on conflicts and violence in northern Nigeria covering Borno, Bauchi, Jos, Kaduna and Taraba states.

The third presenter, Ms Rachel Abdullahi Dibal, Researcher, Youth Initiative for Advocacy, Growth & Advancement (YIGA) exhaustively dealt with the “Causes of Youth Restiveness in Northern Nigeria”. Her paper identified core issues leading to Youth restiveness and Violence in northern Nigeria and factors responsible for restive and violent expressions by the youths to include: peer motivated excitement of being a student; jingoistic pursuit of patriotic ideas; perceived victimisation arising from economic exploitations, the breakdown of value system; poor education and illiteracy; social economic collapse; religious extremism; and substantial abuse of drugs. She described these factors as hydra-headed, mostly embedded in the system. Speaking of the heterogeneous character of the Nigerian state, she had a contrary opinion on whether inter-group conflicts and violence in northern Nigeria is caused by its heterogeneous nature.

Youth restiveness, according to her, is a deviant behaviour since the actors would usually go against acceptable norms and laws of the society. Taking to psychological elucidation dimension, she cited John Bowlby, tracing the problem to lack of close tide between children and their mothers during their first seven years on earth, sitting Sigmund Freud, she traced youth restiveness and violence to un-developed super ego. On structural functionalist perspective, she re-emphasized Robert K. Merton's theory that antisocial behaviour are generated when society extols common symbols of success for all while structurally restricting the access of larger number of people. She further cited “Talcot Parsons Theory” which submits that social system has four basic functional prerequisites which can be seen as problems that society must solve if it is to survive, including: adaptation; goal attainment; integration & pattern maintenance. She called on the Nigeria society to embrace social change in achieving these prerequisites.

She accepted that though youth restiveness is not new in Nigeria, but the dimension it has taken presently is a thing of concern to stakeholders, well-meaning Nigerians, development partners, civil society/community based organisations, United Nations, and the global community considering the damages done by the problem and called on the

government to be more responsive to the plights of the youths in the country by accommodating peaceful protest and responding swiftly to non-violent demonstration of young people rather than wait until lives and properties have been annihilated.

Conclusively, she cited Ahmadu Bello of the Blessed Memory, who said, "Let's understand our differences, so that we can tolerate one another and learn to live in peace and unity. It is only through tolerance and sincerity that we can learn to forgive and gradually rebuild trust". She proffered the following recommendations: The need for Nigerians to rest boundaries and tolerate one another; that religious leaders should guide their youths appropriately instilling in them fear of God and respect for the dignity of the human person, that the educational system be restored to its past glory and our cultural heritage rebuild to meet the standard and expectations of the 21<sup>st</sup> century, urgent government intervention to alleviate poverty, unemployment and provision of infrastructure. Finally, new laws should be enacted to checkmate drug abuse and similar social vices by the youths.

DCP Femi Oyeleye, a serving Deputy Commissioner of Police with Zone 12 Headquarters in Bauchi State took participants through "State Response to Youth Restiveness in Nigeria". He stated that a group of people can only exist peacefully when they have a common goal, destiny, dream, aspiration, wish, desire and will. He explained that they are embedded in our value system which includes: tradition/values, codes/conduct, behaviour, rules and regulations. In reemphasized the importance of order, peace and security to our everyday life and described them as very essential elements not only for good governance but also for development. He acknowledged that it beholds on any good government to ensure the security of lives and property of its citizens and that the constitution requires all to respect the dignity of the human person and the rights and legitimate interests of others, live in unity and harmony and the spirit of common brotherhood. He described the police as the hub of Nigeria national civil life and legal means of societal behavioural control and further gave a historical overview of the Nigerian Police Force and its statutory responsibility.

Narrowing his point to the response of the Nigerian state to Youth Restiveness, he confirmed that the police, Army and the State Security Service Agencies are used to intervene in cases of youth restiveness in Nigeria. He gave three appraisals of states that have witnessed youth restiveness/violence and their responses to it: Firstly, is the riot against the black in the UK, riot against school fees hike in the UK and the Occupation of Wall-Street Protest in the United States of America. He buttressed his point using the different approaches used by the three countries in response to the problem, identifying good practices in managing youth restiveness without force and within the provisions of the law. Although he noted that in areas where force could be applied, it MUST be used as the last resort and that is when somebody's life is in imminent danger i.e. force applied being proportionate to the force threatened. He identified the causes of youth restiveness as identified by the British government to include: classical demonstration of a broken society; many children without homes; schools without principles; reward without effort; crime without punishment; rights without responsibility; communities without control.

A careful appraiser of the Nigerian problem according to him reminds one of the Indian Statesman, Humanist, and Philosopher, Mohandas Karamchanda Ghandi (1869-1948) where he stated that there are seven blunders of the modern world: politics without principles; knowledge without character; pleasure without conscience; wealth without work; commerce without morality; science without humanity; worship without sacrifice.

In conclusion, he called on the adoption of community police partnership which underscores the most neglected principles of policing, "that the police are the public and the public are the police". He further called on certain categories of citizens, corporate and business bodies to be mobilised to contribute to the growth and development of the NPF for the good of all.

The fifth presentation on "Faith Based Organisations Response to Addressing Youth Restiveness in Nigeria (From Muslim & Christian Perspective)" was presented by Alhaji Mahmood Jammal, Islamic Cleric

and Revered Josiah Bala F., Christian leader. Rev. Bala Josiah's facilitation concentrated on the role of the Christians' in peacemaking. He enumerated factors that lead to conflicts in the north: ethnicity, economic differences, land ownership, migration and political power. He added that the tension caused by previous experiences of violence in northern Nigeria between the Muslim and Christian faith communities has contributed immensely to the problem. About the role that religious leaders in the north have played in restoring peace in the region, he gave instances of how there has been inter-religious reconciliation efforts by religious leaders in conjunction with government in Plateau State. Religious leaders according to him can help to advance the course of peace through two ways in the country. Firstly, that conflict borne out of religious issues could easily be resolved by religious leaders adding that in most cases religion may be used as a surrogate for other factors. Secondly, religious leaders can play the role of peacemaking if the conflict erupted through religion. He cited South Africa and Mozambique to buttress his point where religion has been used to resolve conflicts that were caused by other factors.

Interface dialogue he recommended should be adopted by all communities even areas where there are currently no conflicts considering how religious the country and the much premium that is attached our faith and our religious leaders. He lamented the neglect of religious leaders in even peace initiatives while coming on the government to adopt the option of deliberately and deeply involving religious leaders in peace process and peace sustenance.

He identified the challenges of using religion as platforms for peacemaking inter alia:

- Incompatibility of religious narratives;
- The sensitivity nature of religion to reinforce or complicate factors that often propel conflict;
- Forceful conversion and division about conversion;
- Certain religious believes that isolates believers from religious dialogues;
- The fear and doubt of about engaging religious leaders; and
- Interfaith dialogue that may open old wounds.

Alhaji Muhammad Jammal, an Islamic cleric facilitated a session on “the Role of Religion in Peace making from Muslim perspective”. He confirmed that peace is preached by Muslim leaders noting that religion is not the ONLY cause of conflict in northern Nigeria. He classified the causes of conflict in the region in three folds: economic; political and social causes. On the role of Islamic leaders in peacemaking, he said it beholds on them to fashion out ways of mitigating radical sermons scholar and clerics preach at mosques that incite youths at the detriment of national peace and development. He called on the need to for government to be closer to the people and device ways of engaging religious leaders in peace processes, peacemaking, peace-building and reconstruction processes. Since Islam does not abhor the existence of other religion but recognises them and the free will of the people to decide which religion to practice, he was of the opinion that religious leaders should focus on peaceful coexistence through religious diversity.

The sixth presentation was on “the Role of the Youths in Restoring & Building Peace in Nigeria” delivered by Yibis Sylvester, (Coordinator Bauchi Human Rights Network). His paper equipped participants with basic skills required in peacemaking and peace-building and provided them with some northern states which have become perpetual sites of conflict and violence. He added that ethnicity and political interest play considerable role in the problem the region have had to deal with over time.

## **Key Issues Raised/Lessons Learnt**

Below are summary of the key issues raised by the participants during the interactive sessions:

- That CLEEN Foundation should extend the project to primary and secondary school for the purpose of catching them young in disseminating the message of peace and peaceful co existence in northern Nigeria;
- There is a total disconnect between the Youth and the government in northern Nigeria caused by several years of

- neglect of the people in the region;
- That government should be responsive to the plight of the people in the north, particularly the youths;
- The main causes of youth restiveness and violence in northern Nigeria is the failure of the state to meet up with its primary responsibility of ensuring the welfare of the citizenry are guaranteed at all time;
- That “Early Warning System” should be explored by the Nigerian state going forward, accommodating peaceful demonstration of youth against government policies that are not pleasing to them and the state should urgently attend to the grievances of the youths in the north;
- That other causes of youth restiveness could be attributed to economic and social reasons such as **social decay, improper upbringing of children, corruption, and moral decadence, lost of societal values, ethnics and religious intolerance;**
- Human Security is the way forward in solving the security challenges in Nigeria, hard security has never paid off in any part of the world Nigeria is not exception;
- Drug abuse is not the main cause of youth restiveness but rather a factor;
- Nigerians should imbibe the attitude of religious and ethnic tolerance and peaceful coexistence;
- Drastic measures be adopted revive the past glory of education system in the country;
- Religious leaders should eschew incisive sermons while those that preach provocative sermons should be brought to book
- Government should consider the use of religious and traditional leaders in peace initiative but should trade on the part of caution when doing so.
- Government should find proper ways of engaging the youths as they could play vital role in nation building;
- Policing is not a sole responsibility of the police but also that of the private individuals.
- Government should encourage energetic young Nigerians.

There was also a breakout session as participants were divided into groups to discuss “Building Bridges between Northern Youths & the Nigerian State” with each group looking at the Political Perspective, another group looked at Economic, Social Dimension, the last group responded to it from Social Cultural and Religious approach respectively.

Their responses are summarized below:

*How do we build political bridges between the youths and the government?*

- Advocacy visit to policy makers
- Youth practical involvement in governance
- Youths should reject violence and conflicts
- Youth support for idea base politics and not money base politics
- Youths should support political contestants base on the competence and credibility
- Youth participation in policy making
- Building political structure that enables youth participation in politics

*Economic Dimension in responding to the Issue*

- Construction of industries in various areas of the state to create job for youths
- Conventional and vocational training education for youths

*Socio cultural and Religious Group*

- Promotion of unity through cultural festival diversity for various ethnic groups
- Government should encourage youths to be more active in decision making
- Government should be more responsive to the plight of the plights of the people especially the youths
- Religious leaders should resist religious scholars and clerics that preaches radical sermons

## **Conclusion**

Participants expressed their satisfaction to the CLEEN Foundation and Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) in initiating such laudable project. They described it as a step in the right direction in responding to the problem of Youth Restiveness and Violence in northern Nigeria. Further areas of engaging with the youths in the region were identified (Please refer to the communiqué of the proceedings below).

## **Communiqué issued at the End of the Two-Day Summit on Youth Restiveness, Violence, Peace and Development in Northern Nigeria Organised by the CLEEN Foundation at Development Exchange Centre, Bauchi State, on 22-23 November 2011**

**A** two day Summit on Youth Restiveness, Violence, Peace & Development in northern Nigeria held on Tuesday 22<sup>nd</sup> and Wednesday, 23<sup>rd</sup> November 2011 at Development Exchange Centre, Bauchi State. The Summit was organised to empower and mentor young people to become change agents and instruments of peace in their communities by initiating discussions aimed to directing them away from behaviour that engenders conflict by changing their perception of issues that could breed resentment and conflict, with a long term effect of creating an enabling environment for development in Nigeria. It also sought to identify possible solutions on the way forward in addressing the issues to prevent the reoccurrence of violence.

Participants were drawn from tertiary institutions, youth leaders, academicians, media, policy makers, politicians, ministries, the police state and zonal commands, civil society organisations, women leaders and civil society organisations, government agencies, religious leaders Bauchi State House of Assembly and youth groups. It was organised by the CLEEN Foundation with support from the Canada Fund for Local Initiative (CFLI) managed by the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA).

A total of six (6) papers were presented at the Summit around which further discussions were built. The papers presented included:

1. Presentation on the findings of CLEEN Foundation 2011 Crime Victimization Survey on Youth and Violence in Nigeria
2. Youth Restiveness and Violence in Northern Nigeria: A Critical Analysis
3. The Causes of Youth Restiveness & Violence in Northern Nigeria
4. State Response to Youth Restiveness in Nigeria
5. Faith Based Organisations Response to Addressing Youth Restiveness in Nigeria (From Christian and Muslim perspective)
6. Role of Youths in Restoring & Building Peace in Nigeria

There was also a breakout session as participants were divided into groups to discuss “Building Bridges between Northern Youths & the Nigerian State” with each group looking at the Political, Economic, Social, Cultural and Religious approaches respectively.

At the end of the Summit, the participants noted that:

1. There is a major disconnection between the government at the various levels and young people in Nigeria.
2. There is need to create a platform for regular interaction between the youth and the government.
3. The prevailing socio-economic realities in the country do not support the realisation of the common aspirations and yearnings of young Nigerian citizens for quality education, gainful employment, healthcare and decent standards of living;
4. The rising levels of corruption further deepen the socio-economic inequalities in Nigeria and deny young people the benefit of enjoying the proceeds of the vast resources in the country;
5. In the absence of a systematic and constructive engagement of young people by the Nigeria State, they resort to self-help and criminal activities for survival and are vulnerable to political manipulation and recruitment by extremist groups;

6. Security and welfare of the people remains the primary responsibility of the state, which has so far failed in guaranteeing and providing both particularly for young people in northern Nigeria;
7. Security and Policing is not solely the responsibility of the police but of everyone and this can be strengthened by mainstreaming police community partnership at the grassroots;
8. The causes of youth restiveness is traceable to government failure in their primary responsibilities, social decay, improper upbringing of children, corruption, social and moral decadence, lost of societal values, ethnic and religious intolerance, norms and standards;
9. Security is not about force and use of military might but also a product of guaranteeing human security;
10. There is need to encourage, moderate and facilitate inter-faith and inter-cultural dialogue amongst various communities in northern Nigeria.

Following these observations, the participants resolved and recommended as follows:

1. That a forum should be opened in and outside schools that would facilitate interaction amongst students and with government officials;
2. That state governments should acknowledge the energetic and enterprising drive of youths and create enabling environment for starting and growing businesses within the states;
3. State governments should recognise the cultural diversities of people within the region and encourage integration through annual cultural festivals;
4. The educational systems, both conventional and vocational, should be reformed and strengthened to properly engage young people and help them build capacities that would facilitate their gainful participation in economic activities.

5. The government should diversify economic activities to create more employment opportunities for young people within the region;
6. The youths should be encouraged to participate more in the political process and encouraged to support political aspirants with credibility, competence and clear agenda that speaks to the needs of the people;
7. The youths should be encouraged to follow the legislative processes in their respective states and hold regular advocacy visits to policy makers;
8. Government should accommodate peaceful protest and respond swiftly to non-violent demonstration of young people rather than wait until lives and properties have been annihilated. That the state should hold regular inter-faith, inter-religious and inter-cultural dialogues and steps should be taken to mitigate inciting comments of religious leaders and punish those found wanting;
9. More aggressive awareness campaigns be initiated and carried out on the role of youth in peace, development and national building, prioritising the uneducated and youths in the rural communities.

Signed:

**CLEEN Foundation**







# YOUTH RESTIVENESS, VIOLENCE AND PEACE

In November 2011, CLEEN organised a summit on Youth Restiveness, Violence, Peace and Development in Northern Nigeria. The summit was in recognition of the significant role young people play in nation building and the many challenges they confront in trying to gainfully engage the socio-political and economic structures in the country.

Funded by the government of Canada through the Canada Fund for Local Initiatives (CFLI) managed by the Canadian International Development Agency, the project hopes to create an enabling environment for development and good governance.

This book of conference proceedings would thus be useful in understanding the challenges of young people within the region, identifying the push factors of youth restiveness, proffering practicable solutions to youth involvement in violence and other ways to empower, mentor and direct young people to become role models and instruments of peace.



The mission of CLEEN Foundation is to promote public safety, security and accessible justice through empirical research, legislative advocacy, demonstration programmes and publications in partnership with government and civil society.