DEEPENING CIVIL MILITARY RELATIONS FOR EFFECTIVE PEACE-BUILDING AND DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE IN NIGERIA

BEING PROCEEDINGS OF THE CLEEN FOUNDATION CIVIL - MILITARY RELATIONS PROJECT TO FOSTER SUSTAINED DIALOGUE AND IMPROVED UNDERSTANDING AMONG THE SECURITY AGENCIES AND THE CIVIL POPULACE IN NIGERIA.

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Mission of Cleen Foundation

To promote public safety, security and accessible justice through empirical research, legislative advocacy, demonstration programmes and publications, in partnership with government and the civil society
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Preface

In Nigeria, we are at a time when the dynamics of modern warfare have changed dramatically. From insurgency, kidnapping, cultism, pipeline vandalism, conflicts between herders and farmers and armed banditry, the enemy-line is increasingly becoming blurred with the enemy living amongst the people. Again, the challenges resulting from these crises bring enormous adverse effects on the lives of the citizens and reverse the country’s socio-economic development. While these conflicts need to be addressed as quickly as possible through the deployment of state security apparatus, there is also the need to explore other soft approaches to resolving these challenges and their underlying causes. Civil Military Relations provides that approach to bring the people and the military together to the dialogue table and discuss towards an enhanced relationship that drives trust, confidence, mutual respect, an enduring peace and security architecture for Nigeria.

Civil Military Relations in Nigeria as an emerging concept deals with the fundamental issues associated with improving relations between civilians and the military, between the military and other security actors and between the military and civilian authorities. While not an entirely new concept, the practice of civil military relations since Nigeria's return to democracy in 1999 has continued to gain mileage. Through the establishment of civil military relations desks and the use of different strategies by the military and civil society, the strained relationship is progressively improving albeit at a slow pace. The tensed relationship which has remained a major concern to the state, policy makers, scholars and civil society has robbed the security agencies the much needed cooperation and trust upon which the success of their operations rests. Despite the fact that the perceptions of civilians about the military have their historical roots, modest gains have been made by the Military in the last decade to win the hearts and minds of the people. It is against this background that the CLEEN Foundation is implementing a civil military relations project with the objective to foster and strengthen civil-military relations through sustained dialogues between the civil populace and the military to improve accountability, security, and respect for fundamental human rights throughout Nigeria.

Despite the gains made by the Military at fostering civil military relations, the recurrent deployment of the Military across civil spaces has human rights implications. This occurs when deployed personnel have not been adequately trained on the principles of civil military relations. Critically also, is the limited understanding of civilians, of the military as an institution and their
contribution to supporting the Armed Forces of Nigeria. Truth be told, the enormous sacrifices of the Armed Forces of Nigeria to the peace and stability in Nigeria and the protection of its territorial integrity cannot be quantified in real terms. Many have paid the ultimate sacrifice through tragic deaths on the battlefield while others have served the country meritoriously all of their active working years. Civilians therefore need to acknowledge these sacrifices and contribute their own quota to supporting the Armed Forces of Nigeria. A national program of civilian support and scaling up of current efforts including policy options are recommendations to balance the tensed relationship and enhance military civilian cooperation in Nigeria.

The issue of civilian control over the military is another important aspect of civil military relations in Nigeria that has generated keen interest and discourse. Current practices in Nigeria still portend a weak linkage between civilians and the military and the need for greater accountability by the military. Oversight from the parliament over the military is still shadowy while military business remains largely vague with many complexities. It needs to be emphasised that the military is critical to the sustenance of democracy. Accordingly, it must be a willing partner collaborating with civil authorities within the framework of the rule of law, transparency and accountability and display the highest level of professional conduct in its primary role to protect the people and the state.

This publication is therefore an attempt to bring greater visibility to the concept of civil military relations in Nigeria through the contributions of technical experts at the various fora organised by CLEEN Foundation. The publication is in seven (7) chapters. The book opens with an introductory chapter on understanding the dynamics of civil military relations in Nigeria and draws historical analysis from the colonial era right through to modern day. The chapter outlines critical factors that will inform greater understanding of civil military relations in Nigeria. Chapter Two discusses the role of civil military relations in counter insurgency operations in North East Nigeria with a view to further deepening civil military relations in Nigeria. Chapter Three discusses the need for the civil populace to have a good understanding of the military as an institution while Chapter Four examines civil military in Rivers State looking from the perspectives of issues and challenges and an analysis of military’s involvement in the oil economy in the entire Niger Delta. The Chapter concluded with recommendations on improving the professionalism of the military and civil military relations in the state.

Chapter Five focuses on the strengthening civil military relations with a view to improving national security, based on observed experiences from the field and the lessons learnt.
The chapter outlines the current structure of the Departments of Civil Military Relations across the Military. Chapter Six details the roles of civilians and the military in enhancing peace building in Nigeria. Interestingly, within civil military relations are issues of inter-agency rivalry as a militating factor against better security and cooperation. This was examined in great detail in Chapter Seven with suggested ways of working cooperatively amongst the security agencies.

Finally, speeches presented by military and civilian experts at different civil military relations fora organised by CLEEN Foundation are outlined in the appendix. It is our hope that with the lessons and recommendations from the various chapters in this book, a new kind of civil military engagement will be inspired within the military and the civil populace to enhance peace and security in Nigeria. Some of the images/pictures taken at the various workshops are also shown depicting the willingness of the security agencies and their civil society counterparts to work together to achieve good relations in and out of operational areas.

Benson Chinedu Olugbuo Ph.D.
Executive Director, CLEEN Foundation
Foreword

Governments around the world are duty bound to emplace measures to enhance the safety and security of lives of their citizens. This is often achieved through dedicated arrangements that may include armed forces and civil police as it is the case in Nigeria. Threats to national security in Nigeria are diverse in nature and intensity, often escalating beyond the capability of the Nigeria Police Force (NPF). As the number and intensity of the conflicts increase, the Armed Forces of Nigeria (AFN) is constitutionally obliged when called upon to partake in internal security operations, to ensure law and order and safeguard national sovereignty. The call out of the AFN put them in more contact with the civil populace with potentials for conflict between the two groups. Ensuring understanding and fostering cooperation during internal security operations thus calls for robust civil-military relations.

The concept of civil military relations is as old as the history of conflict itself during which formal armed groups and later, the armed forces and other security agencies had to share space with the civil populace in the course of performing their legitimate duties. Such interactions were minimal in the pre-Cold War Era as most conflicts were between national armies with properly defined battle space. Collateral damages to non-military targets and civilian casualties were therefore minimal. Post-Cold War events, however, show a reversal not just because conflicts have become more internal but the adversaries are most times hardly distinguishable from the peace loving and unarmed civilians. Thus, some unhealthy relationships began to develop. In an effort to quickly restore normalcy, the presence of the military becomes more prominent in the society while supporting the civil police to enforce law and order.

The Federal Republic of Nigeria and the AFN have continually made efforts to ensure professional conduct and observance of the rule of law during military and internal security operations. It was in this regard that Civil-Military Relations Departments were established at the Ministry of Defence, Defence Headquarters and the Services Headquarters. Civil military relations desks were also set up in theatre of operations with emergency call lines to facilitate reporting of incidents and quick response to calls by aggrieved members of the society. This is further enhanced by the establishment of the Armed Forces Radio and other civil military relations programmes of the Armed Forces.

Aside the various initiatives of the AFN on the subject, I would like to acknowledge the efforts of CLEEN Foundation at fostering civil military relations over the years through
workshops, lectures and town hall meetings. In particular, this publication on “Deepening Civil Military Relations for Effective Peace Building and Democratic Governance in Nigeria” is a product of several contributions by various scholars, practitioners and researchers within the military, civil society and the academia. It is hoped that the publication would strengthen peaceful coexistence among the populace leading to economic growth and national development in Nigeria.

Effective collaboration among all security agencies and the civil society as well as respect for each other's constitutional roles will surely set the required foundation upon which effective civil military relations can be achieved in Nigeria. This is all the more important in the current campaign against terrorism where a whole-of-a-nation approach is required to tame the adversary and guarantee enduring peace in the collective interest of all citizens.

IE IBAS
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January 2019
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Chapter 1

UNDERSTANDING SOME DYNAMICS OF CIVIL MILITARY RELATIONS IN NIGERIA

By
Oshita O. Oshita Ph.D

Abstract
Across historical epochs, questions concerning civil-military relations have attracted attention in varying degrees both in developed as well as developing socio-political systems. In Plato's Republic, he provided a tripartite classification of society into Philosopher Kings (Rulers), Military (Soldiers) and Workers (Masses), and further associated each group with Rationality (Reason), Spirit (Courage) and Appetite (Food), respectively. One of Plato's concerns in his conception of the ideal society was therefore how the three groups would relate without conflict and thus ensure (social) justice through separation of powers, strict division of labour and non-interference with the duties of the others. Nigeria is a highly pluralistic society with a population of about 170 million people, spread across a diverse demography. The country has a moderately equipped but globally deployed and active military, which has often been under domestic pressure to frequently backstop for the Nigeria Police Force in the maintenance of law and order through the performance of internal security duties. Recurring issues of inter and intra-group conflicts at the horizontal and vertical fronts do occur but stakeholders have come to recognize that reciprocal dialogue will improve civil-military relations in Nigeria. This Paper examines the dynamics of civil-military relations in Nigeria with a view to suggesting a dialogue framework that aims to draw the disparate dots in the two domains into a unified and consensually illuminated whole. Among the recommendations is that all international laws and protocols relating to armed conflicts and promotion of human rights should be domesticated and observed in Nigeria.

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Introduction and Conceptualization

Given the historical evolution of the Nigerian state, the CLEEN Foundation project on enhancing civil military relations is a desirable goal for the civil populace and the military, and indeed for the entire Nigerian society. The practical question is how this objective can be attained and the benefits appropriated for the good of society. One way of doing this is to return to the basics by identifying the sources of the perceptions that have overtime largely undermined the chances of mutual trust and collaboration between the military and civilians. Generally, the dynamics of civil-military relations (CMR) in Nigeria have been impacted by at least five broad pathways of the evolutionary trajectory of the country. These may be roughly characterized as the pre-colonial, colonial, post-independence, era of military incursion in politics and the contemporary period of subordination of the military to civil authority. It is appropriate, however, to lay a conceptual foundation prior to applying the broad brush of analysis of the sources of the relational dynamics of civilian and military groups in Nigeria.

Civil-military relations typically refers to the way people in the society (open civil society) and the military (institution, members and processes) interact in the context of daily performance of their core roles in the service of the state for the intended benefit of society as a whole. The notion of 'open civil society' is used here to distinguish the 'formal civil society', which refers to organized and usually registered associations. The key indicators of healthy civil-military relations would include mutual trust, enhanced citizen security, public safety, communicative understanding, synergies, human rights, and subordination to civil authority.

Some literature credit Tzu (1971) and Clausewitz (1989) with the earliest use of the conceptions of CMR, where they argued that military institutions are primarily servants of the state, although outlines of this discourse featured in Plato's Republic in 360 B.C. Today, the literature shows a broad spectrum of issues that are flagged in conversations under civil-military relations. These include professionalism, budgeting, arms purchase, utilization of intelligence, deployment of troops, collateral damage, war, etc., in which civil authorities are expected to have substantial, if not deciding voice. How debates around these issues have been prosecuted further affects the self-perceptions and mirror-images of the civilians and the military.

Background to Civil-Military Relations in Nigeria

The history of the Nigerian military may be traced to the various security constructs by the colonial authorities between 1862 and 1909, involving northern and southern Nigerian regiments under the West African Frontier Force (WAFF). The first commanders of these
Regiments were Lt CHP Carter (1899-1901) and Col J Wilcox (1900-1909) respectively. During the intervening period, in 1891, the Oil Rivers Irregulars, the third unit, was created and became the southern regiment of the WAFF (Dummar, F. C. 1989:18-19).

The nature and character of CMR in Nigeria derives from the historical antecedents, including socio-political and economic roles that the military has played over the years. The background to civil military relations in Nigeria can be discussed using a heuristic framework of interconnected trajectories of pre-colonial, colonial, post-independence, era of military incursion in politics and the contemporary (period of subordination of the military to civil authority). This will provide the context for appreciating the incremental yet steady evolution of the dynamics that shape civil military relations in Nigeria.

Pre-Colonial Period:
In pre-colonial Nigeria the majority of ethnic nationalities had no formal armies but warriors who were mobilised to perform the duties of the modern day traditional military. Those identified as warriors were the ones that fought, won and lost wars across different parts of pre-colonial Nigeria. In his epic novel, Things Fall Apart, Chinua Achebe presents the picture of a warrior in the character of Okonkwo, while his father, Unoka, a sharp contrast, represented the care-free, merry-making 'appetitive' ordinary person. In traditional African societies warriors were both feared and respected because they were, albeit informal, the community line of defence against unfriendly neighbours. However, unlike the modern notion of a formal army, the warriors had no secluded settlements in the form of barracks. So, unlike modern day military, warriors lived in the community, side by side with the community members in the open civil society.

Colonial Period:
In the colonial era the notion of a formal military first surfaced as the British colonial authority deployed instruments for the subjugation and exploitation of the people of the colony. The Nigerian military could therefore be said to have evolved from the vestiges of the British colonial police and military institutions, which were regarded by the colonies as forces of invasion. This was somewhat replicated in the deployment of ‘Glover Hausas’ in Lagos and a southern regiment in the north.

Immediate Post-Independence Period:
With the emergence of the new nationalized army, and against the backdrop of poor
transition and image management away from the perception of an occupation force, as well as subsequent years of recurring meddling of the military in politics, civil-military relations suffered neglect. Worse still, in the immediate post-independence period, the wrong impression was created that the military was a place for unserious young people who literally had more 'brawn' than 'brains' – those unable to undertake vocations that required 'superior' intellect. A combination of these circumstances and misperceptions were bound to complicate civil-military relations in Nigeria.

The Era of Military Incursion in Politics:

The post-independence image of the military was soon to be smeared by the incursion of the military into political governance, which was like a throwback its colonial origin. Following successive coups that saw the military capturing the political leadership of the state and deciding the fate of society, the military put on a messianic and populist costume. With a combination of political, economic and military power concentrated in one group, the military profession became attractive even to the so-called persons of high intellect against previous perception. This was the era when enlistment into the military schools became highly competitive. The transformation of the public perception of the military from a job for the not-so-well-endowed to the sole dispenser of patronages came with a lot of burden. Military coups became more of the rule than exception, and young entrants into the military regarded themselves as potential Heads of States, military administrators, Aide-de-Camp, Military Assistants, Heads of Task Forces, etc.

Professionalism and discipline in the military began to suffer gradual but steady decline in the years that followed. Agwunobi (1992:90) aptly captures some of the negative impact on the military in the period of politicisation to include:

i. Reduced professional military aspirations

ii. Inclination towards performance of political duties for which military was not drilled

iii. Increased distrust, executions, early retirement or dismissal and fear within the military

iv. Dedication of far more time, energy and imagination by military officers to political leadership and administration than to essential tasks relevant to military professionalism.

The effects of these diversionary engagements on civil military relations were enormous as already alluded to in the preceding sections.

The Contemporary Period:

This period is marked by the emphasis of military subordination to civil authority owing to the global disapproval of military rule. The end of the dominance of military dictatorships and the onset of successive attempts at democratic governance began to witness the emergence of the
image of a new military. In addition, stories of the creditable performance of the Nigerian military in peace support assignments across the world were becoming widely documented. The military expedition in the Mano Union River Basin, particularly, in Liberia and Sierra Leone under ECOMOG brought stories of valour, professionalism and hope for Africa.

Today, some of the most brilliant officers who are high-flying in various professional areas previously not associated with the military can be found in different corps of the armed forces. A good number of military officers have been very well trained, some educated up to the doctorate degree level. Others earned highly specialized and professional qualifications in different disciplines in and outside Nigeria. Officers and men of the Nigerian military at present occupy highly competitive command positions at the international level side-by-side with other militaries.

What does the five-dimensional perception present to us? It points to how perceptions of civil-military relations have evolved over time with fractures and frictions dating from the colonial to the contemporary periods. This is central to our understanding of the sources and evolution of the dynamics of CMR in Nigeria. This also has a bearing on the requirements for military subordination to civil authorities and civilian oversight on military organizations in Nigeria as a country in democratic transition. Further scrutiny of the four-dimensional trajectories can be done through the lenses of the civil populace and the military. For the purposes of our analysis, we assume simply that the civil populace and the military are each a monolithic entity.

Understanding the Sources of Civil Military Relations in Nigeria

One scenario is that some members of the civil populace are stuck in the stereotypes of the past on the jaundiced view of the military, which on their part, I sa sort of misrepresentation, amounts to 'superiority complex'. On the other hand, the military in its over-hang of the past public impressions of its image, harbours a lowly self-image, which fallout on their part is a sort of 'inferiority complex'. In either case, the tendency to have the past deride the evidence of a new reality continues to take a toll on inter-group perceptions and civil-military relationships.

In terms of the post-independence civil perception of the military, the seeming gradual endorsement of the military by the civil populace might have been rightly or wrongly, owing to its control and deployment of patronages under military rule. The military in government was the custodian of all patronages; hence the civil populace courted the friendship of the military for
pecuniary advantages. It became not only a status symbol but an indication of enhanced sense of security for any civilian who was somebody to know military personnel. The society condoned the absolutism and finality with which the military wielded political and other forms of power.

On the part of the military, it remained excited by its having supreme power over a constituency that previously underrated it. At some point, the military obviously became reluctant to share (talk less, relinquish), its newly acquired political power to do and undo. With political power the military declined professionally, while it developed enormous economic muscles, marking the beginning of the era of land-grabbing by 'farming generals' across the country. Yet, within the military, politics and love of power and preference for units saw the selective equipping of some corps. Indeed, there were instances of targeted weakening of some directorates and corps of the military. Beyond the armed forces, the law enforcement institutions were perhaps the worst affected by the deliberate policy of the military to emasculate state institutions. The Nigeria Police Force, for example, was specifically targeted for degrading under General Ibrahim Badamasi Babangida against the backdrop of the Force capacity projected under Inspector General of Police, Sunday Adewusi.

The contemporary viewpoint of the civil perception of the military supports the deconstruction of the iron-curtain impairing effective civil-military relations due to the residue of the old stereotypes. The contemporary viewpoint therefore supports measured openness, on the basis of 'need to know', in the relationship between civil and military authorities as partners in progress. The major planks for nursing and sustaining this viewpoint include dialogue and communicative understanding, trust-building and synergies that will illuminate previously dark alleys and connect civil-military 'forms of life' and 'language games' in a functional way. While dialogue is about mutual acknowledgement of each party's role, communicative understanding involves the additional element of empathy of each for the other for the common good. Arising from the foregoing, it is important for us to examine some of the concrete planks around which the narrative of civil-military relations should be understood and conducted to enhance security and stability in Nigeria. These include:

**Trust and Confidence**: Building of trust and confidence is the bedrock of social and institutional synergies. Issues of superiority and inferiority complex are often implicated in the absence of trust and confidence at inter-personal and inter-organizational levels. Civilians often think that they do not have the trust of the military and vice versa. Where there is mutual suspicion there can neither be trust nor confidence. To build trust and confidence we must
address the sources of the historical as well as other sources of distrust. This is part of what the CLEEN project would achieve.

**Military-Community Relations:** There have not been systematic and sustained military-community relations based on a deliberately crafted communication strategy. Relations between the military and communities in Nigeria have mostly been on ad hoc basis. The battle for the hearts and minds of communities must be sustained at all times, not just when there is insurgency or communal violence. In the field of strategic communication for peace military-community relations is crucial to maintain social equilibrium in times of peace and war. The experience of the Nigerian military in the fight against the Boko Haram insurgents in the north east clearly illustrates the need for a ready-to-deploy and carefully designed communication infrastructure for every military campaign. Realizing this, the armed forces of Nigeria have for the first time, since the Nigerian Civil War, reconfigured their media and communication directorates to meet the challenges of the times.

**Media Images of the Military as Savages:** Undoubtedly, part of the hangover of the era of military dictatorships in Nigeria is the perception of the military as savages. The Afro-beat legend, Fela Anikulapo Kuti, was famous partly for fearlessly highlighting the savagery of the military in some of his most popular songs. These images are perhaps most pronounced in his narrative on the destruction of his Kalakuta Republic and in the song titled *Zombie*. The military, to this day, still suffers from somewhat unfair social media images that depict its members as savages. While there have been cases where some informal actors have used military uniforms to perpetrate crimes that are ascribed to military personnel, much still needs to be done within the rank-and-file to correct the tendency to portray the military as lawless.

**Gender Biases of the Military:** There is the common perception that the military is gender unfriendly. This is partly a historical fact as pristine military duties were male dominated. Even in the 21st century, most militaries are hardly ever considered as equitably representative of the male and female genders. It is often argued that, even where female are enlisted into the military in good numbers there are issues around promotion, training and assignment to specific command tasks and duties, that are still gender discriminatory. Yet, as gender roles are socially constructed, the military in Nigeria is gradually overcoming the gender discrimination with which it had been associated in the past. Many more corps, including infantry and artillery, have both gender performing male-dominated duties sided by side.
Accountability and Transparency Deficit: The civil populace has been suspicious of the military and the secrecy that shrouds its transactional activities, particularly around the budgeting and purchasing of arms and armaments. Such a business model of the military is often construed as capable of undermining accountability and transparency in governance. The absence of information to the public on defence issues creates room for speculations, sometimes culminating in allegations and counter-allegations around the finances of the military. While some of the speculations may be unfounded, discoveries in recent probes into arms deals have exposed the corruption that is sometimes involved in military related expenditures.

Lack of Compliance with International Laws/Protocols: The military is often charged with failure to adhere to various international laws and protocols that specify the rules of armed conflict. In Nigeria, the cases of Odi and Zaki Biam are easily the reference for what some consider flagrant violation of the human rights of citizens. It is argued that the military must respect the standard operating procedures and rules of engagement in armed conflicts and in dealing with belligerents and protecting unarmed civil population, women and children. The debates in this domain largely minimize the contextual issues that both sides must take into account.

Over-Emphasis on Reactive Rather than Proactive Model (EWER): There is a growing debate that militaries should be proactive and go to war only as last resort. This has arisen in the contexts of collateral damages and the cost of psycho-social, economic, political and physical reconstruction. The military, it is argued, should prevent a war or use less damaging strategies in a military campaign. The issues of why early warning and early response is not integral to military training to prevent crises before they escalate are among the most urgent today. In the context of Nigeria's plurality, the military is therefore often accused of prioritizing the reactive model over the proactive and more therapeutic and socially integrative options.

Training content of the military: Stakeholders have come to appreciate the continued disparity in the training of the military and the wide differential in the content of the education and awareness levels between the commissioned (officers) and non-commissioned officers (other ranks) in the military. This is implicated in the often tense social relations between the military and the civilian population. The argument is that the officer cadre relates more harmoniously with civilians while the 'other ranks' relate poorly with the open civil society. This appears to be more than a mere perception as the training contents of the junior military personnel has no place for civil-military relations. On the other hand, the tertiary education of the officers at one point or
the other contained elements of social and human relations. There has thus been increased advocacy by stakeholders around curriculum response to increase awareness on civil-military relations in military training institutions as well as in public education.

**Conclusion**

From the foregoing, the need for communicative understanding between civil society and the military in advancing CMR is based on the assumption that mutual empathy will help build confidence and bridges that are critical to the protection and survival of Nigeria's fledgling democracy. The think tanks in Nigeria should contribute to the development of a functional template for effective relations between the military and civil society. Such relations must be based on the pursuit of interagency goals that are responsive to national needs and the aspirations of the citizenry in the context of a changing global environment. In this regard, it is important for government to anticipate and prepare for gaps that would normally occur in the context of multi-level transitions. Transition gaps come in varying magnitudes depending on whether the change is within an agency, from one person to another within the same political grouping or between different political groupings. An example of transition impact on military conduct was clearly demonstrated in the war against insurgency during the government of President Goodluck Jonathan and President Muhammadu Buhari in 2015 to 2016.

The challenge of poor institutional memory in Nigeria is complicated by the dilution of capacities among disparate individuals in different and often unrelated government institutions instead of strengthening institutional capacities of the statutorily mandated agencies, where they exist.

In summary, there can be no one-size-fits all in civil-military relations in Nigeria. Progress will depend largely on the principle of purposeful adaptation, which is dynamic and needs-driven. After the September 11, 2001 terrorist attack on the United States of America, President George W. Bush invoked this in establishing the Department for Homeland Security. The onslaught of Boko Haram on Nigeria, particularly since 2009, should trigger national response that will include a redefinition of institutional relations, of which CMR is an important component. Now is the auspicious time to create awareness, develop and standardize CMR as a continuous public education component for both military and the open civil society population.
Recommendations

In order to deepen and broaden CMR in Nigeria, it is recommended that:

a. There is the need for all stakeholders to work together towards developing a broad framework for effective civil-military communication in Nigeria. This can be done using a dialogue facilitation model that prioritizes communicative understanding between the military and the open civil society.

b. Particular institutions or clusters of organizations should be identified to drive CMR engagement processes in Nigeria.

c. Grassroots platforms should be established using existing community structures in promoting military-community relations at people-to-people levels.

d. The military should create more media-friendly fora in order to get the media to be more sensitive to the positive contributions of the military in resolving violent conflicts.

e. Gender desk officers would be required in all units of the military, along with affirmative action with respect to recruitment, training and postings to monitor and ensure gender-equity.

f. Accountability and transparency should increasingly become the defining quality of all transactions, not least, business relating to defence and security issues, as has been the global trend since the end of the Cold War.

g. All international laws and protocols relating to armed conflicts and promotion of human rights that are ratified and domesticated by Nigeria should be activated, observed and sanctions strictly enforced against violators.

h. The fact that prevention is better, and indeed, cheaper than cure, requires that military strategy should incorporate a functional early warning and response component (in collaboration with other security/research/intelligence agencies) to prioritize prevention through early warning information;

I. The military should project training in CMR for the officers and men in their respective institutions so as to enable military personnel implore the best sense of judgement in all situations.
Notes and References


Chapter 2

DEEPENING CIVIL MILITARY RELATIONS IN COUNTERINSURGENCY OPERATIONS IN NORTH EAST NIGERIA

by
Onuoha, Freedom Chukwudi Ph.D & Okafor, Joachim Chukwuma

Introduction

Now in its tenth year, the Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria's North East region remains one of the most severe in the world. In 2009, Boko Haram began its campaign of violence in the North East, which soon evolved into an insurgency with terrorist tactics (Burchard and Burgess, 2019). The crisis has claimed over 24,000 lives, displaced more than 2.6 million people, created over 75,000 orphans and caused about $9 billion worth of damage since 2009 (Onuoha and Oyewole, 2018). Sustained violence by the group had led to massive forced displacement and a widespread humanitarian crisis in West Africa's Lake Chad region. Although the insurgency has rocked and continues to ravage much of Nigeria's North East region, comprising the six states of Adamawa, Bauchi, Borno, Gombe, Taraba and Yobe, the hardest hit states are Borno, Yobe and Adamawa.

The Nigerian government has consequently leveraged the military as the pre-eminent kinetic tool alongside other paramilitary, security and law enforcement institutions to counter the evolving threat. Besides the formation of Multinational Joint Task Force by countries of the Lake Chad region, the military-led counterinsurgency (COIN) operations is augmented by voluntary policing outfits such as the Civilian Joint Task Force (CJTF), Hunters Association, Pulaaku Brigade, and Vigilante Group of Nigeria (VGN), among others. Also, a host of humanitarian and development actors have intervened to respond to the humanitarian crisis, not to mention the media and other local civil society groups that are actively engaged with monitoring and responding to evolving situation in the region.

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In principle, the activities of these actors are expected to contribute to the success of COIN operations in the North East. In reality, however, their activities and interaction have been fraught with challenges and tensions (Eme, 2018; Albert, 2014; Goni, 2014; Adeniyi, 2012).

Particularly worrisome is allegation of grave human rights violations levelled against the state security forces and members of the voluntary policing outfits, by human rights and civil society groups (Amnesty International, 2015a; National Human Right Commission, 2013). Humanitarian actors in the region have been accused of involvement in subversive activities by the military, and to some extent state government (Okoye, 2018, Premium Times, 2018). Relations between the military and media outfits has been less than stellar, as the military have repeatedly accused some media outfits and journalists of some sinister motives underpinning coverage of the insurgency (Musa, 2012). Amidst this fractious situation, the greatest beneficiary has been the insurgents while the worst victims remain the hapless civilians needing protection.

The plethora of actors with different interests, missions, orientations and responsibilities have underpinned concern on the nature of civil-military relations (CMR) in the context of ongoing COIN operations in the region. Robust collaboration between the military and host of other actors is vital to successful COIN operations. However, there has been little effort to systematically analyse the nature, causes and implications of friction in CMR for the success of the COIN mission in the North East. This article, therefore, attempts to distil the emergent CMR tensions characteristic of the COIN operations in the North East. Consequently, it asks several questions: In what spheres have CMR tension manifested in the COIN environment of the North East? What are the implications of these streams of tension for the effectiveness of the COIN? And how can robust CMR be promoted to enhance the prospects of COIN operation in the region?

The rest of the article is divided into several parts. First, it clarifies the concept of CMR and COIN. Second, it highlights the major stakeholders and their roles in CMR in Nigeria. Third, it analyses the broad actors in COIN operations in relation to CMR. Fourth, it examines the nature of CMR tensions in the ongoing COIN operations in the North East, identifying key factors that have contributed to turbulent relations between the military and other broad actors. Fifth, the study concludes by proffering strategic recommendations for deepening CMR to bolster Nigeria’s COIN capabilities.
Conceptual and Epistemic Interrogation

The concepts of CMR and COIN are pivotal in this discourse. Hence the way in which they are understood and connected need to be clarified to achieve a shared understanding of their usage in this discourse.

Civil-Military Relations

The concept of CMR is central to any discourse on the role and relevance of the military in a state. The subject of CMR has benefitted from three major classics, namely S. Huntington, *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil Military Relations*, (Massachusetts: Cambridge, 1957); Morris Janowitz, *The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait* (Glencoe Ill.: Free Press, 1960); and Samuel Finer, *The Man on the Horse Back: The Role of the Military in Politics* (London: Pall Mall Press, 1962). Form the perspectives of these classical works, the important theoretical problem of CMR is how to maintain a military that sustains and protects democratic values in a society. Although these works differ in their focus and findings, they have in common an emphasis on civilian control of the military as an institution of the state.

For too long, most of the debate over CMR has therefore been dominated by concerns about civilian control of the military establishment. However, some observers believe that the focus on civilian control has obscured other equally important elements of CMR, especially the recognition of fast-changing security landscape that nations and their militaries operate. As rightly noted by Owens (2012, p. 70), “the question of civilian control is important, but a myopic focus on this issue means that other important questions are often ignored”. With the changing global security environment, scholars are beginning to question the utility of the traditional view of CMR shaped by the influential theories of Huntington and Janowitz. The imperative of revisiting the orthodox or traditional understanding of CMR arise from the changing security environment, issues relating to the use of force, and issues relating to the role of militaries in the reconstruction of weak and failed states (Lyon, 2004). As noted by Burke (2002), this development poses pertinent questions about the relations between military and political elites, the relations of civilians to the military and the state, and the multinational use of force.

Consequently, a paradigm shift in the conceptualisation of CMR that embraces mutuality of interaction has emerged in some recent literature. In this wise, Burk (2002) defines CMR as “the relationship between civil society as a whole and the military organization or organizations established to protect it”. His definition highlights the essence of CMR as the relationship between the military and civilians, however, it overlooks the place of critical governmental
institutions which is necessary for the survival of the state. Similarly, Owens (2012, p.67) defines CMR as the “the interactions among the people of a state, the institutions of that state, and the military of the state”. At the institutional level, there are “two hands on the sword.” For this perspective, CMR entails the interactions among the people of a state, the institutions of that state, and the military of the state aimed at fostering a cooperative, peaceful and stable polity. By this conceptualization, there exists a mutually reinforcing relation between/among the military, the (governmental) institutions and the civil society in a state. The word “civil” in the phrase CMR simply means non-military.

The idea of CMR then rests on a tripod: the military, the institutions of the state and the civil society. The military refers to that state organization or group of organisations permanently established by constitutional law, enjoys a monopoly of certain categories of weapons and equipment, and is responsible for the constrained application of violence or coercive force to eliminate or deter anything or body that is considered to threaten the existence of the nation state and the interests, simply or collectively of its citizens (Edmonds, 1988). Institutions of the state in this context entail public organisations or agencies of government performing functions that are central to the ability of the state to govern its territory. They can also imply “a set of regularised patterns or procedures for the performance of governmental functions” (Olisa, Okoli, and Nwabufo, 1990, p.3). They are public institutions because they are structures created and funded by the state to provide public good. Such institutions could be within the executive or legislative arms of government. Regarding the idea of civil society, it encapsulates the “realm of organized social life that is voluntary, self-generating, self-supporting, autonomous from the state and bound by the legal order or set of shared rules as well as an intermediary entity standing between the private sphere and the state” (Diamond, 1994, p.5).

Conceptually, the interactive process in CMR is of three mutually reinforcing interfaces: the first is the interaction between the governmental institutions and the military; the second is the interaction between the civil society and the military; and third is the interaction between the civil society and the institutions in relation to the control of the military. Mutual interaction among these three elements of CMR is vital to stable polity. This is illustrated in Figure 1. Therefore, the state of CMR in any society is not static but dynamic, often shaped by factors that exist within and outside the military as an institution in the society.
The institutions of the state such as the executive, legislature and judiciary are expected to provide the military with the legislation, policies, resources, and oversight support necessary to sustain a professional force. The military, in turn, is expected to be able and willing to protect the citizens and institutions of the state against external and internal threats. This implies that the military is the servant of society, which exercises monopoly over the use of arms to protect the citizens and state. The civil society on the other hand works independently, but in most cases in collaboration with national and international institutions, to ensure that the military discharge its tasks in responsible, professional and accountable manner. In addition, the civil society will provide the military with information and other supports to attain the objectives of national security.

The foregoing shows that CMR is not a one-to-one interaction or relationship but a one-among-many interactions and relationship. In a democracy, CMR is underpinned by several principles: the supremacy of the people, the constitution of the state, adherence to rule of law,
conformity to laid down institutional processes, procedures, precedents, and respect for international norms, especially human rights (Shoemaker, cited in Zabadi, 2006). The interactions permeate all spheres of the polity. This entails therefore that the institutions of the state, the civil society and the military are interdependent and expected to play complementary roles for the stability of the polity. Healthy interaction among these actors is vital to the maintenance of peace, and even more critical in challenging situations that may require the use of the military in COIN operations. What then constitutes COIN is a pertinent issue at this juncture.

**Counter-Insurgency**

As with the concept of CMR, the search for a common understanding of COIN is easily frustrated by the absence of an agreed general definition due to the fact that each insurgency has its unique driving force. An insurgency is generally defined as “a drawn-out political-military campaign by an organized non-state movement that seeks to displace a government and control the population and resources of a country or region” (Cronin, 2008:3). It is a “protracted violent conflict in which one or more groups seek to overthrow or fundamentally change the political or social order in a state or region through the use of sustained violence, subversion, social disruption, and political action” (Moore, 2007, p.3). Therefore, COIN simply entails actions taken to overcome an insurgency.

According to Hart (1991), COIN refers to an effective strategy in combating insurgency using the overwhelming presence of troops in a pervasive manner that there is simply no place left for insurgents to hide. Though insightful, this definition perspective relies principally on military force to the exclusion of other measures. Thus, it is largely military-centric and makes little reference to the other factors such as the political and economic aspects of COIN. The United States Department of Defense defines COIN as “those military, paramilitary, economic, psychological, and civic actions taken by a government to defeat insurgency” (DoD, 2005). It involves all elements of national power in an offensive approach and can take place across the range of operations and spectrum of conflict. Although this definition acknowledges the different lines of operations in tackling insurgency, its emphasis on defeating insurgency depicts a military bias.

This article, therefore, adopts the definition of COIN by Moore (2007, p.14) which presents it as “an integrated set of political, economic, social, and security measures intended to end and prevent the recurrence of armed violence, create and maintain stable political, economic, and social structures, and resolve the underlying causes of an insurgency in order to establish and
sustain the conditions necessary for lasting stability”. As rightly noted by Moore, the conceptualisation both acknowledges the causes and dynamics of insurgency and the three-dimensional complexity of dealing with them and places military and security operations firmly within the wider context of the conflict. Perhaps most important, it also establishes the end-state of successful counterinsurgencies. Essentially, COIN strategies should be designed to simultaneously protect the population from insurgent violence, strengthen the legitimacy and capacity of government institutions to govern responsibly, and marginalize insurgents politically, socially, and economically. As noted in the U.S. Government Counterinsurgency Guide (2009, p.12), COIN “is often more population-centric (focused on securing and controlling a given population or populations) than enemy-centric (focused on defeating a particular enemy group). The utility of this perspective is that an effective COIN requires in-depth local, political, and cultural knowledge and influence that enable the affected government to mobilize the support of its people and resist the insurgency (Cronin, 2008).

Core Stakeholders and their Roles in Civil Military Relations in Nigeria

The promotion of peace, security and stability require the existence of robust CMR in a state. From the insight gleaned from the tripartite framework of CMR discussed in the preceding section, it is pertinent to highlight some of the critical stakeholders and their roles in fostering robust CMR in Nigeria. These core stakeholders - the military, the institutions and the civil society – have some critical roles to perform for the security and stability of the democratic polity.

The Military

The Nigerian constitution has already provided a good framework for the role of the Armed Forces of Nigeria (the military) in democracy. According to the 1999 Constitution, as amended, Nigeria is committed to maintaining a strong military for the purpose of defending Nigeria from external aggression; maintaining its territorial integrity and securing its borders from violation on land, sea or air; suppressing insurrection; and acting in aid of civil authorities to restore order when called upon to do so by the president, but subject to such conditions as may be prescribed by an act of the National Assembly (NASS). These tasks are quite challenging, especially when acting in aid of civil authority since it invariably compels the military to maintain unusual presence in a space dominated by civil populace. To be sure aid to civil authority is not the primary role of the Nigerian military, but it is vital to the preservation of national security. Such roles have increased in recent times due to multiple security challenges facing the nation, especially the Boko Haram insurgency.
In order to promote democratic stability and overall national security, the military is expected to be accountable to the rule of law, subordinates itself to civil authority, assist in articulating and implementing the national security strategy or defence policy, respect human rights principles and practices, and provide strategic advice to the political leadership. Other roles include, maintain high-level professionalism in discharge of assigned tasks, provide assistance to civilian authority in times of emergency, and assist the police and other agencies to maintain law and order.

Institution

There are numerous and diverse institutions in Nigeria that have critical roles to play in ensuring stable CMR. These institutions include, but are not limited to, the National Assembly (NASS), Ministries, Departments and Agencies (MDAs), and commissions. Regarding relevant MDAs, the Ministry of Defence, National Human Rights Commission (NHRC), and the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) readily come to mind. The relevant institutions of the state have responsibility to ensure the existence of a competent, accountable, representative and professional military. These institutions have the responsibility to check abuses by the military in the society, ensure balanced recruitment into the military, appropriate adequate resources for the military, and approve disciplinary action or sanctions imposed on indicted military personnel. Others include approve the deployment of the military for ISO or PSO, support mechanisms to ensure fiscal and professional accountability in the military, provide legal and policy frameworks to guide the military, and promotes awareness on defence issues and military culture.

In a democratic setting, the effectiveness of these institutions is always a function of the degree of their institutionalization. The level of institutionalisation could be assessed base on four key variables: autonomy, adaptability, complexity and coherence (Huntington, 1968). Autonomy refers to the capacity institutions have to make and implement their own decisions. Adaptability entails the capacity to adjust to environmental changes, importing requisite resources to support the adaptation if necessary. Complexity demonstrates the capacity of an institution to construct internal structures to fulfil its goals and to cope with the environment. Coherence is about an institution's capacity to manage its own workload and to develop procedures to process tasks in a timely and reasonable manner. When state institutions have low level of institutionalisation, the tendency is for the military and indeed other security establishments to act in unaccountable and irresponsible manner.
**Civil Society**

The civil society as earlier noted is a critical component of CMR in any society. The civil society covers the entire gamut of actors outside the realm of the State. It includes trade unions, paramilitary and security agencies, the media, CSOs, professional associations, faith-based groups, NGOs, media organisations, community-based groups and private citizens, among others. The roles of civil society in entrenching robust CMR include promoting respect for the military, advocating popular support for the military in peace and conflict times, engaging the military in dialogues on public concerns, and exposing human rights abuses by the military. Other vital roles include creating public awareness on military culture, and exposing abuse or misuse of the military by the political class, among others.

**Broad Actors in Counter-Insurgency Operations in the North East**

The environment of North East is saturated with actors that have crucial and mutually reinforcing roles to play for the success of COIN operations in the region. The first broad category of actors is state security forces, encompassing the military, paramilitary, intelligence, security and law enforcement agencies. In this regard, the military actors include the Army, Air Force and Navy. The paramilitary actors are Nigerian Immigration Service (NIS), Nigerian Prisons Service (NPS), Nigerian Custom Service (NCS) and National Drug Law Enforcement Agency (NDLEA). The intelligence outfits encompass Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA), Department of State Services (DSS), and National Intelligence Agency (NIA). The security and law enforcement actors include the Nigeria Police Force (NPF), Nigeria Security and Civil Defence Corps (NSCDC), and Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC). As depicted in Figure 2, these forces are deployed to protect the civilian population in countering Boko Haram insurgency.
There is equally another critical broad category: non-state security actors. This group covers informal or voluntary policing groups, such as vigilante groups or neighbourhood watch which play a pivotal role in addressing safety and security needs, mainly at community levels. In the context of the North East, they include, but not limited to the CJTF, Hunters Association, Pulaaku Brigade, VGN (Onuoha and Kwaja, 2018).

Another notable broad category is humanitarian actors, including United Nations agencies, international non-governmental organisations and local non-governmental organisations working to help the women, children and men who have been forced to flee their homes as a result of the Boko Haram insurgency. They provide all kinds of support such as water, food, shelter, medical care, education, protection services, and many other forms of practical assistance that people need in an emergency to survive. Over 3,000 Nigerian humanitarian aid workers work in the North East (Okafor, 2018). As at mid-2018, over 126 non-governmental organisations were operating in Borno State, the epicentre of the Boko Haram crisis (Okoye, 2018).
There is yet another set of actors that actually play an incredibly important role in the North East, and they could be categorised as civil society. This broad category is comprised of groups or organizations working in the interest of the citizens but operating outside of the governmental and for-profit sectors (White, 2018). With respect to the North East, civil society include labour unions, private citizens, faith-based groups, local NGOs, the media, traditional and religious institutions, and other service agencies that provide an important service to society but generally ask for very little in return.

Civil Military Relations and Counterinsurgency Operations in the North East

From a CMR point of view, these broad actors should work in collaboration with one another in order to serve the public. However, their interactions in the North East are fraught with tensions (Tsokar, 2016; Adeniyi, 2012). Using the military as a focal point in the COIN operations, tension has manifested in the relations between the military and the humanitarian actors, the military and the civil society (citizens), and military and other security agencies. A brief reflection on the nature of these tensions and the associated implications for the success of COIN operations is pertinent at this juncture.

Tension between the Military and Civil Society

The deployment of state security forces is primarily oriented towards the protection of the population while confronting the insurgents or terrorists. This is consistent with the aphorism of the counterinsurgency expert, John Nagl that “population security is the first requirement of success in counterinsurgency.” Hence, successful COIN Operations are population-centric. Despite modest success recorded by the military in the ongoing COIN operations such as reclaiming of territory previously held by the insurgents and the free of hostages, its kinetic approach has often posed serious challenges to protection of civilians. In particular, tensions have erupted between the military and civil society primarily over issues bordering on civilian harm more broadly and human rights violations more specifically. Data in table 1 is not exhaustive, but they represent some notable instances of tension between the military and the civil society.
Table 1: Some Cases of Tension between the Military and Civil Society in the North East

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>S/No</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Incident</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>6 January 2019</td>
<td>Maiduguri</td>
<td>Unlawful invasion of Daily Trust Newspaper office and arrest of its staff: Uthman Abubakar and Ibrahim Sawab</td>
<td>The Army accused the newspaper of divulging “classified military information, thus undermining national security”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>15 August 2016</td>
<td>Maiduguri</td>
<td>Army’s declaration of Ahmad Salkida wanted for obtaining the video of the April 14th kidnapping of Chibok girls</td>
<td>The journalist is known to have access to Boko Haram. He was later arrested by the DSS on 5 September 2016</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>13 April 2018</td>
<td>Giwa barracks in Maiduguri, Borno State</td>
<td>The Detention of an estimated 4,900 people in extremely overcrowded cells</td>
<td>Some children were alleged to have been unlawful detained along with their parents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>16 February 2015</td>
<td>Hausari, Maiduguri, Borno State</td>
<td>Clash between the military and the CJTF over insistence by the latter on inspecting the ammunition-laden trucks of the military</td>
<td>5 members of the CJTF were allegedly killed by the military in the clash</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>21 February, 2015</td>
<td>Jimeta Shopping Complex, Yola, Adamawa State</td>
<td>The clash between an Army officer and CJTF member</td>
<td>People were forced to vacate the place for fear of being killed in the process</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>9 March 2014</td>
<td>Maiduguri, Borno State</td>
<td>Clash between the military and the CJTF over refusal to stop questioning 5 plain cloth soldiers who they were told to allow by the military</td>
<td>The confrontation led to the death of one CJTF</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Authors’ compilation
Nagarajan (2017) has identified three key dimensions of civilian harm caused by the actions or inactions of the military in the North East. These actions have implications for CMR in the region. First is the failure to protect vulnerable and at-risk communities from insurgent attacks. Some soldiers are known to have fled from communities when they hear that insurgents are approaching, leaving the civilians in the area to fend for themselves. The second is the failure to prevent collateral damage during military operations, thereby causing direct and indirect harm. The third, and most disturbing, is allegations of human rights violations by soldiers deployed to protect the citizens. Such infractions include unlawful detention, harassment, the destruction of property, sexual violence, torture, and excessive use of force, among others. For instance, the Amnesty International (2015a) alleged that between 2009 and 2015, Nigerian military forces arbitrarily arrested at least 20,000, including children as young as nine.

To be sure, human right protection is a key factor in the way affected society or the international community largely perceive or judge a particular COIN operation. Human rights violations by state security forces do expose the entire COIN operations to moral, reputational, legal, and strategic risks. From a moral prism, rights violations by security forces place huge moral burden on political and military leaders when citizens suffer in the hands of those that should have protected them. Human rights violations by the military and CJTF was a contributory factor in the rise the Knifar women's movement in the North East. The Movement is a group of displaced women, representing more than 1200 men, women and children in military-run detention centres, who are campaigning for justice (Soniyi, 2017). Like the military, the CJTF has been accused of gradually becoming a law unto itself, perpetrating vices like rape, armed robbery, stealing, killings and harassment of innocent people. In addition, the actions of their members have occasionally caused tension in their relations with the military.

From a reputational prism, alleged and proven cases of human rights violations by security forces paint a negative image of the COIN operation. From a legal perspective, it usually triggers investigation and possible prosecution of such abuses by the Nigerian military, either at national courts or at the International Criminal Court (ICC). The commencement of investigation of Nigerian Army for human rights abuses by the ICC in April 2016 is a typical example (Premium Times, 2016). From strategic point of view, it hinders necessary bilateral and international assistance such as equipment support, capacity building, and intelligence sharing, among others, critical in defeating the insurgents. Nowhere is this more evident than in the dynamics of US-Nigeria cooperation in the fight against the Boko Haram. As Burchard and Burgess (2019, p.15) posited:
In mid-2014, after another round of Nigerian military human rights abuses, the United States withheld intelligence from the Nigerian government on Boko Haram/ISWAP until the Government of Nigeria provided credible assurances that its forces would act in accordance with international law of armed conflict and international human rights norms and denied a request from Israel to conduct a third-party transfer of Cobra helicopters to Nigeria.

Beyond private citizens, there is equally tension in the relation between the military and other elements of civil society, especially the media. Such tension has always emanated from the nature of reports by journalists or media organisations on the ongoing COIN, which the military consider as inimical to its operations in the North East. The invasion of Daily Trust Newspaper's offices in Abuja and Maiduguri in January 2019 is the most recent example of cat and dog life characteristic of military-media relations in the theatre of COIN operations.

*Tension between the Military and Humanitarian Actors*

Another manifestation of CMR tension with grave implications for the success of COIN operations in the North East is the unhealthy relations between the Nigerian Army and various humanitarian actors and international advocacy groups such as the United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund (UNICEF) and Amnesty International. As listed in table 2, such tensions have emanated either largely from reports of these groups which were critical of the human rights records of the military in its COIN operations or some activities of these groups the military considers as inimical to Nigeria's national security or capable of undermining ongoing fight against terrorism and insurgency. The military have often responded by either issuing a rebuttal to such reports or, in some extreme cases, suspending the actions of such actors.
Table 2: Some Cases of Tension between the Military and Humanitarian Organizations in the North East

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>S/No</th>
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<th>Location</th>
<th>Incident</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>17 December, 2018</td>
<td>Theatre Command Maiduguri, Borno State</td>
<td>Nigerian Army called for the closure of Amnesty offices in the country for allegedly trying to destabilize and dismember the country.</td>
<td>Amnesty International was accused of fabricating what the military called fictitious allegations of alleged human rights abuses against the Nigerian security forces.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>14 December, 2018</td>
<td>Maiduguri, Borno State</td>
<td>The military suspends the UNICEF, accusing it of training and deploying spies who supports the insurgents and their collaborators.</td>
<td>The suspension attracted deluge of criticism both from Nigerian and international community.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>27 April 2018</td>
<td>Maiduguri, Borno State</td>
<td>UNICEF alleged that the Nigerian military deploy children below the age of 18 in the fight against Boko Haram, and that boys detained at Giwa barracks were being used as cooks, messengers and porters.</td>
<td>The Theatre Command of Lafiya Dole had described UNICEF’s reports as unfounded and staged by the enemies of the gallant Nigerian military.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>14 April 2018</td>
<td>Maiduguri, Borno State</td>
<td>Military’s declaration of three UNICEF Staff (Priscilla Hoveyda, Maher Farea and Milen Kidane) ‘persona non grata’, in connection with alleged leaks of information about soldiers sexually abusing children in the North East.</td>
<td>This development created tension between the Nigerian military and UNICEF.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Authors’ compilation
On 14 December 2018, for instance, the Nigerian Army imposed a three months suspension of UNICEF on the grounds that some of the international humanitarian agencies and non-governmental organisations operating in the North East are sabotaging the war against insurgency. The Army claimed that “there is credible information that some of them are indulging in unwholesome practices that could further jeopardise the fight against terrorism and insurgency, as they train and deploy spies who support the insurgents and their sympathisers” (Ameh, 2018: Online).

Interventions by the US and the UN made the Nigerian Army to quickly rescind the controversial suspension few hours after it was announced. This is essentially because Army did not provide any evidence of its accusations and did not state if it had the approval of President Muhammadu Buhari to take such decision. The high-level diplomatic interventions forced the Army to hurriedly issue another press release few hours later to avoid a diplomatic face-off that could have cost Nigeria dearly.

Existing tension, acrimony and mistrust that manifested between the Nigerian military and these international humanitarian organizations in recent times represent a potent threat to healthy CMR. Some of these organisations and human rights groups have strong connections with foreign powers, and their reports do help in shaping the foreign policy of these states. Hence, how the Nigerian military manages its relations with these set of actors have serious implications not only for the success of COIN operations but also Nigeria's external relations. To avoid tensions with these actors, the military should conduct prompt dispassionate investigation of any infraction of the fundamental rights of the citizens by its personnel as well as conduct careful verification of activities of groups operating in the North East to avoid taking ill-advised actions.

**Tension between the Military and Security Agencies**

Since the start of the Boko Haram insurgency in 2009, the military, particularly the Nigerian Army, has been in the forefront of COIN operations in the North East. This dates back to the July 2009 Boko Haram uprising during which a joint police and military task force codenamed Operation FLUSH was deployed to brutally suppress the revolt (Onuoha, 2010). The operation commanded by Colonel Ben Ahanotu, led to the arrest and killing of several of the group’s members before Yusuf was eventually caught alive on July 30, 2009. He was later handed over to the Police for interrogation but was eventually killed extra-judicially.
Alarmed by the group's growing capacity few years after the 2009 revolt, President Goodluck Jonathan authorised the deployment of a military Joint Task Force (JTF) Operation Restore Order on June 8, 2011, to secure Maiduguri and check the frequency and intensity of attacks by the Boko Haram (Irabor, 2017). The JTF was an ensemble of state security forces: Nigerian Army, Nigerian Navy, Nigerian Air Force, Nigerian Police and the State Security Services.

Given that effective COIN Operation requires intervention across multiple agencies, these security actors are expected to collaborate and synergise efforts towards degrading and defeating the insurgency. Therefore, robust inter-agency coordination and collaboration becomes crucial in maximising opportunities and resources in tackling a highly mobile and ideologically driven insurgent group. However, mistrust and rivalry among them have led to weak coordination and limited intelligence sharing with negative effects on national security. Adeniyi (2012, p.5) succinctly captured the situation thus:

What is, however, peculiar to our nation is a situation where senior officials of these critical agencies constitutionally responsible for protecting us would not only openly trade blames and damaging accusations but would indeed seek to discredit one another in the media in a bid to score cheap advantage. And because of the danger this portends for our national security, there is need for an urgent intervention at the level of political leadership.

Antagonism between the military and other security agencies as well as between and among security agencies has hampered success of ongoing COIN. What is particularly worrisome is that such rivalry and tension have in some isolated cases resulted in violent clashes. Data in table 3 illustrate some incidents of inter-agency rivalry and clashes in COIN theatre in the North East. Clashes among security agencies represent the most dangerous manifestation of unstable CMR in the COIN operations in the North East.
Table 3: Some Cases of Tension between the Military and Security Agencies in the North East

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>S/No</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Incident</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>27 February 2018</td>
<td>Dapchi Town, Yobe State</td>
<td>Kidnap of 110 students of Government Girls' Technical College, Dapchi, by ISWAP militants</td>
<td>The military and the police openly traded blame on each other over the security arrangement in the town that made the abduction possible</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>17 April 2017</td>
<td>Damaturu, Yobe State</td>
<td>Clash between a serving Army Captain and some mobile policemen over a girlfriend the military officer allegedly snatched from a mobile policeman</td>
<td>Four mobile police officers and one soldier died in the confrontation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>21 March, 2017</td>
<td>Magumeri village, Borno State</td>
<td>Stand-off between the Army with other security agencies such DSS, Police and CJTF over receiving early warning about the Boko Haram attack in the town</td>
<td>Four soldiers with other security agencies personnel also were casualties from the attack</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>23 June, 2016</td>
<td>Maiduguri, Borno State</td>
<td>Gunfight between the military and police over the distribution of bags of rice meant for the internally displaced persons (IDPs) at Government House, Maiduguri</td>
<td>A policeman was allegedly shot on the leg</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Authors' compilation
Tragic incidents of this nature have become a recurring decimal among the security forces across Nigeria. Why these forces that are supposedly the embodiment of discipline have always engaged in rivalry and violent confrontations remains perplexing. While some have loosely attributed it to superiority contest among the various security agencies, the alleged non-obedience to the rule of law by most of the agencies is largely responsible (Vanguard, 2011). Thus, the insurgency has persisted partly as a result of professional deficits on the part of state security forces, including lack of synergy in operations and sharing of intelligence.

From the foregoing discussion, it is evident that there are several factors responsible for the tension in CMR in the COIN theatre. Some of the contributory factors to unstable CMR in the region include rivalry, mistrust, poor training, weak institutions and overlapping responsibilities. The environment of North East is replete with numerous state actors with very little thin line that separates their roles. As a result, rivalry and mistrust do manifest in the process of carrying out their functions.

The results of a desktop exercise administered by the first author to over 36 participants (comprising the police and NSCDC) of CLEEN Foundation training on CMR in Rivers state on 8 June 2017, and 48 participants (comprising the police and NSCDC) in Borno state on 7 September 2017, identified inter-agency rivalry as a major impediment to robust CMR. Mistrust, rivalry and over-protection of operational turfs (empire syndrome) by these outfits are some of the factors that militate against effective intelligence gathering and synergy in operations. The reason for such rivalry is the rush by some agency to claim achievements that was made by another agency or through the collaboration of other agencies in ways that diminishes the valuable contributions of their counterparts in the theatre of operations.

In the context of the North East, “the situation is compounded when the government shows favouritism in incentive allocation to the agencies or when one agency unduly claims credit for the success of COIN operations"(Ibrahim, 2017: personal communication). This view is corroborated by (Tsokar, 2016) when he noted that the grudge of most of the security agencies is that, the military, particularly the Army has consistently failed to acknowledge the inputs of the other security agencies in their unbridled support to the campaign to defeat the insurgents.

This situation has created deep mistrust among the security forces operating in the region. Inter-Service mistrust (between the Army, Navy and Airforce) and inter-agency rivalry (between the military and other agencies such as the Police and DSS, etc) hampers timely
generation, processing and sharing of intelligence in the theatre of operation. This unhealthy situation has impeded optimal collaboration and performance against terrorists and insurgent groups in the region. Also, mistrust between the military and humanitarian actors have undermined confidence building and efficient delivery of humanitarian assistance to those in need.

The problem of inadequate training and equipment for security forces contribute to the tensed CMR in the North East. First, ill-equipped and poorly trained security forces lack the will and zeal to defend vulnerable communities and citizens. When and where security forces fail to prevent civilian harm, public trust and support tend to wane. Citizen's distrust of state security forces often impacts on CMR. Second, well trained and equipped forces are better prepared to respect human rights while combating unconventional threats than poorly trained and kitted security forces. There have been several claims that Nigeria's security agencies lack adequate training to confront the Boko Haram insurgents.

Weak mechanisms or institutions to enforce both internal and external accountability are other factors that hinder effective CMR in COIN operations. Successive administrations most of the time lack the political will to redress issues of human rights violations by security forces. The NHRC charged with the protection and promotion of the rights of the citizenry has not been outstanding. Lawyers in the commission are unable to take up cases of violations of human rights especially those perpetrated by security agents as such cases could even be taken up at the risk of their own lives (Nzarga, 2014). Thus, effective accountability structure and institutions will be critical in enforcing decisions that improve CMR in COIN operations in the North East.

**Conclusion and Recommendations**

The Nigerian military has recorded measurable successes in its war against insurgency. The relative peace so far restored in the troubled states of Adamawa, Borno and Yobe before the recent resurgence of attacks by the Boko Haram, and its progeny, Islamic State in West Africa Province, can be attributed to collaboration between the military and other actors – security, humanitarian and civil – operating in the region. Notwithstanding the modest success, there is still challenges associated with the quality of CMR that have impacted negatively on COIN operations. Given that effective COIN operation requires intervention across multiple agencies, robust CMR is extremely crucial. To achieve stable CMR for enhanced COIN operations in Nigeria, the following strategic recommendations are proffered.
**Escalating Training and Retraining:** Since the return to democracy, successive administrations have taken measures to improve on professionalism of the officers of the military and other security agencies by expanding training and retraining of officers, including on the fundamentals of Humanitarian Law and Human Rights Law. While these training programmes have helped to shape the orientation of officers, its effect is yet to trickle down on soldiers and rank and file of the police who are the ones that mostly engage in conducts that undermine human rights. There is the need, therefore, for authorities to review and expand training curricular for the junior officers and other ranks in the military/security agencies to inculcate in them the right democratic values of respect for human rights and professionalism. In the long term, the Nigerian government should develop a framework for the joint training of all prospective candidates for employment in the military and other security agencies in a manner that brings them together under one regimented training programme for at least one year. Thereafter, candidates can then be deployed to their specific forces for further agency-specific training in line with their chosen profession. The idea of such joint training at the early stages of recruitment is that it will build the spirit of one national force in them; enabling instructors to instill in them the consciousness of equality in all the forces irrespective of the agency one will eventually pursue his or her career.

**Promoting Public Awareness:** Years of military authoritarianism has created a 'hate' mentality of the military on the larger civilian population. There is the need for CSOs and NGOs to expand their awareness programmes to improve the knowledge of the public on the workings and organizational culture of the military institution. Such awareness or sensitization programmes will assist the civilian populace in evincing more positive image and support for the military. It could be in the form of radio or television programmes, sponsored adverts and publications. The awareness programme will be critical in breaking down the barriers of mutual mistrust or resentment that have existed between the military and the civilian populace.

**Creating Common Media Briefing Platform:** The creation of a common media briefing platform is one of the ways of improving CMR to reduce the problem of rivalry and envy that results from the quest by one agency to project its image as being either more important than others in the field. It will require the adoption of a policy on crisis communication. The policy will establish a common media briefing platform for the multitude of agencies involved in the COIN operations. It will also clearly set the guidelines on how to communicate achievements to the members of the public with representatives of all the agencies. This will go a long way to erode the basis of rivalry, and consequently deepen CMR. It will equally inform the kind of
continuous and constructive dialogue between the military and the media on the conduct of the war against the insurgents. Such collaboration is crucial to enable the media properly inform and educate the society on the ongoing COIN operations in the North-East. Robust media-military relation is vital in countering terrorists' propaganda and building good image for the Nigerian military.

_Instituting Military Inter-Agency Board (MIAB):_ Instituting of a Military Inter-Agency Board (MIAB) will be useful in checkmating and subsequently, eliminating incidents of violent clashes. This is mostly between security agencies and the military. This is especially both in COIN theatres and elsewhere in the society, where misunderstanding has led to violent clashes. The current practice where once there is any incident of violent confrontation, the leadership of the military and security agencies will set up an adhoc joint investigation panel to uncover the immediate and remote causes of the problem and recommend ways to avert future reoccurrence have failed to address the problem. A possible explanation for this is the undue influence of such constituting authority in teleguiding the activities of the panel, and shaping the outcome of their investigation. This adhoc or case-by-case approach denies the government of institutional memory in dealing with such sensitive and serious security breaches. An institutionalised and durable framework in the form of the MIAB stands in a better position to handle such cases in a more transparent, accountable, responsive and dispassionate manner. Members of the MIAB would include a retired judge of enviable repute, representatives of the military and all security agencies, representative of the Ministries of Interior and Justice, representatives of the Nigerian Bar Association and two other reputable civil society organisations with track record on public safety.

_Instituting independent investigation panel:_ There is the need therefore for the Federal Government in collaboration with the NHRC to establish a formidable independent panel to urgently investigate all cases of human rights abuse allegedly committed by the military, police, and other security agencies in the course of discharging their duties. The panel should be composed of people of impeccable integrity, with the capacity to undertake transparent and diligent prosecution of several allegations of human rights violations, with a view to offering redress where necessary. This is essential to serve as a deterrent to potential violators and to deepen people's trust of the government.

_Adoption of protocol on multi-agency COIN deployment:_ To improve the efficacy of security operations, it will be useful to articulate a protocol of engagement that will clearly demarcate and
properly streamline the areas of responsibility and authority of the various law enforcement and security agencies. This will help to eliminate, or at least reduce, incidences of inter-agency rivalry and role conflicts.

*Conducting agency perception survey:* Conduct of agency perception survey (APS) by state security forces (military and security agencies) will help to gauge the feelings of the local population about the forces in ways that offer insight into their relations with the local population. Such APS can range from the very rudimentary involving commanding officers of the force having regular informal discussions with local population on the conduct and progress of the COIN Operations to a more sophisticated survey designed and conducted by an independent polling organisation to capture the views of the people in both agency-specific and whole-of-operations dimensions. The insights glean from such survey can assist operational and strategic leaders both in better designing and implementing operations to win the hearts and minds of the local population and in delivering short in-theatre training or refresher courses for troops involved in COIN operations.
DEEPENING CIVIL MILITARY RELATIONS FOR EFFECTIVE PEACE-BUILDING AND DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE IN NIGERIA

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Deepening Civil Military Relations for Effective Peace-Building and Democratic Governance in Nigeria


The 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria


Chapter 3

UNDERSTANDING THE MILITARY AS AN INSTITUTION

By
Colonel MA Obari

Introduction

From time immemorial, nations seek avenue to protect its citizens from adversaries by organizing armed men to garrison the state. This was aptly demonstrated in the city of Mesopotamia and Athens in the medieval times. The roles of a country's armed forces are entrenched in her Constitution. The defence of the territorial integrity and other core interests of the nation form the major substance of such roles which eventually impacts on how such military institution would be constituted to suit its responsibilities. The United States is the world's strongest nation, enjoying unique advantages in technology, energy, demographics, military, alliances and partnerships. However, these advantages are being challenged but the US military remain the hub for its' national cohesion. In South Africa, the military are ubiquitous which asserts their capabilities wherever deployed to restore order and national cohesion.

The Nigerian military was established by an act of National Assembly during the first republic whose roles are consequently stipulated in the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (CFRN) 1999, Armed Forces Act Cap A20 Law of the Federation of Nigeria and the National Defence Policy (NDP). In line with this objective, the CFRN in Section 217 (1and 2) stated that, “there shall be an armed forces for the Federation which shall consist of an Army, a Navy and Air Forces…for the purpose of defending Nigeria against external aggression; maintaining its territorial integrity and securing its borders from violation on land, sea and air; suppressing insurrection and acting in aid of civil authorities; performing such other functions as

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may be prescribed by an Act of the National Assembly”. It is on this concept of collective security need that the Armed Forces of Nigeria (AFN) was established, equipped, as an element of the Nigeria National Power, to carry out necessary security functions.

The AFN is made up of the Army, Navy and the Air Force. They are highly trained and ready to respond at a moment's notice to natural or human-made disasters anywhere in the country, within West Africa sub region, Africa and the world at large under the auspices of African Union or United Nations respectively. Yet many Nigerians' knowledge about the military is limited to what they have acquired from movies, books, and media reports. Few outside the military understand the culture, the values, or the people who make up the most resilient military force within the sub region and Africa at large. What do people see in the Nigerian Armed Forces that makes them dedicate their lives, and their families' lives to military service? What is the Nigerian military and who are the people who fill its ranks? How does terrorism in the North East affected today's Armed Forces? What does this mean for the professionals who would want to enlist into the services? This paper is designed to answer some of these questions by providing an overview of the military as an institution, the service members and their families who are the backbone of the institution, and how current military conflicts have affected service members, their families, and the future of military service. However, the information contained herein is not an exhaustive overview of military culture but provides the general public with a basic understanding of the unique life and culture in the military.

It is within this framework that Nigerian's military as an institution will be examined. The purpose of this paper therefore is to discuss Nigerian Armed Forces as an institution, the culture, and the people for the understanding of the general public. It will conceptualise some key terms, give an overview of Nigerian Military and its structure of the Nigerian Military as well its achievements. It will also draw some lessons.

**Conceptual Clarifications**

In discussing this write up, certain terminologies that would aid clarity would be highlighted. These include the military and institution.

**Concept of Military**: The word military is a Latin word “militaris' meaning of soldiers or war, of military service, warlike," "soldier," meaning" one who marches in a troop, "and thus connected to Sanskritmelah "assembly, "Greekhomilos ")assembled crowd. According to Ojo “the military establishment of a nation involves the armed forces, the personnel, especially commissioned officers and soldiers of all services taken collectively. This definition will be adopted in this paper.
**Concept of an Institution:** According to Bellany “it is an organization, establishment, foundation, society, or the like, devoted to the promotion of a particular cause or program, especially one of a public, educational, or charitable character for the well-being of the populace. Onipede, a sociologist observes that an institution is “a well-established and structured pattern of behaviour or of relationships that is accepted as a fundamental part of a culture, or organization for the well-being of the society. Onipede's definition will be adopted in this paper.

**Overview of the Nigerian Military**

The Nigerian Military are the Armed Forces of the Federal Republic of Nigeria established by an act of parliament. Its origin lies in the elements of the Royal West African Frontier Force that became Nigerian when independence was granted in 1960. In 1956 the Nigeria Regiment of the Royal West African Frontier Force (RWAFF) was renamed the Nigerian Military Forces, and in April 1958 the Colonial Government of Nigeria took over from the British War Office control of the Nigerian Military Forces. Since its creation the Nigerian military has fought in a civil war (the conflict with Biafra in 1967 – 70) and sent peacekeeping forces abroad both with the United Nations and as the backbone of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Cease-fire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) in Liberia and Sierra Leone.

The Nigerian Army (NA) is the land branch of the Nigerian Armed Forces and the largest among the armed forces. The history of the Nigerian Army dates back to 1863, when Lt. Glover of the Royal Navy selected 18 indigenes from the Northern part of the country and organized them into a local force, known as the “Glover Hausas” which later metamorphosed into the Nigerian Army on the attainment of independence in 1960. The Command structure based in Abuja is supported by various Army Headquarters Departments, Corps, major formations such as the 1, 2, 3, 81 and 82 Divisions as well as the newly formed 7 and 8 Divisions and schools.

The Nigerian Navy (NN) is the sea branch of the Nigerian Armed Forces. The origin of the Nigerian Navy could be traced to the colonial marine Department of the Royal Navy. This Department was established in 1887 as a quasi-military organization combining the duties of the present day Nigerian Ports Authority, the Inland Water Ways and the modern day Navy. Elements of the Marine Department took part in military operations against the Germans in Cameroun during the First World War between 1914 and 1918. On 1 June 1956, the NNDF commenced operations with eleven assorted ships and craft comprising 2 survey vessels (PETREL and PATHFINDER), 2 training boats (DIGNITY and NYMPH), one patrol craft (CHALLENGER),
3 VIP boats (VALIANT and FRANCES with her Launch), one tug (TROJAN) and one general purpose launch (JADE). Similarly, on 1 August 1956, the first naval legislation was passed by the House of Representatives and was assented to on 5 September 1956 by Sir James Robertson, the Governor General. It was called the Nigerian Navy Ordinance. Captain Skutil, was the first officer to head the Nigerian Navy Defence Force (NNDF) from 1956. The Nigerian Navy command structure today consists of the Naval Headquarters based in Abuja, three operational commands with headquarters in Lagos, Calabar, and Bayelsa. Training Command's headquarter is located in Lagos but with training facilities spread all over Nigeria. There are five operational bases, five forward operational bases (with two more soon to come on stream), two dockyards located in Lagos and Port Harcourt and two fleets based in Lagos and Calabar.

The Nigerian Air Force (NAF) was formally established in January 1964 with technical assistance from West Germany. The NAF started life as a transport unit with aircrew being trained in Canada, Ethiopia and Pakistan. The air force did not get a combat capability until a number of MiG-17 aircraft were presented by the Soviet Union in 1966. In 2007 the Air Force had a total strength of 10,000. It flies transport, trainer, helicopter, and fighter aircraft. As at date the NAF has added other platforms to its fleet. Nigeria also has pursued a policy of developing domestic training and military production capabilities. Like any large organization with a well-established history, the Nigerian Armed Forces has its own culture, language, and ways of conducting business. For civilians with little or no personal exposure to the military culture, the Armed Forces may seem overwhelming, incomprehensible, esoteric, or even anachronistic. However, to understand, work with, and help those who serve in the Armed Forces, it is necessary to have a general understanding of the institution.

**Structure of the Nigerian Military**

The Nigerian military is civilian controlled, and the ultimate authority is the President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, who serves as the Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces, in a civilian rather than a military capacity. This power is vested in him through the CFRN 1999 but, gives the National Assembly and the President the power to declare war. The Nigerian military is an agency of the Federal Government, whose role it is to implement the policies set by legislatures and the Commander in Chief. The Minister of Defense (MOD), a cabinet-level position, is the Principal Defence Policy Advisor to the President and is responsible for the formulation of general defense policy and policy related to all matters of direct and primary concern to the Defence Headquarters through the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) and for the
execution of approved policy. Under the direction of the President, the MOD in synergy with CDS exercises authority, direction, and control over the Department of Defence. The MOD is the primary tenant agency inside the ship house and is responsible for providing the military forces needed to deter war and protect the security of the Nigeria. The MOD serves as second in command of the Armed Forces under the President. The CDS and the Service Chiefs of Staff are responsible for the readiness of the three branches of the Armed Forces and serve as the President's military advisors who do not serve in any military chain of command.

Branches of Service

There are three branches of the military; the Army, Navy and the Air Force, under three primary military departments coordinated by DHQ, the Department of the Army, the Department of the Navy, and the Department of the Air Force.

Military Ranks and Chain of Command

Military rank is about leadership and responsibility. As an individual is promoted through the military ranks, he or she assumes additional responsibility for more personnel, equipment, resources, and missions/operations. Military ranks are divided into three categories such as the enlisted, officers, and warrant officers. Enlisted ranks include the ranks of private, corporal, sergeant, seaman, petty officer, etc. as contained in Insignia of the Nigerian Armed Forces Rank Structure. Officers rank structures are lieutenant, captain, major, colonel, and brigadier general among others and their equivalents in other services. Rank is identified administratively by pay grade. Enlisted service members comprise the “workforce” of the services. They are the men and women patrolling the streets, fixing equipment, cooking meals, processing the paperwork, and performing the thousands of tasks that keep the military functioning. NCOs are in charge or in control (as opposed to in command) of their units and have significant responsibility for the health and well-being of the people in a unit. It is the NCO’s responsibility to ensure that service members are being fed, equipped, and trained, that they are getting enough sleep, and that they are ready to perform their mission. Officers are commissioned by and ultimately derive their authority from the President and are confirmed by the Senate and Services Councils.

Officers command units and are the ultimate authority and responsible party in any military unit. While they leave maintenance of troops to their NCOs, they are responsible for planning, directing, coordinating, and controlling their troops in the accomplishment of an assigned mission or operation. Warrant officers are also considered non-commissioned officers and hold warrants from their service authority. Warrant officers are generally considered
technical experts in a specific area. They do not hold any command authority, nor are they responsible for personnel. They are experts in maintenance, computers, aircraft, personnel functions, and other areas.

**Chain of Command**

Each military unit from the largest (combatant commands) to the smallest section composed of four to ten Service members with a very clear chain of command. The chain of command is based solely on the rank of the individual and there is one assigned officer in charge, the commander and/or one enlisted or NCO at each level who bear all responsibility for the unit. As an individual meets certain benchmarks, including time in service, time at the current rank, and military education requirements, he or she is promoted up the chain of command. With each promotion up through the ranks comes additional responsibilities and greater pay. Additional responsibilities usually include oversight of a greater number of lower-ranking service members and more equipment.

Regardless of rank and the number of individuals for whom a higher-ranking service member is responsible, it is the job of the man or woman in charge to ensure that his or her service members are adequately trained in their jobs, have the necessary equipment to do their jobs, are getting the necessary sleep and food to remain at peak performance, and are following the rules and regulations that dictate military performance on and off the job. In the civilian sector, seldom will someone under the age of 25 years be placed in charge of large numbers of personnel and equipment. However, it is commonplace for newly minted second lieutenants, fresh from Nigerian Defence Academy, to be placed in charge of 30 or more service members and in some cases millions of dollars' worth of equipment. They are responsible for the lives and safety of those who work for them. In a combat environment, the stress level increases exponentially and these young officers quickly lose their greenness as they are hardened by combat, death and loss.

Each unit is clearly structured and organized based on accepted doctrine that is ingrained from the instant an individual first puts on the uniform. Individuals are immediately trained to operate within the chain of command. Each service member has a specific individual he or she reports to and who is responsible for addressing that individual's concerns or problems. “Jumping the chain of command” in most situations is strictly forbidden and may result in formal or informal disciplinary action. Orders are issued from the top of the chain of command to the lowest-ranking members of the unit. The commander may encourage dialogue, may review recommendations for different courses of action from his or her subordinates, and may weigh
various inputs in making his or her final decision; but once an order is issued, the decision is considered final. The order is executed without question. Service members who hesitate in executing an order or who publicly question an order run the risk of at least being formally or informally disciplined and at worst risking the lives of their fellow service members.

The exception the military makes for not following a direct order occurs when the order is believed to be unethical, immoral, or illegal. If an immoral or illegal order is issued, service members are bound by duty and ethical responsibility not to follow that order and to report it to the appropriate authorities. The legitimacy of the chain of command is one of the most important characteristics of the military culture. Maintaining the integrity of the chain of command is critical to the effective functioning and mission success of the military unit. It is also designed to identify clear lines of authority and responsibility and to eliminate any confusion in the decision-making process. Living and working within the constraints of the unit chain of command dictate how an individual functions within the organization as well as how the unit functions as a whole. Those service members who are unable to work within the chain of command, who have problems with authority, or are incapable of following orders from superiors do not last long in military service and often find their time in service to be miserable and fraught with disciplinary actions.

Military Values

Honour and integrity are the core values of military service. In addition, each service has its own specific values that are taught to new recruits from the beginning of their time in service. The Army values are: Loyalty, Duty, Respect, Selfless Service, Honour, Integrity, and Personal Courage. Nigerian Navy values are: Honour, Courage, and Commitment, while the Nigerian Air Force values are: Integrity First, Service Before Self, and Excellence in All We Do. The values of each of the services are more than a list of terms that young recruits must learn and repeat on command; these values define how each service member lives his or her life, approaches every duty, and succeeds at every mission. The military value system sets the Nigerian military apart from its counterparts in the civilian sector.

Military Culture

The military culture is ingrained in military personnel from the start of their careers. Everyone begins life in the military, with some type of initial training. The majority begin by enlisting and attending their service's basic or initial entry training. Officers and other ranks go through basic and continuous training to enhance their professionalism. Regardless of how
someone enters the service, service members spend their time at initial training immersed in the military lifestyle and culture. They learn about the history of their service, military customs and courtesies, proper wearing of the uniforms, military bearing, military values and ethics, and other information that is critical to their success in the service, including how to listen to and follow orders and how to function within the military chain of command. Initial training teaches discipline, focus, and control. Service members are expected to be disciplined in their actions and words and to maintain control of their emotions and their physical selves at all times. Along with discipline and control comes focus. Focus is important to mission success, and the services teach young recruits how to focus in challenging situations where they are lacking sleep, are physically exhausted, or are under unaccustomed and extreme stress. Learning to stay focused, in control, and disciplined in all situations are skills that service members will use throughout their military careers as they are faced with uncertain and often dangerous situations.

Another important aspect of initial training is learning to fire a weapon and protect themselves and their comrades. These include weapons skills such as use and maintenance, hand-to-hand combat skills, and combat life-saving skills. Warrior training for young recruits underscores the fact that their first mission as soldiers, seamen, or airmen is to fight and possibly wound or kill an enemy. This training is repeated throughout a service member's career, though more in some occupational specialties than in others. However, regardless of job function, any one in uniform may be ordered to “pull security” on a convoy or perform another mission in a combat environment in which they must be prepared to respond with deadly skill, should the need arise. These are times when all of the skills that have been ingrained in service members throughout their career are brought to bear and tested. Service members’ first introduction to military service during initial training is also where they learn that there is no greater bond than the one they share with the people “to their left and their right.” For many, this bond of brotherhood/sisterhood lasts throughout their military career and beyond. This bond is highly valued, nurtured, and protected. In life-or-death situations, the people who will help pull the service members through, or who will come for them if they are wounded or killed in combat, are the people who are fighting right by their side.

**Nigerian Military and the People**

It is important to understand the institutional underpinnings of the Armed Forces and the people who comprise the institution. Its members, while demographically, geographically, and ethnically diverse, share a common set of values and beliefs that today underscore their voluntary service to the nation. The Nigerian Armed Forces is an all-volunteer force which has
bonded Nigerian citizens together as a unifying force irrespective of tribe, religion, and belief despite daunting challenges.

**Achievements**

The Military provides an integrated approach composed of National Military Objectives which include: to deter, deny, and defeat state adversaries; to disrupt, degrade, and defeat insurgency such as Maitatsine terrorists and Taliban in the Kano and Yobe in 1980 and 2004 respectively. The military also captured live Mohammed Yusuf, the leader of Boko Haram Terrorist (BHT) in Maiduguri in 2009. The successful flushing of BHT from occupied areas in the North especially the acclaimed BHT Caliphate Headquarters in Gwoza lay credence to the various successes achieved by AFN. Additionally, the Nigerian Civil War was prosecuted without collecting a loan to keep Nigeria one. This is a milestone in the political history of Nigeria. Furthermore, the AFN have strengthened our global network of allies and partners especially in areas of joint training in our strategic schools where other nationals are trained.

The Nigerian military pursues national objectives by conducting globally integrated operations such as in Congo and ECOMOG operations, implementing institutional reforms at home, and sustaining the capabilities, capacity, and readiness required to prevail in conflicts that may differ significantly in scope, scale, and duration. The Nigerian military as a lead institution within West African Region in conjunction with other ECOWAS countries' military successfully restored sustainable peace and democratic rule to Sierra Leone and Liberia after the diamond war in the 2 countries. Training establishments in Nigeria include the prestigious officer entry Nigerian Defence Academy at Kaduna, the Armed Forces Command and Staff College, Jaji, and the National Defence College at Abuja which the military will continue to use to synergize training amongst other security agencies, ministry, departments and agencies as well as other nationals. The AFN is highly involved in the curtailment and elimination of insurgency activities in the North East and the anti-oil bunkering Operation PULO SHIELD in the Niger Delta as well as the ongoing kidnapping activities in the East which seems to have engulfed other geopolitical areas in Nigeria. These activities are affecting critical national assets and socio-economic activities of the state, and thus the preoccupation of the AFN. The involvement of Service personnel in these operations has necessitated mass moving of troops from one location to another irrespective of their family inclination. Therefore, the cooperation, prayers, support and understanding of the general public are highly desirable for the success of our troops in these operations.
Lessons Learnt

There are some inherent lessons that could be drawn from this highlight for the enhancement of a better military.

i. Need for overwhelming political and civil support and cooperation for all military operations.

ii. Need for logistics support and operational platforms for military operations.

iii. Need for media cooperation and support.

iv. Need for synergy of efforts among other security agencies and efficient civil military relations.

Conclusion

Since the establishment of the Nigerian Military and the various transformations mantra that had taken place in all the services, it has continued to be the rally point for national unity and cohesion. The Nigerian Military have done the country proud in various peace keeping operations embarked upon by the troops, seamen and airmen since 1960 in Congo including other ECOWAS and AU sponsored operations in Africa and West African sub-region among others. There is need for the general populace to give the institution the desired cooperation at all times to conduct her constitutional mandate. Given the necessary logistic support and enabling environment, the AFN is capable of doing more towards enhancing national cohesion in Nigeria.
Chapter 4

PRACTICAL ISSUES AND CHALLENGES OF CIVIL MILITARY RELATIONS IN RIVERS STATE

By
Fidelis Allen, Ph.D

Introduction
The General Commanding Officer (GOC), 6 Division of the Nigerian Army, Port Harcourt, was recently reported in a Nigerian newspaper, to have declared total war against cultism in Rivers State. To achieve this, he called for the support of community people. This is similar to the Nigerian Police frequent appeals to the public for support in crime prevention. In other words, the military has to depend on support from the public, in any assertive role it assumes outside its primary responsibility of preserving the territorial integrity of the Nigerian sovereign state. This suggests an inclination to cooperation as a basis for engagement between the military and civilian populations when it comes to certain strictly internal or domestic problems. It also gives the impression that success in the desired relationship may depend on how the relationship itself is conceptualized.

This raises an age-long issue of concern about how military establishments should relate with civilian populations. It also raises the question of relations that serve the overall interest of society. Mainly, this is because there are implications for patterns of relations that work against the interest of society (Yamaguchi and Welch, 2005). When Carl Von Clausewitz wrote several years ago thus “war is merely the continuation of politics by other means…” (cited in Yamaguchi and Welch, 2005) he probably meant war and the military establishment have to be understood in terms of serving the interest of the political class. Yet scholars maintain an argument as to what pattern of relationship the military should maintain with civil and political society.

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The notion that soldiers are servants of politicians and not the reverse is critical. The point of equilibrium, between serving the interest of politicians, the pursuit of its own ideological interest or striking a balance in which the interest of society becomes dominant over and above all others, are theoretical issues around the subject. The literature suggests different political systems produce different patterns of civil-military relations. For example, Samuel Huntington's discussion of the difficulty of attaining an objective control of the military by civil and political society, contrasts with the position taken by Janowitz (1960), who talks about the professional soldier. He raises the important question of context specific role, but argues a common denominator of civilian control of the military, which he sees the accepted norm. The risk of the military asserting its interest over and above those of the civil and political society may exist if they (civil and political society and the military) are distances away from each other. Keeping the military under control therefore requires closeness. Further theoretical thinking points to whether or not the political class is weak. It also points to the degree of internal security of a political system. The incentive or temptation for the military to assert itself over and above civil and political society draws from the state of internal security threat. This is more likely when the threats are high.

In his book, *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations*, Huntington (1957) depicted a classical representation of early analyst of the subject in the context of dominant American scholarship. He argued a need for the subordination of military organizations to diverse checks and balances through procedures, regulations, and budgeting. This is the *Institutional Separation paradigm*. This perspective, which simply advocates ideas that militaries should materially and ideologically be disconnected from political institutions raises a number of questions. There are concerns about how specifically the military should relate with civil and political society (non-combat) in situations of severe security challenges that also require more than the use of raw force to tackle. Inversely, the Concordance Theory (CT) suggests a need for cooperative behaviour of citizens, militaries, and political elites in order to deal with the problem of social disorder. By no means does this imply or suggest direct intervention of the military in the politics of society. Democracy remains a fundamental line of theoretical thinking in terms of context. In any case, preventing military intervention in domestic politics is both a theoretical and practical call on citizens, political elites and militaries. It is also a call for a development strategy that expects from all social institutions people-oriented contributions.
Some have advocated civil-military collaboration, through regular dialogue, and joint
definition of values and norms (Udor 2013; Williams 1998). The idea of institutional separation,
which implies, in practical terms, disconnection of the military from non-combat development
roles is not as much appealing. In the post-military era, developmental patterns of relations
between the military and civil and political society, among others, requires protection of human
rights of citizens, values that support democratization, protection of the environment, security,
and economic prosperity. Finally, an agency-theory of civil-military relations theory exists. The
assumption here is, civilian and political society see the military as agent for dealing with threats
to the authority of civilians. By no mean is this suggestive of subservience. It only means that the
relationship is strategic.

Prior to 1999, Nigeria was not visible in the list of countries with good records of political
succession or regime change through popular elections. The military establishment in Nigeria
has a history of forceful intervention in the politics of the country. The pattern of relations
between the military and civil and political society during the periods of direct military rule, can
best be described as a dictatorship. This meant lack of functional democratic institutions with
clear representational and constitutional responsibilities and obligations. Usually, under such
regimes, the constitution is abandoned. Democracy becomes a vision, embedded in a flexible
fragile diary, political process or transition, and retreat to the barracks. There is no gainsaying
the fact, that preventing the military from directly controlling the wheels of governance and
politics has been a crucial subject of discussion in civil-military relations. Since 1999, Nigeria
has enjoyed continuous regime change without military coups. In any case, the question of civil-
military relations transcends regime type. It was a case of control of the civil and political
society by military institutions during military rule. In the context of democracy, military
institutions are either to be seen as subordinate or under the control of civil and political society
or working in partnership in the interest of development.

This paper proceeds with an assumption that the character of civil and political society-
military relations of a country is a key aspect of assessing the political progress of society, which
has to be gauged regularly. Organizers (CLEEN Foundation, Institute for Peace and Conflict
Resolution and Nigeria's National Human Rights Commission) of the town-hall meeting for
which this paper was written and presented, realized the importance of this subject in planning
the meeting and as part of the implementation of their current peacebuilding project in the Niger
Delta. Against this backdrop, the paper aims to highlight key issues and challenges in civil-
military relations in Rivers State.

**Rivers State /Issues**

Rivers state, which was created in 1967 as a child of circumstances and impending war over Biafra secession, was until recently, mainly devoid of the kind of security threats posed by activities of cult groups, land dispute, illegal oil business, pollution, political interests, kidnappers and so on, in parts of the state. Some analysts simply blame recent violent politics in the state to behaviours of leaders of the Peoples' Democratic Party (PDP) and All Progressives Congress (APC), especially before, during and after the 2015 elections. Armed irregular groups, in the form of political thugs and cultists, have been visible postscripts, with huge implications for peace and security in the state. The 2015 governorship, federal Constituency and state House of Assembly elections were particularly daring.

The state is regarded as the heart of the Niger Delta, in terms of access. It is also important in the long-standing agitation for development and control of the oil resource in Nigeria. The position of a major oil producing state which it (Rivers State) occupies, has come with complex challenges, including mounting concerns about oil related environmental problems, with the Ogoni case as the most prominent in recent times. Insecurity, unemployment and intense political struggles are equally disturbing. The unresolved 'Niger Delta' question has remained part of an overall headache to harmonious political relations between groups and the federal government. These problems, and more, such as the fear of cult-related violence and destruction of water, swamps, farmlands by regular oil companies and activities of owners of illegal refineries have created difficulties for many, especially among local and urban populations. The fear of kidnapping Land related disputes, unemployment, chieftaincy tussle, inter-cult rivalry, kidnapping rose to an unprecedented level before an Amnesty Programme initiated by the state government and response of security agencies brought some respite. The main approach of the government to dealing with threats posed to security has been the use of force, for which the military has been very prominent. In fact, the Joint Military Task Force (JTF) has been the main response mechanism to threats posed to the oil industry.

The emergence of oil as a key national revenue-earning commodity has, in a way, at once, posed a threat to national security. If oil is that important to the survival of Nigeria, threats such as fluctuation in the global price of the product, and those posed by disruptions in the Niger Delta, affect national revenue earning. Easily this becomes a national security issue, as all government agencies, including the military, and ministries, have to depend on the bulk of the money they need from the oil industry. In other words, effective functioning of government depends on how much it gets from producing and selling the oil. Monthly sharing of financial resources derived from oil has had implications for the survival of the country beyond the era of huge oil money.
Impact on the overall development aspirations of the country remains suggestively huge. States and local governments, as well as the federal government, tend to have developed a culture of waiting for the monthly allocation. This has bred laziness and prevented creativity through alternative productive activities. In the case of Rivers State, with significant revenues from both oil and internal sources, it remains to be seen how investments in alternative productive concerns are absorbing the mounting unemployed population of young men and boys, graduating in their thousands from tertiary institutions on a yearly basis.

Rivers State is not excluded from the threat posed by militant groups in the Niger Delta, demanding development. The state therefore is also affected by government's regular application of force in dealing with the problem. Groups demand control of the oil resource. This has brought them directly into confrontation and contest with the government, which by law owns all land and natural resources in Nigeria. This alone creates a need on the part of the military, which is, in essence an institution of the federal government, to assert itself over and above contending groups. The implications on patterns of relationship with the civil and political society can be predicted correctly.

The military works to protect oil industry. This comes with risks, including over-reaction and under-regulated operational activities. As well, it comes with disdain for civilian populations, destruction of livelihoods, fear, insecurity, and violation of human rights. From the perception of local community people suffering massive oil-related environmental destruction, who at the same time are alleged to be the supplier of the agitated armed youths, the military's position of defender of the oil industry and interest of government is neglectful of their victimhood. In any case, the state and federal governments have continued to make declaratory commitments to the improvement of the wellbeing of people of the state. Practical steps have been taken in this direction. For example, Oil Mineral Development Commission (OMPADEC now moribund), Niger Delta Development Commission (NNDC) and Ministry of Niger Delta Affairs, were established to specifically address the problem of development of the Niger Delta. But the issues have remained mainly unresolved. Extant Illegal oil economy is an additional problem, expressing failure of efforts by government and oil companies to ensure undisturbed oil operations in the Niger Delta. Threat posed to the environment, community health, and revenues accruing to government remains huge. Sadly, culprits see the illegal economy as part of their expression of grievances against the failure of the industry to formally accommodate host local community people. What pattern of relations is expected of the military with the civil and political society under this kind of complex social, economic, environmental and political atmosphere? And should the military ensure a human rights perspective to dealing with these
The military in Nigeria has grown quantitatively and qualitatively, to become a key institution of importance, not only for protecting the territorial integrity of the country, but also as an establishment, entangled with natural resource governance. It is also involved in the democratization process of the country. In fact, some see the military to have played a key role of holding the country together as a country, from the threat posed by the 1967-70 Civil War. It fought on the federal side to prevent Biafra secession. It has also been seen to be the facilitator of democracy by handing over to politicians after a process of transition that now seems to have ended since 1999. On the other hand, perception of the military as protector of the economic interest of government and oil companies has also thrived.

Some politicians loyal to the ruling party at the centre have portrayed themselves as beneficiaries of military support in the struggle for political power at the level in the state, by calling for a direct military role in elections. Some do not see this as out of place, if judged from the theoretical perspective that sees high internal security threat as a basis for such military intervention. Even so, critics point to the police as the main security agency that should play the role. The military, unfortunately, is also seen as a beneficiary of the illegal oil economy in the entire Niger Delta. Officers delightfully look forward to postings to the region. They take bribes from collaborative owners of illegal refineries and local marketers. Clearly, the military seems to have different faces, in formal and informal contexts, defining a fluid but forceful approach to handling diverse issues of the threat to the oil industry and security of the political process.

There are numerous challenges faced by the military in the performance of its responsibilities. Conflictive perception of the roles has been inimical. Serving the political class and protecting national oil infrastructure, are often blind to human rights obligations of government. Consequently, there is a growing lack of trust of the military establishment among poor civilian populations. In matters of economic crimes against the state, the military has played more roles than the police. With growing proliferation of arms and failure of security agencies to handle the threat posed to individual and community security, the majority seem whacked over marginal efforts at taking the arms away from the hands of those using them to commit different crimes. This has been compounded by the nature of politics in the state since the last three years. Some believe the military has been political and compromised against core ethics of professionalism, to the detriment of the collective good. These issues easily make the military vulnerable to the dilemma of being located between serving political and societal
interests.

The military is trained to apply extreme force. However, its disposition towards the use of force has to be checked and regulated by law and learning. Training opportunities in civil-military relations are increasingly coming to the military. But they are hardly fully utilized because of red-tapism and rigid command and control system. This is also a challenge. The Niger Delta, generally, remains a laboratory for testing the tendency of the military to act beyond a limit, when it comes to protecting the oil industry. Protecting the industry and addressing grievances on the basis of self-regulated approaches with methods compatible with development expectations across the spectrum of society in which the interest of citizens are core beneficiaries, remains one in which the military is yet to achieve or convincingly demonstrate. Training opportunities with civilian partners can help build relations towards less utilization of force in matters that easily can be addressed without the military.

The poor human record of the Nigerian military is an issue that has attracted condemnation. Fighting criminality in Rivers State, which is the responsibility of the police and other relevant agencies of government, requires a minimal involvement of the military. War-like operations should not be applied in minor internal security threats posed by economic and political crimes (such as stealing of oil and violation of election rules). Non-military procedures involving the full implementation of laws, through arrest and prosecution by the police, can replace strict military operations. For example, the activities of cult groups in elections are a political and criminal matter that involves investigation. This should lead to unearthing politicians involved and subsequent arrest. Meanwhile, the Rivers State government has an existing law that prohibits cultism, which has not been fully enforced. Involving the military in the fight against cultism seems to have also created tension, especially among innocent people, as powerful politicians often collude with some officers of the military to free suspected culprits. This support from politicians has given culprits boldness to continue in the crime. Recent Amnesty Programme of the Rivers State Government to cultists, in exchange for renunciation, and handing over of weapons to the military, remains commendable. It marked a non-violent approach to dealing with the problem of proliferation of arms and cultism. But it remains to be seen, whether the government will move to the next level of implementation with rehabilitation and empowerment of the beneficiaries. Besides, tackling future possibilities require consolidating the gains, by going after their sponsors as well. In any case, their sponsors can also be assured of amnesty without the empowerment component.
Way Forward

The aforementioned practical issues and challenges identified and discussed, require planning, on the part of the political class, which currently control the military. Redirecting and re-orienting the military towards collaborative development role from the perspectives of all segments of society is crucial. Refusing to make governance of natural resources and politics people-oriented will continue to breed a class of politicians and civil populations that depend on force to get things done. For example, there will be no reason for managers of elections to depend on the military for security and effective discharge of responsibilities if the political class first and foremost respect the law and reject indecent political behaviour.

Create regular opportunities for mutual analysis of the problems of society and defining of values and norms. Such opportunities will reduce the risk of misunderstanding and independent assertion of ideological interest of the military over and above those of civil and political society. In addition, the military needs regular needs assessment to keep them away from direct involvement in politics. When officers see their survival in terms of disposition towards a section of the political class and see their future only in terms of who remains or wins in the next elections, the tendency is to assert themselves in society in opposition to those opposed to the segment of political society they prefer.

The Nigerian Police is yet to be fully equipped to play the role of ensuring effective tackling of crime in Nigeria. This role is continuously being played by the military is rather questionable. Often they get criminals and hand them over to the police. The method of arrest often is unlawful, leading, sometimes to extra-judicial killing.

The military is part of society. It should remain a partner with the political society in the development of Rivers State, and not constrain it through violation of human rights and unprofessional involvement in the internal economic and political processes of the state, which other security agencies of government can conveniently handle. Serving narrow interest of powerful politicians and their political parties works against harmonious relationships with the civil and political society. In this case, the various land related disputes, political conflicts, cult-related violence, illegal oil business, armed robbery and several other crimes, are internal problems that require effective implementation of relevant laws to handle.
Conclusion

The paper has addressed practical issues and challenges in civil-military relations in Rivers State. Existing pattern of civil-military relations in the state is typical of the Niger Delta. The state, however presents a particular threat pattern and political atmosphere. Activities of cult groups, coupled with violent political process, led the state to the point in which politicians beckoned the military. In the same vein, the paper has highlighted the oil industry as a factor in understanding civil-military relations in the aforesaid state.
References


Introduction

One of the greatest security challenges confronting the Nigerian state after the Civil War is the current insurgency campaign led by the Jama'atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda'awatiwal-Jihad popularly known as Boko Haram in the North East of Nigeria. This reign of terror continues to create tensions and deepen existing mistrust between civilians and the military on the one hand and challenges for security operatives on the other in the region and in Nigeria at large. The situation in the North East is further compounded by other security threats in other parts of the country involving other non-state armed and unarmed groups. These crises including those linked to the local farmers and cattle herders clashes, kidnapping and armed banditry as well as the incessant ethno-religious crisis have collectively posed threats to the peace and stability of the Nigerian state.

Sadly, a common approach by the Federal Government of Nigeria to addressing these security challenges is the deployment of military and other security agents to conflict and conflict-prone areas. Increasingly, the deployment of the Military into every internal civil security crisis is progressively becoming a norm in Nigeria just as the Soldier metamorphosed into a permanent feature in the daily lives of citizens. As at the last count, out of the 36 states and the Federal Capital Territory (FCT), Nigeria is known to host active military operations in more than 30 states of the Federation (Jibrin, 2013). While there are fundamental issues to interrogate

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relating to the habitual deployment of the Military to every civil security crisis and the constitutional role of the Nigeria Police, the main thrust of this paper is to highlight the practicalities, opportunities, challenges and lessons learned in implementing the civil military relations project by the CLEEN Foundation drawing extensively from field experiences.

Interestingly, even with the deployment of more manpower and weapon systems, the success rates have continued to be debatable given the spate of persistent security challenges in Nigeria. As Jubrin puts it in his op-ed, 'the war strategy for the past decade appears to be to militarily defeat and annihilate the enemy'. In other words, acting out a conventional war strategy against an enemy that is engaged in an asymmetrical warfare, in which the enemy can hide amongst the people, operate in cells and strike at will' (2018, emphasis added). This turn of events has led to the need for a new thinking and the devising of new methods and strategies for combating warfare through building better relations with affected communities.

The civil military relations (CMR) project is part of civil society interventions to foster better relations between the civil populace and the Nigerian Armed Forces with the objective targeted towards improved communications between civilians and the military and respect for human rights of both parties. Reflections from the field are pointers to two key issues: a strong yearning by civilians for the military to relate better with the public and poor awareness of the modest efforts by the military at winning hearts and minds of the public (especially in conflict areas). The central argument in this paper is that if a robust civil military relations program is developed as part of military's strategy in internal security operations in Nigeria, it holds the prospects for serving as an early warning system of intelligence. This will support the military and other security agencies such as the Police to develop mitigating strategies for preventing potential conflicts and for countering violent extremism. The paper concludes with key recommendations and policy directions including the need for a National Policy on Civil Military Relations in Nigeria as pathways to addressing the country's security challenges and improving the accountability of the Military to civil authority in Nigeria. As an important part of the paper, a section is dedicated to the civil military relations structure presently in the Armed Forces and on the types of services rendered to the public. The aim of this section is to promote greater understanding by the civil populace on the structure of the Directorates of Civil Military Relations at the Headquarters of the Services.

**Conceptual Clarification**

The usage of the key concepts in the paper will be clarified to enhance understanding of their application. The concepts are the military, civilians, civil society, democracy and civil
military relations.

**The Military**

The Military in Nigeria also known as the Armed Forces of Nigeria (AFN) as presently constituted comprises of the three Services namely the Nigerian Army, the Nigerian Navy and the Nigerian Air Force (all in charge of warfare and the protection of the territorial integrity of the Nigeria by land, sea and air). Babatunde asserts that the military values discipline, hierarchy, oriented towards law and order and adopts a philosophy of violent aggression (2015:3). The functions of the NAF are well codified in the 1999 Constitution Section 217(2) which includes:

1. defending Nigeria from external aggression;
2. maintaining its territorial integrity and securing its borders from violation on land, sea, or air;
3. suppressing insurrection and acting in aid of civil authorities to restore order when called upon to do so by the President, but subject to such conditions as may be prescribed by an Act of the National Assembly; and
4. Performance of such other functions as may be prescribed by an Act of the National Assembly.

Since the 1960s, the military in Nigeria has contributed to several internal security operations in aid of civil authorities and has supported external peacekeeping missions at various levels mandated by the United Nations (UN), Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the African Union (AU) (Crisis Group, 2016:1). The Military is vested with the legitimate task and power to apply force and weapons of violence on behalf of the State whenever the need arises. This sacred duty places enormous powers and responsibility on the State (National Defence Policy 2006:56). As an institution birthed by law, the military is an important part of the democratization process. The role of the military in a democracy is not only to defend the government of the day but also to defend democracy itself (National Defence Policy, 2006:57). Therefore, the role of the military is to develop and apply the “ways and means” to implement ends, goals, and objectives as defined by civilian political leadership (Mandeles 2009:3). In other words, civilians set the agenda for the military through their democratically elected leaders to utilize it for the good of the state and its citizens. More recently and with the current security threats, there has been an added responsibility to the primary role of the military in terms of providing policing and humanitarian services to distressed civil populations that transcend oversight of the Military (Alemika, 2018). Traditional military training does little to empower troops to respond to these new issues and the unconventional
security threats in Nigeria. Again, while there appears to be some paradigm shift in the curriculum at the various military training schools, military training and ethos has remained largely conservative with the culture of 'we' versus 'them' still in modern-day civilian-military relationship in Nigeria. The military globally are expected to be apolitical and must display high standards of professionalism in the discharge of its duties to the country.

**Civilians, Civil Society and Democracy**

Generally, civilians are persons who are not personnel of the Military. Commonly referred to as part of the broader civil society, civilians have been known to hold and express strong views about the state security agencies within the framework of democracy and freedom of expression. Civil society on the other hand refers to the space for collective action around shared interests, purposes and values leading to social change, justice, equality and respect for fundamental human rights. The guarantees for civil liberties in a democracy are laid out and backed by the 1999 constitution. Civil liberties in a democracy are amplified and enhanced deriving their strengths from the various laws as encapsulated in the constitution as the ground norm for our democracy distinct from government and commercial for-profit actors. Civil society include charities, development NGOs, community groups, women's organizations, faith-based organizations, professional associations, trade unions, social movements, coalitions and advocacy groups (WHO: 2019). These discussions are framed as part of the need for reforms in security sector.

In a democracy, the emphasis is on constant questioning of authority, issue-based discussions and considerations of policy options that are human rights friendly (Babatunde, 2015:3). These values often fall short and are constantly threatened under a military rule. During the 30-year military rulership in Nigeria, the heavy clampdown on freedom of expression (fundamental human rights) of the civil populace and civil liberties are still signposts of the authoritarianism associated with military regimes. It is now widely acceptable that the society is better served in a democracy (National Defence Policy 2006:57). Civilians and the civil society through various efforts and initiatives, contribute to the system strengthening the democratic process and of institutions through the constant demand for accountability of the political leadership and of civilian control of the Military.

**Civil Military Relations**

Civil Military Relations details the relationship that exists between civilians and the Military and between the Military and the government of the day. It has been described as a game of strategic interaction in which each side attempts to achieve outcomes that maximally
promotes that side's interests (Baker 2007: 123). Civil military relations encompass the broad range of relationships and experiences involving various state security actors and non-state actors within a society. It has been described by the National Defence Policy (2006) as the hierarchy of authority between the Executive, National Assembly and the Armed Forces as well as the principle of civil supremacy over the armed forces. Civil military relations according to the National Defence Policy are premised on the principle of civilian control of the military in a democracy (2006:56). However, the challenge in this definition is the narrow conceptualization of civil military relations limiting it only to higher realms of engagement with leaders of the people yet recognising the dominance of civil control over the military. This view which partly aligns with Huntington's civil military theory and concept of 'Objective Civilian Control' is problematic in that modern-day civil military relations discourse and engagement transcends military's relations with top echelon of society but must actively include the average citizen on the street who comes in close contact with the soldier. This concept of civil military relations actively recognises exchanges between civilian leaders with top military brass (who possess a lot of finesse) but also the ordinary citizens. A healthy civil military relation is essential to the stability of democratic regimes and a toxic relationship between civilians and the soldiers will effectively produce either a weak military or one that becomes a threat to the public they are supposed to protect (Tapia, 2016:2). The principles underpinning Civil Military Relations in Nigeria as outlined in the National Defence Policy include:

- The Supremacy of the Constitution
- The Democratic imperative
- Civil control of the Military
- Military professionalism

**Emergence of Civilian-Military Relations in Nigeria**

The relationship between civilians and their military counterparts in Africa has been laced with many infractions and tension; suffice to say that the protector of the citizens from external aggression has overtime metamorphosed to become the 'feared'. Situating the origin of this abnormality, Alemika opined that colonial military forces were deployed for raids and punitive expedition against recalcitrant natives and rulers, leading to a history of fear and distrust amongst civilians and the military (2018). Thus, with decades of military rule in Nigeria, the existence of strong authoritarian imprint on civil life was inevitable and one that requires
strategies to be developed to engineer a cultivation of civic virtue in advancing democracy (Babatunde, 2015:3).

Across the continent, many African countries including Nigeria have witnessed long periods of military rule characterised by bloody coup d'états and alleged human rights violations resulting from military's incursion into politics (Hungnikpo, 2012:2). In the 1990s, the continent witnessed a steady transition from one form of autocratic regime to a democratic path and a decline in military rulership (Ukase, 2014:10). Despite widespread democratisation in much of the Africa, civil-military relations remain strained in many parts of Africa (Hungnikpo, 2012:2). Again, in spite of the democratisation, post-colonial leaders failed to embark on fundamental reform and re-orientation of the military to fit the expected roles in a democratic system and play its own part in upholding the tenets (Alemika, 2018).

The mistrust between civilians and the military as is the case for Nigeria has at its roots, the histories of a 30-year military ruler-ship tainted with allegations of human rights violations by the Armed Forces. However, since Nigeria's return to democracy in 1999 and following global developments in the aftermath of the Cold War, the discourse of modern-day civil military relations began to gain prominence in national security strategies and discourse across the world. In Nigeria, concerted efforts by successive administrations to professionalise the military and put issues of civil military relations on the front burner gradually became a norm. Efforts are being made to professionalise the military, re-indoctrinate it and give it a national apolitical outlook (Babatunde 2015: 4). Civil military relations courses are now being infused into training schedules for military personnel across the services with units/directorates of Civil Military Relations as part of the structure of the services.

In terms of policy direction, commitment at the national level to foster cordial civil military relations has birthed national policies on security with components on civil military relations by successive democratic governments; all in a bid to entrench true civil military relations into mainstream security governance. To match these efforts by the government are various public confidence building initiatives being carried out by the Nigerian Armed Forces themselves and the civil populace to create avenues for dialogues, trust and accountability. Perhaps, nowhere has the need for civil military relations been more pronounced than in the North East of Nigeria. The active insurgency carried out by the Jama'atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda'awatiwal-Jihad group has seen the permanence of the military in the civil life of the people of Borno State for over seven years running. Other parts of the country hosting active military operations also feature the sight of soldiers in close contact with civilians. The close contacts of
the Military with civilians in these areas have their implications for civil military relations in Nigeria and national security.

**The Problematic of Civilian Control of the Military and the Agency Theory**

An investigation into the emergence of the Nigerian Armed Forces particularly the Nigeria Army from pre-colonial era to colonial era reveal a Military that bore the vestiges of authoritarianism, forcefulness and oppression designed then to achieve the objectives of the colonial masters. This view of the Military has unfortunately crept into modern-day Nigeria and has remained intact despite being in a democracy. The current perception of the military by civilians as agents of the state wielding so much power and force has remained a constant; with the sight of troops moving around civil spaces creating anxiety (amongst the public). Little wonder, Jibrin (2013) asserts that “citizens have learnt to fear and avoid law enforcement agents; seeing security agents as potential violators of their security rather than providers of their security”. Regrettably, some soldiers understanding the psyche of civilians and their fear of his potential power of the legitimate use (or abuse) of force utilizes this power to achieve set objectives. In some cases, this may fall outside of professional calling as in cases of pockets of alleged rights violations of civilians. Military's acceptance of civilian authority—the doctrine of civilian control—remains a missing piece of Africa's democratic transition puzzle (Hungnikpo, 2012:2).

The ability of the military to come under full control of civilians is indicated by Huntington in his historic book 'the Soldier and the State' where he outlined theories relevant for civil military relations and the control of the military. The concept of objective civilian control put forward by Huntington denotes the military's primary role to provide national security without undermining the democratic system of government in power (Huntington in Travis, 2016:2). However, Huntington's concept has come under heavy criticisms (Mandeles, 2009, Travis 2016) given the current fragility of most African states and repeated military incursion into politics. Despite these criticisms, it is important to note that effective civilian control of the military is a cardinal principle of civil military relations. The Military also needs to recognize its role in the sustenance of democracy and must be a willing partner in the consolidation of democracy in Africa (Hungnikpo,2012:2). Recognizing the importance of civilian control of the military as a cardinal principle of civil military relations, Baker in his book expressed this as an essential feature of democratic governance and an important element in the prevention of internal armed conflict (Baker, 2007:114). Without close oversight of the military and other state
security institutions such as the Police etc, uncontrolled use of force can in fact spiral into other security challenges and the abuse of human rights as currently seen today in Nigeria. Subjecting the military to civilian control and the demand for greater accountability comes with pushbacks from the military often manifesting in a 'we' against 'them' culture. Feaver has pointed this out in his book as a last military preference for maximal autonomy, translating into a large part as a desire for low civilian interference in military affairs (Feaver, 2003 cited in Baker, 2007:124). However, the point needs to be stressed that the need to subject the military to civilian control is predicated on the principle that the military is an arm of the state and an important tool for state policy (Babatunde, 2015:4). This effectively means that the people's views are expressed through their elected leaders and the demand for accountability and control is within the confines of the law.

The subjection of the military to civilian accountability and oversight is underscored by Feaver through the Principal-Agency theory in relations to civil military relations (Feaver, cited in Baker, 2007). The theory offers both a means for measuring civilian control of the military and mechanisms for addressing the constantly threatened imbalance in the civil-military relationship (Feaver cited in Baker, 2007: 126). However, as a framework for analysis, the Principal-Agency theory and its usefulness for civil military relations is only effective if the Principal (civil authorities) understand their role and power over the agent (Military) and are able to control the use of the agent to achieve democratic/noble ideals. The lack of effectiveness of the principal-agency theory in the context of Nigeria and in Africa is problematic in many ways unlike in mature democracies such as that of the United States and some other western countries where the military is totally subjected to their civil authorities. CLEEN Foundation has gathered reflections from field experiences through the implementation of the civil military relations project. Other findings that are militating against effectiveness of the current strategies on civil military relations are also discussed.

**Civil Military Relations from the Field**

Implementing a civil military relations project in Nigeria is no mean feat given the mutual distrust that exists between civilians and the military. Perceptions of military's high-handedness, uncontrolled use of force, stern-looking soldiers, memories from military's rulership in Nigeria (including wounds that are yet to heal) and the tensions arising from modern-day military-civilian contact all form a strong basis for civilians to avoid the military at all cost. However, emerging security challenges across the land and the recurrent deployment of the military into civilian spaces underpins the need for both parties to come to the dialogue table.
towards understanding their role in securing the country and on protecting democracy itself. The civil military relations project that commenced implementation in 2015 aims to achieve the objective to ensure continuous and improved dialoguing between civilians and the military towards better security outcomes and the respect for the fundamental human rights for the country. The lessons gathered should form the basis for further intervention and recommendations to all stakeholders towards fostering better civil military relations in Nigeria.

**Weak Civilian Control/Parliamentary Oversight of the Military**

Parliamentary oversight refers to the responsibilities of the National Assembly to supervise, using its lawmaking powers over governmental bodies, to promote compliance with the law within the framework of good governance (Aluko, 2015: 181). The National Assembly as an institution is central to the democratization process and in bringing the military under civilian control. By virtue of the roles vested on it through the 1999 constitution Section 218, the National Assembly commands the influence to bring the military under civilian control through strong and effective oversight functions on the military. Luciak (2008:1) affirmed the power of parliaments when she highlighted their additional role and power over finance and budgeting including security budgets. In terms of parliamentary oversight, duties of the various committees set up to oversight the military are still not very effective as highlighted by participants at a Civil Military Relations Stakeholders' Forum on the Legislative Oversight of the Armed Forces in 2018. Military procurement and expenditure are critical areas that have remained opaque to civilians that continue to be contentious topics in civil military forums held in the project. Military leaders and personnel will rather not discuss this at the various fora and continue to make strong cases for classifying procurement related discussions and military expenditure as issues of national security that should not be subject to public scrutiny. However, it needs to be stressed that funding for the military is essentially taxpayers' funds and as such, civilian oversight through the elected parliamentarians should be a core element of subjecting the military to civilian scrutiny for improved transparency, accountability and effectiveness.

Furthermore, there is the issue of technical expertise of the Principal (parliamentarians) seen as a critical factor for effective performance of oversight duty. Without having the right skills set and deep understanding of the internal workings of the Military, most issues related to military conduct in all aspects including procurement and expenditure may fall short of scrutiny and evaluation by parliamentarians. For effective parliamentary oversight of the military, this will be dependent on actual ability and a determination to exercise such powers (Hutchful in Aluko, 2015:188). This ability is a serious concern as it relates to the shortage of personnel that
are well versed in security matters within oversight bodies in Africa (Ball and Fayemi cited in Aluko, 2016:191). The complexity of the Military system is a critical challenge that militates against effective oversight; in the areas of appropriation, constitutional reforms, foreign policy, and national security. Interrogating this further within the framework of Principal-Agent theory postulated by Feaver, accountability of the military (agent) would be weak and ineffective if the principal (civilian leaders) do not have the requisite skills to hold the agent accountable. In the light of weak principal ability, the propensity for opaqueness in the military will be expanded.

**Weak Communication between the Military and the Civil Populace**

Clearly, the subtle feeling of the Military being out of the control of the Principal is still present in the populace. Notwithstanding the freedoms associated with a democracy and the cardinal principles of civil military relations, Nigerians generally note the near absence of a mutual relationship between civilians and the Armed Forces. This challenge has been highlighted as having its roots in the long years of military ruler-ship as the military still find it difficult in subordinating itself entirely to civilian authority (Ukase, 2014:10). Evidently missing is the trust and cooperation that should form the basis of a good civil military relations in Nigeria. The Military is a highly regarded and respected institution in Nigeria owing largely to its very strict training and disciplinary system and the role it plays in fighting off the external enemy to paying the ultimate sacrifice. Yet again, open communication between civilians and the military is remains challenging in present day Nigeria. This view is underpinned by the 'authoritarian logic' of the Military especially for those still in active service who display a superior-inferior relationship against civilians and civil authorities (Ukase, 2014:10). Putting up this image continuously creates an imaginary wall in the communication channels between the civilian and the soldier. Arguably, military training composing of a system of order and strict obedience to rules may partly be responsible for the low communication with civilians. As Huntington opined the Army does what it is ordered to do and nothing more (Hungtington in Travis, 2014:3). Communication dynamics in our civil military relations workshops often reflects these tensed relationships until military personnel warm up to the hearts of civilian participants. Again, it should always be noted that the conversation changes and is richer when the Military attend these meetings.

Again, within the insurgency, that has spanned over seven years in the North East Nigeria; the Military especially the Army has become a permanent feature in the lives of the locals in a bid to curtail the crisis. However, as the crisis continues, so are issues of alleged human rights violations between civilians and security actors escalating. The Crisis Group (2016) states...
that these abuses of the civilian community in various internal operations (past and present) and within the framework of countering violent extremism continues to alienate citizens from the military, whose cooperation are crucial for the success of internal security operations. One of the lessons in implementing this project is that civil military relations is a tool for countering violent extremism. Parties impacted by a security challenge must be willing to come to the dialogue table and discuss positive ways towards ending the crisis. The CMR forums hosted in the North East continues to bring stories of the tensed relationship between the military and the locals where Borno residents have lamented severally the lack of trust by the military to the locals owing to the Army personnel considering everyone as a potential Boko haram suspect or relative to one.

Another challenge militating against positive civilian and military relations in Nigeria is the Military's culture of classifying documents. Almost everything and every enquiry is termed as 'Restricted' or 'Classified' despite the enabling Freedom of Information Act (FOI Act). While the paper does not focus on the FOI and Military adherence, the need for better and improved information sharing from the military institution is key in securing the trust of the citizens. Useful information for the public can be de-classified in such a manner that national security is not compromised and the trust and confidence that civilians have of the military is further consolidated. Better relations from the Military can improve intelligence gathering from the community who will learnt to trust the military with sensitive information without facing a backlash or distrust.

Civil Military Relations Desks in the Military Remain Highly Centralized

An emerging discourse within the field of security sector governance and reform is the need for devolution/decentralization of powers of security structures to lower levels. The rationale often adduced for this is linked to the dynamic nature of security and warfare in the 21st century and the need to provide contextual security service delivery to citizens. Traditional approaches of security provisioning are fast eroding and often throw up the question of capacity and performance in addressing security challenges especially when it becomes recurrent. Nigeria's security institutions are overtly concentrated at the headquarters mostly at the Federal Capital Territory-Abuja. A common practice militating against effective civil military relations especially at the state-level is the need for instructions from the Headquarters and the blurred presence of civil military units/desks for engagement with communities. In fairness to the hierarchical structure of the security agencies including the military, critical civil society interventions on civil military relations continue to be less effective at the state levels. When CMR military personnel are absent at such forums owing largely to delays in sending signals to
such officers at the state level, lost correspondence or lack of a presence of a CMR unit at that division. Our CMR intervention have continued to enjoy the support of the services at the federal level with new in-roads gained and sustained communication and engagement with officers in the relevant departments. However, the dynamics are different and not so smooth at the state/divisional/command level. A more decentralised structure and faster correspondence channels will support better civil military relations engagement and aid information sharing between civilians and the military at the divisional/command levels.

Civil Military as a Dynamic and Evolving Concept

One key lesson learnt in implementation is that civil military relations should be contextual taking onboard issues related to the context or host communities. What is applicable in a community hosting a military facility may not just be the same elsewhere. Where criminality becomes a norm in a particular community, sinking boreholes and or embarking on sanitation exercises may for instance not be the best solution at that time and place even though these may also be priorities. Engagement around civil military relations should constantly evolve and be tailored to meeting the actually needs of the host community. A needs assessment should be part of military operations to understand particular needs as security needs are different for the various demographic groups in the community. Gender-sensitive CMR interventions should be part of the CMR strategies to facilitate inclusion of vulnerable groups such as women and girls in the society.

Military Junior Leadership and Poor Civil Military Relations

Practical evidence from the field indicates that the rank and file of the military are mostly the set of military personnel deployed into civil spaces; as applicable to other security institutions such as the Nigeria Police. These set of junior military personnel are the ones Nigerians come in contact with on a daily basis and continue to have infractions with it. Interestingly, majority of citizens' perception is that junior leadership just fresh out of the training schools are desirous of putting to practice on the civilians the harshness associated with military culture. This view is evidenced by some infraction that occurs especially at military checkpoints/roadblocks when civilians disobey traffic-related rules. Evidences are abound where soldiers pick on defaulting civilians at these checkpoints and ask them to frog-jump or perform other demeaning acts. Military checkpoints continue to be areas of concern as regards human rights abuse on civilians. This is evident in discussions with participants in the Northeast and Southeast states respectively on how military checkpoints constantly violate the rights of the people and have increasingly become points of extortion.

While this paper is not intended to put the blame totally at the doorstep of the military
given isolated cases of civilian incivility to military personnel, the aim is to highlight the overtly ambitious acts of some military personnel to civilians. Participants at various civil military relations workshops by CLEEN Foundation have highlighted the need for continuous training and re-orientation of junior military personnel. These forums have highlighted the importance of infusing CMR courses for new recruits at the training school within the broad framework of respect for the fundamental human rights, the doctrine of democracy and the responsibility to protect by the state.

Similarly, there is an urgent need to introduce and review the present curriculum at all levels of education in Nigeria. This review will necessitate an inclusion of security studies and civil military relations as part of civic education taught in schools. This will support civilians and enhance their understanding of civil military relations and the norms and values of the military and other security institutions.

**Poor Visibility of Military's Efforts at Promoting Civil Military Relations**

The Armed Forces of Nigeria are indeed making concerted and honest efforts at bridging the gap in relations with civilians. Currently, all three services as highlighted above have established civil military units and departments at their headquarters and are embarking on various interventions in different places. The challenge again is most of these efforts are largely unknown to the larger society but end-users of such services. Military services to the society are still disseminated mostly through military media and very few traditional media sources. The Armed Forces Radio is one of a kind in that it enlightens the public about happenings in the military but the question remains how is this popularised to gain wide listener-ship? The Armed Forces Radio also hosts a weekly civil military relations enlightenment program. The question begging to be asked is: how many Nigerians are aware of these programmes? There is therefore the need to urgently build a critical mass of traditional media sources that will constantly disseminate useful information from the military to the public. IEC materials also go a long way to highlight some of these interventions should be considered as alternatives.

**Civilians' Poor Understanding and Appreciation of the Military as an Institution**

Averagely across Nigeria, the generality of citizens still do not understand and appreciate the military as an institution and its ethos. This is mostly connected with the perceived high-handedness in the use of force by the military to the civilian with far reaching implications for civilian appreciation of the Military. Military personnel at civil military fora have consistently
highlighted the lack of understanding of civilians of military values and the institution itself. Personnel have also complained of civilians not abiding by rules set up by military personnel especially during internal operations. Some civilians have consistently violated simple rules set up at military checkpoints especially in the case of the use of making calls at such checkpoints or violation of traffic rules; the soldier of course greets this with very punitive and demeaning measures especially.

In comparison with western countries especially in the United States of America, there is a general appreciation of the military in such climes by the average American. Americans generally have a say on the use of their Armed Forces in internal and external operations. A system of appreciation for military personnel is a common value for Americans as seen at the Airports, ATMs, Supermarkets, Public Transport system etc. It is high time Nigerians also develop that feeling of appreciation and respect for rules set by the Military for the protection of citizens.

A clear case of lack of trust in the military was the well intentioned medical outreach program embarked by the Army in the southeast following the 'Operation PYTHON DANCE in 2017.' The distortion of information created the unfounded stories related to the monkey pox virus following an outbreak. In such situations, trust and confidence is further eroded between both parties. Civilians should learn to trust and appreciate the military as dialogue, trust and confidence remain the cornerstone of positive civil military relations.

*Habitual use of Military Aid to Civil Authorities (MACA) Strategies for Internal Civil Affairs*

The present security challenges bedevilling the country have witnessed an expansion of the traditional roles of the Armed Forces. From the North to the South, East and West, the threats to peace and security are evidently challenging and increasingly difficult to suppress. As a response, the Nigerian Government constantly deploys the Armed Forces to various troubled spots to aid civil security agencies. While the Constitution is clear as to the powers of the President to deploy the Armed Forces for the peace and safety of the country, the worrisome aspect of this arrangement is the habitual use of the military. This calls to question the role of the Police that has the primary task for internal security. Of concern are issues of over-militarisation of certain areas by the military and in civil matters such as elections etc. This constant deployment creates heightened feelings of anxiety amongst the populace given the perception civilians already have of the military. Another angle to the habitual military's deployment in
internal operations is linked to the enormous powers of the President over the Armed Forces and the Police. Aluko raised this point when he alluded that “although the power for making laws to regulate the security sector reside with the National Assembly, in concrete terms, power lies with the Nigerian President” (2015:185).

Civil Military relations forums on this project have served as platforms where these concerns are continuously discussed with relations to the permanence of the military in internal operations. While on the one hand, civilians are concerned about military's long-stay in internal operations in civil space, on the other hand and most interestingly, military officers note the grave dangers in the over-civilianization of the military through MACA strategies as this portends danger for the nation. Officers constantly reiterate the fact that they have not been adequately prepared and trained for the new roles thrusts upon them as a result of new security challenges. From Operations LAIFIYA DOLE to CROCODILE SMILE and PYTHON DANCE, the over-arching questions from civilians at civil military relations forums are that: when does the Military leave a conflict zone and handover to the Police as the primary care-taker for internal security? What is the minimum duration of military operations in civil spaces? What are the rules of engagement that civilians need to be informed of? The point must be re-emphasised that the prolonged stay of the military in civil spaces contributes a lot to allegations of human rights violations by the Military and it effectively incapacitate law enforcement agencies such as the Police.

**Conclusion and Recommendations**

Never has the concept of civil military relations been more relevant than in the present context of security challenges confronting Nigeria and the over-arching need for the military to gain the trust of civilians and work mutually to a more violent-free state. The Military should go a step further in decentralizing and deepening its CMR/HR units and desks across the commands and divisions in all parts of the country. Civil military relations are not only germane in wartime but also very much relevant in peacetime to consolidate and foster mutual respect, trust and improved communication within the populace. Modern civil military must actively recognise the central role and importance of working cooperatively with civil security agencies especially the Nigeria Police and the Nigerian Security and Civil Defence Corps. Inter-agency rivalry and superiority has long deprived the entire security architecture of Nigeria the much-needed intelligence to share information and nip potential conflicts in the bud.

The security challenges springing up in virtually all parts of the country requires a
coordinated approach for addressing such crisis. Military action especially related to internal operations ultimately impacts on civilians on the streets. There is a need for deliberate efforts to be made in further opening up the system and creating avenues for better understanding of the military and the civilians. Institutional awareness programs should form the core of interventions by the Military at gaining the hearts and minds of the people. In this light, the military is encouraged to work actively with the National Orientation Agency with the mandate to reach out to the people to educate the public on their roles at fostering better civil military relationship. The Roadmap for Fostering Civil Military Relations was developed by CLEEN Foundation in collaboration with the military, civil society and other relevant government agencies is an important tool for all stakeholders including civilians, to address and deepen the issues of civil military relations in Nigeria. The Roadmap for Fostering Civil Military Relations can be accessed at [http://new.cleen.org/Roadmap%20For%20Fostering%20Civil%20Military%20Relations%20in%20Nigeria.pdf](http://new.cleen.org/Roadmap%20For%20Fostering%20Civil%20Military%20Relations%20in%20Nigeria.pdf)

There is need for greater understanding of the military as an institution and the central role of civilians in subjecting the military to its control. Where the knowledge is limited, performance will equally remain weak. If on the other hand, knowledge of the Principal is effective, greater demand can be made of the military for greater service and accountability to the Principal within the framework of the rule of law and civilian control. Civil military relations intervention by the military should be contextual and tailored to meet the needs of the people. A needs-assessment can be undertaken by the military through periodic dialogue series to understand the issues and what support interventions can better meet these needs. On legislative oversight of the military, members of the various committees of defence and the military should as a matter of fact ensure to undergo regular training and retraining around areas in military oversight and financing. They should organise regular interface with the military especially service chiefs. These should also serve as platforms accountability for addressing emerging issues within the scope of their responsibility.

Finally, as community policing is synonymous to the Police as a strategy to bring the police closer to the locals they serve, so should the strategy of civil military relations to the Military. This strategy has been decentralized with Community relations officers at the divisional levels. Thus, the Military should intensify and diversify its philosophy on CMR as a tool for public relations. Policy wise, a National Policy on Civil Military Relations is important at this time in the history of our nation. This policy should adopt a whole-of-society approach in laying a strong foundation for better civil military relationship in Nigeria.
Civil Military Relations in the Armed Forces of Nigeria

In recognition of the dynamics of modern warfare and the need for more inclusive, robust, non-kinetic approaches to winning wars in the 21st century and following global best practices, the Nigerian Military currently adopts the quick-impact-project approach aimed at winning the hearts and minds of the citizens in its civil military relations. Increasingly, more CMR/CMA units and departments are being established across board with trained senior officers posted to head such departments and take on this very important task of interfacing with the populace.
Nigerian Army's Directorate of Civil Military Relations (NADCMA)

The Department of Civil-Military Affairs (DCMA) was established in December 2010 by the then Chief of Army Staff (COAS), Lt Gen OA Ihejirika to serve primarily as an interface between the Nigerian Army and the civil populace. The Department is vested with the responsibility of underscoring the fundamentals of civil military affairs as a strategic national institution. The Department is also charged with the introducing and transmission of the core elements of effective civil-military relations in the areas of human rights, rule of law, negotiations liaison and conflict management. The DCMA Vision is “Projecting a professional responsible Nigerian Army through meaningful cooperation with the civil populace”.

Civil Military Relations Engagement by the DCMA

Generally, for the Nigerian Army, the following activities fall within the scope of present operations for civil military relations. These interventions were sourced from the website of the Nigeria Army as proposed by the immediate past Chief of Civil Military Affairs of the Nigerian Army Maj Gen NE Angbazo:

- Medical outreaches in host communities
- Sanitation exercises in areas of responsibility where there is a large presence of civilians
- Renovation/construction of boreholes

Source: Author's based on information from the Services at CLEEN's CMR Events
Convening of town hall meetings/Security meetings-dialogue sessions with Traditional Rulers, Religious Leaders, Village Heads and other civilians to discuss peace and security related issues within the area of operations.

The facilitation of the quick return of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) to ancestral homes in conflict theatres such as the North East through the following:
(a) Block making for re-building new homes for IDPs at their various towns with support of the Nigerian Army Team of Engineers
(b) Cooperation with state governments and ministries of agriculture to assist in land clearing for planting during the planting season and the provision of escorts and patrols during harvest seasons to ensure food sufficiency
(c) Sensitization Workshops in selected IDP Camps
(e) Production and dissemination of radio and TV jingles, banners, flyers and posters for sensitization of the civil populace

Provision of instructional materials to schools and support as Teachers of core subjects

Nigerian Army's Human Rights Desk

Of particular importance and interest is the Human Rights Desk established as a unit within the DCMA to boost the confidence of citizens and improve the image of the Army. The unit was commissioned by the then Chief of Civil Military Affairs-Maj Gen Nicholas Rogers in February 2016. The Desk is saddled with the primary responsibility to investigate all cases of human rights violations involving the army following the increasing interest of the local and international human rights bodies on the activities of the Army in various parts of the country The Desk liaises and facilitates interactions with the human rights organizations; strategize and strengthen capacity of the army in promoting human rights; as well as developing a network of contacts of human rights offices in Nigeria (Rogers in Obioha, 2016). The Human Rights Desk of the Nigerian Army can be reached via email at na.hrd@army.mil.ng and through calls +2348160134303 and +2348161507644.

To further decentralize the Human Rights Desk of the Nigerian Army, the Desk has been established in all the divisions of the Nigerian Army totally nine (9) including that of the Headquarters. The Human Rights Desk at the 7 Division in Maiduguri, North East for instance was established in 2017 with the mandate to promote good human practices and boost civil-military relations in the counter-insurgency campaign of the Armed Forces at the theatre of operations.
Nigerian Navy Department of Civil Military Relations (NN DCMR)

The Civil Military Relations Department of the Nigerian Navy was established by the Nigerian Navy Order 0917-dated 30th of June, 2017. In terms of structure, the department is located under the Transformation Branch of the Nigerian Navy to lead and promote the affairs of the unit. Situating the department under Transformation Branch is informed by the need to align it to emerging issues in global best practices of civil military cooperation and in security provisioning by the Armed Force.

The structure of the Naval Civil Military engagement drills down to the command and unit levels with Civil Military Relations Officers (CMROs) at all levels. Some civil military relations services by the Nigerian Navy include:

- Relations with the civil society including civil society organisations
- Training for Naval personnel/CMR cooperation courses in all Naval training schools
- Participating in United Nations Offices for the Coordination of Civil Military Relations (UNOCHA)
- Periodic interface/experience sharing/Awareness creation/capacity building platforms with Naval CMROs on the field
- Medical outreaches
- To facilitate better interactions, some Naval facilities are open for the use of the civil populace.

Civil military relations has been part of the cardinal doctrine of the Nigerian Navy but now given prominence with the emerging issues in security and with the establishment of the department.

Nigerian Air Force Department of Civil Military Relations (DCMR)

The Nigerian Air Force Department of Civil Military Relations was established in November 2015 with the mandate to undertake the following:

- Promote inter-agency cooperation and relations between the NAF, other paramilitary agencies, MDAs, CSOs and NGOs whose duties and activities are relevant to CMR
- Conduct workshops, seminars and trainings on civil military relations in NAF units and civil institutions
- Oversee the development, implementation and evolution of quick impact projects or programmes to assist distressed communities
- Prepare or coordinate the preparation of inputs on the CMR aspects of any proposed or ongoing NAF missions
- Act as a bridge to reach the civil society
Presently, there are designated Civil-Military Relations Officers (CMRO) trained in various aspects on CMR. CMROs are saddled with the task to ensure training and retraining of personnel and liaising with the public on essential needs (NAF DCMR, 2018:5). NAF CMR engagement is guided by the following principles:

- Communication
- Transparency
- Mutual Respect
- Co-operation
- Common Goal
- Difference in Relationship
- Understanding, Respect and Trust
- Cultural Awareness
- Influence

Beyond training of personnel, some of NAF’s contact with the public on deepening civil military relations also includes but not limited to the following:

- Sanitation exercises around host communities.
- Medical outreaches
- Sporting activities

Commenting on the imperative of civil military relations as a tool for addressing security challenges, Group Commander of the 651 Base Service, Air Commodore Musbau Olatunji (2018) stated “when you have a cordial relationship with the people around you, they will see you as a friend and give you the information that you need and with this information half of the problem (of security challenges) is solved” Going further, he also highlighted the importance of close communication between communities and the military as an intelligence gathering tool for internal operations for the military.
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Chapter 6

CIVIL MILITARY RELATIONS: THE ROLE OF THE CIVILIANS AND THE MILITARY IN PEACEBUILDING IN NIGERIA

By
Nkemneme Andrew Chukwunonye

Introduction

Discussions about civil military relations have become a recurrent decimal since the beginning of the twentieth century as a result of the experiences of the first half of the century that led to the Cold War. This period witnessed a growing military presence in the civilian space, eliciting questions about the control of the military (with guns) by a democratic structure. Samuel P. Huntington (1957) arguments in his book, *the soldier and the state*, and Morris Janowitz (1960) effectively brought civil military relations into the *academia*, particularly in political science and sociology.

This became worrisome when the new democracies in the developing countries especially those that just gained independence from their colonial master had issues of weak governance structures. The consequential effect was military take-over of governments, particularly in the 60s and 70s, of which Nigeria was not an exemption. Nigeria, who got its independence in 1960, had serious political upheaval in 1963 starting with issue around the census, the trouble in the western region and the incarceration of Chief Obafemi Awolowo, the leader of the Action Congress, for treasonable felony. This led to the first military coup in 1966 led by Major Chukwuma Kaduna Nzeogwu which brought the military into the political space of the Nigeria till 1979 when Alhaji Shehu Shagari was sworn in as President of the second Republic of Nigeria. Again, another coup in 1983 truncated the government before they could

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find their feet and Major General Muhammadu Buhari came in as the Military Head of state. This circle of coups and counter coups continued in Nigeria until 1999 when we saw the fourth Republic came to place.

Mohammed Tafida (2015) Doctor of Philosophy Thesis argued that “as the forces of liberal democracy intensified in their spread, political disengagement began to occur and reached a climax in Africa in the 1990s and across most of those states that experienced military intervention and rule. The soldiers began disengaging or withdrawing to the barracks as political power reverted back to the civilian elites. The general outlook of the post-transition period witnessed a reduction in the levels of successful military coups across Africa. The military was conditioned to accept civilian democratic rule and withdraw to the barracks. The nature of civil-military relations (CMRs) changed as the military establishment was subordinated to the supremacy of a civilian authority. This has been more evident in Africa since the end of the 20th century.

The concept of civil-military relations connotes a dynamic interaction between military and the many civil sectors of the state as defined by a boundary. This boundary defines where military power begins and ends in terms of statutory functions, roles and activities. This boundary could be defined by an established tradition or explicit constitutional provisions of a country. Examples are the 1979 and 1999 presidential constitutions of post-independent Nigeria where the role and power of the armed forces are stated in relation to the supremacy of the civilian authorities (FRN, 1979 Constitution, Section 197[1-2]: 64, FRN, 1999 Constitution, Section 217[1-2]: 85). Hutchful (1998: 249) views the military as 'a body of armed men and women practicing the legitimate profession of arms under the authority civilian leaders and the control of duly appointed commanders'. As a special body possessing the platforms and instruments of coercion, the military or the armed forces have certain organisational attributes which distinguishes them by tradition and legal framework from the rest of the institutions in the society to which they belong. In general, this change in the balance of power between the military and civil institutions in emerging democracies has led to changes in the nature of civil-military relations because the military surrenders control of political power”.

The adventure of the military into the political space of some African countries including Nigeria changed the boundaries and consequently changed their functions and the power equation between them and the civilians whom they are expected to report to. The Military in Nigeria had political power for 28 years out of the 57 years of Independence. In the process of
governance, they would have adulterated their military culture with politics and its idiosyncrasies, especially as it is practiced in Africa and most developing countries. They found themselves out of their barracks and trenches to dwell and manage the country's human and material resources and enjoying the full largess of the paraphernalia of their political office. The way and manner which they carried out that responsibility created various impressions in the minds of the civilians. These are people (the military) who were not well tutored in politics and prepared for governance coming into the slippery political terrain of a diverse and multi-cultural society, called Nigeria. The political dynamics as well as the interplay of their military culture and the civil expectations created strains in the relationship between them (the military) with the civilians. With the existence of the military in 1999 from politics a lot of concern arose. The military and the civilians started thinking on what could be done to rebuild this soured relationship between the military and the civilians. How can the perception of the military by the civilians be improved? How can they cooperate amongst themselves understanding that they need each other in securing the nation especially now that the scope and type of crises we have in the country today require military expertise.

It is said that every situation of change comes with its own challenges. The new democracy of Nigeria obviously came with challenges and conflict situations which did not help the relations between civilians and the military. We now have a situation where the military that had retired back to the barracks are again drafted into the civilian space by the emerging conflict in the body politics of the nation. Today, the Military could be found in the Niger Delta combating oil bunkers and militants who vandalise our pipelines, depleting the revenue generated from the oil and gas sector. They are also heavily present in the North/East zone of the country, especially Borno, Yobe and Adamawa states fighting the Boko Haram terrorist group which seeks to occupy the territory and convert it into an Islamic state. Other sensitive issues that seem to impinge on the continuous existence of the country like the protests for self-determination by the Independent People of Biafra (IPOB), Farmers/Herders conflicts, Kidnapping, etc, have also pulled the military out of the confines of the barracks into the civilian space, because the civil defense authorities like the Police, Nigeria Security and Civil Defense Corps, Customs, Immigrations could not curtail the excesses and mischiefs of these groups.

These situations have brought the military and civilians into various forms of conflicts and confrontations which in one way or the other compromised their relationship. A survey conducted at the venue of a Town Hall Meeting in Rivers State organized by CLEEN Foundation showed that 78.6% of the participants accepted that the relationship between the Military and
Civilians in Rivers State was not cordial while 21.4% said it was cordial. 82.9% of civilians present at the workshop said the relationship between the civilians and the military was not cordial while 17.1% said it was cordial. 57.2% of the Military personnel present at the Town Hall meeting said their relationship with civilians was not cordial while 42.8% said it was cordial. It is therefore generally accepted that there are strains and hiccups in the relationship of the civilians and the military in Nigeria.

That is where this paper draws its impetus to try finding the roles civilians and the military could play in closing these gaps in their most cherished relationship, realizing that the security of the society requires the collaboration of both the security agencies and the civilians. Peacebuilding practitioners believe that conflicts in a human society are inevitable and are as dynamic as the society itself. Therefore, conflicts between civilians and military will always be envisaged especially where the military is now playing roles meant for the civil security agencies. They also acknowledge that the conflict variables are themselves not static but change in time and space dimension. Consequently, each conflict situation and variables should be acknowledged, analyzed and solutions proffered along the same matrix. We therefore look for these solutions today for a better relationship between civilians and the military for a better and more secured society.

**Concept of Civil Military Relations in Nigeria**

Looking at Civil-Military Relations, one might be tempted to see it from the periscope of the relationship between the Military and other humanitarian agencies of the UN during a peacekeeping operation (Civil-Military Cooperation) or during a near or post conflict arrangement as defined by the United Nations (Tafida, 2015). In the same accord, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), sees "Civil-Military relations" as encompassing all activities undertaken by NATO commanders in war directly concerned with the relationship between allied armed forces and the government, civil population, or agencies of non-NATO countries where such armed forces are stationed, supported or employed Janowitz, 1960).


While transitional, war-torn or crisis-afflicted societies are a particular risk, stable democracies also have to grapple with civil–military relations, transforming and managing them so as to keep pace with the changing security environment.
Ngoma thus looked at civil military relations in a democratic society to imply an adherence to principles that conform to accountable, legitimate democratic authorities, and the existence of a parliament that exercises oversight over the military and authorises the declaration of war and also makes the executive accountability to it in terms of the character of its defense policy. Democratic civil–military relations could also be looked at in terms of good governance to the security sector, and accountability by individual members of the security sector to national and international laws, as well as political neutrality. Ngoma thus stated that “traditional civil-military relations presume civil supremacy and guidance, in other words, full democratic control of the military in its role and responsibility to society as the ultimate guarantor of national security. This implies the military is a servant of the society which exercises its monopoly over the most violent means of violence in the interest of its citizens in response to popular will and consent. To exercise this role, however, the military must have unique expertise within a corporate structure guided by a strong sense of ethical and moral responsibility”.

Civil Military Relations (CMR) in our Nigeria context puts into consideration our history and the principles of supremacy of the civilians over the military as well as other law enforcement agencies to mean the relationship between civil society as a whole and the military organization or organizations established to protect it and having in mind the need to close the gaps between the groups in their relationship.

As earlier stated the history of the military and other law enforcement agencies is one that the military who controlled political power had supremacy over the civilians in action and words, in office and outside the office and in every facet of the society. There was so much impunity exhibited by the military over the civilians and other law enforcement agencies which negatively impacted on their relationship with the civilians, even after they relinquished political power to the fourth Republic of Nigeria. A well celebrated case was that between the military and Deputy Superintendent of Police, Alozie Ogugbaja, who happened to be the Nigeria Police Public Relations Officer then. DSP Alozie had granted an interview with the media in which he accused the military to be idle; hence they had time to plan coups and counter coups. That statement irritated the military and made the police hierarchy to not only relieve him of his position as the Police Force Public Relations Officer (PRO) but was also redeployed to an isolated division in Akwa Ibom state as a punitive measure. Other subsequent incidents frustrated the young and brilliant police officer into retiring from the police very early in his carrier.

One could conveniently conclude that when we talk of Civil Military Relations in Nigeria it is better understood as a tripartite relationship between the Civilians, the Military, and
other law enforcement agencies. The history of the relationship of these three groups has been checkered as we witness conflict between any of the arms of the military (Army, Navy or Airforce) and either the civilians or the police as well as other law enforcement agencies like Nigeria Security and Civil Defense Corps (NSCDC), Immigration, Customs, Federal Road Safety Corps (FRSC), etc. The conflict could also be between the civilians and any of the law enforcement agencies because the years of military rule militarized the entire system and even the security agencies in words and in deed. I know the Nigeria Security and Civil Defense Corps would claim not being around at the peak of military rule in Nigeria but cannot say they did not imbibe the psychological disposition of impunity exhibited by the armed forces and other law enforcement agencies in Nigeria.

**Perceptions on the Relationship between Civilians and the Military in Rivers State, Nigeria**

In order to ascertain the current perception (May 2017) of the civilians on the military and that of the military on the civilians in Rivers State, the participants of a workshop on civil military relations organized by CLEEN Foundation, made up of civilians and military personnel were asked to write down their views on their relationship with the other party. Summarizing their views in the table below reveals that their relationship was not cordial in any way.

**Table 4: What the Civilians Said about their Relationship with the Military in Rivers State**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>S/N</th>
<th>Perception</th>
<th>Reasons</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| 1.  | The military are wicked/heartless/brutal.            | They do not give a person an opportunity to explain one’s self.  
|     |                                                     | They are too rigid.                                |
| 2.  | The military cannot be trusted/lack of confidence in the military. | They do not have human feelings.                  |
| 3.  | The military are corrupt.                            | They desire to be rich.                            |
Perception like any other social concept is a very relative phenomenon as it could be
different from one person to another. However, psychologists see perception as an innate feeling
of a person about a particular subject matter which often arises from experience. It therefore
differs from one person to another and do not most times mean the same. Same goes to the
perception exercise on civil military relations conducted in Rivers state, but a critical analysis of
the various views showed a complete agreement by both the civilians and the military that their
relationship is not cordial. This goes to buttress the import of the topic to unveil what could be
done by the civilians, the military and other law enforcement agencies in creating a better
relationship between them.

Tafida (2015) posits that the military is supposed to be composed of professionals based
on its exclusive area of competence. It is this exclusivity that makes the military profession
distinguishable from other types of professions in the society. For this to happen there must be a
regulatory mechanism that determines the nature of recruitment and institutional socialization.
Thus, it is generally emphasized that “the military as an institution controls entry into its profession and trains the potential professionals to become experts in the control and management of violence” (Babangida, 1991). The modern military is thus, described as a profession that employs expertise in the use of coercive instruments for a purpose determined by superior authorities who occupy the apex decision-making levels of state power. This is what obtains in those countries with 15 relatively stable civil-military relations be they liberal democratic or authoritarian-based systems.

The creation of new states in Asia, Africa and Latin America by colonial capitalism in the 19th and 20th centuries was anchored (like in the metropolitan political systems) on the principle of military subordination to civil authority and with the soldier expected to leave matters of policy-making in the hands of the post-colonial politicians. However, this intellectual dogma was made to stand on its head as a result of the phenomenon of military intervention in places like Africa, Asia and Latin America. Military coups were by no means restricted to such areas. The military has struck with mixed outcomes in China (1971), France (1958 and 1961), Poland (1981), Portugal (1974), former Soviet Union (1991) and Spain (1981). But it was in Africa, Latin America and parts of Asia like Pakistan, South Korea and Thailand that the propensity for soldiers to stage coups and assume political leadership has been comparatively high.

Military interventions could be understood from two perspectives; the first involves the expansion of military roles outside established policy realms at the request of constituted civil authorities in order to address threats to the government or state. In the second perspective, it is a calculated process, in a swift or gradual manner, of wresting control of the decision-making organs of a country from an incumbent government, in theory, by the military forces of that country or, in practice by a segment of the military (with the direct or indirect support of a non-military ally) through the use of subtle or coercive means. The goal of such action is to transform the power relationship to an advantage for the soldiers in question and their allies outside the military establishment. Both angles converge on the issue of boundary breach in that the military embarks on a role outside the traditional boundary of its professional expertise whether defined by the constitution or long-established tradition.

Finer (1962: 126-127) identifies four levels of military intervention. The scope of such intervention increases from the first to the fourth. The military could employ subtle means in order to influence policy. It could also engage in blackmail where the government is intimidated to a point of complying with its demands. It could withdraw support for the government with the
expectation that a rival group would have a leverage to displace the incumbents from power. Soldiers could supplant the government through a coup d'état. Thus, a coup is merely one kind of intervention. According to Luttwak (1980: 16) it “consists of the infiltration of a small but critical segment of the state apparatus, which is then used to displace the government from its control of the remainder”. As a strategy for overthrowing the government, it implies a sudden strike and seizure of the gravitational centres of political power by a small group of conspirators from the military which is part of the state apparatus (O'Kane, 1981: 288). Most of the 20th century was characterised by the preponderance of military coups in many countries of Africa, Asia and Latin America. Using Africa as a reference point, by the mid-1980s about two-thirds of the countries in the continent were either under military rule or had experienced some form of military intervention at certain periods (Wanyande, 2000: 107). Within a 40 year period since 1960 “over eighty successful military coups d'état were staged and over two dozen leaders were assassinated” (IPA/CODESRIA, 1999). Additionally, Thomson notes that between 1952 and 1990, military coups that were successful in Africa have “resulted in the toppling of governments in 60 per cent of the continent's states” (2000: 123).

Using Africa as a reference point, by the mid-1980s about two-thirds of the countries in the continent were either under military rule or had experienced some form of military intervention at certain periods (Wanyande, 2000: 107). Within a 40 year period since 1960 “over eighty successful military coups d'état were staged and over two dozen leaders were assassinated” (IPA/CODESRIA, 1999). The first is that the military must reach out to the civilian world. Given the essentially universal agreement that civilians must control the military, the duty falls upon the military to find ways to talk to civilians, not the other way around. The second is that civilians must articulate a clear vision of what they expect in terms of the military mission.

Finally, that the most practical and effective means of bringing about dialogue and understanding is through bilateral education, in which both military and civilian would jointly attend specialized schools, training, workshops, where each would be exposed to their history, philosophy, perspectives and ethics governing the operations.

**Peace building Perspective of Civil Military Relations**

It should be noted at the onset that there are two distinct ways to understand peace building. According the United Nations (UN) document *An Agenda for Peace*, peace building consists of a wide range of activities associated with capacity building, reconciliation, and societal transformation. Peace building is a long-term process that occurs after violent conflict
has slowed down or come to a halt. Thus, it is the phase of the peace process that takes place after peacemaking and peacekeeping (in the case of International interventions in conflict affected zones). For our purpose here, peace building is a process that facilitates the establishment of durable peace and tries to prevent the recurrence of violence by addressing root causes and effects of conflict through reconciliation, institution building, and political as well as economic transformation.

Consequently, understanding Peace building within the scope of Civil Military Relations in Nigeria means the process that addresses and resolves real or perceived conflict issues between the military and the civilians (including other law enforcement agencies) with the aim of closing the gaps in their relationship as well as creating a cordial relationship between them to enhance their work and encourage peaceful coexistence. The Nigeria military, as earlier stated has a checkered relationship with the civilians due to the way and manner they carry themselves and manage their relations with the civilians, who they ought to report to. Consequently, they do not enjoy the confidence and psycho-social support from the civilians. Unfortunately, the nature of the conflict we have in Nigeria today has made their presence in the civil space inevitable and requiring that they must find a way of working together to reclaim and rebuild their society.

If building durable peace in Civil Military Relations is therefore a process that will prevent the reoccurrence of conflict between the military and the civilians. This process therefore tries to unravel the root causes of the conflict, design and implement interventions that will bring lasting peace. These interventions could be reconciliatory, building the institutions by strengthening their capacities, and transforming the socio-political statuses. The essence is to removal the conflict factors, empower the institutions politically and economically as well as build their capacity to deal with the situation whenever they raise their ugly heads. Peace building as a process therefore covers that spectrum from a no peace situation to a peace situation.

By deduction peace building in civil military relations is therefore not only a human relations phenomenon but also involves institutional capacity building. The institutions involved must have the capacity to handle their relationship issues as professional as possible. This could be but not limited to intellectual, economic, political, psychological, etc. Any deficiency in any of these areas could negatively impact on the relationship of the parties involved. A good example could be a military that is not optimally financially supported to take proper care of its staff welfare may have a crop of officers who are not dedicated and satisfied with their jobs. Such
a military officer could be easily irritated on the job and mismanage/mishandle minor human relations issues that could lead to human rights abuses which are capable of worsening the already strained relationship with the civilians. Therefore, peace building requires looking out of the box towards finding lasting solutions to conflict situations. The peace builder consequently depends a lot on research in trying to unravel the root causes and identifying intervention options that will address the problem. The options available are usually multifaceted but directed to the causal factors with the aim of eliminating them.

**What Civilians and the Military could do to improve their Relationship**

For a relationship to be cordial it requires the parties to consciously contribute to it. Therefore, for us to build a peaceful relationship between the military and the civilian as well as the other law enforcement agencies, each group must play a significant role. What roles should the civilians and military play in either de-escalating the poor relations or closing the gap in their relationship. In this situation we shall be considering the history of the military with the civilians, the current status and capacity of the military in the present political dispensation where political power has gone back to the civilian, as well as the Terms of Engagement (TOE) of the military in some of their operations vis-a-vis the type of conflict situation confronting them. This is getting to the root of the situation and addressing their deficiencies with effective intervention options. Consequently, I have divided these roles into two categories: Structural and Psycho-social initiatives.

**The Role of Civilians in Improving their Relationship with the Military**

1. **Structural Initiatives:**
   a) Budgetary allocations to the military should be adequate for their operations and regularly disbursed.
   b) Oversight functions of the civilians over the military should be professional and devoid of so much secrecy
   c) The civil society could also help in the orientation of civilians on the operations and Rules of Engagement (ROE) of the military in the civilian space
   d) The national curriculum for civic education should be revisited to include Civic Military Relations, Peacebuilding and Peace Education.

2. **Psycho-social Initiatives:**
   a) The Media should build their capacity in the areas of security and conflict sensitive reporting as well as do balanced reporting of Civil Military Relations.
b) Advocacy meetings with all necessary agencies of the military by the civil society are necessary to improve the understanding of each party's mindset.

c) There should be accountability and transparency in the activities of the military. Oversight functions of the civil society on the military should be taken much more seriously and handled by those who are knowledgeable in military affairs.

d) The civil society should increase their levels of interaction with the military to understand their perception and methodology.

e) The civil society should accord more respect and decorum when dealing with the military.

f) The civilians could assist the military in its operations especially in conflict zones by providing them with some necessary materials for comfort.

The Role of the Military in Improving their Relationship with the Civilians

3. Structural Initiatives

a) Review their curriculum to include courses on human rights, Civil Military Relations and Peacebuilding in order to properly educate their ranks and files on proper human rights and human relations conduct.

b) Establish mechanisms to address human rights violations that dent their image with the civilians.

c) Need for Civil Military Relations training for all cadre of the Military.

d) The Military should reflect accountability and transparency in their operations.

e) The policy of secrecy and classification of materials should be made more transparent.

f) The Military should improve on their communication with the society using the media and their PR departments, especially on their rules of engagement, operations and in the event of any human rights abuse.

g) The Military should make sure their Human rights desk and desk officers are well grounded on the expectations of the civilians and the deliverables of the military.

h) Adherence to all national and international protocols during operations by military.

i) Reduce the duration of military interventions in internal operations.
4. **Psycho-social Initiatives**
   a) The Military should be professional and avoid high handedness of civilians
   b) Any abuse of civilian should be dealt with and communicated effectively to both the military and the civilians
   c) The military should be gender sensitive and seen to implement gender policies and programmes
   d) Joint Interactive sessions of civilians and the military is necessary to clear misgivings and distrust
   e) Improve the conditions of service/welfare and motivational packages of the military to ensure their job satisfaction and security.
   f) Award gallantry and professionalism.

**Conclusion**

In peacebuilding especially where there are underlying conflict factors that have lasted years there is every need for the parties to consciously make efforts towards resolving the issues and forging a better relationship. This therefore requires that the civilians should make efforts to go to the military to understand them better and the military also need to go to the civilians to know their expectations from them. The bottom line is that both parties must have a meeting point and dialogue as much as possible if their relationship will be improved. If their perception of each other is not consciously addressed and properly situated in time and space, their relationship can never be cordial considering that the military and civilians don't enjoy the benefit of the same professional background and experiences.
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Chapter 7

COMBATING INTER-SERVICE RIVALRY AMONGST SECURITY AGENCIES IN NIGERIA

by

Darlington Egbunu Abdullahi Ph.D

Introduction

Nations establish their armed forces, recruit and train personnel as well as equip them with a view to defending their respective nations against any form of external aggression. In this regard, the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (1999) provides in Section 217 (1) that there shall be an “armed forces” for the Federation which shall consist of an Army, a Navy, and Air Force and such other branches of the armed forces of the federation as may be established by an Act of the National Assembly. The primary role of the military profession being the organised application of force in the service of the State is to win wars. The Armed forces are also charged with the constitutional responsibility of suppressing insurrection and acting in aid of civil authorities to restore order when called upon to do so by the President, but subject to such conditions as may be prescribed by an Act of the National Assembly.

In order to achieve a full complement of the national security architecture however, the Constitution also provides in Sections 214 - 216 for the establishment of a Police Force. Similarly, other paramilitary and security agencies such as Nigeria Security and Civil Defence Corps (NSCDC), Department of State Security (DSS), National Intelligence Agency (NIA), Nigeria Immigration Service (NIS), Nigeria Custom Service (NCS), the Federal Road Safety Corps (FRSC) and others were established by various Acts of the National Assembly.

The military and these other agencies are therefore expected to work individually and collectively in a collaborative manner towards achieving peace, security and development of the nation. The synergy is necessary to prevent or speedily address emerging or emergent security challenges. Such challenges include violations of Nigeria's territorial integrity by land, sea and

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Security operatives rather than exploring avenues for collaboration and cooperation in enhancing security, capacity building and sharing of intelligence sometimes engage in unhealthy rivalries among themselves. Intra-Service rivalries, indiscipline, lack of joint training and lack of professionalism amongst others contribute to such rivalries. Sometimes, a particular Service or agency struggles to take credit for some level of successes recorded during a joint operation in which they individually and collectively played their respective constitutional roles. Such situations no doubt often have serious negative implications for national security. This paper will therefore briefly discuss the concept of inter-Service rivalry, its causes as well as some of the best practices to ensure effective collaboration and cooperation among the security Services.

Concept of Inter-Service Rivalry

The Oxford Essential Dictionary of the United States Military (2001) defined inter-service rivalry as rivalry between different branches of a country's armed forces, in other words, competition for limited resources among a nation's land forces (army), naval, and air forces. It noted further that the term also applies to the rivalries between a country's intelligence services or between the police and fire services of a city. Omoigui (2006) on the other hand defined inter-service rivalry as a state of competition, contention, or emulation within and between Services for something of perceived value to the contending interests. It could be tangible or intangible recognition and other perceived benefits to self-esteem. It can be positive (good natured) or negative (associated with deleterious consequences such as the inability to cooperate optimally in support of national defence and security objectives). Both definitions address the issue of inter-service rivalry but the latter definition is more specific to the Nigerian context and is therefore adopted for this paper.

Causes of Inter-Service Rivalry in Nigeria

There are several causes of inter-Service rivalry within the security sector in Nigeria. These include conflicting and duplicated roles and responsibilities assigned to some of the Services in the Acts that established them. A typical example is the duplication of roles between the Nigeria Police and the NSCDC. This has led to clashes between personnel of the two establishments, particularly in the area of pipeline and infrastructure protection as well as maintenance of law and order (Emeh, 2013). When the NSCDC was established, adequate care needed to be taken to avoid the duplicated roles that have been a source of rivalry. Roles assigned to the NSCDC should have been removed from those of the Police through Acts of the National Assembly. Similarly, the FRSC and the Nigeria Police have had to contend with who has the right to prosecute traffic offenders thus leading to friction and court cases. The establishment of the
Traffic Wardens also had some conflicting roles with those of the Police (Traffic Police) before the eventual merger of the Traffic Wardens with the Police. It is necessary to understand that the roles of the various agencies are complementary with a view to achieving the overall objective of national security. However, rivalry could be minimised through ensuring that areas of conflict in the establishment Acts of the existing and newly created security agencies are harmonised.

Inadequate recognition of the roles played by the various security Services in an operation such as the counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency operations in the North East of Nigeria. According to a report by Tsokar (2016), the military, particularly the Army has consistently failed to acknowledge the inputs of some other security agencies in the achievements recorded so far in the fight to restore order in the North East, despite their unbridled support to the campaign, to weed out the terrorists from the shores of Nigeria. He noted that over 4,000 operational policemen had been working in partnership with the military to end terrorism and insurgency in Nigeria. The Department of State Service (DSS) and National Intelligence Agency were also noted to be actively collaborating without adequate recognition. Such feelings, whether real or perceived, can set a stage for uncooperative attitudes, particularly in the area of intelligence sharing to aid the successful conduct of an operation.

It could be noted that the lack of intelligence sharing among the security Services during the events leading to the September 11, 2001 attacks on the World Trade Centre and other targets of the terrorist attacks in the United States was largely responsible for the attacks. Similarly, the London Underground Train Station in the United Kingdom and some locations in France further revealed the dangerous effects of inter-Service rivalry. Some Services reportedly withheld information that could have aided prevention of the attacks, with a view to taking credit for the end result only for the nation to be taken unawares with disastrous consequences.

The failure of a Service to keep strictly to its assigned roles can be a major reason for inter-Service rivalry. At the inception of the Muhammadu Buhari’s administration, the inter-Service rivalry that developed between the DSS and Nigerian Army over the protection of the President, C-in-C was not only seen as unhealthy but a demonstration of lack of professionalism to some extent (The Will Nigeria, 2015). The DSS transformed from being the ‘E’ Department or Special Branch of the Police Force in 1948 through becoming Nigeria Security Organisation (NSO) in 1976 and later broken into three namely SSS, NIA and DIA in 1999. It was empowered to provide security to designated principal government functionaries, sensitive installations and visitation of foreign dignitaries. It is to be noted that VIP protection goes beyond wearing suit and standing behind a VIP. Special trainings are involved. The conflict or rivalry, irrespective of personal interests could therefore have been avoided. This is particularly a sensitive security role that must not be compromised due to rivalry.
Lack of discipline on the part of some Service personnel sometimes causes inter-service conflicts. The Security agencies are known to uphold a high level of discipline and efforts are made to ensure this flow across the Services. There have been instances in which personnel would refuse to “pay compliments” otherwise regarded as salutation or the traditional military greetings thus resulting in the acclaimed senior one challenging the other. This situation sometimes results in conflicts that may lead to greater inter-Service conflicts. There is usually the general defence of the perceived offender not knowing the rank of the other. This thus brings to the fore, the need to enhance joint training for personnel at the lower ranks across the Services since such traits are more common at the lower levels.

Some security personnel have also been known to resort to alcoholism while on official duty and armed. They get drunk and thereafter resort to unethical behaviours. There are several images on the Internet showing some Policemen fighting in public while on duty and carrying their personal weapons. Some others get so drunk that they become objects of ridicule in the public while military personnel over the years have had clashes with the Police and civilians over minor issues. Accidental discharges from the weapons carried could easily occur in such instances and any personnel of either the same Service or other trying to intervene could get injured or shot, resulting in inter-Service conflicts. These are quite avoidable.

On the need to uphold the military profession in high esteem, Alexis de Tocqueville (1835) stated that when a nation losses its military spirit, the career of arms immediately ceases to be respected and military men drop down to the lowest rank among public officials. Therefore, moral and ethical responsibilities must be taken seriously in order to maintain the desired level of respect and professionalism across the Services.

**Best Practices in Inter-Service Collaboration and Cooperation**

The Armed Forces of Nigeria over the years conducted several military training exercises that did not achieve the level expected results to inadequate collaboration towards joint operations. While the individual Services had effective communications systems, inter-operability of communications systems during joint operations often posed major challenges. Some of the joint training exercises affected by problem of inadequate collaboration included Operation SEADOG (31 Mar – 6 Apr 1985) and Operation TAKUTE EKPE (10 – 15 May 2004). It is to be noted that this problem also occurred during major operations (Mshelbwala, 2005). The integration of men and equipment is achieved through joint training. Joint training gives the military personnel the necessary skills to operate jointly while avoiding inter-Service rivalry. Joint training and joint procurement of equipment enables units, formations or different Services to interoperate and achieve effectiveness in operations. The Services must be adequately equipped to enhance inter-operability and collaboration with a view to achieving set objectives.
The process of preventing and combating crimes in any society is complex, requiring that each Service plays its part in single Service and collaborate effectively with others to achieve the overall goal of peace, security and development. Respect for each other and eliminating the duplication of Constitutional roles will go a long way to prevent inter-Service rivalry. This is particularly important for the para-military agencies. Intelligence and information sharing as well as equal recognition for all participating forces in terms of rewards, pay and allowances is very important to prevent inter-service rivalry.

**Conclusion**

Inter-service rivalry among the security agencies in Nigeria has been an issue that keeps occurring in various military operations. Though joint military training takes place at the officer cadre of the Services, it needs to be further enhanced at the lower levels and across Services and efforts made to enhance collaboration and cooperation among them. Moreover, role duplication needs to be eliminated or managed properly through effective collaboration.

Clashes between the security agencies, especially some of the misunderstanding that have taken place in public and gross misconduct with personnel in uniform drinking in public places while armed are precursors to clashes and embarrassments with other Services and the civil populace. All efforts must therefore be made to ensure good conduct of personnel, joint training and professionalism in the discharge of their constitutional responsibilities.
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Appendix I

SPEECHES AND KEYNOTE ADDRESSES AT THE DIALOGUE SESSIONS ON FOSTERING CIVIL MILITARY RELATIONS IN NIGERIA ORGANISED BY CLEEN FOUNDATION

KEYNOTE ADDRESS BY MANUR MUHAMMADU DAN-ALI HONOURABLE MINISTER OF DEFENCE REPRESENTED BY BRIGADIER GENERAL LYM HASSAN COORDINATOR PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS MINISTRY OF DEFENCE

It gives me immense pleasure; representing the Honourable Minister of Defence to deliver this keynote address on this remarkable occasion. Fostering Civil Military Relations Project in Nigeria at a time like this, when civil societies need to understand the purpose and appropriateness of establishing national Armed Forces with adequate capabilities is noble. The various security challenges bedevilling this nation has brought to fore the importance of establishing a formidable Defence and Security Agencies for the protection and projection of national and international interests.

The constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 as Amended has enshrined in Section 217 behalf, States that, there shall be an armed forces for the Federation, which shall consist of an Army, Navy and Air Force and such other branches of the Armed forces of the Federation as may be established by Act of the National Assembly.

The Federation shall, subject to an Act of National Assembly made in that behalf equip and maintain the armed forces as may be considered adequate and effective for the purpose of:

(a) Defending Nigeria from external aggression;
(b) Maintaining its territorial integrity and securing its borders from violation on Land, Sea and Air.
(c) Suppressing insurrection and acting in aid of civil authorities to restore order, when called upon to do so by the President, but subject to such conditions as may be prescribed by an Act of the National Assembly and
(d) Perform such other functions as may be prescribed by an Act of the National Assembly.

The current security challenges have made the Armed Forces of Nigeria to be more

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engaged in some of its stipulated constitutional roles that are not familiar to those that are not conversant with Nigeria's constitution. Employment of Military in aid of civil authority is a binding national duty of Militaries world over. Examples abound in United Kingdom and it's Military in Ireland, the Russian Military in Chechnya, the Egyptian Military and the Religious Extremists and of course Nigerian Military in the various arenas that tends to overwhelm other internal security agencies. The Armed Forces of Nigeria is established to defend, protect, preserve, project and secure Nigerian national interest at home and abroad as directed by Commander-In-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Federal Republic of Nigeria as prescribed by an Act of the National Assembly. Efforts are therefore mad through various means of Communication Strategy to make the civil populace understand and know how to effectively control their military for efficient Civil Military Relations

It is always appropriate to understand the concept and theories of Civil Military Relations deeply not peripherally. Samuel Huntington and Morris Janowitz expounded the theory of Civil Military Relations, other scholars like Peter Faever's Agent's theory, Rebecca Schiff's Concordance theory and Elliot Cohen's theory of Unequal Dialogue, attempted to provide alternatives. However, much more acceptable theories emanated more recently like the Theories of Democratic Civil – Military Relations that are applicable in mature democratic states. Simply, Civil-military relations describe the relationship between civil society as a whole and the military organizations or organizations established to protect it. More narrowly, it describes the relationship between the civil authority of a given society and its military authority. Studies of civil-military relations often rest on a normative assumption that civilian control of the military is preferable to military control of the state. Principally and empirically it explains how civilian control over the military is established and maintained.

In conclusion, this short address will not be complete without stressing the importance of understanding the constitutional provisions that established the military before developing the appropriate communication strategy for the benefits and sustainability of national interests, protection of the state and appropriate control of the military. Lastly, I want to further stress that the Armed Forces of Nigeria is composed of Nigerians for the defence and protection of Nigerians as defined by the Act that established it. The Armed Forces of Nigeria will therefore continue to be absolutely loyal to constituted authority. On this note, the Honourable Minister of Defence wishes you successful dialogue.
CHAIRMAN’S OPENING REMARKS BY BRIGADIER GENERAL JN TEMLONG (RTD) DSS FWC MMAS OON, PRESIDENT ALUMNI ASSOCIATION OF THE NATIONAL DEFENCE COLLEGE (AANDEC)

Today we will be looking at an issue that affects us as a nation, “Civil and Military Relationship”. I believe the present security challenges Nigeria is facing demands a robust relationship between the civilian populace who are being protected and the military that are protecting them. Maximum cooperation is needed between the two sides to achieve a safer Nigeria. This is the sole objective of the state as spelt out in Chapter 2 of our constitution: “The security and welfare of the citizens is the primary objective of the state”. How can this be achieved? You are the instrument of state policy to achieve this. However, experience has shown that there is apathy towards the military and other security agencies by the citizens. In asymmetric warfare, you need the maximum cooperation of civilians. This is because asymmetric warfare is population centric. The terrorists live within us and it is the civilians who will give you timely information about their activities. You must therefore cultivate a robust relationship that is mutually beneficial, devoid of fear and anchored on respect and trust.

The project “Fostering Civil-Military Relations” by CLEEN Foundation, in collaboration with the Institute for Peace and Conflict Resolution is timely and a welcome development. I am happy that the government and Armed Forces have shown commitment to this project. The presence of the Honourable Minister of Defence at this workshop underscores the importance the Buhari administration places on Civil-Military relations in Nigeria. The road map is still at the daft stage and this dialogue offers opportunity for the various stakeholders to make input into it for general acceptability and possible adaptation and implementation. This process will make stakeholders to own the road map. You are therefore change agent.

I therefore enjoin all participants present here this morning to actively participate in the workshop process. Let me state that this is not an avenue to cast aspersion on the military or any other security organization, rather this is a noble project that offers opportunity for stakeholders to engage on the way forward. I wish us all meaningful contributions and a successful dialogue. Thank you for listening and God bless.
GOODWILL MESSAGE BY CHIEF OF THE AIR FORCE DELIVERED BY THE DIRECTOR CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS NIGERIAN AIR FORCE AIR COMMODORE AFAM MOSES CHUKWU

I commend the CLEEN Foundation for their special interest and efforts in promoting cordial and mutually beneficial Civil-Military Relations. Your commitment to this project is evident in the present effort to evolve a road map for a more proactive and inclusive Civil-Military Relations. The Nigerian Air Force (NAF) is pleased to be associated with your organisation and the laudable objectives that you stand for. On our part, the Nigerian Air Force has in the recent past shown an increasing interest in earning and retaining the support and cooperation of the civil populace. This is the primary objective for the establishment of Nigerian Air Force Directorate of Civil-Military Relations. The new Directorate has embarked on a tour of Nigerian Air Force Units to give sensitization talks designed to re-orientate our personnel on the need for better relations with the public, having more professional approach to duties, and respect for rights of the civil populace. Information and complaints Desk has also been established in the office of the Directorate of Civil-Military Relations (DCMR) to enhance cordial relations with the public.

The leadership of the Nigerian Air Force has shown concern for the plight and humanitarian needs of Nigerians affected by the insurgency in the North-East. In an effort to make life easier for the Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs), the Nigerian Air Force has established an emergency hospital at the IDP Camp in Dalori, Borno State and also conducts periodic medical outreach to other IDP Camps in Borno, Yobe, Adamawa States as well as the FCT. The service is also taking all possible professional measures to avoid collateral damages to civilian population in the frontline communities even as we continue with the final phase of the war against insurgency.

We are therefore glad to be part of the efforts of CLEEN Foundation to promote better Civil-Military Relations. May I therefore reiterate the need to continue according the military professional all the attention it deserves in the benefits of our great Nation. We thank all Civil Society Groups here present and solicit your continued support for the Nigerian Air Force in our efforts to defend Nigeria and make it better and safer for all. I rejoice with you as you roll out this Project Implementation of Stakeholders' Civil-Military Relations Dialogue 2016 for the Road Map. I wish you well in the year ahead, thank you all and God bless.
Appendix II

IMAGES FROM VARIOUS CIVIL MILITARY RELATIONS WORKSHOPS AND TOWNHALL MEETINGS ACROSS THE COUNTRY

PICTURES FROM THE CIVIL MILITARY RELATIONS WORKSHOPS, TOWN HALL MEETINGS AND DIALOGUE SESSIONS

Public presentation of the CLEEN Foundation Roadmap for Civil Military Relations in Nigeria at the Headquarters of the National Human Rights Commission in Abuja

The Executive Director of CLEEN Foundation, Dr. Benson Olugbueo speaking at the opening ceremony of the workshop on 'Fostering Civil-Military Relations in Nigeria
Participants at the various workshops and Dialogue sessions of the Civil Military Relations
Brigadier General JN Temlong (Rtd) OON (3rd from Right) Chairman of the Civil Military Relations Dialogue Session; Brigadier General LYM Hassan (3rd from Left), representing the Honourable Minister of Defence, Mansur M Dan-Ali. The others are the representatives of the Service Chiefs, Inspector General of Police and Commandant General of the Nigeria Security and Civil Defence Corps.
CLEEN Foundation's Publications

1. CLEEN Foundation's Publications JOURNEY TO CIVIL RULE A Report on the Presidential Primaries of the All Peoples Party (APP) & Peoples' Democratic Party (PDP) February 13-15 'q1, 1999 Published in 1999

2. POLICING A DEMOCRACY A Survey Report on the Role and Functions or the Nigeria Police in a Post -Military Era, Published in 1999

3. LAW ENFORCEMENT REVIEW Quarterly Magazine, Published since the first quarter of 1998

4. CONSTABLE JOE A Drama Series on Police Community Relations in Nigeria, Published in 1999

5. POLICE. COMMUNITY VIOLENCE IN NIGERIA Published in 2000

6. JUVENILE JUSTICE ADMINISTRATION IN NIGERIA Philosophy and Practice, Published in 2001

7. GENDER RELATIONS AND DISCRIMINATION IN NIGERIA POLICE FORCE Published in 2001

8. FORWARD MARCH A Radio Drama Series on Civil Military Relations in Nigeria, Published in 2001

9. HOPE BETRAYED A Report on Impunity and State-Sponsored Violence in Nigeria Published in 2002

10. CIVILIAN OVERSIGHT AND ACCOUNTABILITY OF POLICE IN NIGERIA Published in 2003

11. POLICE AND POLICING IN NIGERIA Final Report on the Conduct of the police in the 2003 Election, Published in 2003

12. CIVIL SOCIETY AND CONFLICT MANAGEMENT IN NIGER DELTA Monograph Series. No. 2, Published in 2006

13. CRIMINAL VICTIMIZATION SAFETY AND POLICING IN NIGERIA; 2005 Monograph Series. No. 3, Published in 2006

14. CRIMINAL VICTIMIZATION SAFETY AND POLICING IN NIGERIA: 2006 Monograph Series. No. 4, Published in 2007


16. POLICE AND POLICING IN WEST AFRICA Proceeding of Regional Conference, Published in 2008.

17. IN THE EYES OF THE BEHOLDER A Post-Election Survey Report, Published in 2009

18. CRY FOR JUSTICE Proceeding of Public Tribunal on Police Accountability in Nigeria Published in 2009

19. GOOD PRACTICE GUIDE Establishing a School-Based Prevention Programme Published in 2009

20. ANOTHER ROUTINE OR FUNDAMENTAL CHANGES? Police Reform in Nigeria 1999 till date, Published in 2009

21. POLICING WOMEN AND CHILDREN IN NIGERIA Training Manual, Published in 2009

22. CITIZENSHIP AND IDENTITY POLITICS IN NIGERIA Conference Proceedings, Monograph Series, No. 5 Published in 2009

23. CRIMINAL VICTIMIZATION SAFETY IN LAGOS STATE Monograph Series, No. 6, Published in 2010

24. CORRUPTION AND GOVERNANCE CHALLENGES IN NIGERIA: Conference Proceedings, Monograph Series, No. 7 Published in 2010

25. POLICING ELECTION IN NIGERIA Assessment of the Role of Nigeria Police in Election in Nigeria Police in election in Nigeria, Published in 2010

26. ENHANCING ACCOUNTABILITY SYSTEMS IN THE NIGERIA POLICE FORCE Conference Proceedings Monograph Series 8, Published in 2010
27. EMERGENCY RESPONSE TO VICTIMS OF GUN VIOLENCE AND ROAD ACCIDENTS, Conference Proceedings Monograph Series, No. 9, Published in 2010

28. POLICE STATION VISITORS WEEK REPORT 2010 CLEEN Foundation

29. POLICING ELECTIONS IN NIGERIA: Assessment of the Role of the Nigeria Police Force in elections IN Nigeria, Published in 2010

30. TRAINING MANUAL ON PEACE AND HUMAN RIGHTS FOR SECURITY INSTITUTIONS IN NIGERIA CLEEN Foundation Published in 2010

31. REPORT OF CONFERENCE ON MAKING DEMOCRACY WORK FOR NIGERIA PEOPLE Monograph Series, No. 11, Published in 2011

32. YOUNG PEOPLE AND THE POLICE IN LAGOS Monograph Series, No. 12, Published in 2011

33. PROVIDING EFFECTIVE POLICING DURING THE 2011 GENERAL ELECTIONS: Conference Proceedings, Monograph Series, No. 13, Published in 2011

34. RESPONDING TO EMERGENCY TRENDS ON TERRORISM IN NIGERIA Conference Proceedings, Monograph Series, No. 16, Published in 2011

35. POLICE INTERNAL CONTROL SYSTEMS IN WEST AFRICA, Published in 2011

36. CRIME VICTIMIZATION, SAFETY AND POLICING IN NIGERIA, published in 2011

37. OPERATIONAL SING INTELLIGENCE-LED POLICING IN NIGERIA Conference Proceedings Monograph Series, No. 17, Published in 2012

38. GOVERNANCE AND IN SECURITY IN SOUTH EAST NIGERIA Published in 2012

39. POLICE STATION VISITORS WEEK REPORT 2012 CLEEN Foundation

40. POLICE REFORM IN NIGERIA CIVIL SOCIETY FINAL REPORT CSO PANEL Published in 2012

41. CRIMINAL VICTIMIZATION AND PUBLIC SAFETY IN NIGERIA Published in 2012

42. CRIMINAL VICTIMIZATION, POLICING AND GOVERNANCE NIGERIA, Monograph Series, No. 18, Published in 2013

43. EXTERNAL POLICE ACCOUNTABILITY AND THE POLICE SERVICE COMMISSION Conference Proceedings, Monograph Series, No. 19, Published in 2013

44. POLICE STATION VISITORS WEEK REPORT 2013 CLEEN Foundation

45. CONFLICTS AND SECURITY GOVERNANCE IN WEST AFRICA Published in 2013

46. CRIME AND PUBLIC SAFETY IN NIGERIA Published 2014

47. SECURITY AND GOVERNANCE IN NORTH - EAST NIGERIA Published 2016

48. ROADMAP FOR FOSTERING CIVIL MILITARY RELATIONS IN NIGERIA (2016)

49. NON STATE ARMED GROUPS IN NORTH EAST NIGERIA (2018)


51. POLICE REFORM IN NIGERIA: The Devolution Debate (2018)