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# **SECURITY THREAT ASSESSMENT FOR 2019 GENERAL ELECTIONS IN NIGERIA**

## **CONSOLIDATED REPORT**

### **Editors:**

**EEO Alemika  
Oluwole Ojewale  
Chigozirim Okoro**

**October 2019**

**SECURITY THREAT  
ASSESSMENT FOR 2019  
GENERAL ELECTIONS IN  
NIGERIA**

**Editors:**

EEO Alemika PhD

Oluwole Ojewale

Chigozirim Okoro

## Security Threat Assessment for 2019 General Elections in Nigeria

### Editors:

**EEO Alemika PhD ■ Oluwole Ojewale ■ Chigozirim Okoro**

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◦ *Justice Sector Reform*

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## LIST OF ACRONYMS

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<b>CSO</b>	Civil Society Organizations
<b>DfID</b>	Department for International Development
<b>ESTA</b>	Election Security Threat Assessment
<b>INEC</b>	Independent National Electoral Commission
<b>PSI</b>	Practical Sampling International
<b>PVC</b>	Permanent Voters Card

## ACKNOWLEDGMENT

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The CLEEN Foundation expresses her gratitude to our development partners, groups, corporate institutions, and individuals for their specific and strategic support for the success of the research and report of this project.

First, we thank the Department for International Development (DfID) and the European Union for their continuous faith and support in our vision and more importantly for the funding of the Election Security Threat Assessment (ESTA) project. This has enabled us to measure and analyze indicators of election threats in Nigeria. We are sincerely grateful for the opportunity.

Second, we also appreciate the support and cooperation of key stakeholders like the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC), The Electoral Institute, the Nigeria Police Force (NPF), the Judiciary, and other critical actors in the electoral process in Nigeria. We express our profound appreciation to the over 20,000 respondents and the guild of interviewers recruited by our research partners (Practical Sampling International and NOIPoll) in the course of this research exercise. We thank our various development consultants drawn particularly from the academia who contributed chapters to our major reports on the 2019 general elections across the 36 states and the Federal Capital Territory.

Finally, CLEEN Foundation extends appreciation to her staff for their continued dedication and commitment to the greatness of the organization. We appreciate the Executive Director of the Foundation, Benson Olugbuo Ph.D., and the Director of Institutional Services, Peter Maduoma, for their strategic support for this project. Specifically, we recognize the efforts of Blessing Kadiri (Program Advisor), Ruth Olofin (Program Manager), Chigozirim Okoro (Asst. Program Manager), Oluwale Ojewale, Nnamdi Odo, Gabriel Akinremi, Justina Johnson, Ebere Mbaegbu, and our present and past interns for their efforts towards the success of this project. More importantly, we appreciate our board members for their advisory support on the project.

## P R E F A C E

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At the very core of a free, and fair election is a peaceful and transparent process. This core is threatened by abysmal challenges of insecurity across the country ranging from terrorism, kidnapping, communal clashes, to rural banditry. These insecurity challenges put the country at a dangerous spot and even more threatening as the country approaches general elections periodically. These challenges, coupled with the enigmatic violence attributed to the process of election in Nigeria raise serious concern in the minds of people both in the local and international space.

The government in response to these threats devised a couple of approaches which include increased military presence which is believed to help curtail the challenges and also to protect the integrity of the electoral process. It is therefore important to put the activity of every of the stakeholder like INEC, Political Parties, and the Security Agencies into perspective and also to consider their contributions to threats associated with Elections in Nigeria.

Hinged on this backdrop, CLEEN Foundation carried out a study designed to assess the threats posed by different actors connected to the elections in Nigeria. The study was carried out in 3 batches, with all addressing the issue of security threats associated with the elections in Nigeria. Therefore, the study explored the perception of the general public on what they identify to be a threat to the election. The goal was to generate empirical evidence on threats to the process of election and also to help proffer recommendations to key stakeholders on how best to mitigate a negative upsurge in the process of the election.

Based on the measured factors, the study shows that actors such as the INEC, the Media, Politicians, and the Judiciary can be instrumental, either negatively or positively to electoral violence in Nigeria. Also, a majority of the respondents opined that poor election management can serve a catalyst for election violence. More so, all through the three batches of the research, a majority of the respondent suggested that troublesome politicians and candidates can spur a violent election in Nigeria.

Recommendations from this study are targeted at different stakeholder in order to achieve free, fair, and peaceful elections in Nigeria. Continuous education and sensitization on the need to have a peaceful election are suggested for politicians, members of the public and even the electoral umpire. This, if achieved, will not only achieve a peaceful election but also deepen electoral process in Nigeria. The study appeals to both the executive arm of government and the legislature to provide enabling laws that will ensure that the electoral umpire achieves its mandate without undue interference from any quarter. Furthermore, the study recommends that the media and relevant CSOs must see themselves as a critical part of the process and must desist from misinformation and disinformation which can lead to unprecedented election violence in the country.

**Benson Olugbuo** PhD  
Executive Director,  
**CLEEN Foundation**  
October, 2019



## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

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### Background and methods

Electoral violence is a sub-set of a wider phenomenon of political violence. Elections in Nigeria record wide-ranging forms of electoral violence like assassination of opponents; disruptive behaviours, including use of weapons and assault, during voter registration, party primaries, campaigns, polling and collation of results. Other manifestations of electoral violence in the country are killing and attack on electoral officials and the destruction of electoral materials. These acts erode the quality and credibility of the election.

Three rounds of survey were conducted by CLEEN Foundation to assess security threats to the general elections in the country in February and March 2019. A pilot survey in twelve states and a national survey were conducted in the country in 2018. Another national survey was conducted in January 2019, barely a month to the presidential and national assembly elections. Data collected for the pre-election national threat assessments reported in this publication were collected in October 2018 and January 2019. A pilot survey was conducted in 12 states of the country in April and May 2018. The primary objective of the assessments was to determine the factors, actions, and actors that could trigger violence during the general national elections.

Samples for the surveys were drawn through a nationally representative sampling procedure. Respondents in both samples completed a questionnaire with 69 items. In addition, experts completed open-ended questions. The questionnaire, used for the assessment was developed by the Electoral Institute of the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) and the CLEEN Foundation.

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<sup>1</sup>Alemika, E. 2007. Quality of Elections, Satisfaction with Democracy and Political Trust in Africa. *Afrobarometer Working Paper* No. 84 (available on line at [www.afrobarometer.org](http://www.afrobarometer.org)); Dudley, B. (1965) "Violence in Nigerian Politics" *Transition* 5 (21): 21-24; Elklit, J. and Reynolds A. 2005. "A Framework for the Systematic Study of Election Quality". *Democratization*, 12(2): 147-162; Federal Government of Nigeria. 1989. Views and Comments of the Federal Military Government on the Report of the Judicial Commission of Inquiry into the Affairs of the Federal Electoral Commission (FEDECO) 1979-83; Lindberg, S. 2004. "The Democratic Qualities of Competitive Elections: Participation, Competition and Legitimacy in Africa". *Commonwealth & Comparative Politics*, 42(1): 61-105; Transition Monitoring Group. 2003. *Do Votes Count?* Abuja, Nigeria: TMG; Transition Monitoring Group. 2007. *Election Programmed to Fail*. Abuja, Nigeria: TMG

The fieldwork for the first national election security threat survey conducted through face-to-face interviews lasted fifteen days and was conducted from 10<sup>th</sup> to 24<sup>th</sup> of October 2018, with a sample of 11,219 drawn from all states and the Federal Capital Territory of the country. The second national survey with a sample size of 11,421 was conducted from 15-25 January 2019. Fieldwork for the first assessment survey in 2018 was managed by Practical Sampling International (PSI) while that of January 2019 was managed by NOIPolls, both commercial survey administration companies. The face to face interviews was conducted using Mobile Computer-Assisted Personal Interview (MCAPI) technology for data collection. Interviews were conducted in five major Nigerian languages: English, Pidgin English, Yoruba, Hausa, and Igbo.

### Key Findings

1. Improper conducts and actions of security agencies, Independent National Electoral Commission, media, politicians and judiciary featured prominently as the most salient factors that could cause violence during elections (tables 8 and 9).
2. Factors acknowledged by significant majority of respondents as most salient were partiality of security agents, aggressive and excessive use of force, partiality of INEC officials, misinformation of the public by media, partisanship, favouritism and partiality of media, poor training and low professionalism of security agents, low sense of safety among members of the public, lack of transparency and disagreements over selection of party officials and candidates, and broadcast and publication of hate speech.
3. Efficient election management is central to free, fair and credible elections. On average, about 60% of respondents in the 2019 national survey compared to more than 70% in 2018 national survey agreed that poor management of election by INEC could cause violence during the 2019 elections. Among election management decisions and actions identified as likely sources of electoral violence were continuous and underage registration, distribution of permanent voter card, poor voter education by INEC, distribution of election materials, quality of training of election officials, adequacy and location of polling units, failure to prosecute electoral offenders, and the preparedness and partiality of INEC officials.
4. Security management factors emphasized by most respondents as likely sources of violence during 2019 elections included partially of security agencies, aggressive

and excessive use of force, poor training and low professionalism among security agencies.

5. A significant majority (more than three-fifths) of the respondents agreed with statements that decisions and inadequacies of the judiciary could cause electoral violence. Factors identified included corruption and lack of integrity of judiciary, confusing and contradictory court decisions.
6. More than two-thirds of the respondents in the surveys agreed that partisanship; misinformation of the public by media; broadcast and publication of hate speech and inefficient media regulatory agencies were potential sources of electoral violence in 2019.

## Recommendations

- Comprehensive political and electoral reforms are required to enhance the evolution and consolidation of democratic culture and practices in the country.
- Extensive and continuous political education is required for the citizens, politicians, party leaders and elected officials to enhance free, fair and credible elections.
- Electoral management and security bodies should be strengthened with relevant laws, capacity, competencies, and resources to make them impartial and more efficient.
- Judiciary should be adequately empowered by relevant laws and resources as well properly oriented to provide prompt and impartial electoral dispute adjudication
- The media and civil society organizations need to rediscover and internalize their roles as vanguards of civility, good and democratic governance. Appropriate political education, electoral laws, and effective media regulatory agencies specifying the roles and responsibilities of media and civil society organizations in a democratic society are required and should be provided by government and relevant non-state professional and other associations.

### 1.1 Introduction

Democratic elections are competitions for political power through non-violent means. They provide political parties and politicians with the opportunity to present their policies and programmes to the electorates. They also afford the citizens the opportunity to express, through votes, their preferences and choices of political parties and politicians to govern them. Democratic elections also constitute an effective mechanism for holding government, political parties and politicians to account. However, the credibility and efficacy of elections can be undermined by several factors, especially violence at any of the stages of the electoral process. Therefore, an understanding of the actions and actors that trigger violence during elections is critical to the identification and implementation of measures to mitigate insecurity that may undermine the credibility of electoral process.

Electoral violence is a sub-set of a wider phenomenon of political violence. Elections in Nigeria record wide-ranging forms of electoral violence like assassination of opponents; disruptive behaviours, including killing, assault and use of weapons during voter registration, party primaries, campaigns, polling and collation of results, attack on electoral officials and destruction of electoral materials. These acts erode the quality and credibility of the election. In Nigeria, the Political Bureau Report observed that Nigerian politicians rig elections “in most blatant fashion ... violence,

<sup>2</sup>Alemika, E. 2007. Quality of Elections, Satisfaction with Democracy and Political Trust in Africa. *Afrobarometer Working Paper* No. 84 (available on line at [www.afrobarometer.org](http://www.afrobarometer.org)); Dudley, B. (1965) “Violence in Nigerian Politics” *Transition* 5 (21): 21-24; Elklit, J. and Reynolds A. 2005. “A Framework for the Systematic Study of Election Quality”. *Democratization*, 12(2): 147-162; Federal Government of Nigeria. 1989. Views and Comments of the Federal Military Government on the Report of the Judicial Commission of Inquiry into the Affairs of the Federal Electoral Commission (FEDECO) 1979-83; Lindberg, S. 2004. “The Democratic Qualities of Competitive Elections: Participation, Competition and Legitimacy in Africa”. *Commonwealth & Comparative Politics*, 42(1): 61-105; Transition Monitoring Group. 2003. *Do Votes Count?* Abuja, Nigeria: TMG; Transition Monitoring Group. 2007. *Election Programmed to Fail*. Abuja, Nigeria: TMG Federal Government of Nigeria. *Political Bureau Report*

corruption, arson, and brigandage were employed in the mad desire to win and retain power both in the regions and at the centre” (Report of the Political Bureau 1987: 25).

CLEEN Foundation conducts election security threat assessments as an aid to efforts of government, election management, and security agencies, political parties, politicians and civil society to prevent and control violence during elections. The Election Security Threat Assessment (ESTA) assesses the risks of electoral violence during elections.

## 1.2 Methods of data collection

Three rounds of survey were conducted by CLEEN Foundation to assess security threats to the general elections in the country in February and March 2019. A pilot survey in twelve states and a national survey were conducted in the country in 2018. Another national survey was conducted in January 2019, barely a month to the presidential and national assembly elections. Data collected for the national pre-election threat assessments reported in this publication were collected in October 2018 and January 2019. A pilot survey was conducted in 12 states of the country in April and May 2018. The primary objective of the assessments was to determine the factors, actions, and actors that could trigger violence during the general national elections scheduled for February and March 2019.

The sample for the surveys consisted of two sub-samples, comprising members of the general public and experts. Respondents in the public sample were drawn through a national representative sampling procedure comprising (a) stratified and random selection of sectors; (b) random selection of sampling start points; (c) random selection of households, and (d) random selection of eligible respondents. Respondents in the general public sub-sample were adult Nigerian males and females who were eighteen years old or older. To qualify for selection, individuals should have stayed in the selected household for a period of not less than six months and be a citizen of Nigeria. Respondents in the expert sub-sample were selected through a purposive sampling of persons with relevant knowledge of the electoral process and belonged to the following groups within society: police, lawyers, INEC officials, media, academia and CSOs, including NGOs.

Respondents in both samples completed a questionnaire with 69 items. In addition, experts completed open-ended questions. The questionnaire, used for the assessment was developed by the Electoral Institute of the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) and the CLEEN Foundation. It consisted of the Likert question format.

The fieldwork for the first national election security threat survey conducted through face-to-face interviews lasted fifteen days and was conducted from 10<sup>th</sup> to 24<sup>th</sup> of October 2018, with a sample of 11,219 drawn from all states and the federal capital territory of the country. The second national survey with a sample size of 11,421 was conducted from 15-25 January 2019. Fieldwork for the first assessment survey in 2018 was managed by Practical Sampling International (PSI) while that of January 2019 was managed by NOI Polls, both commercial survey administration companies. The face to face interviews was conducted using Mobile Computer-Assisted Personal Interview (MCAPI) technology for data collection. Interviews were conducted in five major Nigerian languages: English, Pidgin English, Yoruba, Hausa, and Igbo.

**2.0****ANALYSIS OF ELECTORAL SECURITY THREATS SURVEY DATA**

In this section, the data collected for the three surveys are presented and analyzed. The history of electoral violence in the respondents' communities as well as the prospect of the peaceful election were analyzed in the first section and followed in the second section by the analyses of actors that could cause violence during the elections. Other sections analysed political, electoral management, security management, judicial and media factors that could cause electoral violence in 2019.

**2.1 History of electoral violence and the prospect of electoral violence in 2019**

Prior to elections in Nigeria, the citizens are usually apprehensive of election-related insecurity. This is because past elections recorded violence at various stages of the electoral process. Respondents in the surveys of 2018 and 2019 were asked whether the 2019 elections will be peaceful in their areas. Respondents were generally slightly more optimistic in 2018 that election will be peaceful in their area. In the survey conducted in twelve states, 73.9% of respondents said that election will be peaceful in their areas, compared to 81.3% and 76.2% in the 2018 and 2019 national surveys. More respondents (61.8%) in the pilot survey said their areas had a history of violence compared to 53.8% and 45.8% in the national surveys conducted in 2018 and 2019 (Table 1). The responses of respondents across the three elections are significant. As the 2019 elections approached fewer respondents reported a history of elections in their areas.

Table 1: History of electoral violence and the prospect of peaceful 2019 elections

History and prospect of violence	Pilot	2018	2019	Average across 3 surveys
	% agree	% agree	% agree	% agree
Peaceful election in the area	73.9	81.3	76.2	77.1
History of election violence in the area	61.8	53.8	45.8	53.8

## 2.2 Actors that could constitute threats to a peaceful election

Respondents in the pilot survey and the two national surveys were asked about actors that constitute threats to peaceful elections. Overall, respondents in 2019 survey compared to those in 2018 surveys were less apprehensive that several actors like political parties, INEC, security agencies, judiciary, media, traditional institutions, political thugs, vigilante groups, insurgents, religious extremists, and other armed groups, pan-ethnic groups and civil society organizations could constitute threat to peaceful elections in 2019.

Respondents in the pilot survey were more apprehensive of the roles of several actors than respondents in the national surveys conducted in 2018 and 2019. Nonetheless, more than two-fifths of the respondents in 2019 were apprehensive that the listed actors could cause electoral violence. Respondents in the 2018 national survey were significantly more apprehensive than their counterparts in the 2019 national survey (Table 2). Troublesome politicians and candidates, political thugs, extremists and cultists, and insurgents were identified by a significant majority of respondents as potential sources of electoral violence during the elections.

Table 2: Actors that constitute threats to peaceful elections

Actors	Pilot	2018	2019	Average across 3 surveys
	% agree	% agree	% agree	% agree
Political parties	78.4	77.1	52.2	69.2
Troublesome politicians and candidates	84.5	82.5	67.9	78.3
Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC)	67.1	69.4	50.2	62.2
Security agencies	72.4	69.4	54.0	65.3
Judiciary	65.0	60.5	47.9	57.8
Media	70.6	62.2	54.4	62.4
Traditional institutions	67.6	59.1	46.2	57.6
Political thugs	84.4	78.2	70.2	77.6
Vigilante groups	65.2	57.3	44.4	55.6
Insurgents	80.4	65.4	46.5	64.1
Religious extremists, cultists, and other armed groups	84.2	69.9	57.8	70.6
Pan- ethnic groups	-	57.4	44.7	-
Civil society organizations	57.7	54.3	37.7	49.9

Critical stakeholders in the election were perceived as potential sources of electoral violence, and this poses serious concerns and challenges. Fundamentally, it indicates the absence of strong democratic political culture within the country and as determinants of the conduct of key political actors. Civil Society Organizations, which are often touted as a catalyst of democratic values and struggles, are fragmented and divided along partisan or primordial cleavages of ethnicity, religion, region, and party.

### 2.3 Political factors that could cause electoral violence

Several political factors were highly rated as possible causes of electoral violence during the 2019 elections by respondents in the three surveys. The factors identified included lack of training and corruption of party agents, citizens' disaffection with government, confusing electoral laws, lack of transparency and disagreements over selection of party officials and candidates, undue influence of money and godfathers, contentious party conventions and primaries and lack of respect for electoral laws and party rules (table 3).

**Table 3: Political factors that could cause electoral violence**

Political factors	Pilot	2018	2019	Average across 3 surveys
	% agree	% agree	% agree	% agree
Contentious party conventions and primaries	79.7	76.7	55.7	70.7
Disorderly party rallies, processions and campaigns	79.0	81.2	64.2	74.8
Lack of respect for electoral laws and party rules	79.6	82.3	69.5	77.3

Undue influence of money and godfathers	81.7	82.8	69.5	78.0
Lack of transparency and disagreements over the selection of party officials and candidates	83.8	85.6	69.6	79.5
Defections and cross-carpeting	75.3	70.5	58.3	68.0
Lack of training and corruption of party agents	84.1	82.9	69.2	78.7
Intergroup conflicts	79.1	75.6	56.4	70.4
Attempt by illegal migrants to participate in the election	79.6	78.3	62.3	73.5
Citizens' disaffection with government	83.0	74.7	62.3	73.3
Widespread availability and use of hard drugs	83.4	81.0	67.0	77.1
Confusing electoral laws	82.8	77.8	65.0	75.2

#### 2.4 Electoral management factors that could cause violence during the election

The most potent sources of electoral violence are decisions and activities associated with the management of the electoral process. Respondents were asked the likelihood that certain activities and problems could cause violence during elections. The majority of respondents agreed that the decisions and actions of the electoral management body could cause violence during elections. Among such factors are continuous and underage registration, distribution of permanent voter card, poor voter education by INEC, distribution of election materials, quality of training of election officials, adequacy and location of polling units, failure to prosecute electoral offenders, and the preparedness and partiality of INEC officials. Overall, fewer respondents in 2019 national survey compared to those in 2018 national survey agreed that these factors could cause violence during 2019 elections. In contrast, more respondents in the pilot survey rated this factor as likely sources of violence than respondents in the two national surveys of 2018 and 2019 (Table 4).

**Table 4: Electoral management factors that could cause violence**

Electoral management factors	Pilot	2018	2019	Average Over 3 surveys
	% agree	% agree	% agree	% agree
Problems about continuous registration exercise	81.6	77.0	57.8	72.1
Underage registration	77.5	76.0	62.1	71.9
Problems about distribution of PVC	79.0	76.7	59.7	71.8
Poor voter education by INEC	79.2	75.9	63.9	73.0
Movement and distribution of election materials	80.0	77.0	60.5	72.5
Quality of election officials	78.9	70.8	61.7	70.7
Substitution of trained electoral officials	80.3	76.6	62.3	73.1
Distribution, location , and adequacy of polling units and voting points	81.9	80.2	64.7	75.6
Failure to prosecute electoral offenders	79.9	74.9	66.3	73.7
Partiality of INEC officials	87.6	82.5	76.5	82.2
Overall preparedness by INEC	79.8	73.5	59.8	71.0

On average, about 60% of respondents in 2019 compared to more than 70% in 2018 agreed that the listed election management factors could cause electoral violence (table 4). Factors that were more frequently emphasized as sources likely to cause electoral violence include partiality of electoral officers and distribution, location and adequacy of polling units, the substitution of trained electoral officers, movement and distribution of electoral materials.

## 2.5 Security management and electoral violence

The majority of respondents in the surveys agreed that several problems associated with security could cause violence during the 2019 elections. However, fewer respondents in the 2019 national survey compared to those in the pilot survey and 2018 national survey agreed that the listed security-related factors could cause electoral violence (table 5).

**Table 5: Security management and electoral violence**

Security factors	Pilot	2018	2019	Average over 3 surveys
	% agreed	% agree	% agree	% agree
Partiality of security agents	91.3	86.3	78.1	85.2
Inadequate or excessive presence of security agents	81.8	82.2	68.9	77.6
Aggressive and excessive use of force	88.2	85.2	76.0	83.1
Poor training and low professionalism of security agents	82.9	84.7	72.6	80.1
Lack of synergy among security agents	80.6	82.2	71.0	77.9
Lack of synergy between INEC and security agencies	82.1	83.4	70.5	78.7
Low sense of safety among members of the public	86.5	83.6	69.5	79.9

Problems associated with deployment of security agents	82.8	76.1	65.8	74.9
Problems associated with the welfare of security agents	78.6	75.4	60.7	71.6

Factors that were emphasized by most respondents included partiality of security agencies, aggressive and excessive use of force, poor training, and low professionalism among security agencies (Table 5).

## 2.6 Judicial factors that could cause violence during elections

More than 60% of the respondents agreed with the statement that the decisions and inadequacies of the judiciary could cause electoral violence. Factors identified by a significant majority of respondents include corruption and lack of integrity of judiciary, confusing and contradictory court decisions (table 6). Fewer respondents in the 2019 national survey compared with those in the pilot survey and 2018 national survey agreed that decisions and inadequacies of the judiciary could cause electoral violence.

**Table 6: Judicial factors that could cause violence during elections**

Judicial factors	Pilot	2018	2019	Average over 3 surveys
	% agreed	% agree	% agree	% agree
Delay in handling pre-election matters	81.6	77.2	66.3	75.0
The partiality of the judiciary	82.4	76.9	69.9	76.4

Corruption and integrity of judiciary	83.5	80.3	70.8	78.1
Capacity of judiciary	80.0	78.2	64.7	74.3
Confusing and contradictory court decisions	81.3	79.5	66.5	75.8

## 2.7 Media and electoral violence

Media play significant roles in elections. More than two-thirds of the respondents in both surveys agreed that several activities by the media could cause electoral violence. Among such factors are partisanship, favoritism and partiality; misinformation of the public by media; broadcast and publication of hate speech, and failure of regulatory agencies to ensure adherence to established rules governing media operations (table 7).

**Table 7: Media and violence during elections**

Media factors	Pilot	2018	2019	Average across 3 surveys
	% agree	% agree	% agree	% agree
Misinformation of the public by media	86.3	83.1	72.7	80.7
Broadcast and publication of hate speech	85.5	80.9	70.0	78.8
Unequal access to media	72.5	67.7	58.2	66.1
Partisanship, favoritism, and partiality of media	85.8	83.3	71.6	80.2

Failure of regulatory bodies to ensure adherence to establish rules by media	79.4	79.5	67.3	75.4
Sensationalism and provocation publication by media	79.5	74.2	67.7	73.8
Abuse of social media	78.6	67.0	60.2	68.6

### 3.0 STATE LEVEL ANALYSIS OF FACTORS THAT COULD CAUSE ELECTORAL VIOLENCE

Respondents across the states agreed that several factors could cause electoral violence during the 2019 general elections. Factors that were most commonly identified across the states were hate speech, availability and use of hard drugs, the partiality of INEC, partiality of security agencies, troublesome politicians, godfatherism, vote-buying, intra-party conflicts, misinformation by media, lack of respect for electoral law and proliferation of arms (table 8).

Actors and actions that were identified by majority of respondents as likely sources of electoral violence in 2019 are political parties and thugs, extremist religious groups and cults, pan-ethnic groups, security agencies, INEC officials, media, cult activities, vote-buying, godfatherism, insurgents, misinformation by media, partiality of judiciary, and vigilante groups (table 8).

**Table 8: Electoral Security for 2019 Elections: Overview of Issues**

States	Factors most likely to cause electoral violence	Actors whose actions could cause violence
Abia	Undue influence of money and godfatherism, lack of respect for electoral law, lack of transparency, intra-party conflicts	Political parties, party thugs, religious groups, pan-ethnic groups, and security agencies
Adamawa	Violent campaigns, hate speech, insurgency, ethnoreligious conflicts	Political parties, party thugs, media

Akwa-Ibom	Partiality and corruption of agencies – security, judiciary, and INEC	Cult activities, godfatherism
Anambra	Undue influence of money and godfatherism, lack of respect for electoral law, lack of transparency, intra-party conflicts	Party thugs, religious armed groups, cultism, security agencies
Bauchi	Hate speech, partiality by INEC	Party thugs, armed groups, insurgents
Bayelsa	The partiality of INEC officials, the partiality of security agencies, availability and use of hard drugs, undue influence of money and godfathers	Party thugs, armed groups, political parties
Benue	The partiality of security agencies, misinformation of the public by media, the partiality of INEC	Political thugs, armed groups, media, security agencies
Borno	Insurgency, vote-buying, hate speech	Political parties, party thugs, media
Cross-River	Partiality and corruption of agencies – security, judiciary, and INEC	Godfatherism, cult
Delta	Undue influence of money and godfathers, the proliferation of arms, inter-communal conflicts	Party thugs, armed groups, political parties, traditional institutions
Ebonyi	Godfatherism, the partiality of INEC, the partiality of security agencies	Party thugs, political parties, armed groups
Edo	Proliferations of arms, undue influence of money and godfathers, intraparty conflicts	Security agencies, party thugs, armed groups, political parties

Ekiti	Undue influence of godfatherism and money, the partiality of INEC officials, hard drugs	Party thugs, media, political parties
Enugu	Godfatherism, the partiality of INEC, the partiality of security agencies	Party thugs, political parties, armed groups
FCT	The partiality of security agencies, excessive use of force, partiality of INEC officials	Party thugs, armed groups, political parties
Gombe	Hard drugs, troublesome politicians, hate speech, ethnoreligious conflict	Political parties, party thugs, media
Imo	Lack of respect for electoral law, contentious party primaries, and candidacy, intra-party conflicts	Political parties, party thugs and armed groups
Jigawa	Hard drugs, vote-buying, and thuggery	Political parties, armed groups, party thugs
Kaduna	Political intolerance, vote -buying, hard drugs	Political parties, party thugs, violent gangs
Kano	The use of hard drugs, troublesome politicians, hate speech	Godfatherism, party thugs, troublesome politicians
Katsina	Hard drugs, vote-buying, banditry	Troublesome politicians, party thugs, violent gangs
Kebbi	Hate speech, Illicit drugs, Partiality of INEC officials	Party thugs, media, security agencies

Kogi	Troublesome politicians, political parties, leaders and candidates , hate speech and illicit drugs availability	Party thugs, security agencies
Kwara	Troublesome politicians, political parties, leaders and candidates , i llicit drugs and hate speech	Party thugs, security agencies, political parties
Lagos	The p artiality of security agents, excessive use of force, armed groups	Party thugs, political parties, media
Nasarawa	The p artiality of security agencies, misinformation of the public by media, the partiality of INEC	Political thugs, media, armed groups
Niger	Troublesome politicians, political parties, lead ers and candidates, illicit drugs availability, hate speech	Party thugs, security agencies, political parties
Ogun	The p roliferation of arms, corruption among INEC officials, political interference in INEC work	Party thugs, political parties, INEC officials
Ondo	The p artiality of INEC officials, hate speech, undue influence of godfatherism,	Media, party thugs, political parties
Osun	Undue influence of godfatherism, troublesome party leaders and candidates, the partiality of INEC officials	Party thugs, s ecurity agencies, political parties
Oyo	Corruption of INEC officials, the partiality of security agencies, armed groups	Party thugs, political parties, armed groups

Plateau	Hate speech, misinformation of public by media, the partiality of security agencies; deployment of security agencies, partiality of INEC officials	Political thugs, media, security agencies
Rivers	Partiality and corruption of agencies – security, judiciary, and INEC	Cultism
Sokoto	Hate speech, Illicit drugs, exclusion of youth Failure to prosecute electoral offenders	Partial INEC officials, partial judicial officials, Vigilante groups
Taraba	internal political party conflicts, a hard drug, hate speech, disaffection with government	Party thugs, armed groups, political parties
Yobe	Hate speech, insurgency, vote-buying	Political parties, party thugs, media
Zamfara	Illicit drugs, hate speech, movement and distribution of election materials, exclusion of ethnic minorities	Insurgents, Media (fake news), armed groups and judiciary

### 3.1 Salient factors that could cause violence during 2019 general elections in Nigeria

In prioritizing the prevention and mitigation of security threats to elections, it is important to identify the salient factors. Table 8 presents the 25 salient factors out of the items in the questionnaire. The conduct of security agencies, Independent National Electoral Commission, media, politicians and judiciary featured prominently. The ranking order of the salient factors provides insight into measures that need to be adopted and implemented to improve electoral security in the country.

Table 9: Salience of factors, actors, and actions that could cause electoral violence

Rank order	Factors, actors and actions 2019 elections	% agree
1	The partiality of security agents	85.2
2	Aggressive and excessive use of force	83.1
3	The partiality of INEC officials	82.2
4	Misinformation of the public by media	80.7
5	Partisanship, favouritism, and partiality of media	80.2
6	Poor training and low professionalism of security agents	80.1
7	Low sense of safety among members of the public	79.9
8	Lack of transparency and disagreements over the selection of party officials and candidates	79.5
9	Broadcast and publication of hate speech	78.8
10	Lack of training and corruption of party agents	78.7
11	Lack of synergy between INEC and security agencies	78.7
12	Trouble politicians and candidates	78.3
13	Corruption and integrity of the judiciary	78.1
14	Undue influence of money and godfathers	78.0

See Appendix 1

15	Lack of synergy among security agents	77.9
16	Political thugs	77.6
17	Inadequate or excessive presence of security agents	77.6
18	Lack of respect for electoral laws and party rules	77.3
19	Widespread availability and use of hard drugs	77.1
20	The partiality of the judiciary	76.4
21	Confusing and contradictory court decisions	75.8
22	Problems with distribution, location, and adequacy of polling units and voting points	75.6
23	Failure of regulatory bodies to ensure adherence to establish rules by media	75.4
24	Confusing electoral laws	75.2
25	Delay in handling pre-election matters	75.0

## 4.0

**KEY FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS**

CLEEN Foundation conducted three surveys in 2018 and 2019 to obtain data for security threat assessment for the 2019 general elections in Nigeria. The first survey conducted in April and May 2018 covered 12 states with a sample of 5000 respondents. This is referred to as a pilot survey. A national survey covering the entire country (36 states and federal capital territory) was conducted in April and May 2018 during which data were collected from a sample consisting of 11,219 respondents. In January 2019, a third survey was conducted in all the states and federal capital territory of the country with 11,421 respondents. In all three surveys, respondents were selected through multi-stage and national representative sampling method.

## 4.1 Major findings

Across the three surveys, the majority of the respondents are of the opinion that the factors, actors and conducts listed in the questionnaire could cause electoral violence. The conduct of security agencies, Independent National Electoral Commission, media, politicians and judiciary featured prominently as the factors that could cause violence during elections (table 8 and 9). The findings imply widespread threats to the electoral process and democracy in the country and underscore the need for widespread reforms to address them. The Report of the Electoral Reform Committee (2008) should be revised and implemented.

### *Actors that could constitute threats to a peaceful election*

Respondents agreed that several political factors could trigger election violence in 2019. The actors identified by a very significant majority of the respondents are the political parties, especially in terms of lack of internal democracy and respect for electoral laws; INEC, security agencies, judiciary, media, and traditional institutions. Other actors identified are political thugs, vigilante groups, insurgents, religious extremists, and other armed groups, pan-ethnic groups and civil society organizations.

### *Political factors that could cause electoral violence*

Several political factors and conditions were acknowledged by the majority of respondents as potential sources of violence during 2019 elections. Among the factors are contentious party conventions and primaries; confusing electoral laws; disorderly party rallies, processions and campaigns; lack of respect for electoral laws and party rules; undue influence of money and godfathers; lack of transparency and disagreements over selection of party officials and candidates; defections and cross-carpeting; lack of training and corruption of party agents; intergroup conflicts; attempt by illegal migrants to participate in the election; citizens' disaffection with government.

### *Electoral management factors that could cause violence during election*

A significant majority of the respondents acknowledged that several actions and decisions of the electoral management body could cause electoral violence. Among the actions and decisions which they agreed to be triggers of electoral violence are continuous and underage registration, distribution of permanent voter card, poor voter education by INEC, distribution of election materials, quality of training of election officials, adequacy and location of polling units, failure to prosecute electoral offenders, and the preparedness and partiality of INEC officials. On average, about 60% of respondents in 2019 national survey compared to more than 70% in 2018 national survey were agreed that the listed election management factors could cause electoral violence.

### ***Security management and electoral violence***

Without security, elections cannot be free and fair. Insecurity undermines popular participation of electorates at all levels and stages of the electoral process. Security management factors emphasized by most respondents as likely sources of violence during 2019 elections include partially of security agencies, aggressive and excessive use of force, poor training and low professionalism among security agencies. Widespread availability and use of hard drugs was also highlighted by respondents.

### ***Judicial factors and electoral violence***

The efficient and impartial judiciary is necessary for the consolidation of democratic practice. It provides authoritative adjudication of disputes. Judiciary provides non-violent resolution of election-related disputes. More than 60% of the respondents agreed with statements that decisions and inadequacies of judiciary could cause electoral violence. Factors identified include corruption and lack of integrity of judiciary, confusing and contradictory court decisions.

### ***Media and electoral violence***

In the literature, media and civil society organizations are often described as vanguards of democracy. However, in societies where the media and civil society organizations are fragmented along divisive lines of religion, ethnicity and other primordial affiliation, they may endanger democratic elections by undermining security, popular participation, and free choices. More than two-third of the respondents in the surveys agreed that several practices and activities of the media could cause electoral violence. Among such factors are partisanship, favouritism and partiality; misinformation of the public; broadcast and publication of hate speech, and failure of regulatory agencies to ensure adherence to established rules governing media operations.

## **Recommendations**

### ***Political actors and electoral violence***

In view of the findings that the conducts and actions of security agencies, Independent National Electoral Commission, media, politicians and judiciary ranked high as the factors that could cause violence during elections (table 8 and 9), comprehensive political and electoral reforms are required. Electoral reforms are required to enhance the evolution of democratic culture in the country. Political parties lack internal democracy and politicians need to internalize the ethics of democratic political party practices, management, and discipline. The roles of money and godfathers in undermining party democracy and discipline need to be curtailed through effective legal regulations. To address these problems, extensive and continuous political education is required for the citizens, politicians, party leaders and elected officials.

### ***Electoral management and electoral violence***

Effective management of electoral processes is critical to credible elections. Electoral management and security bodies need to possess adequate capacity and competencies. Past elections were plagued by poor logistic arrangements resulting in poor management of elections, especially on polling days. Delays in the delivery of election materials and arrival of electoral and security officials often threaten peaceful polling and credible election outcomes. There is a need for the government to enhance the relevant capacity, competencies, professionalism, and resources of electoral management agency and officials in the country.

### ***Security management and electoral violence***

Security is critical to credible elections. Insecurity undermines the participation of different classes of electorate in political parties and electoral contests. Electoral security is enhanced by several factors, including professional and equipped security agencies; appropriate electoral laws effectively and impartially enforced; appropriately managed political parties; enlightened electorates; efficient and impartial electoral management body. Electoral reform that can promote these conditions is necessary and government should ensure necessary improvements.

### ***Judiciary and electoral violence***

Efficient and impartial resolution of electoral disputes is critical to the consolidation of democracy and credible elections. Judiciary plays critical roles in the organization of credible elections and resolution of disputes that may arise. Judicial decisions on electoral disputes were generally characterized by inconsistencies, allegations of corrupt inducements, and delays. Necessary reform to eliminate these problems should be undertaken, including the enactment of relevant laws and training of judges.

### ***Media, civil society and electoral violence***

Media organizations play critical roles in advancing or undermining democratic governance. The Nigerian media and civil society organizations played critical roles in ensuring that the military relinquished power to civilians in 1999. However, since then, they have become increasingly fragmented along with ethnic, religious and partisan political affiliations. The media and civil society organizations need to rediscover and internalize their roles as vanguards of civility, good and democratic governance. Appropriate reorientation, political and civic education, legislation and effective regulatory agencies consistent with democratic governance are required media practitioners and leaders of civil society organizations.

## Appendix 1:

### Salience of factors, actors, and actions in electoral violence threats in the 2019 elections

**Table 9: Salience of factors, actors, and actions that could cause electoral violence**

Ranking order	Factors, actors and actions	% agree
1	The partiality of security agents	85.2
2	Aggressive and excessive use of force	83.1
3	The partiality of INEC officials	82.2
4	Misinformation of the public by media	80.7
5	Partisanship, favouritism, and partiality of media	80.2
6	Poor training and low professionalism of security agents	80.1
7	Low sense of safety among members of the public	79.9
8	Lack of transparency and disagreements over the selection of party officials and candidates	79.5
9	Broadcast and publication of hate speech	78.8
10	Lack of training and corruption of party agents	78.7
11	Lack of synergy between INEC and security agencies	78.7
12	Trouble politicians and candidates	78.3
13	Corruption and integrity of the judiciary	78.1
14	Undue influence of money and godfathers	78.0
15	Lack of synergy among security agents	77.9
16	Political thugs	77.6

17	Inadequate or excessive presence of security agents	77.6
18	Lack of respect for electoral laws and party rules	77.3
19	Widespread availability and use of hard drugs	77.1
20	The partiality of the judiciary	76.4
21	Confusing and contradictory court decisions	75.8
22	Problems with distribution, location, and adequacy of polling units and voting points	75.6
23	Failure of regulatory bodies to ensure adherence to establish rules by media	75.4
24	Confusing electoral laws	75.2
25	Delay in handling pre-election matters	75.0
26	Problems associated with the deployment of security agents	74.9
27	Disorderly party rallies, processions, and campaigns	74.8
28	Capacity of judiciary	74.3
29	Sensationalism and provocation publication by media	73.8
30	Failure to prosecute electoral offenders	73.7
31	Attempt by illegal migrants to participate in the election	73.5
32	Citizens' disaffection with government	73.3
33	Substitution of trained electoral officials	73.1
34	Poor voter education by INEC	73.0
35	Movement and distribution of election materials	72.5
36	Problems about continuous registration exercise	72.1

37	Underage registration	71.9
38	Problems about the distribution of PVC	71.8
39	Problems associated with the welfare of security agents	71.6
40	Overall preparedness by INEC	71.0
41	Contentious party conventions and primaries	70.7
42	Quality of election officials	70.7
43	Religious extremists, cultists, and other armed groups	70.6
44	Intergroup conflicts	70.4
45	Political parties	69.2
46	Abuse of social media	68.6
47	Defections and cross-carpeting	68.0
48	Unequal access to media	66.1
49	Security agencies	65.3
50	Insurgents	64.1
51	Media	62.4
52	Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC)	62.2
53	Judiciary	57.8
54	Traditional institutions	57.6
55	Vigilante groups	55.6
56	Civil society organizations	49.9

## Appendix 2:

### Risk Factors for Pre-Election Related Violence

**INSTRUCTION:** The following are statements that assess electoral risk factors. Please read each statement carefully and respond by **SHADING** only one of the responses in front of each statement. **Please do not omit any item.** For questions 1 – 68, the responses stand for: **SA = Strongly Agree; A = Agree; UD = Undecided; D = Disagree; SD = Strongly Disagree.** For question 69, the responses stand for: **VP=Very Peaceful; P=Peaceful; NS=Not Sure; V=Violent; VV=Very Violent**

#### SECTION I

	General Questions	Responses				
1.	Do you agree that election in this area will be peaceful?	SA	A	UD	D	SD
2.	Do you agree that there has been a history of electoral violence in this area?	SA	A	UD	D	SD
3.	Do you agree that hate speech can make election violent in this area?	SA	A	UD	D	SD
4.	Do you agree that inter-ethnic/religious/communal conflicts can cause election violence in this area?	SA	A	UD	D	SD
5.	Do you agree that troublesome politicians, political parties, leaders and candidates could cause electoral violence in this area?	SA	A	UD	D	SD
6.	Do you agree that attempt by illegal immigrants to participate in the electoral process could cause electoral violence in this area?	SA	A	UD	D	SD
7.	Do you agree that citizens' disaffection with government could result to electoral violence in this area?	SA	A	UD	D	SD

1.	Do you agree that widespread availability and use of hard drugs can bring about electoral violence in this area?	SA	A	UD	D	SD
2.	Do you agree that confusing electoral laws could bring about electoral violence in this area?	SA	A	UD	D	SD
<b>Do you agree that Exclusion and Discrimination of the following groups could cause electoral violence in this area?</b>						
3.	Ethnic minorities	SA	A	UD	D	SD
4.	Women	SA	A	UD	D	SD
5.	The youth	SA	A	UD	D	SD
6.	The elderly	SA	A	UD	D	SD
7.	People living with disability	SA	A	UD	D	SD
8.	Religious groups	SA	A	UD	D	SD
9.	Sexuality	SA	A	UD	D	SD
<b>Do you agree that the following actors constitute threats to peaceful elections in this area?</b>						
10.	Political parties (intra and inter party)	SA	A	UD	D	SD
11.	INEC	SA	A	UD	D	SD
12.	Security agencies	SA	A	UD	D	SD
13.	The judiciary	SA	A	UD	D	SD
14.	The media	SA	A	UD	D	SD
15.	Traditional institutions	SA	A	UD	D	SD
16.	Party thugs	SA	A	UD	D	SD
17.	Vigilante groups	SA	A	UD	D	SD

1.	Insurgents	SA	A	UD	D	SD
2.	Religious extremists, cultists, and other armed groups	SA	A	UD	D	SD
3.	Pan-Ethnic Associations					
4.	Civil Society Organisations (CSOs)	SA	A	UD	D	SD
	<b>Do you agree that the following could cause violence during elections in this area?</b>					
5.	Contentious party conventions/ primaries/meetings	SA	A	UD	D	SD
6.	Disorderly party rallies, processions and campaigns	SA	A	UD	D	SD
7.	Lack of respect for party rules	SA	A	UD	D	SD
8.	Undue influence of money and godfathers	SA	A	UD	D	SD
9.	Lack of transparency and disagreements over the selection of party officials and candidates	SA	A	UD	D	SD
10.	Defections and cross carpeting from one party to another	SA	A	UD	D	SD
11.	Lack of training and corruption of party agents	SA	A	UD	D	SD
	<b>Do you agree that the following can cause violence during elections in this area?</b>					
12.	Problems associated with the continuous voter registration exercise	SA	A	UD	D	SD
13.	Problems of underage registration	SA	A	UD	D	SD
14.	Problems associated with the distribution of PVCs	SA	A	UD	D	SD
15.	Poor voter education by INEC	SA	A	UD	D	SD
16.	Movement and distribution of election materials	SA	A	UD	D	SD

1.	Quality of election officials	SA	A	UD	D	SD
2.	Substitution of trained electoral officials	SA	A	UD	D	SD
3.	Problems associated with the distribution, location and adequacy of polling units and voting points	SA	A	UD	D	SD
4.	Failure to prosecute electoral offenders	SA	A	UD	D	SD
5.	Partiality of INEC officials					
6.	Do you agree that INEC's overall preparedness constitutes a threat to peaceful conduct of this election?	SA	A	UD	D	SD
7.	Do you agree that economic disaffections can cause electoral violence in this area?	SA	A	UD	D	SD
	<b>Do you agree that the following could cause violence during elections in this area?</b>					
8.	Partiality of security agents	SA	A	UD	D	SD
9.	Inadequate or excessive presence of security agents	SA	A	UD	D	SD
10.	Aggressive and excessive use of force	SA	A	UD	D	SD
11.	Poor training and low professionalism of security agents	SA	A	UD	D	SD
12.	Lack of synergy among security agents	SA	A	UD	D	SD
13.	Lack of synergy between INEC and security agencies	SA	A	UD	D	SD
14.	Low sense of safety among members of the public (banditry, kidnapping, assassination, etc)	SA	A	UD	D	SD
15.	Problems associated with the deployment of security agents	SA	A	UD	D	SD
16.	Problem associated with the welfare of security agents					

Do you agree that the following can cause violence during elections?						
1.	Delays in the handling of pre-election cases	SA	A	UD	D	SD
2.	Partiality of the judiciary	SA	A	UD	D	SD
3.	Corruption and integrity of the judiciary	SA	A	UD	D	SD
4.	Capacity of the judiciary (including inadequacy of judges)	SA	A	UD	D	SD
5.	Confusing and contradictory court decisions	SA	A	UD	D	SD
Do you agree that the following can cause violence during elections in the area?						
6.	Misinformation of the public by the media	SA	A	UD	D	SD
7.	Broadcast and publishing of hatred	SA	A	UD	D	SD
8.	Unequal access to media	SA	A	UD	D	SD
9.	Partisanship, favouritism and partiality	SA	A	UD	D	SD
10.	Failure of regulatory bodies to ensure adherence to established rules by the media	SA	A	UD	D	SD
11.	Sensationalism and provocation by the media	SA	A	UD	D	SD
12.	Abuse of social media	SA	A	UD	D	SD
13.	On the whole, what do you think that this election will go?	VP	P	NS	V	VV

Developed by The Electoral Institute (TEI) of INEC (2016), revised (2018)

## SECTION II

Please read each statement carefully and respond by **SHADING** only one of the responses in front of each statement, thereafter kindly provide an explanation for your response. **Please do not omit any item.** The responses stand for: **VL = Very Likely; L = Likely; UD = Undecided; UL = Unlikely; VUL = Very Unlikely**

	Questions	Responses				
		VL	L	UD	UL	VUL
1	Do you think that geographical terrain of this area is a factor that could lead to electoral violence?					
Kindly explain:						
2	Do you think that non adherence to processes and procedures could lead to electoral violence in this area?	VL	L	UD	UL	VUL
Kindly explain:						
3	Do you think that population displacement and population movement has been creating tension and violence in this area that may affect the election?	VL	L	UD	UL	VUL
Kindly explain:						

4	Do you think that foreign interests(including foreign election observers) and interference could lead to electoral violence in this area?	VL	L	UD	UL	VUL
Kindly explain:						
5	Do you think that funding of election is a factor that could trigger violence in this area?	VL	L	UD	UL	VUL
Kindly explain						
6	Do you think that problem with payment of election workers is a factor to be considered in electoral violence in this area?	VL	L	UD	UL	VUL
Kindly explain:						
7	Do you think problems associated with the recruitment of INEC ad-hoc staff could lead to electoral violence in this area?					
Kindly explain:						
8	Do you think that power of incumbency has a role to play in causing electoral violence in this area?	VL	L	UD	UL	VUL
Kindly explain:						
9	Do you agree that proliferation of small arms and light weapons can bring about violence during elections in this area?	VL	L	UD	UL	VUL
Kindly explain:						

10	Do you agree that corruption among INEC officials contributes to electoral violence?	VL	L	UD	UL	VUL
Kindly explain:						
11	Do you think that reliability of election equipment could cause electoral violence in this area?	VL	L	UD	UL	VUL
Kindly explain:						
12	Do you think that inadequate training and conduct of security agents is a factor that could lead to electoral violence in this area?	VL	L	UD	UL	VUL
Kindly explain:						
13	Do you think that inadequate training and conduct of party agents is a factor that could lead to electoral violence in this area?	VL	L	UD	UL	VUL
Kindly explain:						
14	Do you think that relationship between executives and legislature at federal and state levels contributes to electoral violence in this area?	VL	L	UD	UL	VUL
Kindly explain:						
15	Do you think that relationship among the federal, state and local governments contributes to violence during the last election?	VL	L	UD	UL	VUL
Kindly explain:						

17	Do you agree that strong opposition can cause electoral violence in this area?	VL	L	UD	UL	VUL
Kindly explain:						
18	Do you think that political interference with the work of INEC could lead to electoral violence in this area?	VL	L	UD	UL	VUL
Kindly explain:						
19	Do you think that the involvement of informal policing groups could lead to electoral violence in the area?	VL	L	UD	UL	VUL
Kindly explain:						

Developed by The Electoral Institute (TEI) of INEC (2016), revised (2018)

## CLEEN FOUNDATION'S PUBLICATIONS

S/N	Title	Description
1.	Constable Joe	A Drama Series on Police Community Relation In Nigeria
2.	Policing A Democracy	A Survey Report on the Role and Functions of the Nigeria Police in a Post-Military Era Published in 1999
3.	Juvenile Justice Administration in Nigeria	Philosophy & Practice Published in 2001
4.	Forward March	A Radio drama Series on Civil Military Relation In Nigeria Published in 2001
5.	Gender Relations and Discrimination in Nigeria Police Force	Published in 2001
6.	Civilian Oversight and Accountability of Police in Nigeria	Published in 2001
7.	Hope Betrayed	A report on Impunity and State-Sponsored Violence in Nigeria published in 2002
8.	Police and Policing in Nigeria	Final Report on the Conduct of the Police in the 2003 Elections published in 2003
9.	Police-Community Violence in Nigeria	Published in 2000
10.	Journey to Civil Rule	A Report on the Presidential primaries of the All Peoples Party (APP) and Peoples' Democratic Party (PDP) February 13-15, 1999 Published in 1999

11.	Crime and Policing In Nigeria	Challenges & Options
12.	Criminal Victimization and Fear of Crime in Lagos	Monograph Series No. 1
13.	Civil Society and Conflict Management in the Niger Delta	Monograph Series No. 2 Published in 2006
14.	Criminal Victimization, Safety and Policing in Nigeria: 2005	Monograph Series No. 3 Published in 2006
15.	Opportunity for Justice	A report on the Justice Olasumbo Goodluck Judicial commission of Inquiry on the Apo Six Killings by the Police in Abuja published in 2006
16.	Responding to Gender Based Violence	A Tool Book
17.	Criminal Victimization, Safety and Policing in Nigeria: 2006	Monograph Series No. 4 Published in 2007
18.	Beyond Declarations	Law Enforcement Officials and ECOWAS Protocols on Free Movement of Persons and Goods in West Africa published in 2007
19.	Police and Policing in West Africa	Proceedings of a Regional Conference Published in 2008
20.	Nigeria's 2007 General Elections	Betrayal Of Electorate Optimism and Participation

21.	Motion Without Movement	Report of Presidential Committees on Police Reform in Nigeria
22	In the Eyes of The Beholder	A Post Election Survey Report Published in 2009
23	Another Routine or Fundamental Change?	Police Reform in Nigeria 1999 till date Published in 2009
25	Good Practice Guide	Establishing a School-Based Crime Prevention published in 2009
26	Cry for Justice	Proceedings of a Public Tribunal on Police Accountability in Nigeria published in 2009
27	Citizenship and Identity Politics in Nigeria	Monograph Series 5 Published in 2009
28	Criminal Victimization and safety in Lagos State, Nigeria 2009	Monograph Series 6 Published in 2010
29	Corruption and Governance Challenges in Nigeria: Conference Proceedings	Monograph Series 7 Published in 2010
30	Enhancing Accountability Systems in the Nigeria Police Force: Conference Proceedings	Monograph Series 8 Published in 2010
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# Etannibi E. O. Alemika

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Etannibi E. O. Alemika obtained B.Sc. and M.Sc. Sociology from the University of Ibadan (Nigeria) and M.S. and Ph.D. Criminology from the University of Pennsylvania in Philadelphia (USA). He is currently a Professor of Criminology and Sociology of Law at the University of Jos, in Nigeria. His areas of research include policing, organised crime, security sector reform, conflict studies, and penal administration. He is a member of the editorial board of several international journals, including *Police Practice and Research*; *Stability: International Journal of Security & Development*, and the *Australia and New Zealand Journal of Criminology*. His recent publications include Alemika, EEO. 2013. *Organized and Transnational Crime in West Africa*, in Heinrich-Boll-Stiftung and Regine Schonenberg (eds.) *Transnational Organized Crime: Analyses of a Global Challenge to Democracy*. Bielefeld: Transcript Verlag; Alemika, EEO. 2013. *Organised Crime and Governance in West Africa*, in EEO Alemika (Ed.); *The impact of organized crime on governance in West Africa*. Abuja: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, pp. 16-34, and Alemika, EEO. 2013. *Criminal victimization, Policing and Governance in Nigeria*. Lagos & Abuja: CLEEN Foundation), and *Police Practice and Police Research in Africa*, *Police Practice and Research*, 2009: 483–502. Prof. Alemika was a member of Nigeria's Presidential Committee on Police Reform (2006); Chairman of the Presidential Committee on Prisons Reform (2005/2006); Member, Committee for the Restructuring of Fire Services in Nigeria (2012). He is a member of several professional associations, including Social Science Academy of Nigeria; Nigerian Society of Criminology; Academy of Criminal Justice Science (USA); American Society of Criminology; Altus Global Alliance and the African Policing Civilian Oversight Forum and the Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime. He is the Chair of the Board of CLEEN Foundation. In August 2015, he was appointed by President Muhammadu Buhari as a member of the Presidential Advisory Committee Against Corruption (PACAC) in Nigeria.

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Oluwole Ojewale is a proficient public policy researcher and global development professional with cross-cutting research and program experiences on Governance, Advocacy, Community Resilience, Human and Environmental Security. He is currently leading CLEEN Foundation's strategic surveys on: Democracy, Governance, Criminal Justice Reform; and Election Security Management among others. He has published articles in peer-reviewed journals on: counter insurgency; policing, democracy and security governance. He has been trained by the European Union and the Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies on Countering Violent Extremism. He features frequently as a public affairs analyst on major radio and television programs in Abuja, Nigeria.

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Chigozirim Okoro is a Sound International Development Professional with thirteen years of experience and currently Heads the Public Safety and Security Unit at CLEEN Foundation. She is the Program Manager of the European Union funded Project on Mitigating Electoral Violence for the 2018 Off-Cycle and 2019 General Elections in Nigeria. She is the Team Lead Election Security Management Projects at CLEEN Foundation and Program Manager of the DFID funded project on Promoting Public Safety and Security for the 2019 General Elections in Nigeria which involves Conduct of Pre-Election Security Threat Assessment for the 2017 Governorship Election in Anambra State; Conduct of Regional Security Threat Assessment in Twelve States of the Federation and Conduct of Nation-wide Security Threat Assessment for the 2019 General Elections in Nigeria. She coordinated 2016, 2017 and 2018 state level interventions of CLEEN Foundation Election Security Management Project in Edo, Ondo, Rivers, Anambra, Ekiti & Osun states. She is a Certified LEAD Trainer with the European Centre on Electoral Support (ECES) and a beneficiary of the Latin American Security and Defense Network Training on Civil Society and Security Sector Reform in Africa held in Monrovia, Liberia. She holds a Master's Degree in Conflict Resolution & Peace-Building.



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