



ASSESSMENT OF SECURITY AND CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS IN NORTH WEST NIGERIA WITH FOCUS ON ZAMFARA STATE



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Abuja Office:

27, Moses Majekodunmi Crescent,
Opposite Keystone Bank, Utako,
Abuja, FCT.
Tel: 234-09-7817025, 07067899368

Lagos Office:

21, Akinsanya Street,
Ojodu, Lagos, Nigeria
Tel: 234-1-493-3195
234 - 7612479, 09035200933

Owerri Office:

Plot 10, Area M Road 3,
World Bank Housing Estate
Owerri, Imo State
Tel: 08128002962, 08130278469, 08060023936

Edo Office:

39 Oyaide Street,
off Benoni Road,
G.R.A, Benin City, Edo State
Tel: 08073342922

Email: cleen@cleen.org

Website: www.cleen.org.

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Gad Peter
Executive Director,
15/05/2024

FORWARD

The security situation in the region remains precarious, with banditry, kidnapping, terrorism, and inter-communal clashes posing significant threats. Civil-military relations are strained due to human rights concerns and lack of trust. However, with concerted efforts to enhance training, ensure accountability, and engage communities, there is potential for improvement. Addressing the socio-economic factors underlying insecurity will also be crucial for long-term stability and peace in the region. The active involvement of civil society and the media in security sector oversight is an essential part of the human security approach. This region's security situation has unavoidably impacted civil-military relations, which are the interactions between civilian society, governmental institutions, and the military establishment.

The increasing reliance on military intervention to manage internal security has had mixed results regarding trust and cooperation between military forces and the civilian population. The military and other security forces are sometimes seen as both protectors and oppressors. Accusations of human rights violations, heavy-handed tactics, and impunity can lead to friction with local communities. Effective civil-military relations require robust community engagement and collaboration. In some areas, the military has undertaken community development projects to win hearts and minds, but in other places, the relationship remains strained due to a history of abuses and mistrust.

The Nigerian government's policies and the effectiveness of its security apparatus significantly influence civil-military relations. Comprehensive strategies are needed to bolster effective governance, law enforcement, and military operations to improve security and foster better relationships between the military and civilians.

A lack of civilian and democratic control and oversight of the security sector creates an environment favourable to corruption, impunity, and oppression. Effective security sector accountability involves many different actors representing the different layers of modern-day democracies, including government representatives, the parliament, the judiciary, civil society actors and independent oversight bodies such as national human rights institutions. Primarily, it involves the police themselves. In fact, public services as a whole and even the public at large may need to be involved. A three-pronged approach combining repression of misconduct, prevention of future misconduct and awareness-raising among the public may be needed.

CLEEN Foundation with support from Open Society Africa aims to deepen knowledge on the functionality of Civil Military Relationship using the Human Rights Management Information System (HRMIS) developed by CLEEN Foundation with support from the Open Society Africa where quarterly report from media, Community members, Civil society organisations and Community based organisations (CBOs) will be expected as parts of commitment. The aim of the project is aimed at strengthening the oversight agencies commitments as watchdogs in the society create clear understanding on how internal control mechanisms in the security sector functions and how this can be an important means of ensuring that they effectively exercise their oversight role. The citizens will be sensitized and reporting of human rights violations.

Prof. Abubakar Mu'azu
Board Chairman

INTRODUCTION



After the Nigerian authorities officially declared and classified bandits, a criminal organisation operating in the north-western part of Nigeria, as terrorists in January 2022, the Nigerian security agencies have intensified the fight against these criminals. This decision was made in light of the persistently high level of crimes in the area, including murder, rape, kidnapping for ransom, and looting. The widespread armed banditry and the threats it poses to public safety in Nigeria's North-West, notably in the states of Zamfara, Katsina, Kaduna, and Sokoto, have drawn attention to matters of national security. Armed banditry poses a threat to peace and security in the affected States due to the complexity of the criminal activity involved and the frequency with which it occurs (West Africa Network for Peacebuilding, [WANEP], 2020).

The largest national humanitarian crisis to affect Nigeria in decades is being caused by banditry in the north-western region of the country (International Review of the Red Cross [IRRC], 2023). Banditry is currently the country's greatest security danger. The fact that there are 120 bandit camps in the area and that there are more than 60,000 AK-47s under their control is concerning (Rufai, 2021). The North-West region is home to more than 100,000 armed bandits, according to one of the stakeholders chosen by the bandit organisations to serve as their contact with the government. There are more than 30,000 armed bandits operating in just one of the six states of the geographical zone, according to a traditional ruler in one of the six states impacted by armed banditry in the area (Ahmed, 2021). Some of these criminals are well-equipped, have extensive networks of informants and supporters within the greater population, and are knowledgeable about the region's complex terrain (Dipo, 2021).

To end the threat and further strengthen internal security in the afflicted states, the North-Western State Governors started negotiations with a number of armed bandits operating in the area in July 2019. The renewed attacks by bandits in the states of Zamfara, Katsina, and Niger between November and December 2019 posed a threat to the peace agreements negotiated by the state Governors, despite their documented successes, as demonstrated by the drastic decline in attacks, release of kidnapped victims, and recovery of weapons. Armed banditry claimed the lives of over 1058 people between January and December 2019 in the states of Zamfara, Kaduna, Katsina, Sokoto, and Niger, according to data from the WANEP National Early Warning System (NEWS) (WANEP, 2020).

In August, a committee established by the government of Zamfara State to examine the security situation in the state released a report that found 4,983 women had lost their husbands, 25,050 children had become orphans,

and 190,340 individuals had been displaced between 2011 and 2019. According to the report, 3,672 persons were kidnapped during this time, and bandits received over 3 billion naira (US\$6.8 million) in ransom payments (Maishanu, 2022). Apart from physical, social, and psychological harm, the economic effects of the activities of these armed groups have further impoverished the people from paying ransom and seeking the release of their kidnapped relatives. The committee, which was led by retired police chief Muhammad Abubakar, also disclosed that 25,050 children became orphans during the time period and 4,983 women became widows. The report also revealed that 147,800 vehicles, including motorcycles and other vehicles, were burned or destroyed during the time period, while herdsmen lost 2,015 cattle, 141 sheep and goats, 2,600 donkeys, and camels to rustlers (Maishanu, 2022).

A number of important local markets, including Ilella, Dandume, Maidabino, Kankara (Katsina State), and Bardoki, Shinkafi (Zamfara State), have closed as a result of frequent attacks, which has a significant negative impact on other economic activities in the area (Aminu, 2019). Major traders from other parts of the country were drawn to the strategic nature of the trading locations because they offered a variety of food products, including maize, millet, guinea corn, and beans. However, because of their proximity to the forest reserves, these markets were at risk of being attacked. Trading activities were negatively impacted by this as a result of a decline in market sales and supply (Aminu, 2019).

However, there were many attempts by the Governors in the northwest to address this problem but these efforts were not enough to theme the tides of attacks. For instance, a report by (WANEP, 2020) shows that amnesty/dialogue is not properly implemented, losing credibility with the public. Higher fatalities and Internally Displaced Persons are caused by

cattle rustling, illegal mining, kidnapping, and cross-border criminality. Sexual and gender-based violence incidents are on the rise. The affected state governments are considering a state of emergency in the affected communities. Numerous markets in the area are closed, which hinders socioeconomic activity. Security organizations struggle to control the escalating unrest (WANEP, 2020).

The direct military intervention in the area was required in response to this wave of attacks by these nonstate actors in order to use the necessary force to stop the armed bandits. For instance, after a week, the Nigerian military killed about 100 bandits during airstrikes targeting bandits' camps, according to reports, many people were killed and displaced in a bandit attack on villages in the Anka and Bukkuyum districts of Zamfara State (Human Rights Watch, [HRW], 2023). However, some unfortunate incidents were also a part of the ongoing military operations. For instance, in February 2022, seven children were killed in the Maradi region of the Republic of Niger, which borders the northwest Sokoto, Zamfara, and Katsina States of Nigeria, during a military airstrike against bandits (HRW, 2023). An estimated 200 people were killed and 10,000 displaced in attacks by armed bandits, following military air raids on their hideouts of the bandits (United Nations [UN], 2022).

Some locals claim that some military personnel have engaged in harassment, molestation, extortion, and abuse of the civil population's rights in some of the affected areas, despite the fact that security personnel have seen some success in stopping some criminal gang activity (Nextier, 2022). However, the adaptive capacity of armed bandit groups operating in the affected States in the face of the predominately military approach to put an end to the bandits' violent activities makes the need for a multi-approach that includes communication, coordinated community policing, and civil-

military support structures as imperative tools to mitigate the threats. The combined strategy offers a chance for conflict prevention, resolution, and in-depth discussions on stabilizing peace and security in both the States and the entire nation. In order to address the threats in the short and medium term, an inclusive conflict management system promotes local commitment to the process. The state governments' peace initiatives have the potential to lessen the growing threats to human security and reestablish public trust in their capacity to protect people and property in the affected States (WANEP, 2020).

STATEMENT OF THE RESEARCH PROBLEM

Banditry activities in Zamfara state, and other states like Kaduna, Kano, Katsina, Niger, Kebbi and Sokoto have continue growing in number and size and have staged mass abductions of students and other citizens in order to extract ransom payments from parents, families, communities or state governments, kidnapping. According to the civil society organization Global Rights, 1,527 people were killed in the North West in 2020 as a result of armed crime and other forms of violence (International Crisis Group, 2021). This necessitated the military onslaught on these criminals by the Nigeria security forces, an action that has effect of on both the relationship between the security agencies and the civilian population.

However, the success of the state government's efforts to promote peace depends on the nature of relations between the military and civilians (Nextier, 2022). The civil-military problematique, which calls for a particular polity to balance two concerns, is the fundamental conflict that underpins civil-military relations. On the one hand, it must establish a military structure powerful enough to defend the nation. On the other hand, it must find a way to prevent this military establishment from turning against the state that created it (Feaver 1996).

It is anticipated that military and civilian organizations will collaborate more closely in order to prevent or minimize violent conflict, strengthen national security, and build the capacities of governments. Nevertheless, field experience demonstrates that more work needs to be done to enhance communication and collaboration among the variety of aid-providing organizations. Lack of comprehension has resulted in effort duplication,

inefficient use of scarce resources, and unintended effects (United States Institute of Peace, 2023). However, the current accounts of civil-military relations in developing nations like Nigeria are notably renowned for their partiality. When civil-military relations deteriorate, the majority of authors frequently make an effort to logically defend the civilians. They have argued repeatedly from the perspective of the military's use of force as the foundation for the dubious relationship between the military and civil society without reference to the constitutional requirements of the military's role as the protector of the State against internal uprising and foreign aggression (Phinos and Collins, 2019).

Moreover, the military is aware of the need to maintain friendly relations with the general public. For instance, the former Chief of Army Staff (COAS), Faruk Yahaya, who has since retired, stated that the Nigerian Army (NA) is committed to fostering better relations between the general public and the NA. This will help the NA succeed in addressing the nation's many security challenges, particularly when using a non-kinetic approach. (Nigerian Army, 2021).

It is alarming that in Northwest Nigeria, the military and civilians harbor a mutual mistrust and suspicion of one another, making the fight against banditry more difficult. For instance, Brigadier General Sani Ahmed, Commander, 1 Brigade of the Nigerian Army, who is in charge of Sokoto, Kebbi, and Zamfara States, stressed that it would be extremely difficult to put an end to banditry activities in the northwest unless bandits' informants are eliminated because they are still deadlier than the actual bandits (Nwannah, 2023). On the other hand, a military officer and his girlfriend were apprehended for actively conspiring with other saboteurs to provide bandits with military uniforms and ammunition; this arrest was only made possible thanks to community-driven intelligence (Maishanu, 2021).

It is a matter of concern that local populations have become increasingly alienated, leaving them open to being recruited by militant or criminal organizations and encouraging armed mobilization along religious and ethnic lines. This alienation has been facilitated by the proliferation of self-defense militias, the militarization of local communities, and widespread human rights violations committed by security forces (Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project, ACLED 2023). It is against this backdrop that the study assesses the nature of security dynamics, civilian perceptions on the military operations and to explore the possible ways of deepening civil-military relations in Northwest Nigeria with a focus on Zamfara State.

OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY

The main objectives of the study include:

1. To assess the nature of security dynamics in Zamfara State and North West
2. To aggregate civilian perceptions on the military operations in Zamfara State and North West
3. To explore available avenues intended to promote/deepen peaceful civil-military relations in Zamfara State and North West.



CONCEPTUAL CLARIFICATION

Nigerian Security

The Nigeria Security and Civil Defence Corps, tasked with protecting vital national infrastructure and managing related disasters, and the Nigeria Police Force, the country's principal law enforcement body, make up Nigeria's internal security infrastructure. Two main challenges stand in the way. First, because of severe resource shortages, insurgent attacks, and a mentality that places a higher priority on regime or VIP protection, Nigerian police and other official but nonmilitary security forces have gradually lost their ability to protect the country. Second, Nigerian society has effectively grown accustomed to militarized security services and lost the habit of civilian-led security provision as the military has sought or been assigned to fill the gaps. Lieutenant General Tukur Buratai, the Army's chief of staff, has frequently noted that the military now is engaged in internal operations in almost all of Nigeria's thirty-six (Ibrahim & Bela, 2018)



Civil-Military Relations

The phrase "civil-military relations" broadly refers to the interaction between a state's institution of an armed force and the other spheres of society in which it is ingrained. Political scientists, military sociologists, and historians have all contributed to this highly interdisciplinary field of study (Owens, 2017). The field of civil-military relations may have really taken off during World War II, at least in the United States, as social scientists joined the war effort. Early research on civil-military relations tended to emphasize small unit cohesion and the individual service member. (Stouffer et al. [1949–50; Gray 1959](#))

METHODOLOGY

Research Design

The study adopts a survey research design (cross-sectional). This design was selected because it permits the use of a representative sample from people of different socio-economic status and at different times over a relatively short period of time. The study is purely descriptive.

Study Setting

The study area is North West Nigeria with a specific focus on Zamfara State. The North West geopolitical zone comprises seven (7) states, namely Jigawa, Kebbi, Kaduna, Kano, Katsina, Sokoto, and Zamfara. Zamfara State, with its capital as Gusau, is made up of fourteen (14) local government areas, which are: Anka, Bakura, Birnin-Magaji, Bukkuyum, Bungudu, Gummi, Gusau, Kaura-Namoda, Maradun, Maru, Talata-Mafara, Shinkafi, Tsafe, and Zurmi. The state comprises three senatorial districts, Zamfara North, Zamfara West, and Zamfara Central, with the political headquarters at Kaura Namoda, Talata Mafara, and Gusau, respectively. Zamfara is predominantly Hausa speaking state with very little population of other ethnic groups except the state capital, Gusau which has the concentration of other ethnic groups.

Population of Study/Sample Size

The population of the study comprises the civil population residing in Zamfara State. It also comprises personnel of the military and other security agencies, traditional rulers, youth leaders, cutting across all sexes and other stakeholders in Zamfara State, and the traditional rulers. The population

will consist of both men and women who are aged between 18 and 61 years and above. The study adopts Cochran's formula for determining unknown population using a margin of error of 0.05 or at 95% confidence to have 385 sample size.

Sampling Technique

The study adopts a multi-stage sampling technique that includes cluster, purposive, and convenience sampling techniques. These techniques save money and time while ensuring that the right people are chosen for the study. Using purposive sampling, 385 respondents were selected from four Local Government Areas as follows. Anka (71), Bungudu (88), Kaura Namoda (98). Gusau (128), was selected based on its status as the state. These Local Government were selected based on the incidences of armed banditry attacks and the feasibility of data collection in these Local Government Areas. This reflects one local government in each of the geo-political zone to have fair representation of the population. Purposive sampling was also be used to select ten (10) key informants, including three (3) traditional rulers. Other key informants include the Nigeria Human Rights Commission, and one officer of the Nigerian military and other security formations such as the Nigeria Police Force and the Civil Defense Corps and three (3) opinion leaders. All the data will be collected from 410 respondents. This is summarized in the table below:

| Cluster Sampling | Purposive Sampling | Purposive/ Convenience |
|---------------------------|---------------------------|-------------------------------|
| Geo-political Zone | LGA/Town | Sample Size |
| Zamfara North | Anka | 71 |
| | Gusau | 128 |
| Zamfara Central | Bungudu | 88 |
| Zamfara West | Kaura Namoda | 98 |
| Total | | 385 |

Instruments of Data Collection

Data will be collected from primary sources using questionnaire and key informant interviews. Questionnaires was administered to 385 respondents, while a key informant interview was conducted with 10 stakeholders. Questionnaires were structured in closed-ended form, while the interview guide was semi-structured in an open-ended form.

Method of Data Analysis

Data collected from questionnaires was presented in frequencies and percentages, tables, charts, and graphs, while responses from key informant interviews were analysed using thematic analysis. Both responses were analysed and discussed.

LITERATURE REVIEW

The literature available demonstrates how complicated the Northwest bandit threat is. For instance, a committee formed by the former Zamfara State Governor Bello Matawalle to address banditry and other security issues in the state has indicted senior military officials and traditional leaders for their alleged involvement in the recent wave of violence that has claimed more than 6,000 lives in the past ten years. (Nwezeh, 2019). The committee, led by former IGP Mohammed Abubakar, said it had material evidence that five emirs in the state, 33 district heads, and a number of village heads were involved in the wave of banditry that resulted in the deaths of more than 6,319 men and women. He claimed that the banditry, which has persisted in the state for roughly ten years, involved ten soldiers, some police officers, and civil servants (Nwezeh, 2019).

The civil-military relations of a state are influenced by a variety of factors. Its history and culture come first on the list. History and culture are frequently treated by students of civil-military relations as incidental concerns, "intervening variables," that stand in the way of the "real" factor to be studied, the independent variable, whatever it may be, and the dependent variable, the state or pattern of civil-military relations (Desch 1999). However, the significant variations in civil-military relations patterns between Prussia and Great Britain in the nineteenth century and between the United States and Israel today are primarily due to cultural and historical differences (Craig 1955; Strachan 1997; Schiff 2009).

By distributing relative power to civilian and military leaders, a state's political institutions have a significant impact on how well its civil-military relations are managed. There is no doubt that various regime types will display various civil-military relationship patterns (Janowitz 1964; Perlmutter 1970; S.P. Cohen 1984; 2002; Avant 1994; Millett and Maslowski 1994; Bland 2000; Peri 2003; Lewis 2006; Schiff 2009). According to Brooks (2008:33–4), the military may exercise dominance, be subject to civilian control, or share power. The military may only be one component even in highly militarized regimes. For instance, in the Soviet Union, the military had to compete for influence with the KGB and the machinery of the Communist Party (Nichols 1993). Similar difficulties confront the People's Liberation Army (PLA) in China. Civil-military relations in liberal democracies. In such polities, the multiplicity of players in the civilian and military spheres complicates civil-military relations.

The Nigerian government is also concerned about jihadist and bandit groups' growing cooperation. Although a stable alliance between the bandits and the jihadists is unlikely given their lack of a common ideology and hierarchical structure, these groups may band together to fight the Nigerian security forces. Authorities have issued warnings that jihadist organizations, such as the Ansaru organization based in Kaduna, already coordinate with bandits in the North West. ¹¹ The alliance may soon be solidified by the jihadists' pursuit of greater strategic relevance and the bandits' need for steady supplies of cash and weapons. (ACLEDA, 2023). Banditry also has a global element to it. The regional trade in small arms and light weapons is driven by extortion, ransom, and other criminal funds from banditry, and transnational crime is lubricated throughout the greater Sahel region (IRRC, 2023).

In order to find safety in Niger, over 81,000 Nigerians had fled from Katsina,

Zamfara, and Sokoto. Some people who are internally displaced are hosted by extended family, but the majority of Nigerian refugees are gathered in areas with little access to basic services like food and shelter. The government acknowledges the need for action on both sides of the border given the threat's transnational nature. On March 25, representatives from the federal states of Katsina and Zamfara in Nigeria and the Maradi region of Niger met to lay the groundwork for improved coordination and communication (Kone, 2022). The government acknowledges the need for action on both sides of the border given the threat's transnational nature. On March 25, representatives from the federal states of Katsina and Zamfara in Nigeria and the Maradi region of Niger met to establish a foundation for improved coordination and communication. As a result, defense and security forces may work more closely together to better protect civilians. However, addressing the root causes that encourage some Nigerian citizens to join Nigerian bandits is necessary for a long-term solution. The reduction of grazing land and youth unemployment is crucial among these (Kone, 2022).

Health concerns also exist regarding how military activities in the Northwest affect the environment. For instance, a study done in 2013 by Nwaedozie, Mohammed, Faruruwa, and Nwaedozie reveals that Kaduna's military environments, which are used for military training and weapon testing, are polluted and contain significant amounts of trace metals. The results also show that the military installations are a haven for toxic substances that daily seep into the soil and water supplies.

Since their inception, these organizations have varied in their capacity, make-up, and allegiance-some were unofficial, others were supported by the government, still others were semi-independent and frequently lacked accountability. The CJTF's origins can be found in Maiduguri in early 2013,

when Boko Haram intensified its use of terrorism against Islamic clerics who disagreed with their interpretation of Islam and against civilians who supported the government (Ibrahim and Bela, 2018). Local groups of young men equipped with sticks (yan gora in Hausa) formed vigilante groups to patrol and defend their communities in Borno State when it appeared that the state was unable to do so as Boko Haram began using IEDs against such "soft" targets. The CJTF eventually came to be relied upon by the Nigerian military in some areas for intelligence gathering and assistance with manning checkpoints. The CJTF was crucial in keeping Maiduguri from falling to the rebels. Additionally, a full administrative structure was developed, with sectors and units covering wards and local government administrations. According to Ibrahim and Bela (2018), the youth force has about 26,000 volunteers in Borno State alone. In order to combat banditry, the North West replicates the CJTF or hunters/local vigilante. There are still questions about whether they have the states in the Northwest's official support.



PRESENTATION OF FINDINGS

Table 1: Gender

| | | Frequency | Percent |
|-------|--------|-----------|---------|
| Valid | Female | 57 | 14.8 |
| | Male | 328 | 85.2 |
| | Total | 385 | 100.0 |

Table 2: Marital Status

| | | Frequency | Percent |
|-------|-----------|-----------|---------|
| Valid | Divorced | 8 | 2.1 |
| | Married | 268 | 69.6 |
| | Separated | 3 | .8 |
| | Single | 103 | 26.8 |
| | Widowed | 3 | .8 |
| | Total | 385 | 100.0 |

Table 3: Religion

| | | Frequency | Percent |
|-------|--------------|-----------|---------|
| Valid | Christianity | 75 | 19.5 |
| | Islam | 310 | 80.5 |
| | Total | 385 | 100.0 |

Table 4: Ethnic Group

| | | Frequency | Percent |
|-------|--------|-----------|---------|
| Valid | Hausa | 232 | 60.3 |
| | Igbo | 34 | 8.8 |
| | Others | 60 | 15.6 |
| | Yoruba | 59 | 15.3 |
| | Total | 385 | 100.0 |

Table 5: Age

| | | Frequency | Percent |
|-------|-------|-----------|---------|
| Valid | 18-30 | 56 | 14.5 |
| | 31-40 | 131 | 34.0 |
| | 41-50 | 161 | 41.8 |
| | 51-60 | 31 | 8.1 |
| | 61+ | 6 | 1.6 |
| | Total | 385 | 100.0 |

Table 7: Education

| | | Frequency | Percent |
|-------|----------------------------------------------------------------|-----------|---------|
| Valid | Completed Primary School | 38 | 9.9 |
| | Completed Secondary School | 227 | 59.0 |
| | Completed Tertiary Education (NCE, HND, B.Sc, M.Sc, PhD) | 119 | 30.9 |
| | No formal Education | 1 | .3 |
| | Total | 385 | 100.0 |

Table 6: Local Government Area

| | | Frequency | Percent |
|-------|--------------|------------|--------------|
| Valid | Anka | 71 | 18.4 |
| | Bungudu | 88 | 22.9 |
| | Gusau | 128 | 33.2 |
| | Kaura Namoda | 98 | 25.5 |
| | Total | 385 | 100.0 |

Table 8: Occupation

| | | Frequency | Percent |
|-------|------------------------------|------------|--------------|
| Valid | Artisan | 40 | 10.4 |
| | Business Man / Woman | 87 | 22.6 |
| | Farmer / Agric. Worker | 64 | 16.6 |
| | Govt. Worker / Civil Servant | 58 | 15.1 |
| | Professional Worker | 27 | 7.0 |
| | Self-Employed Trader | 64 | 16.6 |
| | Student | 35 | 9.1 |
| | Unemployed Youth / Adult | 10 | 2.6 |
| | Total | 385 | 100.0 |

Table 10: Lead Security Agency in the Fight Against Insecurity

| | | Frequency | Percent |
|-------|----------------------------------------------------------------------|------------|--------------|
| Valid | Joint Task Force (NPF, NA, NSCDC, other state security actors) | 30 | 7.8 |
| | Nigeria Police Force | 43 | 11.2 |
| | Nigerian Army | 301 | 78.2 |
| | Non-State Security Group (Vigilante Group, Hunters Association, etc) | 11 | 2.9 |
| | Total | 385 | 100.0 |

Table 9: Security Challenge

| | | Frequency | Percent |
|-------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------|--------------|
| Valid | Armed Banditry | 3 | .8 |
| | Kidnapping | 4 | 1.0 |
| | Kidnapping Armed Banditry | 203 | 52.7 |
| | Kidnapping Armed Banditry Armed Robbery Drug Abuse | 2 | .5 |
| | Kidnapping Armed Banditry Drug Abuse | 58 | 15.1 |
| | Kidnapping Armed Banditry Ethno-Religious Violence Herders-Farmers Violence Sexual Violence against Women and Girls | 1 | .3 |
| | Kidnapping Armed Banditry Herders-Farmers Violence | 17 | 4.4 |
| | Kidnapping Armed Banditry Herders-Farmers Violence Sexual Violence against Women and Girls | 3 | .8 |
| | Kidnapping Armed Banditry Herders-Farmers Violence Sexual Violence against Women and Girls Drug Abuse | 1 | .3 |
| | Kidnapping Armed Banditry Insurgency | 9 | 2.3 |
| | Kidnapping Armed Banditry Insurgency Communal Violence | 1 | .3 |
| | Kidnapping Armed Banditry Insurgency Drug Abuse | 12 | 3.1 |
| | Kidnapping Armed Banditry Insurgency Herders-Farmers Violence | 1 | .3 |
| | Kidnapping Armed Banditry Insurgency Sexual Violence against Women and Girls | 8 | 2.1 |
| | Kidnapping Armed Banditry Insurgency Sexual Violence against Women and Girls Drug Abuse | 8 | 2.1 |
| | Kidnapping Armed Banditry Sexual Violence against Women and Girls | 32 | 8.3 |
| | Kidnapping Armed Banditry Sexual Violence against Women and Girls Drug Abuse | 20 | 5.2 |
| | Kidnapping Armed Robbery | 1 | .3 |
| | Kidnapping Insurgency | 1 | .3 |
| | Total | 385 | 100.0 |

Table 11: Security Agency to First Reach Out to

| | | Frequency | Percent |
|-------|----------------------|------------|--------------|
| Valid | Joint Task Force | 4 | 1.0 |
| | Nigeria Police Force | 105 | 27.3 |
| | Nigerian Army | 275 | 71.4 |
| | NSCDC | 1 | .3 |
| | Total | 385 | 100.0 |

Table 12: Do You Think Security Agencies Are Doing Enough to Tackle Insecurity

| | | Frequency | Percent |
|-------|-------|-----------|---------|
| Valid | No | 323 | 83.9 |
| | Yes | 62 | 16.1 |
| | Total | 385 | 100.0 |

Table 13: Assessment of Military Operation

| | | Frequency | Percent |
|-------|-------------------|-----------|---------|
| Valid | Hard to Tell | 57 | 14.8 |
| | Successful | 46 | 11.9 |
| | Unsuccessful | 258 | 67.0 |
| | Very Successful | 2 | .5 |
| | Very Unsuccessful | 22 | 5.7 |
| | Total | 385 | 100.0 |

Table 14: Safety in the State Since Military Operations

| | | Frequency | Percent |
|-------|----------------|-----------|---------|
| Valid | Improved | 63 | 16.4 |
| | No Improvement | 192 | 49.9 |
| | Uncertain | 84 | 21.8 |
| | Worse | 46 | 11.9 |
| | Total | 385 | 100.0 |

Table 15: Conduct of Security Personnel

| | | Frequency | Percent |
|-------|-------------|-----------|---------|
| Valid | Cordial | 139 | 36.1 |
| | Don't Know | 60 | 15.6 |
| | Not Cordial | 186 | 48.3 |
| | Total | 385 | 100.0 |

Table 16: Ever Have Encounter with Security

| | | Frequency | Percent |
|-------|-------|-----------|---------|
| Valid | No | 339 | 88.1 |
| | Yes | 46 | 11.9 |
| | Total | 385 | 100.0 |

Table 17: Encounter with Security Agency

| | | Frequency | Percent |
|-------|--------------------------|-----------|---------|
| Valid | | 352 | 91.4 |
| | Army | 2 | .5 |
| | Civil Defense | 1 | .3 |
| | Nigeria Army | 1 | .3 |
| | Nigeria Police | 4 | 1.0 |
| | Nigeria Police Force | 12 | 3.1 |
| | Nigeria Police Forces | 1 | .3 |
| | Nigerian Army | 3 | .8 |
| | Police | 4 | 1.0 |
| | Police force | 1 | .3 |
| | The Nigeria Army | 1 | .3 |
| | The Nigeria Police | 1 | .3 |
| | The Nigeria Police Force | 2 | .5 |
| | Total | 385 | 100.0 |

Table 18: Nature of Encounter

| | | Frequency | Percent |
|-------|-------------|-----------|---------|
| Valid | | 339 | 88.1 |
| | Cordial | 19 | 4.9 |
| | Don't Know | 10 | 2.6 |
| | Not Cordial | 17 | 4.4 |
| | Total | 385 | 100.0 |

Table 19: Ever Reported a Case

| | | Frequency | Percent |
|-------|-------|-----------|---------|
| Valid | No | 183 | 47.5 |
| | Yes | 202 | 52.5 |
| | Total | 385 | 100.0 |

Table 20: Agency Ever Reported an Incidence to

| | | Frequency | Percent |
|-------|----------------------|-----------|---------|
| Valid | | 183 | 47.8 |
| | Joint Task Force | 2 | .5 |
| | Nigeria Police Force | 167 | 43.4 |
| | Nigerian Army | 32 | 8.3 |
| | Total | 385 | 100.0 |

Table 21: Experience

| | | Frequency | Percent |
|-------|---------------|-----------|---------|
| Valid | | 186 | 48.3 |
| | Disrespectful | 99 | 25.7 |
| | Don't Know | 27 | 7.0 |
| | Respectful | 73 | 19.0 |
| | Total | 385 | 100.0 |

Table 22: Handling of the Report

| | | Frequency | Percent |
|-------|---------------------|------------|--------------|
| Valid | | 184 | 47.8 |
| | Don't Know | 67 | 17.4 |
| | Professional | 52 | 13.5 |
| | Unprofessional | 78 | 20.3 |
| | Very Unprofessional | 4 | 1.0 |
| | Total | 385 | 100.0 |

Table 23: Form of Abuse

| | | Frequency | Percent |
|-------|-------------------------------------------|-----------|------------|
| Valid | Asset Confiscation | 14 | 3.6 |
| | Asset Confiscation Extortion | 2 | .5 |
| | Beating | 46 | 11.9 |
| | Beating Asset Confiscation | 4 | 1.0 |
| | Beating Asset Confiscation Extortion | 1 | .3 |
| | Beating Extortion | 21 | 5.5 |
| | Beating Undue Arrest | 19 | 4.9 |
| | Beating Undue Arrest Extortion | 12 | 3.1 |
| | Extortion | 83 | 21.6 |
| | Profiling | 11 | 2.9 |
| | Profiling Asset Confiscation Extortion | 2 | .5 |
| | Profiling Beating | 9 | 2.3 |
| | Profiling Beating Undue Arrest | 2 | .5 |
| | Profiling Beating Undue Arrest Extortion | 1 | .3 |
| | Profiling Extortion | 17 | 4.4 |
| | Profiling Undue Arrest | 6 | 1.6 |
| | Profiling Undue Arrest Extortion | 5 | 1.3 |
| | Sextortion | 2 | .5 |
| | Undue Arrest | 57 | 14.8 |
| | Undue Arrest Asset Confiscation | 8 | 2.1 |
| | Undue Arrest Asset Confiscation Extortion | 4 | 1.0 |
| | Undue Arrest Extortion | 58 | 15.1 |
| | Undue Arrest Sextortion | 1 | .3 |
| | Total | | 385 |

ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS

Assessment of Security situation in Zamfara State

Based on the findings of the study, 52.7% (203) of the respondents overwhelmingly identified banditry and kidnapping as the major security challenges facing Zamfara State. This was followed by armed banditry, kidnapping and drug abuse with (15.1%) 58. The least, security challenge was identified to be armed robbery with 0.3% (1).

Civilian Perception of Military Operations in Zamfara State.

The Nigeria army was identified as the major security outfit that leads in the fight against banditry in Zamfara state with 78.2% (301) followed by the Nigerian Police Force 11.2% (43). While the Non-State Security Group was identified as the least security outfit that is engaged against the fight against insurgency in Zamfara State with 2.9% (11).

The Findings also show that the majority of the 71.4% (275) respondents prefer to report security incidences to the Nigerian Army, 27.3% (105) respondents prefer to report to the Nigerian Police Force while 0.3% (1) representing the least number of respondents said they will report to the Nigeria Security and civil defense Corps.

Findings of the study also show that security agencies were not doing enough to tackle insecurity in Zamfara state with an overwhelming 83.9% (323) while only 16.1% (62) believed otherwise.

On the assessment of military operations in the state, 67.0% (258) pointed out that it is unsuccessful, 11.9% (46) pointed out that its successful while 14.8% (57). Pointed out that it's difficult to say where the military operations in the state have yielded success or not.

On the level of safety in the state, respondents 49.9% (192) stated that the security Zamfara State has not improved, 21.8% (84) were indifferent as to whether the security situation has improved or not while only 16.4% (63). Findings also show that 11.9% (46) stated that the security has been worse.

The study discovered that the relationship between security personnel and civilians in Zamfara State, 48.3 % (186) representing majority of the population stated that the relationship was not cordial, 36.1% (139) stated that it was cordial while 15.6% (60) were undecided.

On the nature of abuses committed by the security agencies in the state, findings show that extortion 23.6% (86), undue arrest and extortion 15.1% (58), undue arrest 14.8% (57), and beating 11.9% (46).

Table 24: Gender * Age * Security Agency to First Reach Out to Crosstabulation

| Security Agency to First Reach Out to | | | Age | | | | | Total |
|---------------------------------------|--------|--------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-----|-------|
| | | | 18-30 | 31-40 | 41-50 | 51-60 | 61+ | |
| Joint Task Force | Gender | Male | | 2 | 2 | | | 4 |
| | Total | | | 2 | 2 | | | 4 |
| Nigeria Police Force | Gender | Female | 7 | 7 | 5 | 0 | 0 | 19 |
| | | Male | 6 | 39 | 35 | 4 | 2 | 86 |
| | Total | | 13 | 46 | 40 | 4 | 2 | 105 |
| Nigerian Army | Gender | Female | 6 | 12 | 17 | 2 | 0 | 37 |
| | | Male | 37 | 71 | 101 | 25 | 4 | 238 |
| | Total | | 43 | 83 | 118 | 27 | 4 | 275 |
| NSCDC | Gender | Female | | | 1 | | | 1 |
| | Total | | | | 1 | | | 1 |
| Total | Gender | Female | 13 | 19 | 23 | 2 | 0 | 57 |
| | | Male | 43 | 112 | 138 | 29 | 6 | 328 |
| | Total | | 56 | 131 | 161 | 31 | 6 | 385 |

The Findings also show that the majority of the 71.4% (275) respondents prefer to report security incidences to the Nigerian Army, the age and gender dynamics shows that majority were male 238 while only 37 were female. Data also indicate that these males were aged mostly (101) adults aged 41-45, followed by 13-40 years and 18-30 years (37). Among the 27.3% (105) respondents prefer to report to the Nigerian Police Force, majority (86) while only 19 were female. Findings further revealed that majority of the male who reported security challenges to the police were aged 31-40 (39) followed by people aged between 41-50 (55). In all respondents between the age of 41-50 constituted the majority that reported a case to the security agencies, followed by 31-40 and 18-30 years.

Table 25: Gender * Age * Conduct of Security Personnel Crosstabulation

| Count | | | | | | | | |
|-------------------------------|--------|--------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-----|-------|
| Conduct of Security Personnel | | | Age | | | | | Total |
| | | | 18-30 | 31-40 | 41-50 | 51-60 | 61+ | |
| Cordial | Gender | Female | 6 | 6 | 7 | 0 | 0 | 19 |
| | | Male | 9 | 38 | 60 | 11 | 2 | 120 |
| | Total | | 15 | 44 | 67 | 11 | 2 | 139 |
| Don't Know | Gender | Female | 3 | 2 | 3 | 0 | | 8 |
| | | Male | 9 | 19 | 20 | 4 | | 52 |
| | Total | | 12 | 21 | 23 | 4 | | 60 |
| Not Cordial | Gender | Female | 4 | 11 | 13 | 2 | 0 | 30 |
| | | Male | 25 | 55 | 58 | 14 | 4 | 156 |
| | Total | | 29 | 66 | 71 | 16 | 4 | 186 |
| Total | Gender | Female | 13 | 19 | 23 | 2 | 0 | 57 |
| | | Male | 43 | 112 | 138 | 29 | 6 | 328 |
| | Total | | 56 | 131 | 161 | 31 | 6 | 385 |

The gender and security dynamics in the conduct of security personnel shows that majority of the respondents (156) who said the conduct of security personnel were male., out of which 58 were aged between 41-50 years, 55, were 31-40 years and only 25, were aged between 18-30 years.

Table 26: Gender * Age * Encounter Crosstabulation

| Encounter | | | Age | | | | | Total |
|-----------|--------|--------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-----|-------|
| | | | 18-30 | 31-40 | 41-50 | 51-60 | 61+ | |
| Yes | Gender | Female | 10 | 19 | 21 | 2 | 0 | 52 |
| | | Male | 39 | 96 | 121 | 26 | 5 | 287 |
| | Total | | 49 | 115 | 142 | 28 | 5 | 339 |
| No | Gender | Female | 3 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 5 |
| | | Male | 4 | 16 | 17 | 3 | 1 | 41 |
| | Total | | 7 | 16 | 19 | 3 | 1 | 46 |
| Total | Gender | Female | 13 | 19 | 23 | 2 | 0 | 57 |
| | | Male | 43 | 112 | 138 | 29 | 6 | 328 |
| | Total | | 56 | 131 | 161 | 31 | 6 | 385 |

The table above shows that majority of the respondents who had an encounter with the any of the security was male within the ages of 41-50. (142). Same applies to those who did not have an encounter with security agencies(138).

Table 27: Gender * Age * Experience Crosstabulation

| Experience | | | Age | | | | | Total |
|---------------|--------|--------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-----|-------|
| | | | 18-30 | 31-40 | 41-50 | 51-60 | 61+ | |
| | Gender | Female | 4 | 5 | 9 | 2 | 0 | 20 |
| | | Male | 22 | 58 | 70 | 15 | 1 | 166 |
| | Total | | 26 | 63 | 79 | 17 | 1 | 186 |
| Disrespectful | Gender | Female | 8 | 7 | 5 | 0 | 0 | 20 |
| | | Male | 12 | 22 | 35 | 8 | 2 | 79 |
| | Total | | 20 | 29 | 40 | 8 | 2 | 99 |
| Don't Know | Gender | Female | 0 | 3 | 1 | | | 4 |
| | | Male | 5 | 9 | 9 | | | 23 |
| | Total | | 5 | 12 | 10 | | | 27 |
| Respectful | Gender | Female | 1 | 4 | 8 | 0 | 0 | 13 |
| | | Male | 4 | 23 | 24 | 6 | 3 | 60 |
| | Total | | 5 | 27 | 32 | 6 | 3 | 73 |
| Total | Gender | Female | 13 | 19 | 23 | 2 | 0 | 57 |
| | | Male | 43 | 112 | 138 | 29 | 6 | 328 |
| | Total | | 56 | 131 | 161 | 31 | 6 | 385 |

The table above shows that majority of the respondents (99) believed that their experience with the security was disrespectful, out of which 79 were male and 20 were female. Majority of the respondents were male withing the age bracket of 41-50. No respondent within the ages of 51-60 and 61 and above had and experience with the security forces.

Discussion

Information gathered from most of the key informants especially traditional ruler in Zamfara State show that there is no improvement in the security situation in the state. One of the informants stated that the situation has only changed in approach "Initially it was farmers-herders conflict but the criminality now is by the local people, both the locals and the herders are all victims" **KICMR 002**. This corroborated with the information that was collated using questionnaires where respondents overwhelmingly indicated that that the security in in the state has not improved. The major security threat was identified to be armed banditry, kidnapping for ransom, and farmers herders' crises.

"Informants from members of the community are the biggest obstacle to the fight against in Zamfara state, improper control of renting of houses to strange people, the association of house builders 'Mayina" often build houses for the bandits. Banditry in Zamfara is fueled by top politicians in the state who identified mining sites and they do not want people to go near the sites also unemployment, poverty, illiteracy. The so-called innocent people who are killed by the military are actually bandits but the politicians make it look as if they are not bandits" **KICMR 001**.

"A lot of the people causing mayhem are indigenes of Zamfara

State, Informants are aiding bandits and are more dangerous”
KICMR 002.

In contrast to the submission of other respondents, the respondent (002) believed that the police should lead the fight against banditry since is an internal security matter and community based. However, the police are ill equipped and are overwhelmed.

This corroborated with the submissions of all the respondents on the role of key informant in worsening the security situation in the state. On whether the efforts of the military, it was found that the efforts of the security in the state is not enough to tackle banditry in the region as stated by the respondent that

“The military is trying but there best is not enough” **KICMR 001.**

Injustice in the handling bandits also make it difficult for community members to cooperate with authorities.

“People are afraid to give information because of the lack of punishment given to bandits who will return to harm them. Lack of government presence in some areas comprised the traditional rulers. In Shinkafi the bandits judge all cases and mange farmlands, the traditional rulers are powerless. As I speak one of the Emir in my domain was kidnapped I broad day light and is in the hands of the bandits. The traditional rulers are the most vulnerable” **KICMR 001.**

Some of the respondents agreed that dialogue should be an option, but rather caution that it should be carefully done so that it will not create more factions to get more attention and more money.

On the relationship between the military and the civilians, it was found that the relationship is not cordial. There is no trust between the military, civilian, and the traditional rulers. The lack of trust is affecting the successes of military operations in the state. For instance, the military do not know the terrain while the local communities have a good knowledge of the terrain and the people.

Respondents pointed out that the gap in communication between the military and traditional rulers also create unfortunate situations where the people turn to see the military as enemies. For instance, some military operations led to the destruction of farm lands in the local communities during operations.

In order to get the community members involved,

“The rules and customs of the community should be taken into account which is lacking in Zamfara State. The military should also engage in humanitarian services to get closer to the people” **KICMR**

001

Respondents also stressed the need for accountability in the security sector. For instance, a respondent stated that.

“The top military officers are “enjoying” the situation because monies given to the officers are not given to the operational soldiers. The military negotiate with bandits when they are caught. The military and other security agencies know where the bandits are but the issues of human rights hinder their operation **KICMR**

003”

Similarly, one of the respondents from Human Rights Commission stated that also of human rights abuses have been committed by security forces especially by the junior ranking personnel.

“Human rights abuses are mostly committed junior ranking Officers but where over to the military authorities nothing is done about it”

KICMR 010.

However, the Nigerian military responded that most of the reported cases are not gone unpunished but the military has its internal mechanism of handling such cases which are not always known to the public. In addition, all the security agencies expressed their concern on revealing the security strategies or sharing intelligence to the local people for the fear of informants.

This agreed with the submissions of most of the respondents that there is no trust between the Nigerian military and community members.

CONCLUSION

Based on the findings of the study, the level of insecurity in Zamfara state has not improved. The major security challenges affecting the state are armed banditry and kidnapping for ransom. The military operations in Zamfara State are successful and inadequate of tackling the current security challenge in the state. Informants from members of the community has been identified as the one of the main obstacles to the fight against insecurity in Zamfara State. The relationship between the military and other security forces is not cordial in the state. Extortion and undue arrest and beating has been found to be one of the most abuses committed by security agencies in Zamfara State.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Based on the findings of the study, the following recommendations are made

1. All the stakeholders especially the traditional institutions in Zamfara state and Northwest Nigeria should embark on awareness programmes to members of the communities to desist from giving information to the bandits and to understand the nature of the destruction that their actions have or would cause their communities.
2. Political actors who are responsible for fueling banditry should be identified and made to face law to serve as deterrence to others.
3. The hierarchy of the military should ensure that there is accountability at all levels to ensure that the human rights of citizens are respected.
4. The root cause of poverty and illiteracy should be addressed so as community members would not be easily recruited into joining banditry or serving as informants due to illiteracy or little financial gains.
5. The security forces especially the police should work on its public image as it relates to extortion while the Nigerian military should focus on beating of civilians.

ABOUT THE PROJECT

Nigeria, like many countries, faces multifaceted challenges related to peace, human rights violations, and security governance. As a response, CLEEN Foundation and International Alert with financial support from Open Society Africa curate a project with specific focus on Strengthening Peace, Human Rights and Accountable Security Governance in Security Approaches to Violent Extremism in Nigeria project was conceptualised in response to numerous conflicts in Northern Nigeria which has become a theatre for humanitarian crisis. This research product outlines key findings and initiatives aimed at strengthening peace, human rights, and security governance in Nigeria.

To increase security sector accountability on rights violations in Nigeria, the project proposes to operationalize the Human Rights Management Information System Platform (www.hrmis.org) to improve the efficiency of civilian oversight agencies in documenting human rights violations by security personnel. This is realized through Baseline Assessment, Capacity Building for security operatives, CSOs and local communities on IHL, Advocacy visits to policy makers and relevant agencies providing civilian oversight, Sensitization workshops, Bi-annual accountability forum for oversight agencies, trainings for agencies and inclusive dialogue, community sensitization, and engagements with a wide range of actors led by influential change agents, CSOs, traditional, and religious leaders.

The project aims to work directly with communities and provide them support to improve security accountability and their sense of security, and strengthen dispute resolution mechanisms. The Community Peace and Security Platforms (PSP) are strengthened by community organizations for an effective early warning and response mechanism. The initiative aims to create a highly inclusive and integrated Peace and Security Platform, providing women and other marginalized groups the opportunity and enabling environment to actively advocate for and participate in community agenda-setting and decision-making processes. For the purpose of preventing violence, promoting discussion, and encouraging citizen involvement, a vibrant network of women, young people, people with disabilities, and CSOs with strong contextual experience is envisioned.



Zamfara
zamfara

