

Security and Governance
in North-East Nigeria

Security and Governance in North-East Nigeria

Edited by

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CLEEN FOUNDATION

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Dedication

To all victims and survivor of insurgency in Nigeria

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Foreword

The North-eastern part of Nigeria has attracted significant attention of the public, journalists, politicians, civil society groups, social scientists, foundations and international agencies. The attraction was not a palatable one, but of great concern to the safety and security of people resident in that part of the country occasioned by the activities of the *Jama'atu Ablus Sunnah Liddawa'ati wal Jihad* (People Committed to the Teachings of the Prophet and Jihad). The organisation has acquired global notoriety and is popularly referred to as Boko Haram. Since its dislodgement in 2009, it has succeeded in reinventing itself into a guerrilla force unleashing deadly attacks on people, villages, police stations, military posts, prisons, churches/mosques, motor parks, markets and schools; kidnapping men, women, children; conscripting young people; releasing videos celebrating its mindless attacks or threatening to launch attacks or showing gruesome murder of its victims in its self-acclaimed drive to Islamise Nigeria. The result is widespread insecurity in Borno, Yobe and Adamawa States, places that bear the brunt of the activities of Boko Haram.

CLEEN Foundation, in line with its mandate, organised this research in six states – Adamawa, Bauchi, Borno, Gombe Taraba and Yobe States – on Governance and Security in North East Nigeria. The researchers have been able to gather and analyse data from different respondents using a combination of research

instruments – questionnaires, Focus Group Discussions (FGDs) and Key Informant Interviews (KI-I) supplemented with desk research and drawing on secondary data. The result of the research conducted in each of the six states constitutes the content of this volume.

The individual state focus has allowed the researchers to provide a more insightful perspective on each of the states. While there may be issues common to the states, which some informed people may find repetitive, this allows for a treatment of the common issues in different contexts which may not be common to all the states. Readers will find that while the states are ethnically and culturally diverse with some ethnic groups existing in all the states, this does not confer commonality. The strength of the individual researchers lies in this detailed discussion of the situation in each state.

There is a sense in which the result of the study makes a case for a wider understanding and recognition of security beyond the physical. The respondents' concerns sounds like a cry for help to live a more meaningful existence in terms of education, health, employment, electricity supply, clean water, good road network, farm inputs, secure markets, religious tolerance, validation of ethnic and cultural identities, connection with elected representatives, and ensuring safety and security. It is in this that one finds the connection between governance and security being salient issues of concern to the public but which is treated with apparent shoddiness by the authorities.

There is inherent in this, an invitation for civil society presence to help drive respect for the people, listening to them and involving them in the process of governance. Though this is not stated explicitly, but the under currents and the subliminal

references to the failures speak to that concern. It is to the credit of the researchers that they were able to tease out these from the respondents.

It is not in doubt that the situation in the north east cannot remain as it was going by the experiences of the people under the onslaught of Boko Haram. The people in that part of Nigeria have now become conscientised by practical experience of the failure of governance and would need to find ways of engaging with the various state governments on their security. This is also a wake-up call to the elected and appointed representatives, exercising power on behalf of the people, to find ways of connecting with the citizens, addressing their concerns and ensuring that service delivery not only reach, but are also meant for the relevant people in relevant places.

The failures that gave birth to the insecurity in the North East has shown that even those who exercise power and authority cannot operate unless they are transparent, accountable and deliver services to the people otherwise, they themselves, will not have the space and peace to operate the machinery of government. It is in this context that they must pay heed to the cry for help as captured by the researchers on governance and security in the six states of the north-east.

The North East may be statistically the poorest of the country and, indeed, its people enmeshed in poverty. However, its rich arable land, existing rivers and dams, its diverse, creative and energetic people suggest that new thinking is required to pursue governance in partnership with the people. Governance is not one set of officials operating in isolation on behalf of the majority of the people. The various researchers have shown respect for the people and their participation are necessary to

create a more secure and peaceful environment for the development of the North-East.

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Preface

Nigeria has witnessed a deteriorating internal security situation since the return to democratic rule in 1999. This may be seen from the proliferation and involvement of non-state actors in security across the different sections of the country. There are various forms of non-state actors (apart from private security outfits) in different parts of the country ranging from Bakassi Boys in the south-east, Movement for the Emancipation of Niger Delta (MEND) in south-south to Boko Haram, Sara Suka and Yankalare in the north-east. The military being present in more than thirty-two states of the nation to restore order appears to be virtually overstretched.

Many reasons have been advanced to explain the continued deterioration of security in Nigeria. The main causes of insecurity in the country are twofold - remote and proximate causes. These may include:

- absence of institutional capacity resulting in government failure;
- the gaping chasm of inequality and absence of fairness and justice;
- ethno-Religious conflicts;
- disconnect between the people and the Government.

These and many proximate factors like, porous borders, rural-urban drift, poverty, and unemployment have combined to further aggravate the problem of insecurity in Nigeria.

Nigeria has experienced both military and civilian rule at different times of her national development, each with its unique

style of maintaining national security. It is generally believed that the management of security under civil rule is also tinted with elements of repression characteristic of military regimes in Nigeria, so that the distinction between the two is very tenuous. Whichever style of government used there is always a correlation between governance and the nature of security. For an effective security system to be fully operational, the leadership must exhibit elements of good governance. Ideally, good governance is the hall mark of credible leadership epitomized in today's world by democracy.

However, while democracy is often associated with good governance, the situation in Nigeria appears to be the reverse. Nigeria's democratic experiment is characterised by conflicts, political assassinations, unemployment among other challenges.

Studies were conducted in the six states that make up the North-Eastern region – Adamawa, Bauchi, Borno, Gombe, Taraba and Yobe – to find out the nexus between governance and insecurity in these states. The research was carried out using a combination of primary and secondary sources of data. The primary data were sourced by administering questionnaires using the purposive sampling system, conducting of focus group discussions and key informant interviews. The secondary data were gotten from the existing literature which includes but not limited to journals, government policy documents, newspapers, academic publications, CLEEN Foundation's National Crime and Safety Survey reports, social statistics compiled by the National Bureau of Statistics and National Population Commission.

Objectives

The objectives of the study are as follows:

- To examine the relationship between security and character of governance in the North-East region.
- To understand major drivers of insecurity in the states.
- To identify the gaps in governance and security in the states.

- To determine the role of NGOs and civil society organisations in improving governance and security in the states.
- To explore the various mechanisms employed by the government at state and local levels with a view to enhancing security and governance.
- To recommend remedial measures with a view to strengthening security and good governance.
- To assess Government's response to insecurity challenges in the states.

Limitations/Challenges

The limitations encountered in the course of carrying out the study were as follows:

- Reluctance on the part of identified respondents particularly the civil servants. There seems to be a lack of interest on their part on the subject matter of the study.
- There was reluctance on the part of women to be part of the interviews; there was a high sense of mistrust and unwillingness to respond to questions posed to them.
- Insecurity challenges in the field also affected the time frame within which the study was conducted.

Findings

- Elected representatives have abused or misused their powers and authority. Nepotism, ethnicity, religion and regionalism are strong influencers of politics and governance in the region.
- Corruption is endemic among government officials' particularly political office holders. The judicial system was found to be non responsive to the plight of ordinary citizens

in the region because it is also bedevilled with corrupt practices.

- Citizens' participation in governance is low and in some places it does not exist. Organised civil society engagement that could galvanise citizens' engagement is also weak. Most of the groups that exist were involved in health related advocacy and mobilisation. This has created poor accountability and service delivery processes at the local government and community levels.
- Accessibility of the citizens to public officials or government functionaries does not exist. Gombe State was the exception where the findings showed that 60 per cent of the respondents were of the opinion that public official and /or government functionaries were accessible to the citizens.
- Security challenges in the region were high. There were incidents of theft, burglary, gang attacks and communal clashes. Some of the security challenges are traced to skewed policies by government, discriminatory processes in allocating resources and distribution of opportunities.
- Security challenges were also traced to weak state institutions and lack of capacity of the institutions to respond to the security challenges.

Recommendations

- Promotion of positive cultural, religious and social values that would build national cohesion and development. This should be adopted across the region.
- Elected representatives should be made accountable to their constituencies. Periodic report back/feedback dialogues should be carried out with their constituencies and other stakeholders. Transparency and accountability should be encouraged at all levels.
- There is an urgent need to facilitate and ensure community participation in the governance process at the state and local

government levels in the region. Marginalised groups such as women and youths should be encouraged to take keen interest in the governance processes in the region.

- Skills acquisition programmes and other employment opportunities should be identified and scaled up to get more youths irrespective of gender and other interest. This is to curb the trend of young persons joining insurgent groups in order to secure means of livelihood.
- Credible leadership should be encouraged in the region. Development of the region should be at the core of any strategy to curb the wave of insurgency in the region.
- Appropriate capacity building and re-orientation for the security and law enforcement agencies working in the region particularly the police so as to build community confidence and foster partnership.
- Capacities of the civil society organisations need to be strengthened to enable them function effectively in the area of holding the government accountable and to be more responsive to the citizenry.

Conclusion

The governance challenges in the north-east region of Nigeria seem to be a microcosm of the larger country which has been characterised by poor leadership. Although insurgency was identified as the most important cause of insecurity facing the region, there are still threats of armed robbery, and communal clashes. The perception that the security agencies are unprepared for the challenges in the region leaves more to be desired.

The general dissatisfaction with the various dimensions of governance performance of electoral officials at all levels, lack of transparency and accountability, endemic corruption created opportunities that were exploited by insurgents to recruit socio economic vulnerable persons to join their cause. This shows an indication of interconnectivity between governance and security.

List of Abbreviations

AIDS:	Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome
ANPP:	All Nigeria Peoples' Party
ASSN:	African Security Sector Network
CAN:	Christian Association of Nigeria
CARE	Cooperative for Assistance and Relief Everywhere
CBOs:	Community- Based Organizations
CEDAW	Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women
CJTF:	Civilian Joint Task Force
CLEEN:	Centre for Law Enforcement Education in Nigeria
CSCE:	Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe
CSOs:	Civil Society Organizations
ECOWAS:	Economic Community of West Africa States
FGD:	Focus Group Discussions
HIV/AIDS	Human Immuno-deficiency Virus/Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome
ICRC	International Committee of Red Cross
IDP:	Internal Displaced Persons
JAC:	Joint Account
JAS:	Jama'atu Ahlis Sunnah Lidda'awatiwalJihad
JTF:	Joint Task Force
KII:	Key Informant Interviews
LGOSF:	Local Governance and Security Forum
LG:	Local Government
LGA:	Local Government Areas

MEND:	Movement for the Emancipation of Niger Delta
MOPOL	Mobile Police
NAPEP:	National Poverty Eradication Programme
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NDHS	Nigeria Demographic and Health Survey
NECO:	National Examination Council
NGOs:	Non-Governmental Organizations
NPC:	National Population Commission
OECD:	Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
OND/NCE:	Ordinary National Diploma/ National Certificate on Education
OXFAM	Oxford Committee for Famine Relief
PDP:	People's Democratic Party
SEGON:	South East Governance Network
SWOT:	Strength Weakness Opportunity Threat
TARCMA:	Taraba Road Construction and Maintenance Agency
UN:	United Nations
UNDP:	United Nations Development Programme
UNHCR:	United Nations High Commission for Refugees
UNICEF:	United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund
VIE:	Valence Instrumentality Expectancy
WASSCE:	West African Secondary School Certificate Examination
WHO:	World Health Organization
YSDA:	Yangtu Special Development Area

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Chapter 1

Introduction

Governance and Security in the North-East Nigeria

- Hussaini Abdu

History and Context

Since the return of civil rule in 1999, Nigeria has been experiencing rising spectre of violence and insecurity bordering on natural resources (mis) management and control, citizenship question, electoral contest, religious and ethnic polarisation, and the current ferocious Islamist insurgency. To be sure, Nigeria is a country of cyclical crisis – the history, dynamics and challenges of its development are deeply rooted in tension, conflicts, instability and insecurity (Abdu, 2013). The Nigerian nation-state has never enjoyed an appreciable period of stability that could guarantee security and sustainable development. Each phase of Nigeria's political history is punctuated by different security challenges - military coups, electoral violence, religious disturbances, militancy and banditry.

In northern Nigeria in particular, poverty, class interest and manipulations in the context of the struggle for the control of state power and resources associated with it have resulted in violent conflicts of different degree and proportion (Abdu, 2010). The region has continued to experience conflicts, ranging from

small-scale communal and ethno-religious violence to high-intensity insurgency of the Maitatsine in 1980s and Boko Haram in recent years. In the last three decades, northern Nigeria has been a major epicentre of violence. It is within this national and regional security context that the situation in the northeast can be better explained. While it is possible to isolate the north east for analysis, it is important to understand that the governance and security situation in the north east is not independent of the broader situation in Nigeria.

The north east geopolitical zone consists of 6 states with distinct socio-cultural and historical background. The region shares international boundary with Niger, Chad and Cameroon along the states of Borno, Adamawa and Yobe. With over 200 ethnic groups spread across six states, the zone is one of the most culturally diverse regions of the country. It harbours some of the poorest human development indicators: almost 70% of the region lives below the poverty line, one of the worst maternal mortality rates in the country, and high levels of illiteracy (NDHS 2013). It is not surprising that it is currently the most insecure region in the country. The region is going through one of the worst spells of violence since the Nigerian Civil War.

The region can be tentatively clustered into a three distinct but interpenetrating socio-cultural clusters. – The Kanuri, the Hausa-Fulani Muslims and the ethnic minority Christian cluster. The Kanuri axis covers Borno and Yobe states. They are predominantly Muslims and have historically played relatively distinct politics from the larger northern Nigerian politics. The Hausa-Fulani Muslims axis covers Gombe, Bauchi, Adamawa and parts of the Taraba State, and the axis gravitates towards the politics of the North-West and has therefore been deeply

influenced by the political direction of the North-West. Because the ethnic minority Christians are also located in these states, the politics is also influenced by the historical contentions between these social groupings. Against the Hausa-Fulani dominated politics of the north, the ethnic minorities who are also predominantly Christians have more political affinity with the Middle Belt (North-Central). The Middle Belt is politically conceived to include the minority Christian areas of the North-East. Sometime the ethnic minority groups gravitate towards southern parts of the country in building strategic political alliances.

The northeast has been ravaged by spates of violence and insecurity in the last two decades. Starting from cross border banditry occasioned by civil war in the neighbouring countries in the 1980s and 1990s, the region is currently going through a complex mix of security challenges, including armed banditry in the international border areas, different shades of communal violence (ethnic and religious violence in Bauchi, Taraba, Gombe and Adamawa states) and ferocious insurgency in almost all the six states. Although the Boko Haram insurgency is more in Borno, Yobe and Adamawa state, it has in many other ways affected each of the states in the region.

With the level of violence in the region in the last few years, the northeast has one of the worst cases of small arms and light weapons proliferation, and also a huge presence of military assault weapons in the hands of the militant groups. Closeness to international borders, especially the Sahel region, has made access to these weapons relatively easier. The zone has in the last ten years produced militant youth groups, the Boko Haram and Ansaru being the extreme ones. Others are ECOMOG in Borno

State, *Yan'Kalare* and *Sara-suka* in Gombe and Bauchi states respectively.

The study attempts to systematically examine the relationship between governance and security in the north east of Nigeria. How has the character of governance in the region influenced security? To what extent is the ranging insecurity in the region linked to governance? The primary objective of the study is thus to examine the relationship between security and the character of governance in the region, and, also, to understand the major drivers of insecurity in the region and determine the role of civil society in improving governance and security in the region.

Governance and Security – conceptual issues

Governance as a concept may have existed for a long time, but its current usage in public discuss effectively started in the 1970s; first in public administration literature and later in international relations and comparative politics (Hyden 2011). The intellectual heritage on which governance discourse rests is therefore varied and complex. This complex heritage has been categorized into two main parameters: effectiveness and legitimacy (Hyden 2011). The former encourages a managerial and technocratic approach to governance. It treats governance as an instrument to get things done with better results. The latter gives rise to a focus on the political aspects of governance and invokes issues such as building democratic institutions, promoting social justice, rule of law, human rights and how the state interacts with citizens (Hyden 2011).

The concept of governance has now been part of mainstream international development discourse for two

decades. It however remained a versatile concept that means different thing to different actors. It covers a wide range of political, administrative, and economic issues.

Over the past two decades, the concept of governance has experienced significant changes in both theory and practice. At the theoretical level, the most remarkable shift has been towards treating governance as regime management. This has meant a greater emphasis on the rules of the game and on the political dynamics surrounding their implementation. At the level of practice, there has been an increasing recognition of the role of citizens in formulating policy and holding government officials to account (Hyden and Samuel, 2011).

Defining governance has preoccupied three different constituencies in the last few years (Hyden 2011). One is the academic community, which adopted the concept from various perspectives in the 1970s and 1980s. Another is the international donor community or development partners, which began applying the concept to its programmes in the early 1990s. A third is civil society activists, who have been at the forefront of shaping the governance discourse in recent years (Hyden 2011). Although some individual governments sponsored different local participation initiatives, these initiatives have not attracted international attention like the three identified consistencies. Hyden therefore succinctly captures the storyline as follows:

The academics helped set the stage for what governance would eventually become in policy practice; the donors developed the concept into prescriptive devices; and activists today are challenging the governance mainstream, because it focuses too much on transferring institutions from the North at the expense of identifying

endogenous social forces that can help build sustainable governance structures (Hyden 2011. 6).

Providing a generally acceptable definition of governance is difficult. Goran Hyden attempted a working definition based on the ranging international discourse as

The formation and nurture of the regime that constitutes the public realm within which state and non-state actors interact to decide on issues affecting the welfare and security of citizens.

Based on this conception, governance is the politics over rules: the constitutional, legal, or procedural context in which policies are made and implemented. It conceives citizens as the true constituency of the state. As a result, governance has both a representative and accountability dimension. While citizens elect their representative to make governance possible, they are also expected to remain alert and hold their representative accountable to make governance real. Democratic governance is therefore not about the implementation of specific policies but about the normative framework – the regime – within which policies are formed and executed. It is about citizens claiming the state in order to make it more responsive, inclusive, and able to serve their welfare and security (Hyden 2011).

Although government is an important stakeholder in governance, there is difference between governance and government. While both concepts involve actions or decisions on the part of an organization and its members to achieve certain goals, governance is a broader concept than government. Governments have the formal authority to act; they also have powers to enforce compliance with their activities, rules, and policies. In particular, governments have, and exercise, political power. Depending on context and perspectives, there is almost a consensus on the broad elements of governance. These include:

- The process whereby elements in society wield power, authority and influence to enact policies and make decisions concerning public life and economic and social development.
- The capacity of the government to manage resources efficiently and to formulate, implement and enforce sound policies and regulations.

This broad understanding of governance doesn't necessarily make the measurement or assessment of governance a straight and easy task. This is clearly reflected in the different approaches that have been adopted for deconstructing and measuring governance by different agencies. Some of the frameworks have been deeply state centric, while others over emphasised the role of non state actors.

Our attempt is to develop a framework that brings different stakeholders in governance process including government institutions, the private sector, citizens and their agencies – civil society groups. At the same time, it also recognises the government as a duty bearer and therefore has the Constitutional responsibility to provide and be held accountable by citizens and their agencies.

For the purpose of the study, we categorised governance into five broad dimensions – political, legal and judicial, administrative and economic, and social. Each of these dimensions refers to specific dimensions:

Political dimension: This is about the political space and the contestations, conducts of political players including civil society, institutional use and abuse of political authority and citizens' faith in the political process.

Legal and Judicial: This is the ability of the state to maintain law and order, safeguard human rights and enable access and delivery of justice.

Administrative dimension: Ability of the state to manage its human, financial and technological resources and deliver basic services.

Economic dimension: Ability of the state to create conducive atmosphere for business in all sectors and ensure macro-economic stability.

Social dimension: The capacity of the state to take care of the vulnerable sections of the society. The role and quality of the civil society, media and environmental governance.

This character and dimensions of governance have relevance to security governance and human security.

The concept of security has gone through different stages of development and understanding. It has grown from physical security to human security, particularly since the end of the cold war. The 'human security' approach provides that threats and challenges to security transcend national defence, and law and order to encompass all political, economic and social issues that guarantee a life free from risk and fear. The focus has shifted from the State to the security of persons; however, these are not mutually exclusive. Security can be thought of as a "public good", responding to the strategic need to support sustainable human development at the same time as promoting national, regional and global peace.

During the past decades, broader security concepts have moved from security research to policy. In the field of international development and security sector reform policies,

definitions of security that include the protection of individuals and communities from violence have effectively replaced classical understandings of security in military terms. Beginning with UN Development Programme's path-breaking Human Development Report in 1994, the international community adopted 'human security' concepts that ultimately introduced a "concern with human life and dignity" into international security debates (UNDP 1994; 22). As a lowest common denominator, current human security concepts promote people-centred and comprehensive approaches to counter the vulnerabilities of individuals faced with critical threats to their lives and livelihoods. This dual concern is frequently summarised as the goal of promoting both 'freedom from want' and 'freedom from fear' (Schroeder 2010).

From human security approach, in 2001 the OECD broadly defined security as:

An all-encompassing condition in which people and communities live in freedom, peace and safety, participate fully in the governance of their countries, enjoy the protection of fundamental rights, have access to resources and the basic necessities of life, and inhabit an environment which is not detrimental to their health and wellbeing. (OECD DAC, 2001: 38)

In 2007, the OECD DAC further specified that the promotion of human security is a necessary ingredient of international development policies.

Security is fundamental to people's livelihoods, to reducing poverty and to achieving the Millennium Development Goals. It relates to personal and state safety, access to social services and political processes. It is a core government responsibility, necessary for

economic and social development and vital for the protection of human rights. (OECD DAC, 2007: 13)

Sustainable development in any society requires sustainable peace. Scholars and practitioners are in agreement that for there to be sustainable human security, society must evolve ways of addressing the root causes of insecurity by fostering participatory democracy, just and accountable governance, the rule of law, respect for human rights, and a balance and equitable distribution of resources, among a host of others. Security initiatives must therefore be anchored on rights and the responsibility of the state to protect and defend the rights of the people.

Security challenges in Nigeria have been compounded not only by the socio-economic challenges of the country, but also the very narrow regime driven conception of security. The security of a prevailing regime is almost synonymous to national security. This conception of security doesn't include vital aspects of social and national development, such as responding to human development needs and managing exclusion.

Societal-system analytics (Marshall and Cole 2008) provides a useful framework for structuring a relationship between complex webs of forces. Basic societal-system analysis takes into account the interconnectedness of three fundamental dimensions of societal systems – governance, conflict and development. The conditions, characteristics, qualities, and prospects of each of the three critically affect the others. Any change in one dimension will have consequences for each of the other two (Marshall and Cole 2008, 2014). The effectiveness or ineffectiveness in performance of the societal-system is therefore expected to be

both incremental and congruent among the three key dimensions. The level of performance in each of the dimensions can vibrate through the system with tremendous impact on the delicate web of human relations and permeate every segment of the dimensions. Societal-system performance is therefore predicated on the system's capacity for collective action. Improvement in the conditions of social system thus requires coordinated changes among all the three key dimensions. These changes could be a combination of applied coordination – effectiveness and voluntary compliance – legitimacy (Marshall and Cole 2014).

Governance, conflict and development therefore influence each other, a problem in one, will manifest in the other two, if the problem is not managed effectively and resolved systematically. The character and quality of governance and development must therefore be taken into strong cognisance in analysing conflict. Similarly, conflict and governance are important determinants of the quality of development, same way development and conflict influence governance (Marshall and Cole 2008, 2014).

In the contemporary complex social formations define by deep seated multiple identities and grievances, individuals and groups can commit, withhold and even transfer loyalty among deferent interests and platforms depending on their perceptions of where their interest will be served and protected. Managing conflict is an important governance issue. Protracted failure to manage conflict could trigger or increase emotive content and political salience, leading to greater mobilisation and polarisation of constituent groups. It could also compound the ideological or political differences between the governing elites and dissenting

groups often referred to as the “polar factionalism (Marshall and Cole 2014). The consequences of protracted conflict could be high on security as observed by Marshall and Cole:

The “unintended consequences” of political intransigence and protracted social conflict accumulate over time and increase systemic deterioration and societal atrophy through the diffusion of insecurity, both intensively and extensively, and contribute to a syndrome of societal-system un-and underdevelopment ... The absence of political will to resolve societal-systemic crises simply extends and expands the ill effects (2014, 1).

Crisis of Governance and Insecurity

After over three decades of military rule, the transition to civil rule in 1999 provided an important opportunity for democratic governance. While the transition ushered in regular elections at the national and state level, citizens engagements in the governance process and the capacity to hold their representatives accountable have been at best limited, creating huge crisis of governance. Oyovbaire (2007) observed that the crisis of governance in Nigeria is fuelled by four related historical factors; protracted military authoritarian rule, weak institutions, corruption and personal rule.

The over three decades of military authoritarian rule is observed to have trapped the country in a praetorian order in which social structures and values have been moulded in the fashion of authoritarianism, governance continues to be conducted in that fashion. As a result, the executive branch is seen, and behaves as both dominant and domineering organ of government, if not the sole organ. The executive alone, to the exclusion of the legislature and even the judiciary, is perceived to

be government. As a consequence of the above, constitutional institutions such as the legislature, the judiciary, political parties and executive bodies are made to stunt and retard in growth or they are gravely weakened. In the case of the legislature, there was no space previously to experience the value of law making derived from a representative social order because there was no legislature distinct from the executive in politics and governance under military rule. Indeed, since 1999, the legislatures at all levels have failed to perform its constitutional oversight responsibility and holding the executive to account. Conversely, it is rather the legislatures that are working hard to perform executive functions (through constituency projects) to remain relevant in their respective constituencies. Every succeeding election produces almost 80% new legislature. Therefore leaning and growth in the business and politics of law making is continuously been retarded by this high level of turnover.

Third, the political economy inherited by the fourth republic. The class character of the economy in which unearned wealth in the form of corrupt accumulation of state funds and resources by a few individuals has tended to skew power relations away from the majority of the people. The role of money in elections has also made it difficult, if not impossible for a large segment of the political class to participate effectively in competing for power. Corruption has therefore been democratised, permeating practically every segment of the society and becoming a major lubricant of politics and electoral contest and contributing to the growing poverty, inequality and violence. While corruption, in itself is a huge problem, the culture of impunity associated with this practice has become a huge challenge to national security and stability. Corruption

undermines accountability, popular sovereignty and promote personal rule. This increases personal rule by the President, Governors and others in leadership positions. Personal rule is a fundamental anti-thesis of constitutional and democratic government (Oyovbaire 2007).

Other governance challenges include manipulation of ethnic, regional and religious identities. Galvanising national consensus to address any fundamental national issue has become a serious challenge. Every national issue is seen from the prism of ethnicity, religion, region or both.

The northeast region of Nigeria is one of the least governed regions in the country. It ranks lowest in all the major development and household indicators. The region harbours some of the worst development indicators - escalating poverty, huge unemployment and widening inequality. Nigeria's large informal economy, poverty and disaffection interact with identity-based forms of economic organization, creating tensions and opportunities that define the character of violence and insecurity in the region. The economic deprivation and social marginalization of youths in most urban areas provided important space for violence and related crime (ONSA 2015).

In Borno in particular, desertification and the desiccation of Lake Chad created a huge economic stress for large population of people (ONSA 2015). This coupled with other environmental factors created conditions for southward migration of people from as far as southern Niger Republic into northern Nigeria including Maiduguri. It has been estimated that the total population of the entire Lake Chad basin area is 37 million, two-thirds of whom live in the Nigerian portion of the lake. In the 1970s the annual production of the lake ranged from 130,000 –

140,000 tonnes of fish, but this has dropped to an average of 84,030 tonnes between 1986 and 2013. (ONSA, 2015)

Table 1
Zonal Incidence of Poverty by Different Poverty Measures

Zone	Food Poor	Absolute Poor	Relative Poor	Dollar Per Day
North Central	38.6	59.5	67.5	59.7
North East	51.5	69.0	76.3	69.1
North West	51.8	70.0	77.7	70.4
South East	41.0	58.7	67.0	59.1
South-South	35.5	55.9	63.8	56.1
South West	25.4	49.8	59.1	50.1

Source: National Bureau of Statistics, 2010

Historical resistance to formal education and the failure of government to provide creative solution to the challenge has created a huge army of uneducated and illiterate youth population in the region. The high and persistent unemployment and poverty have surpassed and stressed the absorptive capacity of the informal economy and social network. There is the competing down of incomes, the lack of capital, and increasing employment as workers rather than entrepreneurs within the informal economy (ONSA 2015). In many instances, traditional artisanal occupations of different sectors of the informal economy are being pushed out by better-educated and connected actors. Narrowing livelihood opportunities in the informal as well as the formal sector have triggered rising contestation by indigenes over access to informal activities, which have historically been the preserve of migrants (ONSA 2015). This has impacted significantly on inter-ethnic, religious and communal relations in the region. This therefore, results in different forms

of violent crime, – from occasional communal violence to protracted insurgency.

Governance and security: Experiences from the North East

Relying on both primary and secondary data, the study covers the six states of the geo-political zone. The secondary data was sourced from an array of studies conducted; this includes books, journals, magazines, newspapers and specialised studies like CLEEN Foundation Security Assessment Reports and a host of other national reports and policy documents. While the primary data was derived from a three-pronged methods of data collection – questionnaire, key informant interviews and focus groups. The study was carried out in each of the states with standard sets of questions and uniform sampling processes and frame. The idea is to effectively guide the structure and create room not only for individual state analysis but also give room for comparative understanding of the states. While the character of security issues in each of the states may differ, the context and causative factors are almost the same.

The challenges of poverty, inequality, exclusion, corruption, youth militancy and environmental issues are some of the common governance and development issues across the states. While insurgency, communal violence, rural banditry, land disputes, chieftaincy tussle and political violence are some of the common security challenges in the zone. The manifestations of these challenges however differ from state to state.

The Adamawa study highlighted the increasing challenges of governance and exclusion. Although it is one of the states affected by the Boko Haram insurgency, the state has a long

history of communal violence occasioned by poverty, exclusion and manipulation of ethnic and religious identities. Empirical data indicates a huge feeling of insecurity, lack of access to government at all levels and deep-seated challenges of political and governance crisis. The dislocations occasioned by the Boko Haram insurgency have compounded the situation.

The Bauchi study indicates a society that is very active in electoral politics, but less active in holding the political leadership to account. Challenges of corruption, poor leadership and social services have permeated the entire landscape of the state. Violent crimes have been observed to have increased since the return of civil rule in 1999. Prominent among these violent crimes is the activities of a politically sponsored youth militant group called 'Sara-suka'. The group is made up of young people often used as political thugs to intimidate the opposition.

Borno is the epicentre of the Boko Haram insurgency; the study highlighted how a relatively peaceful state could transform into one of the most violent and extremely unsecure states of the Nigerian federation. Important in this process of transformation is the historical failure of governance in the state as expressed in the increased poverty, exclusion, corruption and impunity by security agencies. Empirical data indicate active citizens' engagement with the electoral process without corresponding gains for their participation. The state government is observed to have alienated itself from the people at all levels (through limited access), providing little or no room for accountability. Government decisions are hardly questioned no matter the level of unpopularity. For more than ten years, the state failed to conduct elections into the local government authority. This has

undermined local level participation and promoting corruption and abuse of office at the local level.

The Gombe study is built around the activities of youth militant groups called *Kalare*. This militant youth group was used to intimidate the opposition and repress dissenting voices to cover up for poor governance, leadership failure, corruption and abuse of office. This situation had been compounded by deepening poverty, unemployment, illiteracy and exclusion. The study also identified poor citizens' engagement with the governance process, inadequate service delivery and lack of legislative oversight as some of the major contributors to the challenges of governance and insecurity in the state.

The Taraba study shows how complex historical and political issues combined to undermine governance and security. Being also in the fringe of the country with expansive land, Taraba is observed to be one of the under governed states of the country, with poor social services, high unemployment and deepening poverty. The combined effects of historical conflicts and contention over land/boundary, chieftaincy tussle and electoral contest between different ethnic and religious groups have generated some of the most protracted violent conflicts in the region particularly the Chamba-Kuteb and Tiv-Jukun conflict. Several local governments' areas are faced with one form of conflicts or the other. Since the return to democracy in 1999, violence has become increasingly associated with politics. Other security challenges in the state include rural banditry, pastoralist-farmers conflict, kidnapping, youth militancy, armed robbery and political violence. Some of this violence could be a spill over of conflicts in other parts of the region or country.

Yobe and Borno state are located within the same cultural zone. Until 1993, they constituted the old Borno state. It is therefore not a surprise that the activities of Boko Haram are largely in these two states. The Yobe study is therefore more like the extension of that of Borno. The state is another example of how a relatively peaceful society could transform into one of the most violent. While Borno State is undoubtedly the epicentre of the Boko Haram insurgency that has affected the greater part of the North East region, it was in Kanamma, the headquarters of Yunusari LGA in Yobe state located on the border with Niger Republic that the group launched one of its early uprisings, attacking the Local Government secretariat and the police station in 2003 (Bukar 2016). Thereafter, the group went underground and resurfaced in 2009 when it felt there was sufficient ground and capacity to challenge the state. Since then, Yobe and Borno states have recorded some of the worst violent conflicts in the history of Nigeria.

The study also indicates that poverty, exclusion, corruption and lack of public accountability have been the major drivers of security in the state. Yobe is particularly observed to be one of the poorest states in Nigeria. Absolute poverty in the state is 73.8% while the national average is 60.9% (NBS 2010). In terms of literacy, it has one of the highest illiteracy rates in the country with 85.3% females and 83.3% males without any form of education (NDHS 2014). In the health sector, it is reported that 90 per cent of child deliveries take place at home, and less 30 per cent of such births receive anti natal care.

The nature and scale of poverty reflect the interactions of geography, ecology and politics. In terms of size, Yobe State is the second largest state in Nigeria with a major portion of its

land area located in the semi environment characterized by low potentials in terms of agriculture productivity (low rainfall, limited topsoil; scarce water resources). In addition, majority of the population are found in remote rural areas, which tend to suffer from crises of social and economic exclusion. Sparsely populated and isolated settlements usually face problems of lack of access to basic infrastructures, transport routes and extreme economic isolation. The nature and pattern of distributing societal benefits, which places certain areas in perpetual disadvantage is therefore a major source of poverty in the area (Bukar, 2016).

The influence of powerful individuals otherwise known as godfathers is another dimension to the democratic process in Yobe State. Empirical data indicates that powerful individuals possess the means to unilaterally determine who gets party ticket to run for an election and who wins the election (Bukar 2016). The phenomenon of “godfatherism” is indeed not peculiar to Yobe State; it is recognized as one of the biggest dangers to democracy in Nigeria.

Conclusion

Strengthening governance and security in the North-East

This study shows a strong relationship between governance and security in the north east of Nigeria. The security situation in the region is a reflection of the crisis of governance and accountability in the states. Security decision-making have been over centralised and largely controlled by the governing elites. This has continued to undermine citizens’ involvement in security governance and democratic control of the security agents. The state’s attitude to conflict is to suppress it with all

violent means possible. Increasingly security is not only being privatised it is also personalised. The failure of accountability in the course of discharging their duties have created a state of siege in most conflict zones, resulting in wanton violation of human rights and the institutionalisation of a culture of impunity.

The north-east of Nigeria is clearly the most insecure part of Nigeria in recent years. The level of insecurity may not be uniformly spread across the six states, but the challenges of governance are almost common. To respond to the growing security issues, it will be important to improve governance in the states. This will mean improving political, economic and security governance. It will therefore be important to consider the following.

Institute good recovery framework

Protracted conflicts and security contributes to the erosion and contestation of the legitimacy of state and societal institutions. State delivery capacity is largely undermined and citizen's engagement can be very difficult and conflictual. The three core states affected by Boko Haram – Adamawa, Borno and Yobe, exhibit different levels of state fragility and will therefore require effective recovery effort. This effort can be enhanced by four major frameworks – build responsive institutions, ensure inclusive politics, increase community resilience to crisis and build effective partnership (UNDP 2012). First in the framework is to build responsive institutions to deliver necessary services to the people. This will require equipping and building the capacities of the state (federal government, state and local governments) and civil society to ensure services are delivered in a way that is not captive or partial to specific elite or identity-based interests. The second is to promote inclusive politics by building mechanisms that allow for the legitimate and peaceful

expression of interests in a way that does not reverse development gains (UNDP 2012).

The third framework is for public institutions to work proactively with civil society groups and the private sector to improve the resilience of the society to crisis and ensure the participation of the affected communities in monitoring, assessing, mediating, and responding to social conflict and political crises that often accompany the turbulent post-conflict period. The last of the framework is to build and emphasize partnership as a means of achieving the first three frameworks - responsive institutions, inclusive politics and resilient societies. Partnerships with different national and international institution including - federal government, interstate partnership; civil society groups, UN agencies and other development partners will be very important (UNDP 2012).

Improve sustainable development issues

This should look beyond growth in income and macro-economic indicators. Sustainable human development approach is based on the following:

- Social progress - greater access to knowledge, better nutrition and health services.
- Economics - the importance of economic growth as a means to reduce inequality and improve levels of human development.
- Efficiency - in terms of resource use and availability. Human development is pro-growth and productivity as long as such growth directly benefits the poor, women and other marginalized groups.
- Equity - in terms of economic growth and other human development parameters.

- Participation and freedom - particularly empowerment, democratic governance, gender equality, civil and political rights, and cultural liberty, particularly for marginalized groups defined by urban-rural, sex, age, religion, ethnicity, physical/mental parameters, etc.
- Sustainability - for future generations in ecological, economic and social terms.
- Human security - security in daily life against such chronic threats as hunger and abrupt disruptions including joblessness, famine, conflict, etc.

Deepen democracy and good governance

It may not be Fukuyama's *end of history* (1992), but democracy has come to be recognised as the major means of managing diversity and ensuring citizens' engagement in the governance process. It has effective mechanism and capacity to regenerate, contextualise and provide space for popular participation. This effort will require strengthening the legitimacy, accountability and capacity of the governments at all levels. State credibility is important for resource mobilisation and service delivery, this is however a function of electoral mandate and responsive of the government. There is a logical connect between credibility and accountability (Odinkalu 2010). Accountability has both political and institutional dimensions. At the political level it is about citizen's participation in the governance process and their capacity to determine who governs them. At the institutional level it is about the operational effectiveness of the institutions of government. Providing the political and institutions services requires a level of state capacity which is a function of independence of the state institutions and their capacity to serve

public good against arbitrary and personalised interest of the powerful and governing class (Odinkalu 2010).

Improve security governance

The different state case studies show how poor security governance has contributed to escalating insecurity. In some cases, security agencies have directly contributed to escalating violence. Attitude to security issues have been largely militarist. Militarist solution to insecurity tends to place unnecessary emphasis on the immediate issue or manifestation of conflict and ends of up escalating the situation. It is state centric and does not treat citizens as important stakeholders in security governance. Security deployments are frequently based on the whims and caprices of the individuals that control them than on strategic interests and needs.

Because the security system has been so deeply personalised – there are competing interests between the different security agencies, all struggling to please their immediate masters without any consideration for strategic collaboration across the services. This has resulted into a loss of synergy, failure to share intelligence and poor coordination. The Boko-Haram violence has tellingly exposed this predicament. There have been cases of open accusation and counter accusation between the security agencies (Abdu 2013). It is therefore important to re-strategise security governance at all levels of government. Citizens must be allowed to play their role in security governance and to contribute to holding security institutions to account.

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Chapter 2

Governance and Security in Adamawa State

- Dr. Saidu Tunenso Umar

Introduction and Literature Review

Recent events and the continuation of violence, destruction of lives and property in the north-east of Nigeria, and Adamawa state in particular, are indications that the security situation needs to be looked into.

As a state in the Federation of Nigeria, Adamawa has segmented social group networks. It has at least seventy-four dialects, a figure that places it among the most ethnically diverse and pluralistic states in the country. One result of this diversity is that the state has problems when it comes to achieving solidarity in action and purpose. In particular, its hyper-ethnic composition makes it difficult to establish and sustain peace and overall security. Over the years the state has faced threats and different forms of violence from militia groups.

The state also suffers from widespread poverty, and from inefficient health and educational services. There is a very low level of human capital development, with underemployment, poor water resources and sanitary conditions, epileptic energy and power output, environmental degradation, poor housing and transportation. The deplorable road network is a further

negative characteristic of the state, and is another reason for failure to achieve development goals. Despite having a large area of arable land, Adamawa state still records low crop yields, and as a result, food insecurity. The private sector appears non-viable and un-profitable (ADSEEDS, 2006).

All these issues have been highlighted by the SWOT analysis carried out by the Adamawa State development blueprint. The analysis revealed that one of the weaknesses of the state is the lack of effective linkages between the agricultural and industrial sectors. It also captured the major characteristics of the human underdevelopment problem in the state referred to above, namely low income, disease, epidemics, poor sanitation and hygiene, low literacy rate, vulnerability to controllable natural disasters, gender inequality, and generally poor public infrastructure. With limited private sector jobs, the state government has been left to shoulder the burden of providing employment.

Problems in the area of governance include lack of transparency and accountability, lack of security preparedness, insecurity of life and property, as well as pervasive corrupt tendencies and patronage values that have become deep-rooted in not only the public, but also the private sectors. The analysis noted the opportunistic and systematic manipulation of volatile religious and ethnic values (ADSEEDS, 2006), which often culminate in violent conflict with loss of life and property.

The concept of Governance

The concept of governance has continued to be a problem in academic and administrative discourse. The World Bank has identified all issues relating to the personalization of power,

denial of fundamental human rights, widespread corruption and the prevalence of unelected and unaccountable government as manifestations of bad governance (Boerminger, 1994). In other words, governance simply refers to the manner in which power is exercised in the overall co-ordination of a country's economic and social resources for all round transformation in the quality of life of the citizenry. In the view of Landel-Mill and Sergeldin, governance is the use of political authority and exercise of control over a society and the management of its resources for social and economic transformation. Governance also refers to the capacity of a good government for efficient problem-solving and conflict management. According to Adekunle, governance is also the framework through which citizens and groups exercise their rights, meet their obligations and articulate their interests. These assertions can be summarized as central issues relating to authority, reciprocity, trust, and accountability (Hidden and Barton 1992). A process of governance is said to have been established when all these elements are jointly practised. But when they are not practised, governance is said to be bad. Thus good governance exists when there is a framework that imposes demands on policy makers in their exercise of power which encompasses an effective state that provides an enabling political and legal environment for economic growth and the equitable distribution of the good things of life (Genyi, 2006).

The concept of Security

By and large, the character and dimensions of governance affect security. The concept of security has gone through different stages of development and understanding, and has expanded from physical security, to encompass human security –

particularly since the end of the Cold War. The ‘human security’ approach argues that threats and challenges to security transcend national defence or law and order, to encompass all political, economic and social issues that guarantee a life free from risk and fear. This has shifted the focus from the State to the security of persons; however, these are not mutually exclusive. Security can be viewed as a “public good”, responding to the strategic need to support sustainable human development, and at the same time, as promoting national, regional and global peace. In the last decade, broader security concepts have moved from security research to policy. In the field of international development and security sector reform policies, definitions of security that include the protection of individuals and communities from violence have effectively replaced the classical understanding of security in purely military terms, as can be seen from the UN Development Programme’s ground-breaking 1994 Human Development Report.

Over the years, Nigeria’s national security has practically been reduced to the security of the ruling class. Certainly the ruling classes have failed in their attempts to provide the general public with even military or physical security, let alone the type of security that includes vital aspects of social and national development, such as basic social services. In a broader sense, security has been categorized into five broad dimensions, namely political, legal and judicial, administrative, economic and social securities. The political dimension connotes political contestation, the conduct of political players (including civil society), institutional use and abuse of political authority and citizens’ faith in the political process. The economic dimension relates to the ability of the state to create conducive atmosphere

for business in all sectors and to ensure macroeconomic stability. The social dimension refers to the capacity of the state to take care of the vulnerable sections of the society, and the role and quality of civil society, the media, and to environmental governance.

Research methods

The data for this study is sourced from secondary and primary sources. The primary sources include interviews, observation and Focus Group Discussions (FGD). The State Coordinators and Field Assistants interacted with different stakeholders on issues of governance and insecurity in the study area. Information was generated from two local government areas in each of the three senatorial Districts, namely: in Adamawa North – Mubi-North and Madagali LGAs; in Adamawa Central – Yola North and Hong metropolitan LGAs; and in Adamawa South Senatorial District, Numan and Ganye LGAs. The secondary sources include newspapers, radio, television, magazines, the Internet and official documents from relevant bodies and institutions. Others include published books and official documents, journals and civil society groups.

A total of 240 completed questionnaires were collated for analysis and drawing inferences. Based on the sampling methods and sampling frame, a homogenous group of respondents (that is, individuals having some common interest or characteristics) were engaged in discussion using an open-ended interview guide with a moderator who interacted with the members.

Key Stakeholder Interview: Stakeholders (that is, people who have a direct bearing and influence on governance and security) were identified through a rapid stakeholder analysis and

community power mapping. Stakeholders in this regard include experts, decision makers, and people affected by conflict. These individuals were interviewed using the open-ended interview guide.

The sample was stratified by location, gender and economic/political status. Data were collected from six LGAs, three urban and three rural, distributed across the three senatorial districts. Data were obtained from the following populations or groups: Elders, Youths, Women, Ethnic groups, Security agencies such as police and prison staff, Traditional institutions, Teachers in primary and secondary schools, Trade unions – namely the Nigeria Labour Congress and Nigeria Union of Teachers, government officials, vigilante groups, road transport workers, motorcyclists, tricycles, media organizations, civil society organizations, and community and faith-based groups.

Results

Demographic data of Respondents

Figure 1: *Sex of the respondents*




Figure 2: State of origin of the respondents




Figure 3: Age of the respondents




Figure 4: Religious affiliation of the respondents




Figure 5: Educational level of the respondents




Figure 6: Professional/Occupational status of the respondents





Figure 7: Location of the respondents



The data reveals that 94.2% of the respondents were indigenes of Adamawa State. The majority of the respondents 77.9% were males while only 22.1% were females. This is a valid

reflection of the rate of involvement of women in community affairs in the state. This is similar to the result obtained in the assessment of the Adamawa State Economic Empowerment Strategy (ADSEEDS, 2006).

Similarly, the analysis on professional or occupational nature of the respondents shows over 50 per cent are civil servants. This corroborates the fact that private sector participation in the state is low; the State can be said to be a typical 'civil servant state'. 60 per cent of the respondents are Christians, 39 per cent are Muslims while 1% are traditional believers. Over 80 per cent of the respondents spread across Christianity and Islam have obtained tertiary education. 34.6% of the respondents are within the youth age bracket which is 29 - 38 years.

State of governance in Adamawa State

The analysis of the data indicates that there is a nexus between the challenges of governance and insecurity in Adamawa State.

When the respondents were asked to rate the performance of the state legislature, majority of the respondents 56.7% were of the opinion that the performance of the State legislature was poor. One respondent noted: "The members of the State House of Assembly are after election and re-election of themselves or the Governor of the state, and nothing else."

There is no space for participation of opposition parties or ideas in the State. An equal democratic process that guarantees equal participation and inclusiveness of all parties including minorities and opposition parties does not exist in the State. This is more obvious in the rural areas where civic participation in

governance is not encouraged. There is the belief among the people that their votes do not count during the elections.

The data showed that over 60 per cent of the respondents were located in urban areas in the State. 22.3% of them were aware of the existence of civil society organisations (CSOs) which includes nongovernmental organisations (NGOs). They stated that CSOs and NGOs performed well in the provision of essential services to the communities; 8.3% of respondents considered that NGOs and CSOs were engaged in community mobilization. 28 per cent were of the opinion that they were not involved in activities that are related to participating in governance.

Feedback from the respondents indicates that most of the CSOs in the state are like social clubs such as football associations, or gender-based traders associations. Very few of the CSOs perform any watchdog role with a view to enhancing governance in Adamawa State. Community-based policing groups are also evolving in the state and they benefit from local support and knowledge of the environment. They are adjudged to be accessible and effective. However, there has been no mechanism to coordinate their activities with that of the formal police organisation.

Security challenges in Adamawa State

From 1999 to date, Adamawa State has experienced a series of security challenges which have emerged from a variety of causes: ethnic, religious, election violence, armed banditry and militia group operations. Many respondents identified the threat posed by political thugs, politicians and security agents, with 82.9% expressing the view that crime and security challenges in their

community took various dimensions and had resulted in many cases of crime. Priority security challenges identified were terrorism, commercial violence, crimes and ethno-religious violence. These threats were identified by respondents from the Adamawa South Senatorial District (Numan and Ganye LGAs).

Response to security challenges

The opinion of respondents on the response of local government officials to security challenges was not favourable, with 42.5% rating the response of local government officials as very poor, while 21.3% were of the view that local governments had failed to respond to security challenges in their communities. Views about the preparedness of the Nigeria Police Force were hardly better, with 49.6% saying that it lacked the equipment to maintain law and order. 35 per cent felt that its level of preparation to meet the challenges was neither good nor poor, but 5% opined that the level of police preparation is not directed towards tackling security problems. Respondents did not feel that the police were capable of stopping threats to life, citing poor and out-dated equipment as a key responsible factor.

When respondents were asked for the views on the performance by the Adamawa State Government in preventing or handling security challenges such as extremism, militia and communal violence, 37.9% of the respondents disagreed with the statement that the State Government is not making any serious effort to handle the trend towards violence – particularly the insurgency – in their communities. However 69 per cent noted that the Adamawa State Government had been unable to stop inter-faith wars, and ethnic crisis. There are still people without conscience who manipulate communities under the disguise of

faith or ethnic affiliation. We still have persons clamouring for ethnic nationalities or religious entities to kill.

State of governance in Adamawa State

Respondents were of the view that the state's administrative machinery has not been directed towards strengthening public services such as health and education, or to establish anti-poverty schemes. Nearly half of the respondents (45.4%) opined that accessing government functionaries is always very difficult and complained that the local government which ought to be closer to them has no impact on their lives, and that public officials are only seen in the locality during elections or when wedding or burial ceremonies are taking place. Many of the respondents described the government as insensitive to the yearnings and aspirations of the people. In the words of a key informant:

“The health, educational and road services are at a dilapidated level... we are left at the mercy of medicine vendors. The roads are in a deplorable condition, one can hardly transport the farm produce to the nearest market.”

Despite (or perhaps because of) the preponderance of civil servants among the respondents to the questionnaire, most of them opined that corruption has taken over the state's administrative machinery, and that services are no longer provided by the Adamawa State ministries and agencies: “The state ministries, agencies and boards exist only on paper, the only work now is in the office of Accountant General of the state.”

71.7% of the respondents stated that electricity services had disappeared. Although only 24.2% of respondents in the state

capital complained of epileptic electrical services, discussions with key informants revealed that:

“We in this neighbourhood asked the service providers of electricity to cut-off all the lines, because we are tired of paying bills without electricity.”

Thus those who have the means depend on generators as their main source of energy in Adamawa State.

Educational services are still extremely poor, and this means that there has been no opportunity for children and vulnerable persons to have access to basic civic and health education.

When respondents were asked about primary education, 51.3% opined that the delivery of primary education has been politicized. Basic education is seen as being of low or poor quality and unfairly distributed. Respondents said that although public primary schools in urban centres had witnessed a rapid increase in the building of classrooms, this was because contracts had been awarded to meet the aspirations of political allies. But the teachers recruited did not have relevant teaching skills and the level of enrolment level is very low. Respondents complained that the few who were enrolled demonstrated unsatisfactory levels of performance, especially in numeracy skills. In addition, glaring gender and geographical disparities were noted. Schools in the rural areas were reported as suffering total neglect in terms of facilities, poor quality of teachers and lack of supervision by educational administrators. Against this background, it is not surprising that the majority of the respondents 70 per cent expressed dissatisfaction with primary educational services.

A majority of the respondents (72.1%) were dissatisfied with water services, with only 23.3% expressing satisfaction. The available sources of water are streams, wells and pump-operated boreholes. However the number of hand pumps is not commensurate with the needs of the population. 74.6% of the respondents had a very low opinion of the quality of sanitation services, and respondents also complained that when refuse is dumped, there are no vehicles or means of removing or otherwise disposing of the waste, particularly having regard to the large distances to official dumping centres. In focus group discussions participants said that poor sanitation and poor health services meant that people are still dying from diseases that should have been eradicated. For example, children are still dying from malaria due to the failure to control mosquitoes, while women are still dying from maternal complications. The filthy environment makes the people of Adamawa State vulnerable to diseases such as cholera, diarrhoea and typhoid fever, particularly in the urban centres where most of the study was conducted.

Housing services are very poor, particularly in the state capital, Yola. The shortage of housing has left civil servants vulnerable to high rents charged by landlords. In the words of some respondents and participants in interviews and group discussions:

“These services are generally very poor. As a whole, it makes life so difficult for us... Cholera is always on the increase...With the epileptic education, health and electricity services, we have a very low sense of security...We in Adamawa State have continued to experience bad governance from all the regimes under our democratic dispensation.

The state is almost fourteen years behind other states of the federation.”

On the whole, responses to the questionnaires showed that the government has been cutting costs by reduced services to the underprivileged in Adamawa State. Resources and facilities have not been extended to farmers in the rural areas, and they have not received any adequate training on modern farming skills from government extension workers. With attacks from insurgency groups like Boko Haram, the State faces the threat of food insecurity, since the farming communities of Madagali, Gulak, Michika, Betso, Bazza and Sabon Gari are all in camps for internally displaced persons.

Respondents complained that the government of Adamawa State has failed in its responsibility to assist the peasant farmers who produce food for the teeming population of Nigeria. Only 37.1% felt that the state government had achieved average effectiveness in promoting agriculture in the state. 69 per cent of the respondents said that they have no access to credit and loan facilities, while only 16.7% of the respondents said they had accessed such faculties. While 37.1% of respondents said that they had received advice from the state’s agricultural extension staff, 55.8% said they had never had any advice or training from the state government.

As regards employment, 65.4% of respondents said that job opportunities were not available in Adamawa State, with many graduates and school leavers remaining without jobs. The 1999 Constitution placed education on the concurrent list, and it is on this basis that the Universal Basic Education, which is supposed to be “an assistance to the state and local government in Nigeria

for the purpose of uniformity and qualitative basic education throughout Nigeria” (UBE, 2005) was introduced.

The impetus for the intervention of government in basic education stems from a number of international conventions such as the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), on corruption, and on the Rights of the Child. These conventions recognise that the human family is a fundamental grouping within society which provides the environment for the growth and well-being of all its members, particularly women and children. But despite these various instruments, extensive discrimination against women and children continues in Adamawa State, and is reflected in the numbers of vulnerable and disadvantaged street children, orphans and children from Qur’anic schools (or Almajiris). Respondents were of the view that the Adamawa State government has done little to make it possible for these disadvantaged persons to benefit from these rights.

The data generated indicates wide geographical variation between the rural and urban locations, with children in rural areas appearing to be generally disadvantaged. Above all, the girl-child has been more discriminated against by being denied enrolment even at basic levels of education.

Most respondents (64.2%) said that none of the anti-poverty programmes undertaken by the state or local governments had reached them. The implementation of these programmes was seen as discriminatory, with one respondent stating that:

“All the anti-poverty programmes so far undertaken by the state are only among friends and family of the executive branches of governance.”

North eastern Nigeria in general and Adamawa State in particular faces a threat from global warming and climate change. Conferences and research on climate change have warned that as global warming increases, there will be an increase in disease, while water levels and resources will shrink, resulting in reduced crop yields. Environmental conditions are therefore more likely to lead to famine. Soil fertility has decreased to such an extent that it is now in danger of exhaustion. The southern part of Adamawa State, which has a high potential for biofuels has been neglected, with desert encroachment posing a real threat. No attempt has been made to harness the bountiful wind energy potential blowing from the north, and a viable alternative to solar power is thus being wasted. Thus instead of the high winds providing resources for the benefit of the people, they bring desert encroachment, which is another cause of insecurity. Respondents expressed their dissatisfaction with the Adamawa State government by saying:

“In the past few years or so, in every government sector, conditions have either failed to improve, or they are worsening. Public health has been threatened due to unclean water, along with poor sanitation. Many people are dying. Each year...there are several health problems.”

Security challenges and governance in Adamawa State

Generally, insecurity has continued to increase since 1999. The crisis of security in Adamawa State has many different aspects. Firstly, for the past two decades, fear of general insecurity has impeded commerce, causing epileptic social capital development and undermining normal economic activity. Consequently

poverty has increased, with many in the state facing social and economic challenges. Secondly, the administrative system of Adamawa State has been destroyed, with the Governor and the Commissioners being seen as not accountable to the people. There appear to be many cases of financial misappropriation, and as at the time of this research (August, 2014), the state's civil servants had not been paid for over four months. Respondents noted a complete lack of coordination or coherence in government activities, and a reliance on out-dated solutions. During interviews and discussions, respondents said that several individuals who hold no official position in the government, and many institutions that had been created without any legal backing, were performing official functions, exercising state powers and expending public funds. The most egregious example was the eldest son of former Governor Murtala Nyako, who was said to have taken leave of absence from military service. Despite holding no official position in the Adamawa State government, he wielded enormous power under the Special Project Unit (SPU), the headquarters of which was located in the former Governor's personal residence. Decisions taken by him at the SPU were officially binding; and because virtually all the state's major public contracts and expenditure pass through it, the SPU is the clearing house of Adamawa State contracts. On the one hand, the lack of any legal instrument establishing the SPU means that there is no official responsibility or accountability of the type that would be obtainable under civil service rules and procedure, while on the other hand, most public officials have been prevented from performing their primary role, with the result that public servants in the state are frustrated and reluctant (Ardo, 2011).

Section 7 of the 1999 Constitution establishes local government as the third tier of government: the objective behind this is to bring government closer to the people and to encourage participatory democratic government. Respondents in this study however, expressed the view that the local government system in Adamawa State has been practically destroyed. The statutory allocations to local governments from the Federation Account had been brazenly deducted by the state governor, leaving the local governments unable to pay staff salaries for several months. Furthermore, there have been no local government elections for two years: instead, the local government councils have been run by career civil servants for two years.

Respondents characterised Adamawa State government's leadership as poor and corrupt. They protested about alleged phantom public expenditure which has destroyed the state's financial standing and prevented necessary expenditure on essential resources such as roads, health, electricity and water. One example of the wastage of public funds was the alleged hiring of between 15,000 and 50, 000 special assistants, each of whom was paid various amounts each month. Respondents alleged that nobody in government is able to state the actual number of such special assistance, or to identify what their schedules of duty might be.

Another concern for respondents to this study was the way that human rights in the state were being trampled upon, while the rule of law was not being respected. They cited the destruction of posters and billboards of opponents of the government in power in the state on the excuse that these were "unlawful", and the use of the Nigeria Police to disrupt lawful meetings when these were held by opposition parties. Extra-

judicial killings were alleged to be on the rise, especially in Mubi, Shelleng, Numan, Namtani and Ganye. Despite violence which resulted in loss of life, injury and destruction of property, no culprits were arrested, with the state government being seen as playing politics with the lives of the people. Its insistence that all was well indicated a lack of concern, whereas the perception of respondents was that identity patronage and ethnic and religious disquiet was being stoked. Such was the conclusion of the Administrative Panel of Inquiry into the Numan/Lamurde Civil Disturbances of 8th and 9th June, 2003.

It was a combination of all these issues as identified by respondents to this study that were seen as having led to the impeachment of Governor Nyako in 2014.

Major drivers of insecurity in Adamawa State

Since the return to civil rule in 1999, Adamawa State has experienced intense insecurity, the reasons for which are numerous and interrelated. Most of the factors fuelling insecurity stem from religion, ethnicity, politics, unemployment and poverty.

Ethnic politics has become an obstacle to the establishment of social order in the state. There has been rapid decrease in trust among citizens, and between citizens and the government. Associations such as Ethnic Development Associations and unions, social clubs, religious groups and political party membership tend to rally around ethnic identities (Howard, 1981). These tendencies have been described by (Galtung 1996) as vertical cleavages, and this view has also been expressed by (Akpata 2000). This situation has been described by Fanon as follows:

"The National or State bourgeoisie could not stand up to defend its immediate interests and sees no further than their nose, reveals itself incapable of simply bringing national unity into being, or of building up Nation or State on a stable and productive basis. The National front which has forced colonialism to withdraw cracks up, and wastes the victory gained."

Ethnicity continues to be used as a violent and poisonous instrument of competition, but behind this ethnic jingoism is a struggle for a share of modern goods and services. In urban areas, Nigerian communities tend to live in relative peace and harmony until there is competition for goods and services. Although the elite wield power in the name of the nation, it uses most of this power for itself, leaving only crumbs for the rest of the community.

The influx of people from neighbouring countries and states has also been a major issue as regards security within Adamawa State. Some are people of questionable character with no fixed abode. Some of them pose as dry season farmers, water hawkers, shoe makers, fingernail-cutters and kolanut-sellers, but many are juvenile delinquents, with a large number of unemployed and uncontrollable children roaming the streets.

The media, both local and international have also been accused of inciting conflict through their reportage. Some recorded messages of preachers in public places such as market squares and centres of worship have also been inflammatory. Indeed, religious doctrines propagated in this way have caused serious divisions among people of the same faith.

Conclusion

The deplorable circumstances in Adamawa State and its socio-economic and political landscape will continue to experience bad

governance and security challenges until its ethnic diversity and bountiful resources are harnessed and strengthened by progressive leadership. This can be achieved when all its citizens, both leaders and followers, share a common aspiration to live in peace with one another. Living in peace is the only route to the meaningful transformation of human endeavour in the State.

Therefore, the following measures should be implemented:

- i. the art and process of governance is the common human heritage that can produce and secured generation now and in the future;
- ii. leaders and followers should collectively stand against inhumanity from any quarter. National laws should be harmonized with international treaties as instruments for the support and the respect for human rights;
- iii. enhance national capacity for emergency preparedness and response support the development of national strategies and plans for disaster and emergency management;
- iv. promote the use of positive cultural heritage for national cohesion and development. Promote the use of dialogue as a tool for conflict prevention, management and resolution;
- v. promote measures that will encourage private sector participation and investment. Strengthen capacity for monitoring and evaluating development programmes. Support mainstreaming of gender-related issues. Promote and develop processes and the review of policies and legislation that hinder access of vulnerable groups;
- vi. promote partnership with local communities, civil society organisations (CSOs) and other national development

actors in order to undertake activities that empower the poor and other vulnerable groups to participate in poverty reduction programmes, advocate for the equitable provision of basic social services, maintenance and expansion of existing ones.

APPENDICES

List of Governors of Adamawa State from Inception

S/n	Names	From	To	Durations
1.	Col. Mohammed Dahiru Jega Sokoto	4 th February 1976	24 th July 1978	1 year 5 months
2.	Brig A. R. A. Mahmud Bandel	25 th July 1978	30 th September 1979	1 year 2 months
3.	Alhaji Abubakar Barde Jalingo Taraba	1 st October 1979	2 nd May 1983	3 years 8 months
4.	Wilberforce Juta Maiha	3 rd May 1983	30 th September 1983	5 months
5.	Alhaji Bamanga Tukur Jada	1 st October 1983	30 th December 1983	3 months
6.	Mohammed Dahiru Jega Yayi Gomna Sau (2)	4 th January 1984	1 st September 1985	1 year 8 months
7.	Col. Yohanna Madaki Kaduna	1 st September 1985	26 th September 1986	11 months
8.	David Jang Jos	26 th September 1986	31 st July 1988	1 year 11 months
9.	CMA Isa Mohammed Kamba	5 th January 1990	2 nd January 1992	2 years
10.	Abubakar Salihu Kamba	5 th January	2 nd January 1992	2 years

		1990		
11.	Abubakar Saleh Michika, Michika	2 nd January 1992	18 th November 1993	1 year
12.	Group CAPT Girgori Abononi Bandel	13 th December 1993	21 st September 1994	1 year
13.	Isma'ila Mustapha Bernin Kebbi	21 st September 1994	21 st August 1996	2 years
14.	NAVY Kalu Igboma Abirba	22 nd August 1996	6 th August 1998	1 year 5 months
15.	LT. Col. A. G. Hussani Plateau	6 th August 1998	29 th May 1999	10 months
16.	Mr. Boni Haruna Michika	29 th May 1999	29 th May, 2007	8 years
17.	Admiral Murtala Nyako	29 th May, 2007	15 th Jult, 2014	7 years
18.	Alh. Ahmadu Umaru Fintiri	15 th July, 2014	8 th October, 2014	3 weeks
19.	Barr. Bala James Ngilari	8 th October 2014	29 th May 2015	7 months

Source: Mohammadu Bassoro – ANDAL – FA'IDAJI

Incidents of Major Violence in Adamawa State

Date	Place	Type
8 th June, 2003	Numan, Lamude, Ngbalang	Ethnic
June, 2004	Numan, Demsa, Lamude	Ethnic/Religious
January, 2010	Lamurde, Lafia, Ruggange	Ethnic
January 2011	Lamurde, Tsuwa, Lafiya	Ethnic
February, 2012	Lamurde, Lafia Chulmo, Luggare	Ethnic
22 nd March, 2013	Ganye	Insurgency (Boko- Haram)

August, 2014	Hong, Kobri, Gashela	Insurgency (Boko-Haram)
May, 2014	Madagali, Gulak, Sabon Gari, Shuwa	Insurgency (Boko-Haram)

*Special Project and Programme Unit (S.P.P.U) Report of Data
Statistic of Adamawa State Ethnic Groups*

S/ no	Local govt. Area	Ethnic Group and Per centage
1.	Madagali	Marghi 72%, Matakam 13%, Sukur 07%, Fulani 05% and others 03%
2.	Michika	Higgi 86%, Fulani 06% and others 08%
3.	Mubi South	Gude 73%, Fulani 10% and other 17%
4.	Mubi North	Fali 58%, Dandankwa 31%, Fulani 06% and others 09%
5.	Maiha	Nzanyi 81%, Fulani 13% and others 06%
6.	Hong	Kilba 89%, and others 11%
7.	Gombi	Ga'anda 48%, Hona 18%, Lala 13%, Bura 11%, Gwaba 07% and others 03%
8.	Song	Yungur 51%, Mboi 15%, Holma 12%, Bata 07%, Fulani 10%, Gudu 03% and others 02%
9.	Girei	Bwatiye 42%, Fulani 38%, Tambo 15% and other 05%
10	Yola North	Laka 17%, Hausa 24%, Igbo 20% and others 33%
11	Yola South	Bata 11%, Verre 23%, Fulani 29, Hausa 07% and others 04%
12	Fufore	Bata 23%, Verre, 37%, Fulani 29, Hausa 07% and others 04%
13	Mayo Belwa	Nyandag 41%, Mumuye 07%, Fulani 32%, Chaamba 12%, Gomla 05% and others 03%
14	Jada	Chamba 45%, Fulani 27%, Koma 13%, Mumuye 09% and others 06%
15	Ganye	Chamba 71%, Fulani 18%, Mumuye 08% and

.		others 03%
16	Toungo	Chamba 73%, Fulani 13%, Mumuye 10% and others 04%

Special Project and Programme Unit (S.P.P.U) Report of Data on Adamawa State Religions and Percentage

S/n	Local govt.	Christianity	Islam	Traditional
1.	Madagali	Christianity 64%	Islam 31%	Traditional 05%
2.	Michika	Christianity 73%	Islam 25%	Traditional 02%
3.	Mubi North	Christianity 43%	Islam 55%	Traditional 02%
4.	Mubi South	Christianity 77%	Islam 22%	Traditional 04%
5.	Maiha	Christianity 33%	Islam 64%	Traditional 03%
6.	Hong	Christianity 80%	Islam 18%	Traditional 02%
7.	Gombi	Christianity 78%	Islam 19%	Traditional 03%
8.	Song	Christianity 67%	Islam 21%	Traditional 02%
9.	Girei	Christianity 59%	Islam 40%	Traditional 01%
10	Yola North	Christianity 55%	Islam 44%	Traditional 01%
11	Yola South	Christianity 40%	Islam 58%	Traditional 02%
12	Fufore	Christianity 52%	Islam 45%	Traditional 03%
13	Mayo Belwa	Christianity 65%	Islam 33%	Traditional 02%
14	Jada	Christianity 57%	Islam 41%	Traditional 02%
15	Ganye	Christianity 60%	Islam 37%	Traditional 03%
16	Tounga	Christianity 53%	Islam 45%	Traditional 02%

List of Governor Nyako's Commissioners Indicating Ethnic Affiliation

1	Ibrahim Tahir	- Justice	9	Alhaji Rufai Umar	- Youth & Sport
-	LGA	- Ganye	-	LGA	- Gombi
-	Tribe	- Fulani	-	Tribe	- Fulani
-	Religion	- Muslim	-	Religion	- Muslim
2	ƙ	- Work	10	Alhaji Tijjani Maksha	- Livestock & Nomadic
-	LGA	- Girei	-	LGA	- Maiha
-	Tribe	- Fulani	-	Tribe	- Njenyi
-	Religion	- Muslim	-	Religion	- Muslim
3	Usman W. Chekke	- Agriculture	11	Benedict K. Danki	- Water Resources
-	LGA	- Yola	-	LGA	- Toungo
-	Tribe	- Fulani	-	Tribe	- Chamba
-	Religion	- Muslim	-	Religion	- Christian
4	Abdulrahman Abba Jimeta	- Information	12	Chief Medan Teneke	- Special Duties
-	LGA	- Yola South	-	LGA	- Demsa
-	Tribe	- Fulani	-	Tribe	- Bata
-	Religion	- Muslim	-	Religion	- Christian
5	Barr. Aisha S. Zurno	- Women & Youth	13	Dr. Recab Bongi	- Education
-	LGA	- Song	-	LGA	- Lamurde
-	Tribe	- Fulani	-	Tribe	- Bachama
-	Religion	- Muslim	-	Religion	- Christian
6	Abdulrahman S. Abubakar	- Land & Survey	14	Emmanuel Teri Vahyala	- Finance
-	LGA	- Mubi North	-	LGA	- Michika
-	Tribe	- Fulani	-	Tribe	- Iiggi
-	Religion	- Muslim	-	Religion	- Christian
7	Dr. Zainab Kinomechi	- Health	15	Mrs. Hanatu Kadala	- Environment
-	LGA	- Fufore	-	LGA	- Mubi South
-	Tribe	- Fulani	-	Tribe	- Gude
-	Religion	- Muslim	-	Religion	- Christian
8	Abubakar Buba Madawaki	- Local Govt & Chieftaincy	16	Kobis Ari Timno	- Rural Infrastructure
-	LGA	- Fufore	-	LGA	- Guyuk
-	Tribe	- Fulani	-	Tribe	- Lungunda
-	Religion	- Muslim	-	Religion	- Christian

Source: The Broom, 2007, Vol. 1 No.

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Chapter 3

Security and Governance in Bauchi State of Nigeria

- Dr. Saalah Yakubu Ibrahim

Introduction and Literature review

In recent times, African countries have been experiencing the rising spectre of violence and insecurity. The drivers of this unfortunate situation vary from region to region and from country to country. Within the West African sub-region for instance, there are several drivers of such unrest, ranging from political to religious and economic factors. Nigeria being the largest and most populated had its own specific causes, and even within Nigeria, different regions have witnessed different levels and drivers of insecurity such as militancy in the Niger Delta, Bakassi Boys in the south east, O'dua Peoples' Congress in the south west and the Boko Haram insurgency in the north-east. As a result, citizens across the country are living under various levels of insecurity, which can in some cases be debilitating and almost overwhelming. This review is an attempt to understand the relationship between governance and the rising insecurity with particular reference to Bauchi State.

According to the World Bank (1989), governance concerns the manner in which power is exercised in the management of a country's economic and social resources for development.

Governance is the exercise of authority – political, economic and administrative – to manage natural resources and affairs. On the other hand, security is the condition of feeling safe from harm or danger, the defence, protection and preservation of core values and the absence of threats to acquired values. David (2006) sees security as the survival and condition of human existence; that it promotes peace, development, and justice, but that its absence creates condition of conflict and insecurity. Elaborating on insecurity, Bassey (2001) argues that the condition can be characterized by the forced exodus of populations which creates refugee flows, genocide, the rape of women, ethnic cleansing, and organized killing of the unarmed, child soldiering, anti-personnel mining of farmlands among other threats to human wellbeing.

The concept of good governance is generally defined with some level of flexibility. Depending on the context and the overriding objective, the concept encompasses full respect for human rights, the rule of law, effective participation, political pluralism, transparent and accountable processes and institutions. Because good governance relates to political and institutional processes and outcomes that are deemed necessary to achieve the goals of development, it can be said to be ‘good’ to the degree to which it delivers on the promise of human rights – which includes civil, cultural, economic, political and social rights. Resolution 2000/64 of the Commission on Human Rights identified the key attributes of good governance as: transparency, responsibility, accountability, participation and responsiveness.

The north-eastern part of Nigeria is presently going through one of the most critical and difficult periods of its history. The unfortunate conditions being experienced in the region are the

product of multiple variables, which, to all intents and purposes, revolve around the lack of good governance.

Since Nigeria returned to civilian rule in 1999, the nature of governance in the country has been the subject of debate by scholars and citizens alike. This is because governance in Nigeria cannot be explained in isolation from the country's historical experience, since that is the structural basis for the current wave of ethno-religious and politico-economic crisis in the land. This state of affairs raises serious concerns about the question of governance in Nigeria where the politics of deprivation and mismanagement of resources appears to overshadow the principles of accountability, transparency and responsibility. This situation has thrown up security challenges in Nigeria's poverty-ridden society.

Objective of the study

The primary objective of this chapter is to examine how the character of governance in Bauchi State impacts on security. Its specific objectives are to:

- Examine the relationship between security and character of governance in the region.
- Understand the major drivers of insecurity in the state.
- Identify the gaps in governance and security in the state.
- Determine the role of civil society in improving governance and security in the state.

Conceptual clarification

Odock (2006) sees good governance as a system of government based on good leadership, respect for the rule of law and due process, on the accountability of the political leadership to the

electorate as well as transparency in the operations of government. A critical question to ask is whether it is possible to have good governance without good leadership? The level of personalisation in Nigerian politics would seem to create the reality that the former is logically derived from the latter; at least to the extent that good governance is at least possible where there is effective and efficient leadership.

Peace on the other hand, is seen as the absence of war and although by logical extension, war is seen as the absence of peace, this is faulty because, the true meaning of peace is missing. Ibeanu (2005) approached peace from a sociological perspective to argue that peace is a condition of social harmony in which there are no social antagonisms. Peace, therefore, is a condition in which there is no social conflict, and in which individuals and groups are able to meet their needs, aspirations and expectations. From this structural functionalist perspective, peace can be achieved where existing social structures perform their functions adequately, supported by the requisite culture, norms and values.

Similarly, Galtung (1990) identified two dimensions of peace. First is negative peace, which means the absence of direct violence, war or fear on the part of the individual, the nation, the region and indeed at the international levels. Second is positive peace, meaning the absence of unjust structures or unequal relationships, and the presence of justice and inner peace of the individual. Violent conflict, whether social, political or environmental, contributes to crisis situations in terms of loss of human lives and material capital. So it is that the lack of peace experienced in the north-eastern region of Nigeria has contributed to the condition of underdevelopment in the region.

Security is viewed as the condition of feeling safe from harm or danger, the defence, protection and preservation of values, and the absence of threats to acquired values (Terrif, 1999). In fact, security is about survival and the condition of human existence. Thus it can broadly be viewed as freedom from danger or threats to an individual or a nation. McNamara (1968) sees security as tantamount to development. Kofi Annan (1998) emphasized the human perspective of security when he posited that security means much more than the absence of conflict, and that lasting peace – an inherent ingredient of security – will encompass areas such as education, health, democracy and human rights, as well as protection against environmental degradation and the proliferation of deadly weapons. Indeed, there can hardly be security in the midst of starvation, peace building without poverty alleviation, or true freedom built on the foundation of injustice.

On the relationship between citizenship and security, Aligwara (2009) submits that security of the individual citizen is the most important. He argues that security is for the citizens, and not citizens for security, and so, that for citizens to live in peace, the basic necessities of life such as food, good health, job opportunities, justice, freedom and all other ingredients of life must be provided.

Study area

Bauchi State evolved from the North-Eastern State. It was created out of the old Northern Region in 1967. During the colonial era up to independence in 1960, it formed part of the Bauchi-Plateau Province of the old Northern Nigeria. In the 1967 state creation exercise, Bauchi Province, together with

Borno, Saradauna and Adamawa provinces, constituted the former North-Eastern State.

The original Bauchi state, which then comprised the present Bauchi and Gombe states, came into being in 1976. Gombe State was carved out of the old Bauchi State. The present Bauchi State is made up of twenty (20) Local Governments namely: Alkali, Bauchi, Bogoro, Dambam, Darazo, Dass, Gamawa, Ganjiwa, Giade, Itas/Gadau, Jama'are, Katagum, Kirfi, Misau, Ningi, Tafawa Balewa, Toro, Warji and Zaki.

Bauchi State has a total of 55 ethnic groups, of which the main ones are Hausa, Fulani, Gerewa, Zair, Jarawa, Bolawa, Kare-kare, Warjawa, Zulawe and Badawa. These different ethnic groups have their languages, settlements, customs, festivals, historical background, occupational patterns, beliefs and many other features that form part of the existence of the people of Bauchi State. There are similarities in their languages, occupational practices, and dress modes of the ethnic groups with high degree of ethnic interaction especially in marriage and economic activities.

Bauchi State covers a total land area of 49,259.01 square kilometres, which represents about 5.3% of Nigeria's total land mass. The state is bordered by seven states: Kano and Jigawa to the north, Taraba and Plateau to the south, Gombe and Yobe to the east and Kaduna to the west. Agriculture is the major occupation of the people of the state, where 75 per cent to 80 per cent of its inhabitants engage in food and cash crop farming. The population of the state, based on the 1991 population figures, was 4.2 million in 2004 with an average annual growth of 3.0% per annum. 50.5% of the population is males while 49.5% are females.

Table 1: Population of Bauchi State 2004 (projection)

S/ No.	L.G.A.	1991 POPULATION CENSUS			2004 PROJECTED POPULATION		
		MALE	FEMALE	TOTAL	MALE	FEMALE	TOTAL
1.	Alkali	87,757	87,511	175,278	131,436	131,053	262,489
2.	Bauchi	183,824	173,099	356,923	275,287	259,225	534,512
3.	Bogoro	25,733	27,136	52,869	38,537	40,638	79,174
4.	Dambam	41,096	41,346	82,442	61,544	61,918	123,462
5.	Darazo	82,778	81,053	163,831	123,965	121,381	245,346
6.	Dass	24,942	25,339	50,281	37,352	37,942	75,299
7.	Gamawa	92,685	88,535	181,220	138,801	132,586	271,387
8.	Ganjuwa	72,894	71,864	144,758	109,163	107,620	216,783
9.	Giade	46,366	45,246	91,612	69,436	67,758	137,194
10.	Itas/Gadu	68,193	67,514	135,707	102,123	101,106	203,229
11.	Jama'are	36,073	34,363	70,436	54,021	51,461	105,482
12.	Katagum	98,490	96,576	195,066	147,494	144,628	292,122
13.	Kirfi	41,981	40,612	82,593	62,869	60,819	123,688
14.	Misau	68,245	67,494	135,739	102,201	101,076	203,277
15.	Ningi	81,470	80,997	162,467	122,006	121,298	243,303
16.	Shira	113,124	109,679	222,802	169,410	164,250	333,660
17.	Tafawa Balewa	61,660	64,543	126,503	92,339	97,106	189,445
18.	Toro	107,770	104,483	209,253	156,899	156,469	313,368
19.	Warji	28,099	29,019	57,190	42,080	43,565	85,645
20.	Zaki	82,602	81,314	163,916	123,701	121,772	245,473
TOTAL		1,442,792	1,418,095	2,860,887	2,160,662	2,123,677	4,284,339
% Distribution		50.4%	49.5%	100.0%	50.4%	49.6%	100.0%

Source: Directorate of Statistics Ministry of Budget and Economic Planning, Bauchi

Methodology

In conducting the research, both primary and secondary sources of data were used. The main secondary sources were books, journals, reports and web search. For the primary sources, a research assistant was engaged and trained to assist in the

distribution and retrieval of questionnaires. A few individuals were also interviewed personally for clarity, but the main instrument used was a questionnaire containing fifty-three (53) questions. The major issues investigated centred on governance and its effect on security. The variables are political, judicial, administrative and economic. Five local governments were selected based on Senatorial Districts. The state capital, Bauchi, was chosen in the Bauchi South Senatorial district, two each – one urban and one rural – were selected from the Northern and Central Senatorial Districts. For this purpose local government areas created before 1997 were chosen as urban while those created after 1997 were treated as rural. The local governments thus selected are; Shira and Giade for Bauchi North; Ganjuwa and Darazo for Bauchi Central and Bauchi for Bauchi South. The details of questionnaire administration are presented in Table 2.

Table 2: Questionnaire Distribution

Senatorial District	Local Government	Number
Bauchi South	Bauchi	60
Bauchi Central	Ganjuwa	30
	Darazo	30
Bauchi North	Giade	30
	Shira	30
TOTAL	5	180

Source: Field work, 2014

Data presentation

Of the 180 questionnaires distributed, 170 were retrieved. This reduction in number was caused by the failure of some respondents to return the questionnaires within the time

available: six of these were in Bauchi local government while four were in Shira local government. The composition and features of the respondents are presented below.

Table 3: Demographic and Profile of Respondents

Variable		No	Percentage
Origin:	Indigenes	165	91.5
	Non-indigenes	05	08.5
Sex:	Males	141	82.9
	Females	29	17.1%
Ages:	18 – 20	48	28.2
	29 – 39	78	45.9
	40 – 50	40	23.5
	51 – 60	04	2.4
	60 and above	00	0.0
Religion:	Islam	148	87.1
	Christianity	22	12.9
	Traditional	00	0.0
	Others	00	0.0
Level of Education	Primary	05	2.9
	Secondary	16	9.4
	Tertiary	148	87.1
	Non-formal	01	0.6
Occupation/profession	Civil Servants	89	52.8
	School teachers	21	12.3
	Self employed	10	5.9
	Private Sector employee	01	0.6
	Trade/business persons	06	3.5
		03	1.8
		32	18.8
	Industrialists	08	4.7
	Students		
Unemployed			
Location:	Urban	90	52.9
	Rural	80	47.1

Source: Fieldwork, 2014

Table 3 shows that almost all essential and interest groups were represented, with a fair distribution between urban and rural areas.

Political dimension of Governance

Under this heading, questions were raised on political participation, representation and the performance of elected officials, voting and the activities of government institutions. The responses of respondents on each have been collated and presented in Table 4 below.

Table 4: *Participation in last elections*

Variable	No.	Percentage
Yes	150	88.2
No	20	11.8
Total	170	100

Source: Fieldwork, 2014.

The responses received indicated that a large of number, up to 88.2% went to cast their votes in the last Gubernatorial and House of Assembly elections. The inability of some to vote was for reasons such as names not being on the voters register or not being qualified to vote. Others did not vote because they were either unavailable during the elections or because they did not feel like voting.

A major way of demonstrating good and effective governance is communication between political office holders and the electorate. It is through this contact that the problems of the governed can be understood and properly articulated. The

study therefore investigated the level and quality of such communication. The responses obtained are produced below:

Table 5: Accessibility of political office holders by the electorate

Variable	No.	Percentage
Not easily accessible	62	36.5
Accessible with some difficulty	45	26.5
Easily accessible	40	23.5
Don't know	23	13.5
Total	170	100

Source: Fieldwork, 2014.

Table 5 shows that most respondents (63%) felt that political office holders are either not easily accessible or only accessible with difficulty (the nature and magnitude of which could not be measured due to some differential interests), while only 23.5% felt that they were easily accessible with 13.5% not knowing whether political office holders are easily accessible or not.

The Nigerian Constitution bestows certain authority and responsibilities on those who are elected into office. In the discharge of these responsibilities as well as in exercising authority, abuses occur either intentional or otherwise. In Bauchi State, an effort was made to assess the extent of any possible misuse of power. For this purpose, attention was paid to the activities of three key groups of actors, namely the governor and his cabinet; the legislature; and the Local Government Chairmen and councillors. The responses received are presented in Table 6 below:

Table 6: Misuse of power by representatives

Variable	No.	Percentage
Extremely high	60	35.3
High	55	32.4
Neither high nor low	26	15.2
Low	07	04.1
Extremely low	04	10.6
Don't know	18	02.4
Total	170	100

Source: Fieldwork, 2014.

In this context, the expression “misuse of power” refers to the use of power by incumbents over and above normal practice, for example by appropriation of power for personal gain, self-enrichment or nepotism. It was in this context that respondents gave their views regarding political office holders in Bauchi State. No single individual was targeted or identified, rather the questions related to the entire spectrum of political office holders. The responses as presented above give the impression that misuse of power in Bauchi State by elected political office holders is high; with 67.7% the respondents opining that the level of the misuse is extremely high or high.

Local governments were established as the third tier of government in Nigeria to bring governance nearer to the people. Advocates of modern democracy urge that many people should be involved in decision-making processes. This study sought to assess the extent of such involvement in Bauchi State through the opinions of the respondents who are predominantly indigenes. Their responses are shown in Table 7 below:

Table 7: Community Participation in Local Government activities

Variable	No.	Percentage
I don't participate	54	31.8
I participate to some extent	86	50.5
I participated very well	20	11.8
I don't know	10	5.9
Total	170	100

Source: Fieldwork, 2014.

The responses in the above table 7 show that communities are involved in the activities of their local governments, with only 5.9% saying that they do not know whether local people are involved in the activities of their local governments, although 31.8% said that they do not participate. For the 62.3% who participate to some extent or very well, it is not clear at what level they are involved, and it is likely that at best their involvement may not go beyond some form of self help measures.

The world has become a global village with expanding access to information and communication technology. Philanthropists have widened their approach to cover almost all aspects of human endeavour, more especially in third world countries. At the same time, many nations have embraced the idea of liberal democracy and are at various stages of democratization. Since many non-governmental and community-based organizations (NGOs and CBOs) have taken it upon themselves to embark on advocacy as well as other activities, the study attempted to ascertain the level of awareness of such NGOs and CSOs among the people of Bauchi State.

Table 8: Existence of NGOs in Bauchi state

Variable	No.	Percentage
Yes	140	82.4
No	30	17.6
Total	170	100

Source: Fieldwork, 2014.

This shows a high level of awareness of the existence of NGOs, but since some of such NGOs have been in existence for a considerable time, the study went further to probe awareness of the activities of these organizations in Bauchi State.

Table 9: Activities of NGO's in Bauchi State

Variable	No.	Percentage
Policy advocacy	18	10.6
Service provision	58	34.1
Community development work	62	36.5
Community mobilization	22	12.9
Peace Restoration	03	1.8
All of the above	07	4.1
Total	170	100

Source: Fieldwork, 2014.

The responses shown in Table 9 indicate that the NGOs are actively involved in socio-economic and political affairs of Bauchi State, and that their activities extend to a wide range of activities. This involvement can point the way for development in Bauchi State.

There can be no doubting the importance of the private sector in a country's socio-economic and political development. Some developed nations point to the private sector contribution to governance as a major factor in their attainment of their present status. In Nigeria, the private sector is contributing to

the socio- economic and political system of the country. The private sector can also influence government in the area of policy formulation and implementation. Where this is done through sponsoring candidates for elected office, it is a patron-clientele type of politics, and it is this kind of relationship that has characterized Nigerian politics. The study therefore delved into the extent to which private individuals influence the government in Bauchi State, and if so, in what ways.

Table 10: Influence of Private/ Individual on government of Bauchi State

Variable	No.	Percentage
Very influential	31	18.2
Somehow influential	59	34.7
Influential	45	26.5
Not influential	17	10.0
Don't know	18	10.6
Total	170	100

Source: Fieldwork, 2014.

The responses in Table 10 suggest that private individuals exert influence on the government of Bauchi State and its local governments. Whether or not this influence is for good of society as a whole, there can be no doubt that it shapes the nature of governance in the state. The study probed further to see what forms this influence has taken.

In developing nations like Nigeria, governments are faced with more demands than their resources can meet. To make up for the deficiency, some private individuals are called upon to assist the government. However, where such calls are made, a few individuals may take advantage and advance their own interests without consideration of the impact on or consequences

for the wider society. Some of these consequences are detrimental to the socio-economic development of society while some are beneficial. Table 11 shows the areas seen as beneficial to the general public as well as the level of input beneficial only to individual interests.

Table 11: Role of private sector in governance and security management

Variable	No.	Percentage
Support to state and local government	81	47.7
Support to the police	23	13.5
Work only for their business	32	18.8
Fund security agencies	30	17.6
Don't know	04	2.4
Total	170	100

Source: Fieldwork, 2014.

Table 11 shows that a large majority (78.8%) of respondents identified areas of support to government from the private sector or individuals that can be said to be of benefit to the community as a whole, while 18.8% were of the view that such support to state and local government was for their own narrow interests. Whatever is the rationale for such support, there can be no doubt that the private sector and individuals are seen as supporting state and local governments in Bauchi State.

Public safety and security challenges

Governments establish certain structures in order to control and regulate individual conduct and behaviour in the society, as a means of mitigating what sociologists call 'survival of the fittest'. Such structures protect every member of society and assist in the equitable distribution of resources. But where such structures are

weak, with the result that a society is characterized by injustice, unpleasant developments are the likely outcome.. This section examines these structures and the impact of their strength or weakness in Bauchi State.

Table 12: Existence of security challenges

Variable	No.	Percentage
Yes	104	61.2
No	66	38.8
Total	170	100

Sources: Fieldwork, 2014.

The majority (61.2%) of the respondents agreed that they are facing security challenges. As mentioned earlier, this is partly attributable to the failure of the structures established to govern society. Further questions identified the different types of security challenge in Bauchi State as shown in Table 13.

Table 13: Types of crimes

N0	Type of crime	No. of respondents	Percentage
1	Terrorism	15	8.8
2	Ethno-religious violence	07	4.1
3	Armed robbery	16	9.4
4	Theft	42	24.7
5	Drug abuse	02	1.2
6	Sara suka	1	0.6
7	All of the above	33	19.4
8	Undecided	54	31.8
	Total	170	100

Source: Field work, 2014.

Read with Table 12, Table 13 shows that even though 38% did not believe that Bauchi State faced any security challenges,

only 31.8% did not identify any particular type of crime, while 68.2% were able to identify specific types of crime.

In addition to the more general types of crime, a group or criminal gang particular to the area – ‘Sara Suka’ – was identified. Sara Suka is a group that indulges in the use of dangerous drugs. During the key informant interview it was discovered that the group emerged as a result of neglect and the failure of the authorities to integrate them into society in any meaningful way. The active or visible members of the group are youths, who carry weapons and attack victims, but they also have sponsors, or passive members. The group’s operations are targeted and also random. Targeted operations mean attacking individuals either because they are seen as interfering with its business, or because the group’s sponsors identify them for attack. Untargeted operations take the form of the indiscriminate attacks and destruction of property.

Sara Suka have two sources of finance: firstly, from their sponsors who are mostly politicians. The group itself creates the second source, mostly from stealing. It is not clear when this group emerged, but it became prominent in Bauchi State after the return to civil rule in 1999. It has been difficult to identify the areas where its members are most highly concentrated, but the general belief is that they are all over the state. Further inquiries to establish whether Sara Suka has any relationship with ‘Yandaba’, a social group that existed before 1999 confirmed that there is no such connection between the two groups. While the Yandaba’s activities consist of hunting of animals in the bush, the ‘Yan Sara Suka attacks human beings. While these security challenges necessarily call for a response from the security agencies, the crimes take place within

communities and society for which government is primarily responsible. The study therefore sought the views of respondents on the governments' response to the various types of crime identified.

Table 14: Government response to these crimes

Variable	No.	Percentage
Very poor	52	30.6
Poor	63	37.0
Neither poor nor good	09	5.3
Good	35	20.6
Very good	03	1.8
Undecided	08	4.7
Total	170	100

Source: Fieldwork, 2014.

The responses in Table 14 show deep dissatisfaction with government responses to crime in Bauchi State, with 67.6% expressing the view that in regard to ensuring peace and security – the essential conditions for good governance as championed by the social contract theorists – the performance of the Bauchi State structures had been poor or very poor.

One of the institutions of government charged with the responsibility of ensuring peace and security is the Nigeria Police Force. The perceptions of the study's respondents as to this institution's preparedness to handle these responsibilities and respond to security challenges are given in Table 15.

Table 15: Police preparedness in handling security issues

Variable	No.	Percentage
Not prepared	49	28.8
Somehow prepared	68	40.0
Prepared	35	20.6
Very prepared	12	7.1
Undecided	06	3.5
Total	170	100

Source: Fieldwork, 2014.

Table 15 indicates that those who consider the police in Bauchi State prepared to handle security issues are similar in numbers to those who consider that they are not prepared (27.7% and 28.8% respectively). While the larger percentage (40 per cent) adopted the lukewarm view that the police were ‘somehow prepared’, the substantial percentage who are not impressed is an indication that much more needs to be done by the police in Bauchi State.

Closely related to the issue of how security is handled, is the relationship between the police and people. This relationship is vital because the people constitute the greatest source of information for effective and efficient policing. Responses on perceptions about the nature of relationship between the police and the people in Bauchi State are presented in Table 16.

Table 16: Nature of relationship between police and people in Bauchi State

Variable	No.	Percentage
Strongly disagree	35	20.6
Disagree	51	30.0
Neither disagree or agree	30	17.6
Strongly agree	43	25.3
Undecided	11	6.5
Total	170	100

Source: Fieldwork, 2014.

These responses show that half the respondents in Bauchi State do not believe that there is a good relationship between the people and the police, and only 25.3% agree that the relationship is good. With 17.6% standing between these extremes, it is doubtful if the police have healthy enough relations with the people to have a positive impact on their performance in Bauchi State.

Behind the incidence of crime and security challenges or the capacity of the Nigeria Police Force to deal with them lies the issue articulated by a Sara Suka member: neglect and failure on the part of government. While the primary responsibility for this rests on society itself, the public service of that society, which is established to serve the people, is a major means by which that responsibility is carried out, and by which the good things of life are provided to the people (as championed by social contract theorists). To achieve this, a public service must live up to the norms and values of that society. Institutions upon which public trust is bestowed must live above board. Therefore, if some individuals within those institutions engage in corrupt practices, they may be regarded as ineffective in delivering the desired societal goods. It is for this reason that the study investigated public perceptions about corruption in Bauchi State's public service.

Table 17: Existence of corruption in the public service in Bauchi State

Variable	No.	Percentage
Strongly disagree	24	14.1
Disagree	27	15.9
Neither disagree or agree	30	17.6
Strongly agree	72	42.4
Undecided	17	10.0
Total	170	100

Source: Fieldwork, 2014.

Table 17 shows that a large percentage of respondents strongly agreed that corruption exists in the public service in Bauchi State, while 30% disagreed. Given the large percentage of respondents who are themselves in the public service, either as civil servants or teachers (see Table 3), it is safe to say that corruption exists in the public sector in Bauchi State.

The institution charged with the responsibility of ensuring justice in society is the judiciary. Its strength or weakness influences both governance and security. Institutions of the judiciary, namely the courts, are found in Bauchi State at various levels. But for them to be able to function properly, and to apportion blame and ensure justice, all parties before it must be given a fair hearing, whether as accused persons in criminal trials or as plaintiffs or defendants in civil trials. Only when fair hearing is assured can courts deliver judgments that will guarantee peace and security. That is why this study investigated the views of people in Bauchi State on whether the courts really observe the principle of fair hearing.

Table 18: Observance of fair hearing by courts in Bauchi State

Variable	No.	Percentage
Strongly disagree	33	19.4
Disagree	44	25.9
Neither disagree or agree	28	16.5
Strongly agree	35	20.6
Undecided	30	17.6
Total	170	100

Source: Fieldwork, 2014.

Table 18 shows that as high a percentage as 45.3% of respondents maintained that courts in Bauchi State do not give cases before them a fair hearing. 16.5% were neutral while only 20.6% asserted positively that courts in the state observe the principles of fair hearing. While 17.6% expressed no view, the simple reason appears to be that they have not been involved in a situation that would cause them to appear in court. Against this background, the lack of confidence in the judiciary in Bauchi State has grave implications for security, the maintenance of law and order or avoidance of resort to self-help.

Conclusion

The study revealed the situation in Bauchi State is as follows:

- No disenfranchisement in regard to voting unless the individual is not interested or prioritizes other activities.
- Political office holders are not easily accessible by the electorate. This was the view of over 60 per cent of the respondents.
- Misuse of power by representatives of the people occupying political office exists in Bauchi State, a situation that over 65 per cent of the respondents claimed to have encountered.

- Communities are actually involved in the activities of local governments where up to 60 per cent of respondents confirmed that they or their community participate in the activities of their local governments.
- The people are aware of the existence of NGOs and CBOs in the state, viewing them as active in various forms of community development.
- Private individuals do influence the government and its agencies by providing assistance to both state and local governments. In some cases, this is to secure advantage for themselves.
- There is a wide range of criminal activity and threat to security in Bauchi State. Government response to these challenges is not adequate.
- The police are not prepared to handle security issues effectively in Bauchi State.
- The relationship between the police and the people in Bauchi State is not good enough to enhance police effectiveness.
- Corruption exists within Bauchi State's public service.
- Adherence to the principle of fair hearing by the courts in Bauchi State is poor.

The cumulative effect of all these conditions above is an indication of the absence of good governance, the consequences of which are discontent, underdevelopment and apathy, which are drivers of insecurity. In line with Vroom's Valence Instrumentality Expectancy (VIE) theory, there is a direct relationship between good governance and high levels of security on the one hand, and between bad governance and insecurity on

the other. Thus where the parameters of good governance earlier described are not met, there is likely to be insecurity, and where insecurity exists there is almost certainly a lack of good governance.

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Chapter 4

Security and Governance in Borno State

- *Abubakar K. Monguno, PhD*

Background

Nigeria has witnessed a deteriorating internal security situation since the return to civilian rule in 1999. This may be seen from the proliferation and involvement of non-state actors in security across the different sections of the country. Such non-state actors (apart from private security outfits) in different parts of the country range from Bakassi Boys in the south-east, Movement for the Emancipation of Niger Delta (MEND) in south-south to Boko Haram, *Sara Suka* and '*yankalare*' in the north-east. The military, which is present in thirty-two states of the nation to restore order (Sanda, 2014) appears to be overstretched.

One of the worst-hit of all the states in terms of declining security is Borno State, which has been the epicentre of Boko Haram insurgency in the last few years.

Until 2009, although the state was generally one of the most peaceful in the country, there was episodic religious violence, which can be loosely categorized into two. First were internal religious violence that occasionally followed events such as lunar eclipses, characterized by the looting of shops (particularly those belonging to the Igbo ethnic group) and the vandalism of brothels and beer parlours, allegedly perpetrated by Muslim

youths (Imam 2006). These were often isolated events, which mostly occurred in urban areas. The second dimension of violence includes spill over effects of religious violence from the northwest region of Nigeria, such as the Maitatsine uprisings or the protests that followed the publication in Denmark of cartoons of Prophet Mohammed.

The turn of events since 2009 has been deeply disturbing. The level, scope and magnitude of violence have been well beyond people's expectations or experience. A weekly tracking of the security situation in Nigeria conducted for over five years by the US-based Council on Foreign Relations (2014) shows that Borno State is the most insecure of all the 36 states of Nigeria with a record of over 2,400 deaths in only two years. Most of these casualties have been attributed to Boko Haram.

There may not be a single explanation for this, but examination of a number of factors that appear to have combined may help us to understand this rapid transformation of Borno from a relatively peaceful state to a violent and insecure one. The search for explanations and the examination of response measures by government point to issues related to governance – especially social and economic factors – as overarching (Monguno, 2013). A more potent perspective perhaps lies in the nexus between governance and insecurity. George-Gbenyi (2013) for instance, reminds us that for effective security, elements of good governance such as the rule of law, transparency and accountability in the management of resources, political stability as well as the provision of basic needs and services are *sine qua non*. It is in this context that this study examines the relationship between governance and security in Borno State.

Objectives of the study

The objectives of the study are to:

- (i) examine the relationship between security and the character of governance in Borno State;
- (ii) understand the major drivers of insecurity in Borno State;
- (iii) identify the gaps in governance and security in the state ; and
- (iv) determine the role of civil society in improving governance and security in Borno State.

The study setting

In terms of landmass, Borno State is the largest state in Nigeria with an area of 69, 435 km². In 2006 the total population of the state was put at 4,171,115 (National Population Commission, 2010). Borno is part of the larger pre-colonial political empire of Kanem Borno that lasted over a thousand years and spread across sections of countries around the region, including Niger, Chad and Cameroun. Though separated by borders, the people still maintain strong cultural ties. The state occupies Nigeria's international borders over 650 km long with three countries: Niger, Chad, and Cameroun. These borders are poorly manned, thus allowing for the easy cross-border movement of small arms and light weapons. Chad and Niger in particular have been badly affected by internal conflict, and this has also had grave implications for Nigeria's security as it relates to these particular borders.

The area today called Borno used to be the nucleus of, and politically the most significant part of the former North-Eastern State that was created in 1967 and which presently constitutes Nigeria's north-east geopolitical zone. 1976 saw the creation of Borno and Bauchi States from the North-eastern State, while the

creation of Yobe state in 1991 reduced Borno State to its current size and form. The state is presently comprised of 21 Local Government Areas (LGAs) and has three senatorial zones, Borno North, Borno Central and Borno South. Borno North includes Abadam, Guzamala, Gubio, Kaga, Marte, Monguno, Kukawa, Nganzai, Magumeri and Mobbar; Borno Central has Ngala, Mafa, Konduga, Maiduguri Metropolitan, Jere, Dikwa, Bama and Kala Balge; while Borno South covers Biu, Chibok, Gwoza, Askira/Uba, Bayo, Kwayakusar, Damboa, Hawul and Shani.

Borno State is ethnically diverse, having about 30 different indigenous ethnic groups (Seibert, 2000) with Kanuri being the dominant group found in the northern and central parts. Other ethnic groups include Babur/Bura, Marghi, Glavda, Kibaku, and Kanakuru, who inhabit the southern part of the state. Inter-ethnic marriage, particularly between Kanuri and Shuwa Arab, as well as the hegemonic role of the Kanuri over other groups for centuries, has ensured the assimilation of large numbers of minority ethnic groups, especially the Marghi, Maffa, Mulgwai and Gamergu, along with some minority ethnic groups from the neighbouring countries. As a result, a large proportion of the members of these otherwise distinct ethnicities have been culturally assimilated to become Kanuri. Borno is often reputed to be the gateway to Islam in Nigeria, as Islam was declared a state religion in Kanem Borno as early as the eleventh century (Alkali, 1987). Thus the people of Borno are predominantly Muslims. Sunni Islam of the Tijaniyya order is the main practice, although there have been rapid inroads by the Izala (Salaf) in the last few decades. Christian missionary activity in the southern part of the state in the early part of the twentieth century has

also given rise to a sizeable population of Christians in the state, producing a distinct cultural landscape.

Contact with the West has become a dominant factor in not only Borno State's socio-cultural and religious differences, it also reflects on the differential level of development within the state. For instance, the southern part of the state is more advanced in formal education and therefore shows better social development indicators. While development indices are generally not readily available on the basis of the different regions within the state, where they are available, they reflect poor development indicators. For instance, the literacy rate for men in Borno was observed to be 41.7% against a national average of 75.2%, while that of women was 22.2% as against a national average of 53.1% (NDHS, 2013). NDHS also puts the median age at first marriage for women in the state aged 20-49 years, at 17.3 years. Recent data on economic indicators disaggregated according to states hardly exist, but a recent General Household Survey Panel estimated that 50.2% of the people in the north-east are poor (World Bank, 2014). More specifically, in 2010 the National Bureau of Statistics estimated that 55.1% of the people in Borno earned less than one US dollar a day (National Bureau of Statistics, 2012). In terms of health indicators, the current conflict in the state has had a negative impact on healthcare delivery. The state has also been reported as having only ten doctors for its 4.5 million population (Alhassan, 2014).

Method of data collection

The study employed a mixed methodological approach in generating data. However, the primary instrument of data

collection was a 53-item questionnaire which sought to find answers to four key governance and security issues.

The governance issues identified are political, legal/judicial, administrative and socio-economic dimensions. The study was conducted in five LGAs of Borno State, cutting across the three senatorial Districts. In Borno North the study was conducted in Monguno and Nganzai; in the Borno Central it was conducted in Maiduguri Metropolitan; and for Borno South senatorial district the study covered Biu and Hawul.

In Borno North and Borno South senatorial zones, one urban and one rural LGA were selected, while Maiduguri, the state capital, represented Borno Central. Hawul (Borno south) and Nganzai (Borno north) are considered rural while Biu and Monguno are classified as urban. The simple justification for this classification is that Biu and Monguno were created in 1976, and as such, they are deemed to have existed long enough to acquire urban characteristics. On the other hand, Hawul and Nganzai were created much later and are still essentially rural in terms of the predominant livelihood of the people, which is agriculture. In all, 180 persons were targeted: 30 respondents in each of the LGAs selected in the southern and northern zones, while 60 respondents were targeted in Maiduguri. The higher number of questionnaires in Maiduguri was due to the fact that the town has about one-third of the entire population of the state (Waziri, 2009). Some 12 questionnaires were not returned, leaving a total of 168 completed. The questionnaires were administered with the help of research assistants conversant with the sampled LGAs. Additionally, ten key informant interviews were held in Maiduguri to help complement the quantitative data generated.

A few limitations need to be borne in mind with regards to the data generated. Initially, the research assistants interviewed respondents themselves, but the lengthy nature of the questions made some respondents abandon the interview. As a result, the questionnaires were later made for self-completion, that is, they were given only to literate people in the sampled LGAs.

Concept of Governance and Security

Governance and security are two important concepts that have dominated social science discourse in the last decade or so, especially with respect to developing countries. Governance is simply the utilization of power by those in authority. It has been defined by the World Bank as “the way in which power is exercised in the management of a country’s economic and social resources for development” (World Bank, 2004). This includes the process by which leaders are selected, monitored and replaced; the capacity of the government to effectively formulate and implement sound policies; and the respect of citizens and the state for the institutions that govern economic and social interactions among them.

Security, on the other hand, refers to safety or the absence of threats. It is technically defined as the absence of threat to core human values including the physical safety of the individual (Hamson, 2001, cited in Salkire, 2003). Other core human values include protection of basic liberties, economic needs and interests. Security may be of different types but two main types are of immediate concern to us in this study: human security and national security, both of which are intricately related and mutually reinforcing. Human security, a concept which developed more recently in the 1990s, has been defined by the

United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) as “safety from chronic threats such as hunger, disease and repression”, as well as protection from hurtful disruptions in the pattern of life in jobs, in homes and in communities (UNDP, 1994). Human security has evolved as a paradigm shift from security seen largely as a territorial issue, to security as a human affair. It has six major dimensions: personal, economic, environmental, community, health and food security. National security on the other hand, is often viewed as the protection of a nation’s sovereignty and territory from external attack (Acharya, 2001). The concept of security, including national security has been changing in response to new ideas and challenges. For instance while national security has traditionally been viewed as the defence of a country from external attack, experiences from Nigeria and Mali, where insurgency perpetrated by citizens against the state has posed a considerable threat to national security, calls for a better conceptualization of national security. Acharya (2001) reminds us why definitions of concepts in security change. He recognised six major catalysts of change that help us define security, namely new ideas about international relations, the emergence of new forms of threats and perceptions about such threats, shifts in the distribution of power, and new international leadership. Others are new kinds of warfare (including technological changes that are associated with them), domestic political change, and advocacy by international institutions.

Governance and insecurity in Nigeria

Nigeria has experienced both military and civilian rule at different times of her national development, each with its unique

style of maintaining national security. It is generally believed that the management of security under civil rule is tainted with the same elements of repression that are characteristic of military regimes in Nigeria, so that the distinction between the two is tenuous. Whichever form of government, there is always a correlation between governance and the nature of security. For an effective security system to be fully operational, the leadership must exhibit elements of good governance (George-Gbenyi, 2010). Ideally, good governance is the hallmark of credible leadership epitomized in today's world by democracy.

However, while democracy is often associated with good governance, the situation in Nigeria appears to be the reverse. Nigeria's democratic experiment is characterized by conflict, political assassination and unemployment, among other challenges (Ogundiya, 2010). Studies conducted in south eastern Nigeria show that the failure of government in the provision of basic necessities often contributed to insecurity (Ukiwo, Henri-Ukoha and Emole, 2012; Ikwuamadi, 2012). These studies qualitatively examined how the nature of governance impacted on insecurity. A nexus between governance and insecurity in Nigeria has been more succinctly provided in a recent study of three major conflicts, namely the Odi crisis in Niger Delta, the Tiv/Jukun conflict in Benue and Taraba States, and the Boko Haram insurgency in Borno/Yobe by Abdu (2013). One of the main conclusions reached is that conflicts in Nigeria are largely a reflection of the crisis of governance. Specifically, Abdu, observed thus,

"The Odi violence and subsequent invasion was largely a function of the larger violence in the Niger Delta, caused by a long history of

poverty, exclusion, *environmental* degradation and struggle for self-determination with a good dose of ethnic identity politics. In Benue, the years of conflict over land and other economic resources had led to violence between the major Tiv and Jukun ethnic groups. Almost all the major studies and reports on Boko Haram indicate that the conflict is rooted in widespread poverty, extreme levels of youth unemployment, growing illiteracy, and widening inequalities." (Abdu, 2013, p.187).

Results and Discussion

Respondents' background characteristics

To situate the study within the current security situation in the state, the background characteristics of the respondents – location, age, education, gender and occupation – are necessary. Respondents interviewed for this study were mostly resident in the urban areas (68.5%) against 31.5% interviewed in the rural areas. 62 per cent of the respondents are indigenous to Borno State against 38 per cent who came from other states. Even though the sample was purposive, this finding indicates that there are still many people from other states living in Maiduguri despite the security problems being faced. Only respondents 18 years and above were targeted but most respondents were still young, being between 18 and 28 years (50.6%). The smallest age group was 51 – 60 years constituting only 4.8% of the sample. Muslim and Christian respondents in the sample constituted 71.4% and 26.2% respectively, reflecting the numerical predominance of adherents of Islamic faith in the state. An insignificant proportion of respondents practise African Traditional Religion (4.2%). Educationally, most respondents have attained post-secondary education (79.2%). The large proportion of respondents with higher education resulted from the changes in certain aspects of the methodology, which is the

change from administering the questionnaire by interview by field assistants to handing it out for respondents to complete it by themselves, which meant distribution to only literate respondents. As a result, only 4.2% of the respondents in the sample had no formal education.


Political and administrative dimensions of governance

This aspect of the study sought to elicit views on the respondents' satisfaction with how government functions in the state. Variables used included the respondents' assessment of corruption in government, proper functioning of the legislature, accessibility to leaders, community participation, and civil society awareness. Most of the sampled respondents (70.2%) voted during the last gubernatorial and House of Assembly elections in 2011: again, this is probably due to their higher level of education. Only 50 respondents (29.8%) did not vote during those elections. Disaggregated data on voting by sex showed that slightly higher percentage of females (35 per cent) than males (29 per cent) did not vote (table 1). For respondents who did not vote, the reasons for their failure to do so were quite varied (figure 1). Forty per cent of them said that they were not available during the elections; while 18 per cent were not qualified (the high number of respondents 18 – 28 years discussed earlier should be borne in mind). It is important to observe that only eight per cent of respondents said that they simply did not feel like voting.

Table 1. Percentage Respondents who voted During Last Elections

Voting Status	Male (n=118)	Female (n=50)
Yes	71	65
No	29	35
Total	100	100

Source: Field data, 2014

Figure 1. Reasons for not voting

Source: Field data, 2014

Despite the high percentage of respondents who voted in the 2011 elections, there was a general feeling that elected representatives were guilty of abuse of power. In the perception of 48.2% of respondents, elected representatives abused power to a large extent, while 23.8% considered that they did so to some extent. Only 14.9% feel otherwise. This perception is similar with respect to corruption by government officials and the functioning of the state legislature. Corruption among

government officials was perceived to be extremely high by 47 per cent of respondents as against only 1.8% who think it is extremely low. Interestingly, a significantly higher percentage of males (79.7%) than females (20.3%) held the belief that government officials are corrupt. This large discrepancy may be attributed to men's greater access to information and contact with those in positions of power (employment or authority) that could have placed them in situations where they are more likely to experience corruption. Similarly, the perception of 29.2% of respondents is that the state legislature has functioned very badly, while 35.7% consider that it has functioned badly. This contrasts with the only 7.1% who believe it has functioned very well. This finding seems to reflect the fact that currently, most legislators in the state have abandoned their constituencies and their legislative duties, but are seen as having resorted to exploiting the poverty situation by giving hand-outs, apparently in preparation for the 2015 elections.


The perception of the leadership provided by the state governor however, is slightly different (figure 2). 35.2% of respondents think it is average; 17 per cent think it is not effective at all while 7.9% believe it is very effective. Data disaggregated by sex shows however that slightly more females (10.9%) than males (7.6%) think the leadership provided by the state governor is very effective. The greater percentage of the respondents who view the governor's leadership as average may be due to his more populist approach to governance when compared to his predecessor. For instance, a respondent reported that when counter-insurgency measures adopted by the military in the state led to the burning of people's properties, the state government responded by paying compensation for damaged

property and giving cash assistance to families whose relations were killed in the conflict. Specifically, it was pointed out by the respondent that

‘This governor has tried. He has given money [compensated] people whose homes were destroyed by soldiers in Gwange ward and all families who lost their members’ – (KII, Maiduguri, 12/9/2014).

Additionally, since 2013 when the state started to experience massive internal displacement of people, the state government was seen to be responsive to their needs. Such measures were highly valued by ordinary people in the state and this may be what is responsible for the slightly better performance of the governor in their perception.

Fig. 2. Effectiveness of Leadership Provided by State Governor (%)



Source: Field data, 2014

Citizens’ access to government is central to proper management and functioning of the process of governance.

Accessibility was measured in terms of the ease of reaching government officials and local authorities. Table 2 shows the level of access respondents have at the LGA and state levels. Generally, only 13 per cent of respondents think government officials are easily accessible. Over half of them believe government functionaries can only be reached with great difficulty. Since ideally, government at the local level is supposed to be closer to the people, the respondents' rating of the accessibility of their local government authority was also elicited. Nearly half of all respondents think local government authorities are only accessible with difficulty (48.8%) while one-fifth believes they are not accessible at all (19.6%). Only 7.7% think local government officials are easily accessible. This dismal perception of the accessibility of local government officials has a very strong gender bias, with only 25 per cent of respondents who perceive them as accessible being women. Lack of accessibility of local government authorities may also have been exacerbated by leaders who are not accountable to the people because for eight years there have not been any local government elections. Instead, the state government has been appointing caretaker committees to run the local governments every six months. Such appointed leaders (whose attrition rate is often high) are hardly held accountable by the people, and do not consider themselves accountable, preferring to remain aloof. This may also explain the low participation in local government activities by respondents.

Participation in governance by citizens adds value to the quality of governance. But only 19 per cent of respondents said they participate adequately in the activities of their local government, while 35.1% do not participate at all. Key

informant interviews conducted revealed that where there was participation, it was mainly in the area of politics and revolved around matters such as who should be considered for appointment to represent the communities at the local level. Occasionally, individuals participated in mobilization for development, particularly to advocate for certain services at the community level. By contrast, civil society organizations (CSOs) are perceived as participating in governance more than individual members of communities. About 25 per cent said that CSOs participate to a large extent while 33.9% said that they participate somewhat.

Table 2. Respondents' Perception of Government Accessibility

Response	Accessibility of Government Officials (%)	Accessibility of Local Government Authority (%)
Not accessible at all	20.2	19.6
Accessible with difficulty	57.7	48.8
Accessible	6.0	14.3
Easily accessible	13.1	7.2
Don't know	3.0	10.1
Total	100	100

Source: Field data, 2014

The availability of infrastructure and services is an equally important indicator of governance. The responses showed low levels of availability of electricity, water housing, primary education and sanitation. Table 3 shows the responses on the availability of these services. The service rated as the most

available is primary education with 56 per cent, while the least available is sanitation which is only 25 per cent benefit from.

Table 3. Availability and Functioning of Infrastructural Services

Infrastructure/service	Yes (%)	No (%)	Don't know (%)
Electricity	36.3	58.9	4.8
Primary education	56	44	0
Water	38.7	50.0	11.3
Sanitation	25.0	63.7	11.3
Housing	26.2	60.7	13.1


Source: Field data, 2014

Legal/Judicial Governance Issues

In the context of this study legal/judicial issues pertain to how law and order is maintained by the authorities and the citizens' perception of such maintenance. The greatest threat to security in Borno State is extremism as indicated by 56 per cent of respondents while theft poses the least threat (4.8%). A greater proportion of males (63 per cent) compared to females (40 per cent) rated extremism as the major security threat in the state. However more women (22 per cent) rated ethno-religious violence as a challenge than men (10 per cent). Interestingly, all the four main types of threat to security identified were mentioned by 11.2% of respondents, i.e. including armed robbery and communal/ethno religious violence. While these threats were seen as continuing to affect citizens very negatively, the state and local government response to them was rated generally 'fair' by respondents. For instance, while 26.8% and 19 per cent believe the response is very poor and poor respectively, 17.9% and 12.5% think it is 'good' and 'very good' respectively. More disturbing is the respondents' perception that the police are not prepared or well-enough equipped to deal with the

security situation in the state (figure 3). Most of the respondents (35.7%) think the police are not equipped to face the challenges to security faced by the people. This was also restated by almost all the respondents during the key informant interviews.

Fig. 3. Police Preparedness to Handle Threats



Source: Field work, 2014.

While respondents generally think the police are ill-prepared to deal with the threats to security in Borno State, the judicial process was seen as exhibiting certain irregularities. The judicial process is therefore rated as 'very bad' by 19.6% of respondents and 'bad' by 31.5%. Only 34.4% perceive that the judiciary is good. In terms of corruption, nearly half the respondents (46.7%) strongly agree that the judiciary in Borno State is corrupt. Table 4 shows respondents' perception of certain irregularities in the judicial process, for example bribery to obtain judicial services

and to escape sentence under law. The responses in both instances are very similar. For instance, while 42.3% of respondents feel strongly that citizens need to pay bribes to get services that are ordinarily theirs by right, 46.4% believe people pay bribes to escape unfavourable sentences. The gender aspect of these responses does not show large differences in the way men and women perceive corruption in the judicial system, although more women feel strongly that people pay bribes for judicial services. These perceptions indicate that there is gross abuse of the judicial process and an accelerating reduction in citizens' confidence in the judiciary. It should be noted that escape from sentence simply means the aborting of punishable cases either at the level of the police or at the law courts.

Table 4. Respondents' Perception of the Judiciary

Response	Bribery to obtain service	Male	Female	Bribery to escape sentence	Male	Female
Strongly disagree	20.2	34.7	38.0	16.7	21.1	19.5
Disagree	14.3	45.7	34.0	18.5	12.7	20.0
Neither	16.7	11.8	14.0	11.3	17.8	14.0
Strongly agree	42.3	5.0	8.0	46.4	44.9	42.0
Don't know	6.6	2.0	6.0	7.1	3.0	4.0


Source: Field data, 2014

Economic and Social Issues in Governance

Economic and social issues are the obvious indicators of governance in any given setting, as the scorecard of governments is normally tied to them. For instance, a government that fails to provide jobs or create the enabling environment for business to thrive is usually rated low by citizens. These failures can have severe adverse consequences for the security of the nation. Accordingly, the respondents' opinion on the state government's performance on agriculture, employment, marketing and general welfare of the people was sought. Borno State government's promotion of agriculture was assessed to be average by most respondents (35.7%), but 16.1% rated it 'not effective at all'. Agriculture is a major employer of labour, and this may be why the availability of job opportunities in the state within the last ten years was perceived to be low by 61.9% of respondents. That only 4.2% of respondents rated government's concern for agriculture as 'very effective' is instructive. The welfare of vulnerable groups such as women, children and the disabled in Borno State, was equally perceived to be poor, and only 13.1% strongly agree that the welfare of these vulnerable groups is well catered for by the government, while 41.7% simply disagreed with the statement that their welfare was well catered for by the government while 15.5% disagreed strongly. Responses were somewhat contradictory between males and females on the extent to which the welfare of women and children has been addressed by government, with a greater percentage of females than males in each case agreeing and disagreeing with the statement that their welfare has been adequately addressed by the government (figure 4).

Nevertheless, it is clear that the general perception is that poor attention is given to the welfare of women, children and the disabled in the state, and this is a reflection of their plight in Borno State. Since the escalation of violence in the state especially from 2011 to date, the welfare of women and children has not only suffered serious setbacks, but also their rights have been violated. For instance, primary and secondary school students could not attend schools for nearly one whole session due to insurgency. More worrisome has been the abduction of nearly 300 secondary school girls from Chibok town in April, 2014. Women and children also constitute the largest group among the internally displaced persons currently taking refuge in public camps and host communities in the state.

Figure 4. Respondents' Perception of Welfare of Vulnerable Groups by Sex (%)



Source: Fieldwork, 2014

Discussion

The preceding analysis points to the weakness of governance in Borno State, a weakness which appears to be part of a general problem in Nigeria. The data show that while people are generally enthusiastic about democracy – as evidenced by the high percentage of respondents who voted in the last elections in the state – it has largely failed to yield the desired dividends to the people. A recent survey conducted on the economic conditions of Nigerians shows a decline between 2003 and 2008. While only 30 per cent of respondents perceived their economic condition as very good in 2003, by 2005 and 2008, the corresponding figures had declined to 26 per cent and 28 per cent respectively (Afrobarometer Round 5 Survey, 2013). A similar survey, the Nigeria Harmonized Living Standard Survey (2010), has also indicated a progressive increase in the incidence of poverty among Nigerians. Poverty increased from 28 per cent in 1980 to 46 per cent in 1985 and 66 per cent in 1992; in 2010 it was estimated that 69 per cent of Nigerians were poor (National Bureau of Statistics, 2010). A review of Nigeria's democracy and governance (Oke, 2010) posits that the symptoms of poor democratic rule in Nigeria's fourth republic are corruption, civilian authoritarianism, and economic and infrastructural decay. Specifically, it has led to abysmal economic failures that "culminated in serious infrastructural decay to the extent that most institutions of government were not working to expectation" (Oke, 2010, p. 37). Being indices of economic development, these economic failures often become reflected in the general development of the nation so that Nigeria's development becomes both a symptom and consequence of bad governance (Ogundiya, 2010). This is similar to the views of

Ogbonnaya, Umoju and Udefuna (2012) that the challenges to Nigeria's democratic governance lie in electoral irregularities/malpractices, intra and inter-ethnic rivalries, religious crises and insecurity, poverty, inadequate/weak democratic institutions as well as institutionalized corruption.

Indeed the findings of this study also show that government in Borno has alienated itself from the people at all levels through limited accessibility which give little room for accountability. Thus, there is no opportunity to question decisions taken at all levels of governments, no matter how ill-conceived or misplaced they may be. One factor that may have accentuated this problem is the failure to conduct elections into the local government councils since 2007. The immediate implication of this is that appointed local government executives do not feel any obligation to the people they govern.

One of the most important issues surrounding governance in Nigeria today is the maintenance of law and order. The judicial process in Borno, whether handled by local authorities, the police or law courts is perceived to be marred by fraudulent practices and gross miscarriages of justice such that respondents rate their performance very low. Again, this appears to be confirmation of a general trend in Nigeria's judicial system. In a recent survey on the perceptions of Nigerians, 98 per cent identified corruption among the police as an issue (Afrobarometer, 2013). That 66 per cent of survey respondents in 2001 and 70 per cent in 2003 identified the police as corrupt indicates growing public mistrust in the nation's judicial system in general, and the police in particular (Lewis and Alemika, 2005). Pascal (2012) notes that the Boko Haram insurgency has raised credible issues of abuse by security agencies which must be

addressed if the insurgency is to be checked. The extra-judicial killing of the Boko Haram leader Mohammed Yusuf and many others thereafter immediately come to mind here. Similarly, the numerous allegations that the police have been sharing information with suspected members of Boko Haram raise questions on both credibility and corruption.

From the foregoing, governance in Borno State appears to be a microcosm of the greater Nigerian situation characterized by poor leadership. This is believed to have contributed to the current level of insecurity in the state. The most important challenge to security identified in this study is insurgency, although other forms of threats such as armed robbery, theft and communal violence have also been identified to a lesser extent. However, it is obvious that the security agencies particularly the police are seen as being unprepared for the challenges that lie ahead. This may be seen from the continuing violence against citizens by Boko Haram, whose fighters often overpower not only the police, but also the combined team of security agencies – the Joint Task Force. At the time of writing, there are nine local governments (one-third of the total) under occupation by Boko Haram insurgents, who have hoisted their flag to replace the Nigerian flag. These are Bama, Askira/Uba, Gwoza, Konduga, Ngala, Marte, Abadam, Dikwa and Mafa. Consequently, Borno State has been rated as the most dangerous place in Nigeria, while Maiduguri, its capital, the second most dangerous local government after Damaturu (Nigeria Stability and Reconciliation Programme, 2014). Several studies point to poor governance as reflected in economic, political and social issues as the underlying and facilitating factors behind the current insecurity (Pascal, 2012; Shettima, 2012; Campbell, 2011).

Conclusion

Nigeria is currently faced by a progressive decline in the welfare of the people. Some fifteen years of democracy suggests little or no improvement in the administrative, judicial and social and economic condition of the people. Unemployment, corruption among civilian and the military, an unjust judicial system are just a few of the many symptoms of poor governance that may have contributed to insecurity in the state, and may have contributed to the growth of groups like Boko Haram. In Borno State and indeed other parts of the country, there has been an increase in the level of violent conflict, resulting in massive displacement of people. Either as a consequence or as a causative factor, the welfare of vulnerable groups in the state has not been properly addressed in Borno. Again, this points to poor governance. To counter these, greater accountability and accessibility is required from public and law enforcement officials to the people as well as increased levels of participation in the decision-making process, especially at the level of communities and local government. Quicker dispensation of justice is also necessary as part of overall improvement required in the judicial process.

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Chapter 5

Security and Governance in Gombe State

- Mahmoud Umar

Introduction

For over half a decade, Nigeria has been enmeshed in a firestorm of insecurity that has caused the deaths of scores of innocent civilians, foreigners, security personnel, elected officials and many government workers. Security challenges have assumed formidable dimensions, and have forced the country's political and economic managers – and indeed the entire nation – to rue the loss of their loved ones, investments and property. The lack of safety across the country is reflected in the high number of violent crimes such as kidnapping, ritual killing, suicide bombing, religious killing, politically motivated killing and violence, ethnic clashes, armed banditry and other crimes that have become a characteristic of life in Nigeria since 2009 (Imhonopi and Urim, 2012). Not only has the continued state of insecurity threatened the very fabric of national integration and created ecology of fear, disquiet and anxiety; it has also dealt a deadly blow – or what may be called 'spectral bite' – to governance and development in Nigeria.

The situation has assumed deeper dimensions in the north-eastern part of Nigeria, which has witnessed the worst cases of

proliferation of small arms and light weapons, widespread use of assault weapons in ethno-religious violence, political thuggery and insurgency orchestrated by different groups using names such as the *Jama'atu Ablis Sunnah Lid da'wati waljihad* otherwise called 'Boko Haram' or simply 'JAS'; *Jama'atu Ansarul Muslimina fee Biladis Sudan* or simply 'Ansaru'. Others include the political thugs known as 'Ecomog' in Borno State, 'Yan Kalare' in Gombe State, and 'Sara Suka' in Bauchi State.

As one of the centres of this violence, Gombe State has witnessed fewer insurgent attacks compared to Borno, Adamawa, Yobe and Bauchi States, but has suffered more from political thugs threatening the peaceful coexistence of different communities in the state.

Objectives of the study

The broad objective of this study is to examine the relationship between security and governance in north-eastern Nigeria, with reference to Gombe State. The specific objectives are:

- i. To determine the major drivers of insecurity in Gombe State.
- ii. To explore the various mechanisms employed by the government at state and local levels with a view to enhancing security and governance.
- iii. To determine the role played by NGOs and civil society organizations in enhancing security and governance in the state.
- iv. To recommend remedial measures with a view to strengthening security and good governance in Gombe State.

To achieve these objectives, the study posed the following questions:

How have the state and civil society organizations fared in terms meeting security and governance challenges in the North-East?

Is there any link between governance and security in Gombe State?

What fundamental changes are needed to transform the security architecture and sustainable governance in Gombe State in particular, and the north-east in general? These and other related questions structure this study and will be answered from the information generated during its course.

Background information on Gombe State

Gombe is a state in north-eastern Nigeria, created out of Bauchi State on 1st October 1996 by the administration of late General Sani Abacha. Its capital is at Gombe. Called the *Jewel in the Savannah*, Gombe State covers an area of 20,265 km² and has a population estimated to be around 2.7 million. Gombe State shares boundaries with Yobe State to the North, Adamawa and Taraba States to the South, Borno State to the East, and Bauchi State to the West.¹


Historically, Gombe State is a fusion of two distinct groups of people: the emirate of Gombe North, and the ethnic grouping of Gombe South. Bubayero established the emirate during the Sokoto jihad of 1800 when it emerged as part of a larger state-building force.

The government of the emirate, which had its headquarters in Gombe Abba, was formed to control the larger part of what

¹ (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gombe_State).

constitutes Gombe State today. It did so until the advent of the British colonialists in the early 20th century, following which the area was governed through two administrative units, namely Gombe Native Authority and Tangale Waja Native Authority. However, with Independence in 1960 and subsequent military administrations, local governments have been created. Between 1976 and the present, the then two Native Authorities had metamorphosed into the present 11 local governments, namely Gombe, Billiri, Akko, Balanga, Shomgom, Nafada/Bajoga, Funakaye, Dukku, Yamaltu/Delba, Kaltungo, and Kwami.

Figure 1.1: Showing the eleven Local Governments of Gombe State



Source: <http://gombestatemhe.com.ng/>

The state is home to many ethnic groups including Tangale, Terawa, Waja, Kumo, Fulani, Kanuri, Bolewa, Jukun,

Pero/Shonge, Tula, Cham, Lunguda, Dadiya, Banbuka, Hausa and Kamo/Awak. Hausa is the commercial language among the people.

The people of Gombe state are primarily farmers producing food and cash crops such as cereals – maize, sorghum, rice and wheat; and legumes – cowpeas, groundnuts, soya beans and bambara nuts; They also produce fruits – orange, lemon, mango, guava, paw-paw and grapefruit; and vegetables – tomato, pepper, onion, okra, pumpkin and melon. Tree crops cultivated in the state include gum Arabic, kenaf, sugar cane, sunflower and ginger. Industries in Gombe State include Ashaka Cement Plc, cotton ginneries, furniture and block-making industries, and other small-scale industries. Gombe is also blessed with natural resources such as uranium, gypsum and limestone. Recently, petroleum deposits were reported to have been discovered in the state.

Method of data collection

For the purposes of this research, both primary and secondary methods of data collection were employed.

The primary method of data collection was the administration of questionnaires and Key Informant Interviews. 180 questionnaires were distributed across the state which, for this purpose, was divided into three clusters based on senatorial district contiguity as shown below:

Senatorial District	Local Government Selected	Number of Questionnaires
Gombe North	Gombe Local Government	60
Gombe South	Billiri Local Government Shomgom Local Government	30 30
Gombe Central	Akko Local Government Yamaltu/Deba Local Govt.	30 30
Total		180

Source: Field Survey 2014

The above breakdown shows that Gombe Local government, a metropolitan local government, took all sixty questionnaires for the Gombe North Senatorial district. This was because of its urban nature and because it has a comparatively large population with people from different backgrounds.

In Gombe South Senatorial district, Billiri local government was treated as an urban local governments, and thirty questionnaires were randomly administered there, while Shomgom local government, a rural local government also had thirty questionnaires. In Gombe Central Senatorial district, thirty questionnaires were administered in rural Yamaltu/Deba local government and thirty were administered in Akko local government, an urban or semi-urban area.

Of the 180 questionnaires distributed, 168 were returned, and the data analysis is based on these.

Key informant Interviews were also conducted to elicit first-hand information from top government functionaries, security agencies, paramount rulers, leaders of thought, imams and pastors, NGOs and leaders of vigilante groups.

Secondary data was obtained from literature on security and governance such as books, journals, magazines, relevant specialized studies, government policy documents and online sources.

Literature review

The concepts of Security and Governance

Security and governance, like most social science concepts, are widely contested and evolving concepts. Central to the debate is the attempt to deepen and widen the concept of security from the level of the state, to societies and the individual; and from military to non-military issues (Krahmann, 2003:9). The challenge to a state-centric notion of security builds upon the argument that the end of the Cold War has significantly reduced the likelihood of inter-state war, whereas a wide range of threats, from civil war, transnational crime and terrorism to infectious diseases, appears to have increased. In 1999, about 32,000 individuals were killed in interstate wars worldwide. But in the same year, more than 900 people were killed through terrorist attacks, while 2.8 million were killed by AIDS (UNAIDS, 2000). While scholars have remained divided over the necessity of a more inclusive notion of security (Krause and Williams, 1997), politicians, the military and the security industry quickly picked up on these new security threats after the Cold War. NATO and the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) for instance, have expanded the scope of their security functions to areas such as the war on terrorism, international peace keeping, refugee settlement and the promotion of civil society. The European Union and its member states are defining an increasing array of their concerns in terms of security, including

immigration and development aid (Manners, 2002). Although some scholars have criticized the securitization of political, social or environmental issues (Waeber, 1995), this study suggests that a broad notion of security (one that incorporates social and economic security, as opposed to the traditional notion of security that is only based on the protection of life and property) has come to define much of the practice of contemporary security policy-making and is therefore used throughout this study.

At the same time as government and international organizations have expanded their security functions however, limited resources, lack of expertise in non-traditional areas of security, and divergent interests among the governments of – for example West African states – have led to the increasing fragmentation of authority in security policy-making. In dealing with the insurgency in north-eastern Nigeria for example, Nigeria has accused Cameroon of not giving support to the Nigeria military (Peregrino Brimah, 2014). More generally, Nigeria has failed to develop a single narrative on the violence raging in the north east, largely because of lack of capacity to understand the dynamics of unconventional warfare. The political environment is therefore awash with conspiracy theories and attempts to shift blame and responsibility. Currently, in addition to national government and international organizations, a variety of private actors ranging from charities to commercial security companies have emerged in local, regional and global security, dealing with issues such as humanitarian aid (OXFAM, 2000; CARE, 2001), human rights monitoring (Amnesty International, Human Rights watch 2002),

refugees (ICRC, 2001; International Rescue Committee, 2002) and military training and protection.

The first duty of a government is to keep its citizens safe. As Hobbes observed, only the state has the wherewithal to guarantee security and save society from anarchy, and since government represents the state, the state through its government should provide adequate security to justify its *raison d'être* (Gaskin, 1996). Omede (2011) sees security as a dynamic condition which involves the relative ability of the state to counter threats to its core values and interests. McGrew (1988) holds that the security of a nation hangs on two important pillars. First is the maintenance and protection of the socio-economic order in the face of internal and external threats; second is the promotion of a preferred international order which minimizes threats to core values and interests, or to the domestic order. For Nwolise (2006) security is an all-encompassing condition, which suggests that a territory must be secured by a network of armed forces and that the sovereignty of the state must be guaranteed by a participatory and patriotic government, which in turn must be protected by the military, police and the people themselves. He argues that the people must not only be secure from external attacks, but also from the devastating consequences of internal upheaval such as unemployment, hunger, starvation, disease, ignorance, homelessness, environmental degradation, pollution and other socio-economic injustices. Citing Rothschild, Nwagboso (2012) argues that in the long sweep of history, security has been about people, and that without reference to the security of the individual, security makes no sense at all (McSweeney, 1999). Dike (2010) and Omede (2011) have taken this argument a step further by

emphasizing that Nigeria's security should be viewed holistically; that it should be made to see citizens as the primary beneficiaries of every security and developmental deliverable that the state can offer. Thus Nigeria's security will involve efforts to strengthen the capacity of the Federal Republic of Nigeria so that it can advance its interests and objectives to contain internal and external aggression, control crime, eliminate corruption, enhance genuine development, progress and growth, and improve the welfare and quality of life of its citizens.

The current security situation in north-eastern Nigeria, particularly in Gombe State, is very disturbing. With the 2015 general elections approaching, politicians recruited political thugs known as 'Kalare boys'. This heated up the polity and compounded an already dangerous security situation in the state.

Being the antithesis of security, insecurity has attracted such common descriptors as want of safety, danger, hazard, uncertainty, want of confidence, state of doubt, inadequately guarded or protected, instability, trouble, lack of protection and being unsafe (Achumba, Ighomereho and Akporobaro, 2013). Achumba *et al.* argue further that in a state of insecurity there exists a vulnerability to harm, loss of life, property or livelihood. Therefore insecurity is a state of not knowing, a lack of control and the inability to take defensive action against forces that portend harm or danger to an individual or group, or that make them vulnerable. For Beland (2005), insecurity is "the state of fear or anxiety stemming from a concrete or alleged lack of protection." It refers to lack of safety, or inadequate freedom from danger. This definition reflects physical insecurity, which is the most visible form of insecurity, but it feeds into other forms

of insecurity such as economic insecurity and social insecurity. These are included in the scope of this study.

As regards security relations between diverse groups have traditionally been conceived in terms of alliances or communities. However the fragmented but overlapping networks which structure collaboration among the growing range of public and private security actors seem to be adequately described by the concept of governance. Although this is sometimes defined as a generic term that includes any form of coordination of interdependent social relations (Jessop 1999:35) ranging from centralized state control to self-regulation (Rhodes, 1996:653; Eising and Kohler-Koch, 1999:68), the notion that government can be differentiated from governance appears to be more nuanced.

While government refers to the political control of a centralized state, governance denotes the coordination of social relations even in the absence of a unifying authority at the sub-national, national or international level (Czempiel, 1992: 250; Gordenker and Weiss, 1996:17).

Krahmann, (2003) defines governance as:

...the structures and processes which enable a set of public and private actors to coordinate their interdependent needs and interests through the making and implementation of binding policy decisions in the absence of a central political authority.

Gautam, (2013) defines governance as the exercise of economic, political and administrative authority to manage a country's affairs at all levels. It consists of the mechanisms, processes and institutions, through which citizens and groups articulate their interests, exercise their legal rights, meet their

obligations and mediate their differences. Without good governance, developmental schemes cannot bring about any improvement in the quality of life of citizens.

These different definitions of governance show that government is but one actor in the governance process among several others in society such as non-governmental organisations (NGOs), community-based organisations (CBOs), the private sector, civil society and the general public. Not only public agencies, but non-governmental stakeholders also exercise influence on the way the rules of the game are formulated and how they are played out in the public domain. Therefore governance is a broader concept than government, and multi-stakeholders operate it. This conceptual definition of governance is used in this study to examine the relationship between governance and security, how security in north-eastern Nigeria is shaping governance, and how governance is being shaped by security.

Causes of insecurity in Nigeria

Many reasons have been given for insecurity in Nigeria, both remote and proximate (Onifade, Imhonopi, and Urim, 2013). These may include the following:

1. Absence of institutional capacity resulting in Government failure
Fukuyama (2004) calls this the breakdown of institutional infrastructures. The foundations of Nigeria's institutional framework are mostly shaky and have provoked deterioration in governance and democratic accountability, paralyzing the existing formal and legitimate rules vested in the hierarchy of social order (Achumba *et al.* 2013). This view is corroborated by

Igbuzor (2011) who sees the state of insecurity in Nigeria as a function of government failure. That failure manifests in the incapacity of government to deliver public goods to its citizens. This lack of basic necessities has created a growing army of frustrated Nigerians who resort to violence with little or no provocation or opportunity. Such is the scenario in Gombe State where the group known as 'Kalare Boys' are responsible for several atrocities and assaults on innocent citizens. Although Nigeria has the resources and capacity to provide for the needs of its people, the entrenched culture of corruption in public service has resulted in the dearth of basic necessities: what Hazen and Horner (2007) called a "Paradox of Plenty". The result of these and related problems is that crime has increased, and the security of lives and property is no longer guaranteed.

2. The gaping chasm of inequality and absence of fairness and justice

The perception of marginalization by many Nigerians is informed by the ostentatious lifestyles of the political class and the elite against a background of the grinding poverty of most citizens. Even security has almost become the exclusive preserve of those who can buy it. As Egwu (2000) says, the security of the Nigerian nation-state has been reduced to that of the ruler and his immediate supporters. Thus the security calculus of the Nigerian State can be said to have failed because it does not understand the vital point that social and national development must be supported by the basic social, economic, or even military conditions necessary for effective national security. Although this state of inequality, unfairness and injustice has

forced Nigerians to become more self-reliant, it has also made them more likely to resort to self-help.

3. Ethno-Religious conflicts

Ethno-religious conflicts break out when the relations between members of different ethnic or religious groups is characterized by lack of cordiality, mutual suspicion and fear, and a tendency to use violence to settle grievances. In a multi-ethnic and multi-religious society such as Nigeria's, these conflicts have revolved around a myriad of concerns, for example the distribution of scarce resources, public offices, power, land, chieftaincy titles, the creation, demarcation and control of local government councils, control of markets and religious activities. Many of these ethno-religious conflicts have resulted in violence and large-scale killings (Adagba *et al.*, 2012).

4. Disconnect between the people and the Government

Over the years, there has been observed a growing disconnect between people and their government which neither civilian nor military administrations have been able to bridge, leaving misunderstanding, mistrust and resentment to fester. Because the people do not understand government, or have a perception that government does not care about their welfare, they become easy prey to centrifugal forces.

5. Loss of socio-cultural and communal value system

The collapse of moral values within Nigeria is another factor behind the continued security challenges that the country faces. The modern age may have brought greater individual freedoms, but it has also seen a disintegration of traditional communal

values which despised and punished greed, oppression and exploitation of the weak. New values that are zero-sum, narcissistic, chauvinistic and corrupt in nature and which preach that might-is-right are in the ascendancy. Enduring social values and morals have been exchanged for the more destructive aspects of western or modern culture (Onifade, Imhonopi, and Urim, 2013).

These and many proximate factors such as porous borders, rural-urban drift, poverty and unemployment, have combined to aggravate the problem of insecurity in Nigeria.

Background on the activities of Kalare Boys in Gombe State

Gombe State, like the rest of Nigeria, is home to large number of unemployed young men who have little opportunity for legitimate employment or socio-economic advancement. As in other parts of Nigeria, some of these youths in Gombe have formed loosely organized criminal gangs and turned to violent crime to make a living. In Gombe, these gangs and their members are generally referred to as Kalare or “Kalare Boys” (HRW, 2007).

Just like the other negative trends discussed in this report, the Kalare boys have proved to be easy prey for politicians who offer them small amounts of money, drugs, alcohol and weapons in exchange for carrying out acts of intimidation and assault, or simply for accompanying their campaigns in a demonstration of muscle. An activist who works to rehabilitate ex-Kalare Boys who have turned away from violence and crime told Human Rights Watch:

“They take drugs, they are out of their minds, but that is what government wants. [Politicians], go to their temples [meeting places] and give them money, motorbikes, and alcohol.”

Because of this political connection, Gombe’s Kalare gangs have committed not only politically related crimes since 2003, but also other forms of violent abuses with complete impunity. Law enforcement agencies have made no meaningful attempt to rein them in. As one senior civil servant put it, “They are an authority unto themselves, they do what they want in Gombe.” From politically motivated attacks, their activities have degenerated to crimes against ordinary civilians such as assault, rape, harassment, and extortion of ordinary civilians, all of which continue alongside their continuing political role which latter was most notable during the election period of 2007. Many Kalare youth are armed, most commonly with machetes, clubs and similar weaponry.

The Gombe Elders Forum, an association of respected former state and federal government ministers, doctors, religious figures and civil servants, commissioned research by local doctors into the scale of the human rights impact of the Kalare on their state and published their findings in the national press. They allege that between December 2003 and April 2007, at least 115 people were killed and scores more injured as a result of Kalare violence in Gombe state. It is not clear how many of the dead were innocent bystanders as against participants in fighting between rival gangs or political factions.

Political sponsorship of Kalare gangs

Civil society, opposition and other sources in Gombe alleged that prior to the 2003 elections, the Peoples Democratic Party

officials in Gombe were said to have recruited unemployed young men, armed them and paid them to intimidate their opponents, chase voters away from polling stations and disrupt voting. They played a significant role in rigging the outcome to oust the incumbent All Peoples' Party (APP) Governor Abubakar Hashidu and pave the way for the installation of Danjuma Goje of the PDP (HRW, 2007).

The Kalare gangs continued to engage in acts of intimidation of political opponents even after the 2003 elections. A former Commissioner in the State government who had left the PDP for an opposition party alleged that his farm was attacked by Kalare boys in 2005:

Kalore came to my farm and burnt it," he said. "They burnt orchards, livestock, and crops. Two of my workers were beaten as well. One was lucky to escape with his life. Now, every time I go to the farm, I go armed.

In September 2006 two All Nigeria Peoples Party (ANPP) governorship aspirants were attacked by political thugs. The youths attacked the convoy of the national secretary of the party, Senator Saidu Umar Kumo, destroying over 20 vehicles and injuring many of his followers.

Prominent former politicians in Gombe told Human Rights Watch that many powerful figures within the Kalare gangs are in fact on Gombe's state and local government payrolls. One former government official gave Human Rights Watch a list of Kalare leaders, many of whom, it was claimed, occupy senior positions within the state government, including special advisors and personal assistants to the Governor. Other activists, lawyers and civil servants in Gombe town confirmed the connection,

adding that these leaders and their associations are well known in Gombe.

Presentation of the Results of the present study

Table 1.1: State of origin of Respondents

Variable	Frequency	Percentage
Gombe Indigenes	125	74
Non-Indigenes	43	26

Source: Field Survey 2014

With the majority of the respondents (74 per cent) being indigenes of Gombe State while only 26 per cent are non-indigenes, most participants can be expected to have first-hand knowledge of Gombe State and its peculiar problems.

Table 1.2: Sex of Respondents

Variable	Frequency	Percentage
Male	96	57
Female	72	43

Source: Field Survey 2014

Table 1.2 indicates that there are more male respondents: 57 per cent against 43 per cent female. However, the distribution seems to be representative enough as both have a reasonable percentage.

Table 1.3: Location of Respondents in term of either rural or urban centre

Variable	Frequency	Percentage
Urban Centre	108	64
Rural Area	60	36

Source: Field Survey 2014

The above table shows that 64 per cent of the respondents were from urban centres while 36 per cent were from rural areas. Given that 60 questionnaires were distributed in the Gombe metropolis, which is an urban centre, as well as two other urban centres which took 30 each, this representation is adequate.

Table 1.4: Respondents' Perception on the Misuse or abuse of power and authority by elected representatives

Variable	Male	Female
To large extent	52	40
Some what	21	12
Not at all	15	10
I don't know	08	10

Source: Field Survey 2014

The table above shows that the majority of respondents of either gender opined that political office holders have abused or misused their power and authority a lot or somewhat (75 per cent of men and 52 per cent of women). A mere 15 per cent and 10 per cent of respondents (male and female) felt that they have not abused their powers, while 8% and 10 per cent of male and

female respondents respectively expressed no opinion. This is quite disturbing as it is likely to result in voters losing confidence in political office holders, with political apathy being the result.

Table 1.5: Perception on the level of corruption among government officials

Variable	Frequency	Percentage
Extremely High	56	33
High	35	21
Neither high nor low	33	20
Low	22	13
Extremely low	10	06
I don't know/ I can't say	12	07

Source: Field Survey 2014

Table 1.5 indicates that corruption is perceived to be extremely high with 54 per cent of respondents asserting that it is high or extremely high: in other words, more than half of the respondents share the view that corruption among government officials is high in Gombe State. Some 20 per cent of the respondents however opined that corruption is neither low nor high, 19 per cent thought that it is either low or extremely low. Some 7% said that they do not know or cannot say.

Table 1.6: Rating the Functioning of the State Legislature

Variable	Frequency	Percentage
Very bad	32	19
Bad	45	27
Neither bad nor good	30	18
Good	40	24
Very Good	18	10
I don't know/ I can't say	03	02

Source: Field Survey 2014

Table 1.6 shows that mixed perceptions regarding how well the state legislature is functioning. 46 per cent of the respondents felt that it is performing either badly or very badly; 18 per cent took the neutral view that it is neither bad nor good; while 30 per cent considered that its performance is either good or very good. Only 2% had no view at all.

Table 1.7: Quality of functioning of the state Governor and his Cabinet

Variable	Frequency	Percentage
Very bad	22	13
Bad	29	17
Neither good nor bad	33	20
Good	48	29
Very Good	26	15
I don't know	10	06

Source: Field Survey 2014

Table 1.7 indicates that 46 per cent of respondents took a favourable view of the performance of the state governor and his cabinet, with 44 per cent rating it as good or very good: this was much more than the 30 per cent who rated it bad or very bad. Some 20 per cent had a neutral opinion on the quality of service from the governor, while 6% of the respondents indicated they do not know.

Table 1.8: *Whether respondents participate in local government activities*

Variable	Male	Female
I Participate	17	11
I participate to some extent	18	14
I participate very well	12	08
I don't participate	49	39

Source: Field Survey 2014

Table 1.8 above shows that the numbers of those who participate in local government activities, to whatever extent, is lower than the numbers who do not participate, for both male and female respondents. This indicates alienation of both genders from the processes of grassroots governance.

Table 1.9: *Respondents' awareness on civil society, NGOs and CBOs in their communities*

Variable	Frequency	Percentage
Yes	61	36
No	107	64

Source: Field Survey 2014

Only 36 per cent of respondents are aware of the presence of civil society organizations in their communities, with a large majority of 64 per cent stating that they are not aware of the presence of such groups in their communities.

Table 1.10: *the extent to which civil society groups participate in governance process*

Variable	Frequency	Percentage
To large extent	32	19
Some what	18	11
Not at all	72	43
I don't know	46	27

Source: Field Survey 2014

Table 1.10 Given the lack of awareness of civil society activity indicated in Table 1.9, it is hardly surprising that only 30 per cent of the respondents were of the view that civil society groups participate in the governance process, while 43 per cent said there was no participation by NGOs and CBOs in the governance process and 27 per cent said that they do not know.

Table 1.11: Role of the private sector on governance and security management

Variable	Frequency	Percentage
Support the police	16	10
Support State and Local Government	12	07
Work only for their business interest	76	45
Fund Security agencies	09	05
I don't know	55	33

Source: Field Survey 2014

Table 1.11 shows that while some respondents believe that the private sector supports public bodies such as the police, security agencies or state and local governments (22 per cent), most respondents (45 per cent) were of the view that the private sector works only for its own business interests, while 33 per cent indicated that they do not know.

Table 1.12: Respondents' perception on the prevalence of security challenges in their area

Variable	Frequency	Percentage
Yes	146	87
No	22	13

Source: Field Survey 2014

The table above shows that 87 per cent of the respondents were aware that there are security challenges or threats in their area, with only 13 per cent saying that there are no security challenges in their area.

Table 1.13: *The nature of security challenges or threats*

Variable	Frequency	Percentage
Extremism, Terrorism & Insurgency	38	23
Communal/Ethnic/Religious Violence	16	10
Armed Robbery	22	13
Petty Crime/theft	20	12
All of the above	20	12
Any other (e.g. attack by Kalare boys)	50	30

Source: Field Survey 2014

The above table reflects a fairly even distribution as regards the specific types of security threat that respondents face in Gombe State, although a disturbing 30 per cent indicated that the main threat was attacks of the kind mounted by the Kalare boys, while 23 per cent identified extremism, insurgency and terrorism as the main security problem.

Table 1.14: *level of state and local government responses to security challenges*

Variable	Frequency	Percentage
Very poor	43	26
Poor	24	14
Neither poor nor good	19	11
Good	52	31
Very Good	14	08
I don't know	16	10

Source: Field Survey 2014

Total 1.14 indicates those who felt that the state and local governments' response to security challenges was poor or very poor (40 per cent) was almost matched by those who considered that their response has been good or very good (39 per cent). While 11 per cent took a neutral position, ten per cent were unable to say.

Table 1.15: *Level of responsiveness of both government officials and security agencies to crime and security issues*

Variable	Frequency	Percentage
Very Irresponsible	25	15
Irresponsible	18	11
Neither Irresponsible nor responsive	33	20
Responsive	58	34
Very responsive	34	20

Source: Field Survey 2014

Table 1.15 above shows that a majority of the respondents (54 per cent) considered that government and security agents had been either responsive or very responsive on crime, while only 25 per cent considered that the response had been either irresponsible or very irresponsible, with 20 per cent taking a neutral position.

Table 1.16: Rating the performance of the judicial system in Gombe State

Variable	Frequency	Percentage
Very bad	30	18
Bad	46	27
Neither good nor bad	25	15
Good	33	20
Very good	26	15
I don't know	08	05

Source: Field Survey 2014

Table 1.16 shows that only 35 per cent of respondents considered the performance of the judicial system as good or very good, while 45 per cent rated it bad or very bad. With 15 per cent saying that it was neither good nor bad and 5% saying that they did not know, it is difficult to say that the judiciary is living up to its billing as “the last hope of the common man” in Gombe State.

Table 1.17: Accessibility of government functionaries to general public

Variable	Frequency	Percentage
Not accessible at all	45	27
Accessible with some difficulty	56	33
Easily accessible	31	19
Don't know/can't say	36	21

Source: Field Survey 2014

Table 1.17 shows that while 27 per cent of the respondents indicated that government functionaries are not accessible to the public at all, 33 per cent opined that they are accessible with some level of difficulty with 19 per cent saying that government functionaries are easily accessible. 21 per cent stated that they do not know how accessible government officials are.

Table 1.18: Respondents perception on the quality of agricultural input provided by the government

Variable	Frequency	Percentage
Very Satisfied	31	19
Satisfied	44	26
Neither Satisfied nor Dissatisfied	24	14
Dissatisfied	29	17
Very dissatisfied	22	13
I don't know	18	11

Source: Field Survey 2014

Based on the breakdown in table 1.18 above, a greater percentage of respondents (45 per cent) are either satisfied or very satisfied with the quality of agricultural input such as seeds and fertilizer provided to farmers by the government. However, while 14 per cent are neither satisfied nor dissatisfied, 30 per cent are either dissatisfied or very dissatisfied, with 11 per cent expressing no view.

Table 1.19: Perception on whether Job opportunities have increased in Gombe State in the last ten years

Variable	Frequency	Percentage
Yes	83	49
No	65	39
I don't know	20	12

Source: Field Survey 2014

Table 1.19 indicates that 49 per cent of respondents considered that job opportunities have increased in Gombe State over the last ten years, while 39 per cent feel that they have not. 12 per cent of the respondents indicated they do not know.

Table 1.20: Taking care of the welfare needs of women, children and people with disabilities by the government

Variable	Frequency	Percentage
Strongly disagree	26	15
Disagree	17	10
Neither disagree	30	18
Strongly agree	85	51
I don't know	10	06

Source: Field Survey 2014

The above table clearly shows that while 25 per cent of respondents disagree or strongly disagree with the statement that the Gombe State government addresses the welfare needs of

women, children and persons with disabilities, a majority of 51 per cent strongly agree with it.

Table 1.21: *Whether respondents' communities benefited from any anti-poverty programme of the state or local government*

Variable	Frequency	Percentage
Yes	88	52
No	62	37
I don't know	18	11

Source: Field Survey 2014

Table 1.21 above shows that more than half of the respondents (52 per cent) lived in communities that were covered by one anti-poverty programme or another of the state or local government, but while 37 per cent said that their communities were not benefiting from such programmes, 11 per cent were unable to say.

Interviews

Interviews with key respondents indicated that there has been a continuous rise in insecurity in Gombe State since Nigeria's return to civilian rule in 1999. A security officer identified one of the major drivers of insecurity as the political class itself (Personal Communication, 2014), noting that in their efforts to capture political power by all means, those involved saw politics as a zero-sum game with the winner taking all and the loser completely vanquished. Since those who participate in politics do so only to win, with losing not being seen as an option, they recruit gangs such as Kalare boys as political thugs to attack

political opponents with knives, machetes and cutlasses. He noted that this menace had assumed worrying dimensions with the killing of rival political thugs, attacks on passers-by, fights over the division of money offered by politicians and the snatching of ballot boxes, while their political connections meant that they perpetrated a variety of other crimes such as theft, burglary, and rape with impunity, and asserted that no less 20 cases of one atrocity or another committed by the Kalare boys were reported every week.

Those interviewed identified poverty and unemployment as major drivers of insecurity in the state, since these factors meant that poor and unemployed boys were readily available to be mobilized as political thugs for relatively small amounts.

A community organizer running the Nura Ahmed NGO expressed dissatisfaction with the “Anti-Kalare Squad” security outfit established by the then Goje Administration with a view to stopping or curtailing the activities of Kalare boys, noting that their attacks had continued unabated. However the Dankwambo administration had made positive efforts to integrate some of the Kalare boys into the Gombe State public service of the state as marshals whose duty it is to assist police, road traffic and environmental sanitation inspectors in the state.

But in the run up to the 2015 elections, opposition politicians such as N. Ahmed, expressed the view that what Governor Dankwambo had done was convert the Kalare boys into protective guards for the power elite in the state, and that he could not face elections in the state without the Kalare boys (Ahmed, N. personal communication, October 2014).

This appears to have been corroborated during the state’s local government elections which were conducted in 2012. The

Governor was alleged to have declared that as far as political thuggery in the state is concerned: “*Wai an cire wa yan Kalare sunbatta.*” The implication was that the ban on Kalare activities had now been lifted and so in return, they must ensure the success of the PDP in the local government elections. Although there is no independent evidence to support this allegation against the Governor, there is no doubt that the local government elections witnessed assassinations and fights between rival Kalare groups, while since those elections, there has been an increase in violence, theft, killings, attacks and counter-attacks, all of which have been blamed on different Kalare groups in the state.

On the issue of governance generally, Gombe State appears to have done well in meeting the expectations of citizens. An officer with the state’s Ministry of Works referred to what he described as people-oriented projects that had been embarked on throughout the state. Examples of such projects by the present administration cited by this interviewee include road construction, improvement of Gombe township roads and the dualization of other roads within the state, construction of bridges such as the great Kuri Bridge in Yamaltu/Deba local government, the expansion of potable water provision to the Federal low cost housing estate, and laying of water pipelines to townships. Other projects cited as people-oriented were poverty alleviation programmes that had been introduced to enhance capacity acquisition by women in different fields such as fishery, sewing, beauty salons in which women were not only trained, but were also given business equipment related to their area of specialization, and the sum of ₦50,000.00 start-up capital (Degri; Personal Communication, October 2014).

The Centre for Community Health and Development, a civil society organization which caters for orphans and the less privileged, as well as health advocacy, said that it had received a lot of goodwill and support from the state government in the area of funding, and moral and financial support for orphans. The state government had also mobilized paramount rulers to support its HIV/AIDS programmes such as voluntary counselling and testing.

Discussion and findings

The following findings were obtained from the information generated during this study:

1. Elected representatives have abused or misused their power and authority (see Table 1.4). This view is not unconnected to a common trait of the political class which, when seeking political office, presents itself as engaging in politics in order to support the aspirations of the people and to protect their interests, but which, once power is attained, becomes inaccessible to the masses and fails to champion their cause.
2. Corruption among government officials is high in Gombe State. With 54 per cent opining that it is either high or extremely high, it is hardly surprising that the former Governor was charged to court for alleged corrupt practices involving funds for pensioners and contracts awarded by his administration. However, as is usual in such cases, some respondents alleged political motives for the prosecution.
3. The State House of Assembly is not functioning very well in the view of nearly half of the respondents (46 per cent saying its functioning was bad or very bad) (See Table1.6).

4. The study reveals also that the quality of service delivery by the Governor and his cabinet is fairly good although the results were mixed, and the 30 per cent who considered service delivery to be bad or very bad should not be glossed over. The Governor was rated as having done well as regards infrastructure and physical projects, views which were corroborated during interviews. However, some communities complained that they were not being supported in terms of funds to expand their business and other handcraft activities.
5. Communities and respondents are not adequately participating in the activities of their local governments. This may be because there are not enough development associations and civil society groups to mobilize the government and the people to engage in development and community self-help efforts.
6. Civil society groups do not participate effectively in governance processes in the state. Empirical evidence suggests that the ones that are present in the state, such as Centre for Community Health and Development (which is actively involved in HIV/AIDS counselling and care for orphans and the destitute) interact well with state and local governments, but the lack of awareness of the activities of NGOs and CBOs by most respondents suggests that the number of such organizations in the state is unduly low.
7. Private sector organizations are seen as working only to maximize their business interests, with only low percentages being aware of any support from this sector for government or the police and other security agencies. It is likely that most respondents are unaware of the level of collaboration

between government, security agencies and the private sector. However security experts in the state maintained that synergy between them and the organized private sector in tackling the menace of crime in the state was good.

8. Security challenges ranging from theft, burglary, gang attack by Kalare groups, to communal clashes along the Dadiya-Ture-Tangale axis abound in the state. Other forms of security challenges include insurgency-related attacks such as the late 2011 attacks on the MOPOL Command, the attack on Gombe Township Police Station on 24th February 2012, attacks in Bajoga Police Station and a bank in the local government, an attack on Kumo Police Station at the headquarters of Kumo Local Government. The state has also suffered from suicide bombing attacks, with such attacks taking place at the Governor's residence on Thursday June 5th 2014 and at the 301 battalion of the Nigerian Army at Gombe on Sunday 8th of June 2014.
9. The level of response given by both state government and security agents recorded mixed results. Though one can say in sum that the response was viewed positively by a majority, with 54 per cent considering them to have been either responsive or very responsive (see Table 1.15), a disturbing situation on the ground was revealed, with frequent crimes being committed by Kalare boys with intermittent attacks blamed on Boko Haram elements. The reluctance of the government and security operatives to confront groups such as the Kalare boys was ascribed to the fact that the power elites in the state hire some of them. This is because, they are known to commit the worst crimes such as murder and robbery, while it was also alleged that

some of these criminals had been hired as Personal Assistants (PAs) to the Governor. Against this background, little should be expected in terms of curtailing the activities of Kalare groups in the state.

10. The judicial system is not responsive to the plight of ordinary citizens, and is seen as bedevilled with corrupt practices on the part of judicial officers, including judges. With the perception that justice and equity are compromised for money and positions, the likelihood of resort to self-help is increased.
11. Government functionaries are accessible to the public but, with some level of difficulty.
12. Job opportunities have increased in the last ten years, but the state's efforts are seen as only opening up employment within government circles. Private investment remains low, as quite apart from the lack of security for property and persons, the government is not considered to have provided conducive atmosphere for the private sector to operate and thrive.
13. The state government is perceived as making efforts to provide for women; children and persons with disabilities (see Table 1.20). Anti-poverty programmes are bringing benefits to the people of every community in the state. Interviewees also cited skills acquisition and training for women, efforts to facilitate marriages for widows and the divorced as being of both social and economic benefit.
14. In general however, insecurity persists, and is seen as not improving.

Conclusion

Conclusively, the abuse and misuse of power and authority by elected representatives is quite disturbing given that it will erode the confidence reposed in them by the electorate and could lead to political apathy. Corruption being considered high among government officers in the state is a serious threat to good governance. Lack of ready access to elected representatives by citizens or voters is a serious threat to good governance and will erode the confidence reposed in them. The response on the quality of service delivery by the governor and his cabinet is quite encouraging and that it is true to say that there is good governance in some sectors in Gombe State, but not in all, particularly security sector governance which faces a lot challenges. It is disheartening that many communities are not aware of the activities of civil society organizations but this situation can be changed if the state government takes positive steps to empower citizens to establish such organizations. By reinforcing the idea that governance is a collective responsibility, good governance in the state will be enhanced.

The presence of security challenges of different dimension in the state is quite problematic because they paralyze social, economic and even political activities in the state. The purchasing power of the people is very low because of security threats to life and property this has affected trade and commerce in the State. In particular, the Kalare boys constitute a great danger to the collective good of the people of Gombe State. These threats should be tackled both by government policy and institutions and through advocacy by civil society organizations.

Recommendations

- i. Elected representatives should live up to expectations by fulfilling campaign promises and implementing constituency projects such as skills acquisition for youths, provision of pipe borne water, construction of access roads etc. to provide jobs and improve infrastructure.
- ii. Government officials must be transparent in managing public funds in their custody. This can be achieved by regular auditing of their accounts and the introduction of e-payment in all government transactions in the state, as this will go a long way towards combating the menace of corruption among government officials.
- iii. There is a dire need for State House of Assembly members to improve service to their respective constituencies. This can be done by opening an office in their respective constituencies and periodically making themselves available in such offices. This will enhance accessibility and give them first-hand knowledge of the problems peculiar to their constituents, so that they can address them in the House, thereby enhancing the prospects for good governance in Gombe State.
- iv. The Governor and his cabinet need to do more to improve security and to provide good governance. Youths in the state should be empowered in the same way that efforts were made to empower women. This can be achieved through partnership with the private sector to establish skills acquisition centres where youths can be engaged, trained and offered start-up capital for their businesses. This will help to reduce petty crime and political thuggery in the state.

- v. Community participation in the governance process at both local and state government level should be facilitated. This can be done by government at all levels mobilizing community members to establish self-help organizations or CBOs, NGOs and civil society groups which can liaise with the government to carry out governance-related projects.
- vi. Government at both state and local government level must curtail the activities of Kalare boys and similar groups in order to secure the future of the people of Gombe State. The most realistic way of doing this is by ensuring that politicians do not provide them with monetary incentives to carry out politics-related crimes, or give them cover when apprehended for suspected crimes. Government should rehabilitate Kalare boys by integrating them into the proposed youth skills acquisition programmes. The government should also work for their moral re-generation and rehabilitation to become good and responsible citizens, including teaching by clerics. For the common good of society, the Gombe State Governor must commit himself to reverse the evil trend of supporting and financing these thugs.
- vii. Attacks by insurgents can be curtailed if the security infrastructure is properly empowered to promptly respond to any attack by such groups. Also if the insurgents can be accessed, efforts should be made to urge them to embrace peace and to re-integrate them into society. This will ensure the collective peace and security for all, not only in Gombe State but in the whole of the Nigerian nation.

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Chapter 6

Governance and Insecurity Challenges in Taraba State

- Emeka D. Oruonye

Introduction

The increasing rate of crime and violence caused by insurgent groups, with the attendant loss of lives and property, has brought the north-eastern part of Nigeria to world attention. With insecurity challenges persisting since 2009, citizens have been forced to wonder whether Nigeria still has functional government institutions. Such is the level of distrust and lack of confidence in government that the situation has engendered in the north-east region.

Until 2009, the north-east of Nigeria was relatively peaceful but now, despite the huge presence of military personnel and security operatives, the security situation is seen to be getting worse. This has raised a number of questions: Why has this crisis persisted? Whom do we hold responsible for the deteriorating security situation in the region? Could it be that the government no longer knows what to do, or that it lacks the ability to contain the situation? Are the security operatives and military personnel incompetent? Do they lack the necessary facilities and logistic capacity to contain the situation? It is these and other questions that have informed the need to examine the nexus

between governance and insecurity in the north eastern part of Nigeria, with special reference to Taraba State.

One of the greatest problems of development in Taraba State, especially the southern part, is ethno-religious and communal conflict. For several years Taraba State has suffered violent conflicts which have resulted in the militarization of young people and the accumulation of small arms. The combined effects of historical conflict and contention over land, boundary disputes and electoral contest have generated varying levels of violence. A number of local governments in the state are faced with one form of communal violence or the other, much of it associated with politics. Violence in the state is dominated by ethnic conflicts arising from land disputes, conflict between nomadic and sedentary farming communities, and chieftaincy disputes. Criminal violence is also common. Armed conflict in Taraba State is also influenced by violence in other parts of the country, which has on some occasions spilled over in to Taraba state. It is this complex dynamics of security and governance that this study examines.

Objectives of study

1. To examine the relationship between security and the character of governance in Taraba state.
2. To examine the major drivers of insecurity in Taraba state.
3. To examine the links between governance and insecurity in Taraba state.
4. To assess government response to security challenges in the state.

This study will therefore pose some pertinent questions:

1. What is the state of security in Taraba State since the return to civil rule in 1999?
2. What is the state of governance in Taraba State since 1999?
3. What are the key drivers of insecurity in Taraba State since 1999?
4. To what extent is insecurity in the state linked to governance failure in the state?
5. How does the state of governance influence security in the state?
6. What are the challenges in state and civil society responses to insecurity in Taraba State?
7. What needs to be done to engender sustainable peace and security in the state?
8. In what ways can improvements in governance yield peace and security dividends in the state?

Method of data collection

This study is based on a survey conducted in Taraba state over a period of two months from 18th August to 24 October 2014. The main sources of data used in this study were key informant interviews (KII), focus group discussions (FGD), responses to questionnaires and interviews with a cross section of citizens. Twenty KIIs with persons occupying leadership positions in government, civil society and the private sector were conducted, while six FGDs were held. Secondary materials such as books, journals, articles, memoranda to Commissions of Inquiry into various conflicts, and reports on specific cases were consulted. Resources from CLEEN Foundation and statistics compiled by

the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) and National Population Commission (NPC) have also been very useful.

Purposive sampling was adopted for the KIIs, FGDs and administration of the questionnaire. The criteria for the selection of the local governments where the study was conducted were geographical spread and representation of urban and rural settings, the span of existence of the LGA, its size, population, infrastructure and accessibility. Also factored into the selection process were the risk factor, and the prevalence of insecurity issues. One rural and one urban LGA was selected in two of the three senatorial districts in the State, while in the Northern Senatorial District, only the state capital, Jalingo, was selected, giving a total of five LGAs as follows: Jalingo in Taraba North, Sardauna and Bali in Taraba Central Senatorial District, and Takum and Ussa in Taraba South Senatorial District (Table 1).

Thirty questionnaires were administered in each LGA except Jalingo, which had 60. The questionnaires were used to elicit information on four key governance and security areas, namely political, legal/judicial, administrative and socio-economic. Interviews were recorded with hand-written notes, and where the respondents permitted, photographs were taken.

The data collected using questionnaires were analysed using the SPSS statistical package, while content-analysis was deployed for the data obtained from the individual interviews and focus groups, and it was subjected to descriptive analysis.

One of the greatest challenges encountered in the course of this research was the reluctance of respondents, especially civil servants in the state, to participate. Civil society organizations, particularly youth organizations and road transport workers unions exhibited high levels of enthusiasm because of their desire

for change. By contrast, many civil servants were not enthusiastic and showed little interest in the subject matter. Women's groups also seemed uninterested, adopting a "This doesn't concern us" attitude, and taking refuge behind tradition and religion to treat governance and security as a 'men's affair', since the men were the ones in power, and it was men who took all the decisions concerning governance and security in the state. This attitude is not unconnected with the dominance of Taraba's political terrain by men. Since the return to civilian rule the state has elected only one female Senator (Senator Aisha Jummai Alhassan - Taraba North) and only one elected female representative in the State House of Assembly (Hon. Mrs. Rashida Mohammed, Nguroje constituency) out of 24 legislators. In the state executive council, there have never been more than three female commissioners at any given time. Out of 163 elected councillors, only sixteen were women and this number was only achieved after the then First Lady had appealed to the ruling Peoples Democratic Party to ensure that women were given an opportunity to contest elections.

Background of Taraba State

Taraba State was created out of the now-defunct Gongola State by the Federal Military Government led by General Ibrahim Babangida, on the 27th August 1991 along with eight other states. It derives its name from the River Taraba, which is one of the main tributaries of River Benue. Historically, Taraba State comprises the pre-1976 divisions of Muri, Mambilla and Wukari. The state is the second largest state in terms of landmass in Nigeria. It is located in the southern part of north-eastern Nigeria along the eastern borderland between Nigeria and

Cameroon. The state lies roughly between latitude 6°25'N and 9°30'N and between longitudes 9°30'E and 11°45'E. It is bordered on the west by Nassarawa and Plateau States, to the north by Bauchi and Gombe States, by Adamawa State to the northeast, and by Benue State to the south-west. Taraba State is bounded on the south and south-east by the Republic of Cameroon (an international boundary) that runs for a distance of 437 km (Oruonye and Abbas, 2011). The porous nature of Nigeria's international frontiers allows for the unregulated movement of people, goods, as well as arms and ammunition across the borders. The state covers a land area of about 60,291km² with a population of 2,300,736 people according to the 2006 census.

Taraba State has abundant natural resources as aptly captured by the sobriquet "Nature's gift to the Nation". It is well endowed with climate and vegetation types that range from a humid climate and forest vegetation in the south, to a seasonal wet and dry climate and savannah vegetation in the north.

Despite these resources, the people suffer from poverty. Bashir (1993 and 2000) described the state as the neglected and grossly underdeveloped part of the former Gongola state. Because of its rugged topography, lack of access roads from other parts of the country, and the neglect it suffered from past administrations, the state remains largely peripheral to the nation's economic and political life (Bashir 1993 and 2000).

Population and Ethnic groups

According to the 2006 National Population Census, the population of Taraba State was 2,300,736, of whom 1,199,849 (52.2%) were males, and 1,100,887 (47.8%) were females; a surplus of 98,962 more males than females. This imbalance gives

a gender ratio of 48:52. The state's population growth rate is 3.1% per annum (Oruonye and Abbas 2011). Based on this, it is projected to be 2,948,300 in 2014. The state has a very youthful population as shown in Table 1, with 47.4% of the population falling into the less productive group aged between 0-14 years, while the working age population (15-59 years) constitute 49.6% of the population. Those aged 60 years and above constitute 3% of the population. Of the working age population, those aged 30-59 are considered the most productive, but these constitute only 23.9% of the total population. This large population of young makes gives a high dependency ratio for the state, and this in turn, makes saving and investment difficult. The high proportion of youth also means that there is a high demand for educational facilities and certain types of health care. The implication is that Taraba State ought to invest heavily in providing for the health and educational development of its youthful population. Limited resources mean that these basic needs can only be met at the expense of investment in infrastructural development and industrialization to facilitate productive economic ventures. At the family level, the high population of youth impacts heavily on individual incomes, especially with the extended family system, making saving and investment difficult, and thereby perpetuating the vicious cycle of poverty.

Table 1: Age Distribution of Population in Taraba State (2007)

S/NO	Gender	Population	Percentage
1	Male	1,199,849	52.2
2	Female	1,100,887	47.8
3	Total	2,294,800	100
Age group			
4	0 – 4	352,012	15.3
5	5 – 14	738,536	32.1
6	15 – 29	591,289	25.7
7	30 – 44	379,621	16.5
8	45 – 59	170,254	7.4
9	60 – 64	25,308	1.1
10	65 – 69	11,503	0.5
11	70 and above	32,210	1.4

Source: National Population Commission Abuja.

Taraba State is one of the most ethnically diverse states in the Federation, with over 80 different ethnic groups, including Mumuye, Ichen, Wurkun, Mambilla, Kuteb, Chamba, Jukun, Tiv, Yandang, Fulani, Jenjo, Kunini, Ndoro, Kambu, Kaka, Bandawa, Munga, Zo and Banbuka. Other ethnicities such as Igbo and Yoruba are also found in the state. Hausa is a commonly spoken language in the state irrespective of ethnicity. The state is also religiously diverse with large populations of Christians and Muslims. Although this ethnic diversity could have been a source of strength, it has been a source of conflict that has stalled development. Most of such ethnic conflicts are rooted in historical animosity, mutual suspicion and distrust among the different ethnic groups, but these divisions have been

exploited by politicians for electoral advantage, thereby deepening differences among the people.

Political and administrative structure

At the time of its creation, Taraba State comprised only nine Local Government Areas, namely Jalingo, Zing, Lau, Karim-Lamido, Sardauna, Bali, Gashaka, Wukari and Takum. In September 1991, three more LGAs, namely Ibi, Yorro and Donga, were created, while in 1996, a further four LGAs: Ardo-Kola, Kurmi, Ussa and Gassol, were created. The state presently has sixteen LGAs administered by elected Chairmen.

Taraba State has three Senatorial Districts. Of these, the Northern district comprises six LGAs: Jalingo, Yorro, Ardo Kola, Karim Lamido, Lau and Zing. The Southern has five LGAs, namely Wukari, Takum, Ibi, Donga and Ussa, and the Central district also has five LGAs, namely Bali, Gassol, Kurmi, Gashaka and Sardauna.

Apart from these LGAs, Taraba State has eighteen district areas, which are units based on cultural factors that emphasize ethnic affiliations (Bashir, 2000). Bashir further observed that unlike the LGAs, which operate officially and are constitutionally recognized as the third tier of government, the districts are administered traditionally through a hierarchy of chiefs or emirs, village and ward heads. The state has seventeen chiefdoms or emirates headed by chiefs or emirs of various grades. The traditional setup of the district level administration serves as an important link between the grassroots population and the local government administration. This arrangement, though not yet sufficiently exploited, appears to have helped to

reduce tension and conflict among some of the various ethnic groups in the state (Bashir, 2000).

Governance structure in the state

The formal structure of governance in Taraba State consists of the Governor, who is the state's chief executive, assisted by the Deputy Governor, the Secretary to the State Government, and Commissioners who make up the State Executive Council, which is the highest governing body in the state. In addition, there are Special Advisers and Special Assistants. The Governor also has primary responsibility for security in the state, for which there is a Security Committee chaired by the Governor who, like many of his counterparts all over Nigeria, is often styled 'Chief Security Officer'. To facilitate this, the Taraba State Governor has a special security vote which has recently been increased from ₦80 million naira per month to ₦200 million naira (Ehichioya, ND).

The chief executive officer at local government level is the Chairman, who also has primary responsibility for security at that level. He is assisted by the Vice Chairman, the Secretary to the Local Government and five Supervisory Councillors who together make up the eight-person executive council at LGA level. Each LGA has a security committee which is backed by law and chaired by the Chairman of the LGA. Other members are the Vice Chairman, the Secretary of the LGA, three members nominated by the Chairman, the most senior Police officer in the LGA, the most senior Customs officer, the most senior Immigration officer, the most senior military officer and the most senior officer of the State Security Service all within the LGA; a representative of the Muslim Council, a representative of

the Christian Association of Nigeria (CAN) and a representative of the traditional rulers/council.

Each security committee holds monthly meetings to review the security situation in its area. When the need arises, emergency meetings are held. Ordinarily the committee uses the resources at its disposal, but if there are security challenges, it seeks funds from the State Government through the Bureau for Local Government and Chieftaincy Affairs. The Local Government Chairman also has a security vote which he shares with the security operatives in his LGA to facilitate their work. From time to time the Chairman also holds special meetings with representatives of various communities in the LGA, such as the traditional leaders (ArDOS and Jauros), which affords such community representatives the opportunity to report any security threat or challenge in their domain (Interview, 2014c).

At the district/village level, there are the traditional council headed by chiefs, emirs, village heads and title-holders in the chieftom/emirate. The traditional council plays an advisory role to the local and state government on customary and security matters.

There is a legislative body at both state and local council level. At the state level this is the State House of Assembly, while at local government level, it consists of elected representatives from local council constituencies, namely ward councillors. The legislative arm of government is responsible for making byelaws at the council level, while at the state level, it makes laws, approves appointments and exercises oversight function with regard to the activities of the executive arm. The legislative arm is headed by an elected Speaker of the House of Assembly.

The judicial arm of government, headed by the Chief Judge, consists of High Courts and Magistrates Courts, while the Sharia court is headed by a Grand Khadi.

The 1999 Constitution provides for the separation of powers, and for checks and among these three arms of government. Since the return to civil rule in 1999, Taraba State has been governed by the Peoples Democratic Party (PDP): Rev. Jolly Nyame (29th May, 1999-29th May, 2007), followed by Danbaba Suntai (29th May 2007 to date). The PDP has also produced all the Senators and Members of the Federal House of Representatives from the state since 1999.

Socio-economic situation in Taraba State

About 80 per cent of Taraba State's working population is directly engaged in agriculture, while 20 per cent are engaged in other economic activities, including white collar jobs (TSEEDS, 2004). The crops most commonly cultivated in the state include cereals such as maize and rice; legumes such as groundnut and beans, and tubers such as cassava and yam. Taraba State has the largest land area in the country devoted to the cultivation of sweet potato (30.72 ha), with an output of 245,800 metric tons in 2009 (NPAFS, 2009). Tree crops in the area include palm oil, banana/plantain and orange. Cash crops produced in the state include coffee, tea and groundnut. The State's agricultural sector is dominated by small scale rural farmers.

The state has over 52 discovered solid mineral resources, with the highest hydroelectricity power potential in the country. It is also a tourist haven with the largest National Park in West Africa (Gashaka Gumti National Park).

Fishing is an important economic activity in the state, with an average annual production of 1,987 metric tonnes (TSEED, 2004). The daily fish catch in some LGAs such as Ibi, Lau and Donga, is about 3,000 kg. Over 30,000 families are fully engaged in fishing (TSEED, 2004). The state has one of Nigeria's highest concentrations of livestock, with over 10 million herds of cattle, most of them on the Mambilla Plateau. About 30 per cent of the state's population is engaged in pastoralism (TSEED, 2004). Lumbering is also carried out in some parts of the state, such as Sardauna, Gashaka, Kurmi and Ussa LGAs.

About 70 per cent of the population lives in rural areas. In a study on the structure of rurality in Nigeria by Madu (2008), Taraba State ranks seventh in the country, after Gombe, Kogi, Plateau, Bauchi, Kwara and Kebbi States. A rural state, with a rurality index of 4.973, less than 25 per cent of the population is engaged in white collar work or non-agricultural activity. The state has a high rate of unemployment, which was put at 26.8% in 2009.

Poverty is especially severe in the rural areas where social services and infrastructure are limited or non-existent. The majority of those who live in rural areas are poor, and depend on agriculture for food and income. Taraba state has only three Microfinance Banks out of the 866 in the country (Tobi and Akani, 2014). The Nigerian Bureau of Statistics (NBS) 2010 poverty profile report shows that only 31.1% of the people in Taraba State fall within the non-poor category, while 68.9% are core poor (Table 2).

The state ranks low in all major development and household indicators (Table 2). The National Demographic and Household Survey (NDHS) 2014 report shows that 95.6% of women in the

state do not own a house and 93.5% do not own any land. 43 per cent of men in the state do not own a house and 53.1% do not own any land.

Table 2: Selected Social Statistics for Taraba State

Education	Primary School Enrolment 533,130 (2008)
	Secondary school enrolment 122,000 (2008)
	No. of Primary schools 1,502 (2008)
	No. of Primary School Teachers 15,607 (2008)
	No. of Secondary schools 91 (2008)
	No. of Secondary School Teachers 2,682 (2008)
Health	No. of Registered Doctors 58 (2008)
	No. of Registered Nurses 846 (2008)
	No. of Pharmacist 96 (2008)
	Total Health Facility (Public - 416, private - 195) 611 (2008)
Unemployment	Rate of unemployment 26.8% (2008)
Poverty profile	Core Poor 68.9 % (2010)
	Non Poor 31.1 % (2010)
Security	No. of Policemen 5,054 (2007)
	No. of Police stations 71 (2007)
	No. of Police posts 123 (2007)
	No. of Village post 33 (2007)
	Ratio of Population to one Policeman 455 (2007)
	Reported armed robbery 80 (2008)
	Prison Inmate Population 957 (2008)
	Prison capacity 1,650 (2008)

Source: NBC/CBN/NCC Social Economic Survey on Nigeria, 2008.

Taraba State's internally generated revenue and its statutory allocation from the Federation Account has almost tripled in less than a decade, as has its annual budget (Table 3). However this has not translated into any meaningful impact on the welfare of

the people of the state, whether by the provision of infrastructure, facilities or employment opportunities. Table 3 shows that the state spends more on recurrent expenditure than capital expenditure. This has implications for infrastructural development in the area. Key sectors in the state such as agriculture, education and health are still begging for government attention, a factor reflected in the NDHS 2014 report which shows that 70 per cent of people in the state experience difficulty in accessing health care facilities and 35.6 % of school age children are out of school.

Table 3: Taraba State Budget in the last decade

Year	Budget	Capital Expenditure	Recurrent Expenditure	Federal Statutory Allocation	Int. Generated Revenue (IGR)
2006	₦24,231,108,740	₦15,931,108,740	₦8,300,000,000	₦14,767,464,479	₦2,189,300,574
2007	₦31,934,660,280	₦21,132,715,725	₦10,801,944,555	₦25,009,440,790	₦2,240,117,675
2008	₦37,560,261,475	₦23,185,572,898	₦14,374,688,577	₦3,057,226,300	₦2,069,369,535
2009	₦45,300,000,000	₦24,087,207,025	₦21,212,792,975	₦18,336,483,425	₦2,331,513,355
2010	₦64,144,351,808	₦19,207,436,062	₦44,936,915,746	₦25,237,654,156	₦3,323,509,720
2011	₦58,759,148,453	₦13,762,722,745	₦25,255,043,954	₦25,664,351,440	₦2,500,000,000
2012	₦73,852,442,531	₦38,251,329,691	₦35,601,112,840	₦42,000,000,000	₦6,083,306,923
2013	₦73,415,972,736	₦34,585,885,064	₦38,830,087,672	₦42,359,199,958	₦8,833,710,016
2014	₦79,665,775,220	₦37,964,216,630	₦41,701,558,590	₦42,517,659,683	₦5,137,415,197

Source: Taraba State Ministry of Finance, Jalingo.

Educationally, the state is very backward. Although the number of schools and of pupils and students has increased since the 1999 transition to civil rule, the quality of teaching in the schools leaves much to be desired. This is reflected in the fact that Taraba State has not recorded more than a 16 per cent pass in secondary school terminal examinations such as the West African Secondary School Certificate Examination (WASSCE)

and National Examination Council (NECO) in the last decade (Oruonye, 2014). According to the National Population Commission, the distribution of population age six and above in Taraba State by literacy status stood at 856,756 (499,141 male and 357,615 female), which is 64.4% of children within the schooling age-group. This information is presented in Table 4. A National Literacy Survey (2010) conducted by the NBS estimated adult literacy rates in Taraba State at 23.3% and illiteracy rates at 76.7% (Table 4). Apart from the obvious benefits of being able to read and write, literacy also enables citizens to participate effectively in the governance of their community, but this opportunity is denied the large youthful population of the state who lack qualitative education, vocational training or requisite skills. With the high poverty rate of 68.9% and an unemployment rate of 26.8%, these excluded youths can become easy tools for conflict, crime and violence – portending a serious security threat.

Table 4: Distribution of Population age 6 and above schooling status

S/No	Schooling Status	Population
1	Never attended school	848,028
2	Attended in the past but not now	309,452
3	Attending Primary School	271,359
4	Attending Junior Secondary School	88,324
5	Attending Senior Secondary School	112,737
6	Attending Tertiary School	159,278

	Educational Attainment	Population
1	None	936,642
2	Nursery	210,092
3	Primary	156,596
4	Junior Secondary School	133,076
5	Senior Secondary School	251,552
6	OND/NCE	68,457
7	University Graduate	23,541
8	Post Graduate	5,337
9	Others	3,885

Source: National Population Commission Abuja, 2006.

According to the CLEEN Foundation nationwide crime survey, views on corruption in Taraba State show that 36.9% believe that it is decreasing while 51.2% believe that it is on the increase (Alemika, 2013). However, only 9% reported demands for bribes by government officials; the lowest in the country. The crime survey report also shows that at 1%, experience of armed robbery in Taraba State is the lowest in Nigeria. 10 per cent of the respondents to the CLEEN Foundation survey have experienced crime, with mobile phone theft making up 41 per cent of reported crimes, and physical assault making up 18 per cent. 14 per cent of respondents to that survey had reported crimes to the police. Despite this, 99 per cent of Taraba citizens suffer from fear of crime: the highest rate in the whole country (Alemika, 2013).

The most common forms of criminal victimization suffered by household members in Taraba State range from robbery (0.6%), domestic violence (13.7%), physical assault (3.6%), theft of money (26.8%) and burglary (8.9%) (Alemika, 2013). The personal crime victimization was reported to be low (10 per cent).

Crime victimization surveys by CLEEN Foundation in 2011 show that perceptions of safety from crime and violence now, compared to the past ten years, ranges from worse (30.4%) to better (40.5%). In 2007, Taraba State had 5,054 policemen, with three Area Commands, 17 Divisional headquarters, 71 Police stations, 123 Police posts and 33 Village posts. This gives a ratio of one policeman to 455 persons.

Findings from the present survey

Governance in Taraba State since 1999

Rev. Jolly Nyame was the first civilian governor of Taraba State after the 1999 return to civil rule. Previously he had been elected as governor in 1992 (which term was truncated by the November 1993 military coup), but he served two full terms for the eight years from 29th May 1999 to 29th May 2007. On assuming office in 1999, Nyame inherited security challenges from his military predecessor which had led to loss of life and destruction of property, hospitals and other infrastructure. Nyame set out to improve Taraba State's infrastructure. He built a modern specialist hospital in Jalingo equipped with state-of-the-art facilities, and referral hospitals in other parts of the state. An extensive road network was developed in Jalingo, including an 11 km by-pass which he named after himself, while housing units were built for civil servants. Unfinished projects from the Nyame era include a modern market and an airport, which has not been commissioned up to the time of writing. Governor Nyameh instituted projects designed to develop human capital, such as training programmes and the construction of a modern sporting complex. An urban transport scheme which provided youths in the state with buses, taxi cabs and motorcycles had the

triple objectives of easing movement, providing cheap transportation and providing employment. On the governance front, Nyame ensured that local government council allocations were released regularly. Furthermore, a broad spectrum of the ethnic groups in the state, were represented in his cabinet.

When Danbaba Suntai succeeded Nyame as the governor of the state, in order to speed up work on the proposed Taraba State University, the State College of Education was relocated to Zing. The Taraba State Polytechnic was similarly relocated from Wukari to Suntai (his home town), in order to create space for the newly approved Federal University of Wukari.

In the health sector, work commenced on the construction of a modern school of Nursing and Midwifery, while Takum General Hospital, which had been destroyed during the ethnic crisis of 1997, was rebuilt and equipped with modern facilities. To improve the rehabilitation of roads, the Taraba Road Construction and Maintenance Agency (TARCMA) was established, and it not only contributed to the expansion of urban roads in Jalingo, it also constructed four kilometres of roads in each of the state's 16 LGAs. The intra-state road network was improved by the construction of the Jalingo-Suntai-Garba-Chede road, the further extension of which to Bali, Gashaka and Sardauna LGAs is still in progress. The Agricultural Products Marketing Agency was established to buy excess food crops at reasonable prices, to encourage farmers to maintain and improve production.

Danbaba's administration was seen as strongly committed to improving the welfare of women and children, and indeed, the 'Children's Parliament' was established during his first term.

In a bid to monitor the effective management of financial resources at local government level, Danbaba merged local council accounts with those of the state government in the 'Joint Account' (JAC). This gave the state government effective control over all statutory allocations to LGAs from the Federation Account. The effect was to almost completely paralyze governance at the local council level, effectively reducing LGAs to extensions of state ministries, instead of a separate tier of government. Oruonye (2013) observed that the incessant dissolution of local councils by the state and imposition of caretaker committees, together with the Joint Account, have eroded the principles of democracy at the local council level. The thus incapacitated local councils have found it difficult to tackle the many challenges they face, such as the high level of illiteracy, poor medical facilities, lack of financial resources, lack of social amenities, lack of participation and involvement of local communities in governance, as well as general indiscipline among local government workers. This failure and lack of social service delivery alienated the people at the grass roots (Oruonye, 2013).

Governor Danbaba Suntai was seen as being passionate about maintaining peace and protecting the lives and property of Taraba State residents. Indeed, many of those interviewed during this study asserted that there were no cases of recurring crisis during the greater part of his tenure, and ascribed the relative peace enjoyed in the state to the Governor's proactive approach to security-related issues. For example, when it appeared that the annual *Kuchecheb* cultural festival in Takum LGA might erupt in violence, the Governor prohibited it. Residents observed that once there were signs or rumours of any security problem or threat anywhere in the state, security operatives would

immediately be sent to contain the situation. The Governor was also proactive about making peace, and was able to successfully resolve long-standing inherited chieftaincy disputes such as those in Sardauna and Takum LGAs. To support security agencies in the state, 29 Mitsubishi pickup vans and 5 Toyota Hilux vehicles with Motorola multi-security utility systems were purchased for joint police and military patrols at the porous border between Taraba State and the Republic of Cameroon.

Despite these efforts, Governor Danbaba Suntai faced major challenges. First was interference by his predecessor. Having assisted Danbaba to succeed him even though Danbaba did not contest for the party's ticket during the primaries, ex-Governor Nyame was said to have dictated practically everything about governance in the state until the inevitable rift. Those appointed by Danbaba after he broke away from Nyame were seen as more urbane and educated, while Danbaba vowed that it would no longer be "business as usual" in the state (Jaiyeola, 2014). However, during his second term, Danbaba fell out with his deputy, Alhaji Sani Abubakar Danladi. As a result, Danladi was impeached and removed by the State House of Assembly, and Alhaji Umar Garba was appointed as Deputy Governor in his place in October 2012.

One week after Deputy Governor Garba was appointed; Governor Danbaba sustained serious injuries when a plane he was piloting crashed at Yola International Airport in Adamawa State. Three weeks later, on the 14th of November 2012, the Taraba State House of Assembly made Umar Garba Acting Governor. The ensuing political crisis brought with it new governance challenges. Although the Acting Governor maintained that he was holding brief for the Governor, when

Danbaba returned from his overseas treatment in August 2013, he dissolved Garba's 13-member cabinet and appointed a new Secretary to the State Government (Mr. Gebon T. Kataps). Acting Governor Garba however challenged these actions and ordered the affected commissioners to remain in office. Governance in Taraba State was thus at the mercy of two factions – the Governor's and the Acting Governor's – with two State Executive Councils (Ayodele, 2013) and corresponding division in the State House of Assembly. Each faction schemed to control the machinery of government, but neither litigation over the constitutional position, nor the intervention of the PDP to broker peace, was able to resolve the impasse.

In the run-up to the 2015 general election, the political scene in Taraba State was marked by regionalism, religion and ethnicity. The Muri Emirate, which extends across both the Northern and Central zones, has dominated Taraba State politics since its inception, leaving those in the Southern zone agitating that it was their turn to produce the next Governor. On the religious front, Muslims were dissatisfied that no Muslim had been elected Governor since the creation of the state. For this reason they threw their support behind either Acting Governor Garba, or a Muslim from the Southern zone. Respondents were of the view that a combination of factors such as finance, popularity, party platform, ethnicity and religion would be needed to win power in the state in the 2015 elections.¹

¹ In the end, Darius Ishaku won the PDP's ticket and eventually emerged as winner of the 2015 gubernatorial elections.

Political dimensions of governance

This section reviews the respondents' satisfaction with the way government functions in the state as regards the legislature, accessibility of leaders, community participation and civil society awareness. 86.1% of respondents to the questionnaires administered for this study had voted in the 2011 gubernatorial election, while 13.9% had not voted. Of this 13.9% who did not vote, 81 per cent did not give any reason for not voting.

42.2% of the respondents were of the opinion that their elected representatives misuse their power and authority to a large extent, 25 per cent felt they did so to some extent, while 9.4 were of the view that they did not misuse their power and authority, with 22.2% unable to give an opinion.

50.6% of the respondents believed that corruption among government officials is extremely high, 27.8% believed it is high, and 10 per cent felt that corruption was neither high nor low. Only 0.6 said that corruption among government officials is low, with 3.3 % saying that it is very low, while 7.8% do not know. The perceived high level of corruption among government officials has implications for service delivery, and this in turn can heighten insecurity in the state.

Table 5: Respondents' perception of Corruption among Government Officials

S/No	Perception of Corruption	Frequency	Percentage
1	Extremely high	91	50.6
2	High	50	27.8
3	Neither high nor low	18	10
4	Low	1	0.6
5	Very low	6	3.3
6	Do not know	14	7.8
7	Total	180	100

Source: Fieldwork, 2014

18.3% of respondents are of the opinion that the state legislature's performance is very bad, 20.6% that it is bad, 20.6% that it is neither bad nor good, 25 per cent that it is good and 7.2% that it is very good, while 8.3% expressed no opinion (Fig. 1).




Figure 1: Respondents Opinion on the Functioning of the Legislature

16.7% of respondents are of the opinion that the leadership provided by the Governor and his commissioners is not effective at all, 14.4% that it is not effective, 43.3% that it is averagely effective, while only 13.9% believe it is effective and 7.8% that it is very effective, with 3.9% saying that they do not know.

One aspect affecting perceptions about the quality of leadership is the amount of access citizens have to those in positions of authority, that is, the ease or difficulty experienced in making contact with government officials. The respondents'

rating on this aspect as regards the Governor and commissioners at state level, and council Chairmen at local council level, is presented in Table 6. 26.7% of the respondents are of the opinion that the Governor and his Commissioners are not accessible at all, 42.8% say that they are accessible with some difficulty, while 14.4% admit that they are accessible and 8.3% find them easily accessible, while 7.8% could not say. Despite the idea that local government is supposed to be closer to the people, this trend of inaccessibility is replicated at the local council level reflecting the belief of most respondents that governance at the local council level exists in name only, and has little or no impact on the lives of rural dwellers. 17.2% of the respondents were of the opinion that elected local government officials are not accessible at all, 48.9% are of the opinion that they are accessible with some difficulty while only 16.7% of the respondents believe that they are accessible, 11.7% easily accessible. 5.5% said that they do not know.

Table 6: Respondents' Perception of Government Accessibility

S/No	Response	Accessibility to governor and commissioners	Accessibility to Local council authorities
1	Not accessible at all	26.7%	17.2%
2	Accessible with difficulty	42.8%	48.9%
3	Accessible	14.4%	16.7%
4	Easily accessible	8.3%	11.7%
5	Do not know	7.8%	5.5%
6	Total	100	100

Source: Fieldwork, 2014

On the quality of the functioning of the governor and his cabinet, 18.3% of the respondents are of the opinion that it is very bad, 15.6% that it is bad, 26.1% see it as neither good nor bad, while 31.1 % believe that it is good and 4.4% that it is very good, while 4.4% do not know. This trend is also replicated at local council level where 26.1% of the respondents are of the opinion that the functioning of the local government authority is very bad, 26.9% that it is bad, 18.3% that it is neither bad nor good, while only 17.8% say that it is good and 7.2% very good, with 5.5% saying that they do not know. The functioning of the Governor and his cabinet is rated better than that of local government authorities (see Table 7).

Table 7: Respondents rating of the functioning of Government at state and council levels

S/No	Response	Functioning of Governor and cabinet	Functioning of Local government authority
1	Very bad	18.3 %	26.1 %
2	Bad	15.6 %	26.1 %
3	Neither good and bad	26.1 %	18.3 %
4	Good	31.1%	17.8 %
5	Very good	4.4 %	7.2 %
6	I do not know/I can't say	4.4 %	5.5 %
7	Total	100	100

Source: Fieldwork, 2014

31.7% of the respondents hold the view that members of their communities do not participate in local government activities, 38.9% say that they participate to some extent while 17.8% believed that members of their communities participate

fully, with 11.7% expressing no view. This low participation reinforces the earlier opinions about local government councils, by which they are seen as mere extensions of state ministries, lacking the capacity to face the many different challenges confronting them, and being neither responsive nor accountable to the people. Some respondents recognised that the participation of citizens in the political process is an essential part of good governance, as it helps to improve public resource management and reduces levels of corruption by making public servants and political leaders accountable to the people. In FGDs, discussants observed that neither the country nor the state have made much progress since the return to civil rule. One commented:


“If we consider the amount of money that both the federal and state governments have earned since the return to democratic rule and compare it with what is on the ground as work done, then we will see that we have not made any progress. There is no solution to our present problem because our political leaders are very corrupt and non patriotic. An individual can embezzle a state’s resources and walk away free. The security operatives and judiciary are more or less errand boys and working tools that help the political class accomplish their ambition to loot the state treasury. I wish that the country was still under the colonial rule because our political leaders have betrayed the trust and confidence of the people.” (FGD, 2014a).

Legal/Judicial issues in governance

This section examines law and order issues as well as the perception of the citizens about the functioning of the judiciary and law enforcement agencies and institutions. The findings of the study shows that most respondents (38.3%) consider communal and ethno-religious violence to be the greatest

security challenge in Taraba State, 19.5% believe it is petty crime/theft, while only 18.3% consider extremism, terrorism and insurgency to be the greatest threat (See Figure 2).

Fig. 2: Respondents' opinion of the nature of crime/security challenges in the area



14.4% gave the state's judicial system a very bad rating while 19.4% rated it bad, 31.7% neither good nor bad, while 22.8% believe it is good and 4.4% that it is very good, while and 7.2% do not know. Only 10.6 of the respondents strongly disagree that the state's judicial system is corrupt and 16.7% disagree. 26.1% neither disagree nor agree while 38.9% strongly agree that the judicial system is corrupt while 7.8% say they do not know.

Drivers of insecurity in Taraba State

Several factors have raised levels of insecurity in Taraba State, and these include chieftaincy disputes, through land and boundary disputes, leadership problems, unemployment, poverty and economic disparity. These were identified during the study, and expanded upon during Key Informant Interviews and Focus Group Discussions.

Conflict over Traditional Chieftaincy

One such conflict has its origins in the rivalry between the Kuteb and Jukun-Chamba in Takum LGA. While the Kuteb people claim to be the original inhabitants of Takum and see the Jukun-Chamba ethnic groups as migrants, the Jukun-Chamba claim that it is they who were the original inhabitants of the area. Following the death of the traditional chief of Takum (Ukwe) in 1997, the Jukum-Chamba ethnic group insisted that it was their turn to produce the next chief. The fierce resistance of the Kuteb led to violent conflict in Takum.

The traditional chieftaincy of Sardauna LGA also witnessed a dispute between the indigenous Mambilla ethnic group and the resident Fulani that lasted for many years. This dispute was successfully resolved by the state government, and a new Emir has been installed.

Boundary Disputes

Disputes over the siting of the boundary between Benue and Taraba States have manifested in disregard for boundary demarcations and instability in the political control of the towns and villages on the disputed borders. The crisis over the boundary between Takum and Ussa LGAs following the 1996 creation of local governments led to violent conflict and the

forceful displacement of some people who were left deprived and disenfranchised in their place of birth.

The creation of Ussa LGA in 1996 was itself an attempt to resolve the problem of ethnicity in Takum LGA. All the Kuteb communities in Takum LGA were constituted into the newly created Ussa LGA without any consideration for geographical proximity, causing the emergence of orphaned communities. For example, the four communities of Jenuwa Gida, Jenuwa Kogi, Kwambai and Bika, which were less than five kilometres away from Takum, were incorporated into the new Ussa LGA in a way that made no sense. The problems caused by this 1996 LGA creation caused a conflict that lasted for three years. Eventually, those affected – who were left neither in Takum nor in Ussa LGA – were able to persuade the state government to make a fixed commitment to the area, which in March 2008, resulted in the enactment of legislation creating the Yangtu Special Development Area (YSDA). Commenting on this law, Governor Danbaba Suntai declared:

“From the commencement of this order and notwithstanding the provision of section 87 (1) and (2) of the Taraba State Local Government Law 2000, the village areas/communities of Kwambai, Bika, Jenuwa Kogi and Jenuwa Gida are hereby constituted and created as a Development Area to be known and called YANGTU Special Development Area (YSDA).” (cited in Oruonye and Abbas, 2011).

The state government therefore provided funds for the establishment of an administrative structure and the furnishing of a temporary secretariat, and the YSDA presently receives a direct budgetary allocation from the state government. However, the affected people have continued to express a desire to either

belong to an LGA or be constituted into a separate and independent LGA. During the sixteen years that this problem has persisted they have written to the National Assembly protesting against their exclusion from local government administration, pointing out that since the last LGA creation, voters in three wards in the area can only vote in Presidential, National Assembly and Governorship elections, but cannot vote or be voted for in State House of Assembly or local government elections.

Grazing/Farmland

The January 2002 dispute between local farming communities and Fulani herdsmen over grazing lands in Tonga Maina village on the Mambilla Plateau displaced hundreds of people. According to the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR), an estimated 17,000 Nigerians – mostly Fulanis – fled to the Republic of Cameroun in the wake of the conflict (IPCR, 2006).

In 2014 Fulani herdsmen and Tiv/Jukun crop farmers clashed in the southern part of the state, with the Fulani herdsmen being accused of moving from village to village, killing and burning the houses of those perceived to be Tiv or Jukun.

Unemployment and poverty

The high rate of youth unemployment in the state, particularly in the southern part where violence has been on the increase in the last decade, is a major driver of conflict in the state. The dangers posed by unemployment are worsened by increasing poverty in the state. Where the majority of the people are jobless and hungry, yet the political options offer nothing new, those at

the grass roots express feelings of being at the same time under threat, and abandoned. In this regard, the results of this study agree with previous studies (ActionAid, 2008), that conflict is caused by the systemic and structural injustice of the institutional framework.

Inadequate leadership

The inability of leaders to bring the different peoples in the state together for dialogue also contributes to crises in some parts of the state, particularly in the Wukari-Ibi area. Although the Jukun believe that their traditional ruler, the Aku Uka is supreme and that his pronouncement on any issue is final and must be accepted by all irrespective of position or attainment in life, the Aku Uka has not exploited this position to bring about lasting peace. Views expressed by those interviewed for this study indicated that his interventions had rather had the opposite effect. For example, the crisis of 2nd September 2014 followed a peace meeting at the Aku Uka's palace. A participant in a FGD said:

"Several times we hear of peace meetings and immediately after such meetings, crisis will break out. The participants to such meetings and their deliberations or outcomes are not made public. How would the people know who and who represented them and whether the representation was adequate and their interest presented in such meetings?" (FGD, 2014b).

Another participant alleged that the present crisis at Wukari started with the accession of the present Aku Uka, noting that his predecessor, Aku Atoshi, had representatives of all the ethnic groups in Wukari in his cabinet, but that the present Aku Uka had not continued this practice.

Cultural differences

The disposition of the people in terms of their culture, religion and poverty contribute to insecurity. This is where particular groups dominate the political arena of a community in terms of the 'have' and 'have not'. The masses are neglected, as the politicians distance themselves from the people. People resort to violence to get their voice heard by those in governance whenever they perceive any unjust policies or government decisions that do not favour them. This is worsened when such government is not accessible to the masses and there is no effective mechanism for seeking redress.

Economic disparity/Ethno-religious tensions

Economic disparity among different ethnic groups in Taraba State also acts as a driver of conflict. The Fulani, who were considered to be migrants on the Mambilla Plateau, are said to have become wealthy and to have taken control of a large expanse of land for grazing their livestock. The indigenous Mambilla ethnic group on the other hand, who constitute 90 per cent of the population, complain of having little land left to cultivate. A similar situation exists in the Wukari area where the migrant Hausa Muslims have become very enterprising and successful in business.

However, although the real foundation for some of the conflicts in the state may be economic disparity, the differences highlighted by this disparity can assume the guise of religion or ethnicity, and are often manipulated in this way.

Alubo (2011) observed that ethnic conflicts in Taraba State are long standing and predate the birth of modern Nigeria (p. 95). This is particularly so with reference to the Tiv and Jukun

ethnic groups. Historical accounts show that the major bones of contention between the two groups are land related, and control over economic resources and political power. This contention over land led to violence between the two ethnic groups in 1990-1992, with widespread killings and whole villages destroyed on each side. (Avav and Myegba, 1992).

The conflict between the Jukun-Chamba and the Kuteb in the southern part of the state dates back to the 1990s, but it flared up again in March 1997, when the Jukun-Chamba attacked the Kuteb during the annual *Kuchicheb* festival celebrated by the Kuteb people to offer thanks for the previous year's harvest, purification of the new farming session, and supplication for peace and good neighbourliness. (Mbove, 2012). The fighting, which started in Takum, soon spread to the neighbouring villages, and featured the use of dangerous firearms.

Religion is also used in political campaigns as a divide-and-rule tactic to breed distrust among the people, often being the primary consideration in respect of the distribution of political appointments, employment, facilities or infrastructure. As a result, crises in Taraba State often assume a religious dimension. Indeed, there is only a thin dividing line between ethnicity and religion in many communities in northern Nigeria, as was amply demonstrated in the recent Ibi-Wukari crisis. While some Muslims groups claim that it is a religious crisis, Christians dispute this, citing the fact that some Muslim Jukuns remain untouched in Wukari because they respected and have regard for the Jukun culture. The complicated nature of the Ibi-Wukari crisis, with its indigenous Christian Jukun and traditionalists on one side, against indigenous Muslim Jukuns and non-indigenous Hausa/Fulani Muslims on the other illustrates many of the

challenges that Taraba State faces, and how government responses can ameliorate or exacerbate insecurity.

Christian Jukuns accused the former Acting Governor of working with unofficial sources of information such as top civil servants (e.g. Alh. Sani Sule Saleh – a Permanent Secretary) and politicians (e.g. Alhaji Danladi Shehu – Deputy Chairman of the Peoples Democratic Party) instead of the formal structures of governance such as traditional leaders, LGA Chairs or elected representatives in the State House of Assembly. Christian Jukuns objected to the permanent secretary and party chieftain being put forward as representing a crisis-ridden LGA at the state executive council meeting.

Another common cause of complaint in such conflicts relates to discrimination in the provision of relief, and in this case, it was alleged that the former Acting Governor only made provision for the Muslim Jukun victims of the crisis: they were moved to Jalingo for treatment and attention at the IDP camp, while the Christian Jukun victims who had fled to Gboko and Makurdi were left unattended to.

In such conflicts each side perceives itself as being on the receiving end of uneven responses to security challenges, and the Wukari crisis again, amply illustrated this sense of grievance and victimhood. While Christian Jukuns alleged that once any Muslim culprit was arrested, an order would come from ‘government house’ to hand such suspect over to the Commissioner of Police after which the person would be released. They complained that although there were two army barracks in Taraba State at Takum and Baruwa, an army check point at Bantaje that was later moved to Dorowa, was manned by soldiers deployed from Yola, whose commander does not

take instructions from Army commanders in Taraba State, but from Yola. They alleged that these soldiers, who had been deployed by the efforts of the former Acting Governor, were there to protect only the Muslims, since these soldiers only patrol one ward out of the ten wards in the LGA. The Christian Jukun alleged that the Wukari crisis had persisted for so long because it was government sponsored.

On the other hand, some of the Muslim Jukuns interviewed for this study alleged that the crisis was a calculated attempt by the Christian Jukuns to convert Wukari town into a Middle Belt Christian headquarters, as indicated by many banners and signposts carrying the inscription “Wukari, the new Jerusalem annex”. Muslim Jukuns claimed that Christian Jukuns have vowed to rid Wukari town of Muslims and the Islamic religion, and accused the Aku Uka of Wukari of fuelling the crisis by openly taking sides and supporting the Christian Jukuns whom they accused of instigating the violence against the Muslim Jukuns and Hausas in the area.

Governance and security challenges in the state

Good governance entails respect for the Constitution and the rule of law by all, including the President, Governors, Ministers and other high public officials and political representatives. Where political or public office holders and military leaders violate the Constitution or engage in acts that disregard the rule of law when dealing with citizens or their opponents, they inevitably contribute to outbreaks of violence. Thus, government officials and senior security officials can contribute to insecurity by the way and manner in which they conduct themselves. The findings of this study agree with the views of

previous scholars, that the insecurity challenges in Taraba State are strongly related to state weakness and governance failings. The people's lack of confidence in their leaders has created an atmosphere of tension and distrust, and left the state unable to contain the insecurity challenges.

These failings are demonstrated by the inability of the state government to make public the outcome or implement the recommendations of various judicial commissions of inquiry or panels of investigation into various crises in the state, for example, the 2013 Ibi-Wukari crisis. This type of specific failure on the part of government is an indicator of general governance failure and state weakness when it comes to protecting the lives and property of citizens in the state. Despite consistent recommendations from several commissions, committees, panels of enquiry and so on, few have ever been implemented. Alubo (2011) observed that the ten point recommendation of the Commission of Inquiry into the Tiv-Jukun crisis of 1990/93 was not implemented, and that this failure triggered the 2001/2002 conflict between the two ethnic groups. Conflicts re-occurred because a lasting solutions were either not found, or where recommendations (of committees or panels of inquiry), are not implemented, particularly if the victims of such conflict are left with the impression that government's failure to act is because it is supporting the other party. Where this perception takes hold, they resort to self-defence.

Most of the respondents were of the opinion that governance in the state under the former Acting Governor contributed to security challenges (Iroka, 2014). Some considered that he was partial and not fair to all parties involved in recent crises in the state. Respondents observed that even when

government officials received warnings about impending breaches of the peace, they would not respond until the attacks had been carried out. It was alleged that on one occasion, after the former Acting Governor had compelled the people to sign a peace pact without listening to the contending factions, conflict broke out the very next day.

One of the key informants interviewed accused the Government of not helping matters when it came to the Wukari crisis. He said that after a meeting of stakeholders had unanimously agreed that the way out was to constitute a panel of investigation to investigate the matter, then make public the outcome and implement its recommendations, the state government had agreed and constituted a panel which had finished its investigation and submitted its report, but that nothing had been seen or heard of the report since then. The report was never made public and no action has been taken. He argued that had the recommendations of the panel been implemented and those responsible prosecuted, the situation would have improved. This failure or refusal to implement recommendations was laid at the door of the former Acting Governor who was accused of directing that the panel of investigation's recommendations should not be executed. Indeed, some respondents interpreted every action of former Acting Governor Umar as partisan. When he had called the commanding officer of the Army Barrack Takum to deploy to Wukari to contain the situation, and the commanding officer had indicated that he could not do so without a directive or permission from his superior at Abuja, Garba was alleged to have called the commanding officer at Yola, who was a personal friend of his. The Yola commanding officer had responded

immediately with a military helicopter and ten vans of armed military personnel who arrived at Wukari before the soldiers from Takum (less than 60km away) arrived.

One of those interviewed alleged that past Tiv-Jukun crises were a major source of arms in the town:

“The crisis exposed us to the use of sophisticated weapons and guns. At that time, the leaders mobilized money from the local council and traditional sources to purchase the guns and weapons for the youths, as the major concern was how to protect the territorial integrity of the Jukun community. All hands were on deck without any discrimination of sectionalism or religion. When the fighting finally ended, there was no effort to either disarm the militant youths or withdraw the weapons and arms at their disposal. This made many youths in the region to take to robbery since they no longer enjoy the loot from the fighting. Some of the youths that were very good at handling weapons were even hired to go and assist their neighbouring communities in fighting their enemy and even beyond the region. The increasing spate of the violence has now made it necessary for everyone in the community to look out for a means to purchase gun to protect his or herself. If I get the opportunity, I will do everything I can to have my own gun because if I had my gun, those youths wouldn't have burnt down my house or else I would have killed as many of them as I could.” (Interview, 2014a).

This was corroborated by Alubo (2011) who found that in the Tiv-Jukun conflicts, the Tiv accused Group Captain Ibrahim Kefas, a retired Air Force Officer and former Military Administrator of Cross River State, of arming and training the Jukun militia, with Retired General Theophilus Y. Danjuma also accused of providing military personnel and materials to his Jukun ethnic group. General Danjuma was also accused of enlisting soldiers to fight for the Jukun during the time he was Minister of Defence under the Obasanjo presidency. The retired

General has remained a central and controversial figure in the long running Tiv-Jukun conflict (Alubo, 2011). A role that he reprised in the conflict between the Chamba-Jukun and the Kuteb and the chieftaincy dispute in Takum LGA, in which the Kuteb accused him of preventing the installation of the traditional chief in Takum in order to favour his Chamba-Jukun kinsmen, as well as complicity in the boundary dispute between Takum and Ussa LGAs. According to a key informant interview:

“Governor Danbaba Suntai may have succeeded in settling the chieftaincy tussle at Sardauna LGA but he couldn’t have done it at Takum because first he is a Chamba by tribe, one of the contending ethnic group to the chieftaincy and secondly because of fear of some powerful individual. Retired General T.Y. Danjuma is a Chamba who has strong influence in the corridors of power at the federal level. It is a known fact that in Nigeria, there are individuals that are more powerful than institutions. This is the power play in the whole scenario.” (Interview, 2014b).

As it is, the high expectations of citizens at the dawn of the present democratic dispensation appear to have been dashed. Some respondents even claimed to prefer military rule to civilian administrations because according to them, under civilian administration the masses suffer both from communal conflict and from attacks by insurgent groups in the area. Another respondent alleged that during Governor Nyameh’s regime, the silent assassination of political opponents and critics of government had occurred, but that under Governor Danbaba Suntai, people felt free to speak their minds without reprisal. Most respondents said that during Governor Danbaba’s first term, there were very few communal conflicts if any, while

robbery and other violent crimes also reduced. During his second term however, particularly following his plane crash, the security situation in the state degenerated under the Acting Governor. The competition between the Danbaba faction and Acting Governor Garba's adherents to control the institutions of Taraba State meant that the state itself was often an issue in conflict situations. The resulting weakness meant that Taraba State was ill-prepared to meet the challenge posed by the fresh threat of the insurgency due to the fact that conflict often thrives in failed, weak or poor states (ActionAid, 2008).

Government response to the challenges of insecurity

When Boko Haram insurgents began to attack major towns in north eastern Nigeria, Governor Danbaba Suntai banned the use of motorcycles (popularly known as *okada*) in Jalingo. For his part, Acting Governor Garba directed all LGA chairmen to be security conscious and ensure that there is no breakdown of law and order in their respective areas. LGA Chairmen were also directed to ensure that the traditional rulers were carried along in the fight against insecurity. Garba stated that meetings were being held with stakeholders at all levels and that special committees for this purpose had been inaugurated in all the LGAs (Owuamanamand, 2014). To tackle the new security challenge, the state government donated 180 motorcycles to vigilante groups for patrols. 35 Toyota Hilux vans were also donated to the State Police Command to help maintain peace throughout the state (Yushau, 2014). These donations were intended to boost the morale of the vigilante groups and complement the efforts of the security agencies. The state government also deployed senior civil servants to their respective

areas to assist in the promotion of peace in their local communities, while security personnel were deployed to the crises areas and provided with patrol vehicles.

Even before the Boko Haram insurgency, six camps had been established by the state government for IDPs at Jalingo, Bali, Mutum-Biyu, Wukari, Ibi and Donga to cater for, among others, the over 30,000 people displaced by the Ibi-Wukari crisis (Taraba State Emergency Management Agency). As noted above, the state government had set up a Commission of Inquiry into the immediate and remote causes of the Ibi-Wukari crisis. Respondents to this study described this Commission as one of the most popular and widely publicized of all the investigations into conflicts in Taraba State in recent times. While inaugurating the commission, Acting Governor Garba promised that:

“...perpetrators of the recent crisis in Wukari and Ibi Local Government Areas will be prosecuted to serve as deterrent to others.” (NBF, 2013).

The Commission has finished its investigation and submitted its report. While receiving the report, Garba said:

“Government will take a hard look at the details of the report and act accordingly in a manner that is just and fair. Those that have a case to answer will be made to face the music, while those whose hands are clean will have nothing to fear. We cannot continue to condone the culture of impunity which has recently been responsible for loss of precious lives and wilful destruction of property.” (Itodo, 2013)

This was the last statement on the report, which has not been disseminated and cannot be accessed by members of the public. Many respondents complained that the Acting Governor

Garba was not proactive, compared to Governor Danbaba Suntai who was seen as proactive and fair and just too all groups, irrespective of religious or ethnic identity.

The response of the Federal Government to the conflicts in the state has not been very decisive, although it has occasionally sent armed troops and Mobile Policemen to conflict spots, and at other times, has sent relief materials to victims of the crisis through the Taraba State Emergency Management Agency.

Asked about what civil society could do as regards peace building in Taraba State, one respondent asked what role they were expected to play, noting that as long as government failed to punish the culprits, it would not be safe for civil society to get involved in peace-building. Another discussant commented as follows:

“As NGOs, we don’t have the mandate to arrest or prosecute but to advise the government appropriately and voice out our feelings. If all effort fails, then everyone may have to take the laws into his hands. If there are no actions taken, then indirectly you are saying please continue. With this situation, there is no way you can curtail the crisis. The machineries of government are not responding adequately to the challenges of insecurity in the state.” (FGD, 2014a).

When respondents to the questionnaires were asked to rate the level of the state and local government response to these security challenges, 30.6% of them believed that it is very poor, 20 per cent poor, 23.9% that it is neither poor nor good, while 13.9% rate the response as good and 6.1% as very good, with 4.4% saying that they do not know. Most respondents believed that the police are ill-equipped to enforce law and order in the state. Asked whether the people in the state are at ease with the

Police, 21.1% strongly disagree, 28.9% disagree and 20 per cent neither disagree nor agree. Only 23.3% strongly agree and 6.7% said that they do not know.

Conclusion

This study has examined governance and security challenges in Taraba State, and the link between these and government's response to the security challenges. The findings of the study show that there is a strong relationship between the quality of governance and the intensity of security challenges in the state. It shows that Taraba State's security challenges are caused by poor government policy, unjust policies and discrimination in allocation and distribution of opportunities and resources. Security challenges are also exacerbated by the weakness and failure of state institutions in responding proactively to potential security threats. The study has found that apart from those dealing with reproductive health and HIV/AIDS advocacy, most civil society organizations in the state are not well known to the citizens. The majority of citizens do not participate in the governance process, especially at the local government level, and hardly engage the state in demanding service delivery and accountability. Since the culture of self-help is not well entrenched in the state, and the people are dependent on government and international development agencies to provide them with basic needs such as borehole, dispensaries and schools, this failure to engage directly affects the quality of benefit they derive from governance. At the same time, the dependence of the people on government for basic goods and services makes the struggle to control the various levels of government all the more intense. The electoral process and appointments into key

government positions are influenced to a large extent by ethnicity, religion and regionalism. Leaders and politicians in the state exploit cultural and religious differences for their own advantage and to the detriment of the state. Insecurity also has adverse effects on the credibility and transparency of elections, with people tending to vote for an inadequate candidate who shares their religious or ethnic identity, rather than a credible candidate who is from a rival group.

Recommendations

Security challenges can be reduced in the state if the following are entrenched in governance:

1. Empowerment of the civil society organizations in the state to be advocates for the peaceful co-habitation of different ethnic groups in the area. The membership of such CSOs should reflect diverse identity groups.
2. Transparency in the electoral process.
3. Accountability of those in governance to the electorate
4. Equity and justice to all citizens irrespective of ethnicity, religion or geographical background and
5. Credible leadership

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- Interview, 2014a. Interview with Hon. Murtala I. Bawa, a two-term councillor of Avyi ward, Wukari Metropolitan on 3rd September, 2014 at Taraba State University Exams Office Jalingo between 9:30 to 10:45am.

Interview, 2014b. Interview with Dr. Gambo Matudi, a lecturer at MAUTECH Yola on 14th September, 2014 at 2:25pm at his residence in Mayo Dasa along old airstrip, Jalingo.

Interview, 2014c. Interview with the Secretary of Sardauna Local Government Area, Eng. Katung Abraham between 9:10am to 10:30am, held in his office, at the LGA Secretariat on 10th September, 2014.

Chapter 7

Security and Governance in Yobe State

- Yagana Bukar

Introduction and Literature review

Against a background of pervasive poverty, corruption and widespread unemployment, nearly three decades of military rule in Nigeria saw massive deterioration in government institutions and weakened governance capacity at all levels. The transition to civilian rule in 1999 was therefore accompanied by high expectations of peace and social development. Democracy was presented as the only framework within which development expectations could be facilitated because it is based on consent and popular participation. But the anticipated opportunities seem to have given way to disillusion and disenchantment. This has been attributed to crude politics, corruption, selfishness and greed on the part of political leaders. According to Ibrahim (2013), since the inception of democratic governance in 1999, the federal government of Nigeria has done little or nothing to improve human rights and the protection of its citizens' lives and property, despite these being among its cardinal responsibilities.

Democracy is viewed as having failed so far to deliver good governance: instead, insecurity, poverty, unemployment and other social problems have become basic features of Nigeria's

identity. Idada and Uhumwuangho (2012) opine that the liberalisation of the political atmosphere brought about by civil rule in 1999 was used to mobilize primordial sentiments and identity politics, the attendant consequences of which – insecurity and violence, ethno-religious crises with resulting loss of lives and property – have become widespread and rampant. Adekola (2010) attributes the lack of good governance, corruption and widespread security problems mainly to the lack of free, fair and credible elections; lack of freedom of speech and publication; refusal to accept defeat by political gladiators; corruption and the non-observance of the rule of law, all consequences of the long period of military rule.

For many commentators, the absence of security constitutes the single most significant threat, not only to democracy and good governance, but to the corporate existence of the country as a single entity (Adekola 2013; Idada and Uhumwuangho 2012). Indeed, violence has assumed such serious dimensions such that ethno-religious crises, militancy, religious riots, vandalism, arson, and political assassinations have been basic features of Nigeria's democracy since the country returned to democratic rule on 29th of May 1999.

The Nigerian situation encapsulated above is not different from that of Yobe State, which can be considered microcosm of Nigeria's plurality in terms of religious and cultural diversity. The insecurity in Yobe State was instigated by a sectarian group, *Jama'atuAblis Sunnah Lidda'awatiwalJihad* (JAS) otherwise known as Boko Haram, which has engaged in terrorist activities to kill, maim and destroy thousands of lives and properties in the state and other parts of the north east region since 2009. The group has killed innocent citizens and attacked security outfits.

Its activities have had a huge impact on the socio-economic and political development of the State. Indeed, the spate of bomb blasts, kidnappings, vandalism and killings attained such alarming proportions that Yobe State, together with Borno and Adamawa States, has been under emergency rule since 2013.

While neighbouring Borno State is undoubtedly the epicentre of the Boko Haram insurgency affecting the north east region, it was in Kanamma, the headquarters of Yunusari LGA in Yobe State located on the border with Niger Republic, that the group launched one of its earliest uprisings, when it attacked the LG secretariat and the police station in 2003. After this, the group went underground, but resurfaced in 2009, apparently believing that there was sufficient basis to declare an Islamic State or Caliphate, and engaging in target killings as well as hit and run attacks towards that goal. Since then, Yobe and Borno States have recorded some of the worst violence in the history of Nigeria. Although the frequency of insurgency attacks on Damaturu and other major towns have significantly reduced in recent months, the state capital is currently experiencing an influx of internally displaced persons from surrounding LGAs who wander the streets helplessly, and whose situation compounds the security challenges. Meanwhile, the rural areas are still faced with grave insecurity and in some places; insurgents have completely taken over some LGAs, for example, Gujba and Gulani LGAs.

JAS claims that its basic mission is to impose Sharia law or create a Caliphate, but in attempting to understand this mission, many are dismayed by its mode of operation, which features wanton killing and the murder of innocent civilians, as these are alien to the religion it seeks to propagate and are quite contrary

to the teachings of Islam. It is therefore not surprising that many citizens link the emergence of JAS to a failure of leadership to provide good governance; a failure characterized by youth unemployment, political thuggery, poverty, endemic corruption, proliferation of small arms and religious extremism.

The situation in Yobe State is seen by many as a demonstration of the inability of government to execute one of its fundamental functions, namely to provide and guarantee security of life, property and liberty. It is against this general background that this study seeks to investigate the relationship between security and the character of governance in Yobe State by identifying the major drivers of insecurity since 1999. The study also examines the issues and phenomena that bedevil effective governance and the extent to which insecurity is linked to governance.

The framework within which this study is conceptualized relates to the structural violence paradigm as advocated by Galtung (1969), which underscores the role of socio-cultural systems, political structures and state institutions as direct drivers of violent conflicts. Indeed it is widely recognized that the absence of economic, social and political development are instigating factors of terrorism (Briscoe and Ginkel 2013). Individual and group grievances such as poverty, unemployment, illiteracy, discrimination and economic marginalization can be used as mobilizing instruments by sinister groups to find support and recruits for terrorist violence. It must be noted though, that while structural violence may explain the attraction to groups like Boko Haram, it does not take account of other causal factors, since not every member of Boko Haram is economically disadvantaged and indeed not every illiterate or unemployed

youth is a member of the group. The study therefore acknowledges the complexities that exist in assessing the extent to which the structural violence paradigm explains the insurgency.

The study area

Yobe State was carved out of former Borno State on the 27th of August 1991 by the regime of President Ibrahim Babangida. The state is located between latitudes 10.5° and 13.1° north and longitude 9.5° and 13.5° east, with a total land area of 47,153km². Yobe State is bordered to the east by Borno State, Gombe State to the south, and Bauchi and Jigawa States to the west. In the north, it shares Nieria's international border of 323 km with Niger Republic.

The 2006 National Census puts the population of Yobe State at 2,432,321 with one of the lowest population density in Nigeria of 49 persons per km. The current projected population stands at about 3.5 million. The state is pluralistic in both ethnic and religious composition, with a diverse historical and cultural background. The Kanuri are the most dominant ethnic group while the Fulani, Kare-Kare, Bade, Bolewa Ngizim and Hausa are all found in large numbers. Hausa language has gained widespread acceptability as a common medium of communication among the people as is the case in most parts of Northern Nigeria. The majority of the population are Muslims while Christians are also found in significant numbers, especially among minority tribes such as the Kare-Kare, Ngizim and Ngamo. Tribal and ethnic identities appear to be suppressed by a religious identity which plays a major role in the history and politics of the area in such a pronounced manner such that it is

very common for individuals to describe their identity first and foremost as Muslims before mentioning their ethnic affiliations.

Located on the fringes of the fragile semi-arid region, Yobe State is one of the poorest and most ecologically vulnerable states in Nigeria faced with problems of drought, desertification and general environmental degradation. Agriculture, which is the major source of livelihood, is highly constrained by variable and inadequate rainfall, high temperatures and lack of soil fertility as well as several socio-economic factors. Small-scale subsistence farming engages more than 80 per cent of the population who grow crops such as millet, sorghum, and beans for local consumption. Cash crops such as wheat, rice and vegetables are cultivated along the Fadama areas of Nguru wetlands and along the Kumadugu Yobe Basin.

Other sources of livelihood in the state include pastoralism, fishing and local mining. It is one of the largest suppliers of cattle and reputed to have the largest cattle market in West Africa at Potiskum, the economic nerve centre of the state. The Kumadugu Yobe River system, together with the Hadejia-Nguru Wetlands, provides one of the richest fishing grounds in the country.

Despite this, Yobe lacks a basic revenue base. As a result it depends hugely on statutory transfers from the federal government: indeed, such transfers account for over 80 per cent of the state's revenue. Based on Human Development Indicators such as literacy, health and life expectancy, the state compares unfavourably with other states of the Federation. The NBS (2010) estimates that the measure of relative poverty (defined by reference to the living standards of the majority in a given society) is 73.3% in the north-east region, the highest in the

country. It is estimated that 2.1 million of the 3.5 population in Yobe State live below the poverty line: this means that 78 per cent of the population survive on less than a dollar per day.

The 1999 transition to civilian rule witnessed the emergence of Bukar Abba Ibrahim as the Governor from 1999-2007, followed by Mamman Bello Ali who died in office in 2009. The present administration is headed by Governor Ibrahim Geidam who assumed office in January 2009.

Method of data collection

Yobe State comprises of 17 Local Government Areas (LGAs) and three senatorial districts. A combination of stratified and purposive sampling procedure was utilized to select six LGAs for this study. It was intended to select two LGAs in each Senatorial district on the basis of urban and rural LGAs, but the LGAs selected in Yobe South Senatorial district – namely Damaturu and Potiskum – are both urban because these areas have recorded some of worst cases of violence since the beginning of the insurgency in 2009. It should also be noted that the study was not conducted in LGAs controlled by insurgents for obvious security reasons, nor was it conducted in areas where insurgency is entirely absent. The selected LGAs are shown in Table 1.

A convenient sampling technique based on a respondent's willingness to participate was used as the selection criteria. The participants included both male and female respondents drawn from all cadres of society, namely civil servants, students, traders, farmers, as well as the unemployed. A well-structured questionnaire was used to elicit primary data from respondents in the selected LGAs. Interviews were conducted with four key informants in Damaturu and Potiskum, the two major towns in

the state. Two research assistants were used to facilitate the process of data collection. Secondary data was collected from government publications, textbooks, journals, and online material. Descriptive statistical tools were utilized in the analysis.

Table 1: Yobe State Senatorial Districts and Sample LGAs.

SENATORIAL DISTRICT	LGAs	SELECTED LGAs
Yobe East	Bursari; Geidam; Gujba; Gulani; Tarmuwa; Yunusari	Geidam; Bursari
Yobe North	Bade; Jakusko; Machina; Karasuwa; Nguru; Yusufari	Bade; Karasuwa
Yobe South	Fika; Fune; Nangere; Potiskum; Damaturu	Damaturu; Potiskum

Limitations of the study

The logistics of conducting a field research in a conflict zone can be exceedingly challenging considering the risks associated with travelling and the high level of mistrust in the society which makes interactions and associations quite difficult. There were difficulties in establishing rapport and creating conducive environment without raising suspicion, and this usually took a lot of time. Probing to obtain high quality information or asking politically sensitive questions carried the inherent risk of being misconstrued. The inability of the study to conduct Focus Group Discussions (FGDS) meant that we were unable to hear the full narrative behind the statistics which might have provided deeper and richer insights on complex issues raised by the

subject. However, Key Informant Interviews were used to compliment and triangulate the information obtained from the questionnaire.

Results and discussions

The character of governance

There is a broad and continuing debate on the concept of governance and what really constitutes good governance in the worldwide discourse on politics and development. Gisselguist, (2012) defines governance as the processes and systems by which a government manages the resources of a society to address socio-economic and political challenges in the polity. Good governance is identified as a worthy goal and a means by which economic growth and development can be achieved and has assumed a firmly entrenched position as a primary factor for development and an indicator of measuring the development of a country. According to the UN (1998) good governance is perhaps the single most important factor in eradicating poverty and promoting development. It consists of a public service that is efficient, a judicial system that is reliable and an administrative system that is accountable to the public. The key components of governance, which include the exercise of economic, political, judicial and administrative authority to manage the affairs of the state at all levels, are important indicators of the aggregate wellbeing of democratic governance. It is a concept that is applicable to all sections of society that provide the necessary anchors for the act of governance.

It is within this context that this section examines the character of governance in Yobe State by looking at the domestic

political situation in which power is exercised in managing and distributing social and economic resources.

Political governance

The nature of elections

Most of the respondents (74 per cent) voted during the last gubernatorial elections while the 26 per cent who did not vote claimed that their reluctance to vote stemmed from a feeling that their votes did not count. Indeed even among the respondents who did vote, many perceived the elections as a charade and feel quite disenfranchised. The general opinion was that the electoral process is riddled with corruption and is characterized by vote-buying, multiple voting and manipulation of results by officials of the electoral commission and security agencies. In particular, an interview with a youth leader in Potiskum revealed instances where ballot boxes were snatched and taken to unknown destinations, as well as instances of intimidation and harassment which were attributed to political thugs. While it was generally agreed that democracy thrives where people are free to stand for election and to vote during elections, with individuals being allowed to make their choice freely, respondents interviewed alleged that not only the officials of the electoral agency, but also law enforcement agents and even voters are all involved in the business of election rigging. If a democratic system is judged according to its adherence to the basic tenets of democracy, a fraudulent electoral process characterized by electoral violence and corruption is clearly a threat to the genuine expression of the people's will and the emergence of a credible and competent leadership.

The influence of powerful individuals (otherwise known as godfathers) adds another dimension to the democratic process in the state. The majority of respondents (65 per cent) asserted that powerful individuals possess the means to unilaterally determine who would get the party ticket to run for an election, as well as who wins the election. The phenomenon of “godfatherism” is not peculiar to Yobe State, it is considered as one of the biggest dangers to democracy in Nigeria. Yet paradoxically, it only survives with government support. It is a contractual relationship between godfather and godchild, in which the godfather continues to influence the affairs of governance once the godchild is installed in office. According to Ayoade (2006), godfatherism negates all tenets of democratic process by obstructing candidate selection and even executive selection once government is installed. Ultimately it reduces the legitimacy of government and voids the electoral value of the citizenry as a whole.

Accessibility and accountability of elected officials

The study showed that elected officials are generally not easily accessible because they do not make much attempt to penetrate the social and economic fabric of their communities except during electioneering campaigns. As shown in Table 2, Local Government officials appear more easily accessible than the Governor, and Cabinet and House of Assembly Members. Most Members of the House are rarely seen in public and indeed, no longer reside in the state but operate from Abuja because they are the primary targets for kidnapping and assassination by insurgents. LG officials are also rarely present in the communities they serve, let alone accountable to the people they

govern. With the insecurity affecting most LGAs, elected officials are even less present in the communities while some LGAs (Gujba, Gulani, and Fune) now run the affairs of their domain from Damaturu, the state capital. As a result, there is little or no information on budgetary allocations and community development projects. Farmers complain of lack of fertilizer and other agricultural incentives at the Government-subsidized rates.

It has been pointed out in the literature that government agencies are more likely to be held accountable if they extract revenues in form of taxes, bills and other forms of revenue accruable to the state. Where such income from such sources appears low, there is no incentive for LG officials to be transparent or accountable, or even to function effectively. This partly explains the clear disconnect and lack of communication between the “grassroots” government and their constituencies.

Among the various components of good governance, transparency is widely recognized as a core principle which allows citizens to hold institutions and governments responsible for their policies and performance and ultimately, to reduce corruption. In this regard, transparency is closely related to accountability. The lack of transparent and accountable political institutions at various levels of governance in essence indicates the failure of governance to meet its responsibilities.

Half of the respondents indicated that they participate in the activities of civil society organizations engaged in activities such as community development and mobilization, provision of services and policy advocacy. The major organisations, such as Network of Yobe Civil Society Organizations, Civil Society Organizations Network for Peace and Civil Liberty

Organizations, are active in the governance process at the state level.

Table 2: Accessibility of Elected Officials

	Not accessible at all (%)	Accessible with Difficulty (%)	Accessible (%)	Easily accessible	Don't know/can't say
L G Officials	12	45	25	10	8
House of Assembly	47	33	10	5	5
Governor and Cabinet	15	57	17	3	8

Source: Fieldwork 2014

Corruption among elected office holders

The level of corruption is perceived to be very high as indicated by 72 per cent of respondents. As is the case with the rest of the Nigerian State, corruption seems to exist in every structure of governance. Discussions with officials of the Network of Yobe State Civil Society Organizations revealed that corruption is so widespread and varied that it cannot be holistically attributed to any single factor or institution. Corruption is not confined to elected officials alone; it exists in every arm of government. In fact LG officials are viewed as more corrupt than the state officials. Transparency International's report on corruption in Nigeria, observed that:

"Every single responsible institution in Nigeria is corrupt and has failed to appreciate fully the obligations upon it to do something about corruption. Consequently, the effects of corruption on the state and

the society in general are so devastating to the point that the nation's political structures have significantly lost their capacity to perform their constitutional functions" (*This Day* 2004:6).

Performance of elected officials

In terms of performance, despite being relatively more accessible, LG officials are judged "bad" by 45 per cent of respondents, a worse figure than the 37 per cent who judged the House of Assembly members bad, or the 15 per cent scored by the governor/cabinet members. These much better scores for the governor and cabinet are remarkable enough to elicit further inquiry which revealed that this more favourable perception is probably related to the high level of illiteracy and lack of awareness about the responsibilities of different levels of government. For example, the presence of the governor at sites of violent disturbances or the presentation of relief to insurgency victims are not seen as the governor discharging his duties, but as humanitarian or compassionate gestures, as though the governor were distributing relief from his personal wealth. Thus, 27 per cent of respondents thought that the leadership of the Governor and cabinet is effective while 47 per cent indicated the view that their performance was average.

Table 3: Performance of Elected Officials

	Very bad	Bad	Neither good/bad	Good	Very good	Don't know
LG officials	10	35	25	18	5	7
House of Assembly	18	19	28	18	10	7
Governor and cabinet	7	8	38	28	10	9

Source: Fieldwork 2014

The judiciary and security agencies

While the judiciary is recognized as an institution that plays a mediating role among various stakeholders in society, 48 per cent of the respondents do not consider it effective or impartial in enforcing the rule of law. Most of the respondents do not regard the judiciary as a platform from which to get justice and 40 per cent “Strongly agree” that citizens have to bribe officials to escape liability or sentencing. Thus the court system as an avenue to fair hearing and timely verdicts is highly contested by the respondents but surprisingly, they stopped short of rating the judiciary as “corrupt”, as 47 per cent of the respondents could “neither disagree/agree” that the judiciary is corrupt. This may not be unrelated to the fact that despite its poorly rated performance, compared to the other arms of government, the judiciary is still a revered institution which is held in high esteem.

The responsibility of the Nigeria Police Force is to foster peace and security, and it ought to be the hope of the common man, the downtrodden, and victims of abuse. However, people generally describe the Police as monsters, tormentors and enemies because of their negative behaviour and attitudes towards both complainants and suspects. The study revealed that 57 per cent of respondents disagree that people are generally at ease with the police. Citizens do not volunteer useful information to the police and would rather conceal such information in order not to become victims of unlawful arrest. A majority of the respondents (68 per cent) reported that they had been the victims of police extortions or brutality at some point in time. Respondents complained about illegal road blocks where all motorists have to pay before crossing; the jailing of innocent

individuals for crimes they did not commit; and that many are languishing in prison because they do not have bail money. 54 per cent of those interviewed disagree that they receive fair treatment if arrested. Consequently, in times of crises, the police are usually the first target of aggrieved youths, armed robbers, and terrorist organizations. Police stations are seen as the lion's den rather than places where justice can be sought. 55 per cent of the respondents do not view the police as prepared and equipped to enforce law and order with only 13 per cent believing that the police are prepared to enforce law and order.

The security situation in the state

Security is considered a critical foundation and cornerstone for sustainable development and economic growth. In Yobe State, widespread poverty and poor governance have created an environment where ethno-religious crises and extremism have reached an intolerable scale that has impacted hugely on economic and social activities in the state. Indeed, the level of insecurity in the state is identified as the single most important challenge to its economic development.

The major attacks that culminated in the imposition of a State of Emergency in Yobe State in 2013 include the attack on Damaturu in November 2011 which remains the single deadliest attack the state has witnessed since the beginning of the crisis. The operation, which started around 6pm and lasted till 6am the next day, saw the destruction of the Police and JTF headquarters, the Federal and State secretariats, and the looting of three

commercial banks.¹ The sect also bombed or razed all the churches in the town to the ground. The second attack, during which over 200 people lost their lives, took place in December 2013. At the time Boko Haram insurgents had taken over and were in control of Buni Yadi, Buni Gari and Goniri villages – all in Gujba LGA, while Katarko Bridge that links Buni Yadi to Damaturu was destroyed. The insurgents also targeted and destroyed vital economic nerve centres such as the cattle markets in Potiskum and Ngelzarma.

Many respondents noted that Damaturu and other major towns have been experiencing relative peace in recent times. However, the relative peace was shattered by the November 3rd 2014 attack in Potiskum which targeted a religious procession of the Shite sect marking the end of Islamic Calendar Year known as the *Ashura*, and in which 30 individuals were killed and many more wounded.

In assessing the response of the various arms of government to the insurgency, the LG authorities are generally rated to have performed poorly but some respondents were quick to add that the LGs do not have the capacity to deal with the insurgency considering the scale and intensity of attacks. The response of the state government officials and the security agencies was seen as “neither responsive nor irresponsible”: this suggests that if adequately equipped, security agencies and government officials have the capacity to respond to crime and security challenges.

A number of facilitating factors have been identified for the upsurge of violence, chief among which are poverty, rising youth

¹ *The Guardian*, Lagos, November 6, 2011

unemployment, the use of thugs for political violence and the proliferation of small arms and light weapons. The major drivers of conflict and their link to failure of governance, and implications for security are examined in the following section.

Poverty and unemployment

Poverty has been conceptualized in several different ways by scholars and development experts with divergent backgrounds and perspectives. One approach to defining poverty may treat inadequate access to government facilities or services, environmental issues, ignorance and illiteracy, as relevant factors. The UNDP's (1994) definition of poverty cites the inability to provide such physiological subsistence (food, shelter, clothing, basic education, healthcare transportation and gainful employment) to the extent of being unable to protect human dignity. This study draws its analysis of poverty from this definition. Compared with other states in the federation, Yobe State is identified as one of the poorest according to different national survey reports. Absolute poverty in the state is 73.8% while the national average is 60.9% (NBS 2010). In terms of literacy, it has one of the highest illiteracy rates in the country with 85.3% females and 83.3% males without any form of education (NDHS 2014). In the health sector, it is reported that 90 per cent of child deliveries take place at home, and less 30 per cent of such births receive ante-natal care.

The nature and scale of poverty in the area also tend to reflect the interaction of geography, ecology and politics. In terms of size, Yobe State is the second largest state in Nigeria with a major portion of its land area located in the semi-arid environment characterized by low potential in terms of

agricultural productivity (low rainfall, limited topsoil; scarce water resources). In addition, the majority of the population are in remote rural areas which tend to suffer from crises of social and economic exclusion. These sparsely populated and isolated settlements face the problem of lack of access to basic infrastructures, transport routes and extreme economic isolation. The nature and pattern of distribution of societal benefits, which places certain areas at a perpetual disadvantage, is therefore a major cause of poverty in the area.

With reference to population, the age structure in Yobe State is similar to what obtains in other parts of the country, with nearly three-quarters of the population below the age 30 (NPC, 2006). An increasingly youthful population with low levels of education, unemployed and economically deprived is easily drawn to violence and extremist activities. Violent extremists seek to exploit the economically vulnerable in the society. A study conducted by CLEEN Foundation (2014) on youth radicalization in Yobe State identified poverty and unemployment as the major drivers for youth extremism and violence, while illiteracy was identified as the second factor driving the insurgency. Respondents, particularly in Geidam LGA, reported instances where Boko Haram members were openly offering as much as 50,000 naira and automatic guns as incentives to potential recruits.

Poverty is also seen as a result of unemployment and lack of access to regular means of livelihood because individuals not only lack access to basic amenities such as shelter, they also lack adequate income to enhance their active participation in society to such an extent that it limits the actualization of their potential. Jobless youths are frustrated due to inequality and

economic deprivation that have rendered them unemployed. In this perspective, poverty is the product of poor management of human and material resources on the part of government institutions. A study conducted by Adole *et al.*, (2013) on the impact of political violence on the socio-economic development of Yobe State found that poverty and unemployment are the outcome of poor management of human and material resources or leadership failure, and are observed to be the main drivers of political violence. The authors attribute political violence in Yobe State to systemic leadership failure and bad governance.

A key informant in Potiskum explains:

“The Boko Haram crisis has its roots in years of bad governance that have produced an army of unemployed, unemployable, disenchanting and demoralized youths who are now willing tools for those seeking to perpetrate violence.”

The inability of government to constructively engage the teeming youth population has inadvertently created a steady supply of potential recruits to extremist groups. A report by NSRP (2011) on the mapping of conflicts in Borno and Yobe States indicated that conflicts are driven by bad governance and the resulting disconnect between government and the governed, which breeds injustice. The NSRP study traced the insurgency in the two states to the failure of governance and deteriorating institutions against a backdrop of youth poverty, illiteracy, unemployment and political violence.

Although the literature often points to an indirect and complicated connection between poverty, education and extremism, the large number of young people living on the margins of society who are easily drawn to extremist activities

points to a clear linkage between education, poverty and extremism. Indeed, members of Boko Haram are mostly “almajiris”, school dropouts, illiterate youths and political thugs. Briscoe and Ginkel (2013) reveal that individual and group grievances such as poverty, unemployment, illiteracy, discrimination and economic marginalization can be used by sinister groups to find support and recruits for terrorist violence.

Administrative governance


Good governance requires that government functionaries and institutions are accessible and promptly respond to the needs, grievances and aspirations of all citizens. The study found that 50 per cent of respondents feel government functionaries are not easily accessible, and that 53 per cent believe that such functionaries are not responsive to the needs of the respondents. To further examine the performance of government, the study assessed the availability of basic facilities such as water, electricity, education and sanitation. It was found that most (63 per cent) of the respondents indicated that they had access to water, but it was also observed that in most of the rural LGAs, water access did not meet the WHO/UNICEF (2005) minimum standards of accessibility to water defined in terms of time spent, distance covered, quantity of water used and indeed the quality of water itself. Pipe-borne water connection is virtually non-existent in Geidam and Bursari and Jakusko LGAs. Most of the residents in Bade LGA depend on vendors who fetch water from government provided boreholes. Several households in Damaturu and Potiskum depend on personally drilled boreholes. At the same time, 45 per cent of those interviewed do not have access to proper sanitation. Housing problems appear to be the

most common and this is not surprising considering the socio-economic status and the level of poverty in the state as a whole. The lack of housing was a major problem facing 62 per cent of those interviewed. Issues related to electricity largely have to do with unstable power supply, which has made many people to depend on generators. The unstable power supply has constrained the performance of small scale businesses such as mechanical works, business centres, and tailoring, among others.

The education sector appears to be one of the sectors receiving significant attention from government. Several recently renovated primary schools were observed in each of the LGAs under study and indeed, 70 per cent of respondents indicated the availability of primary schools in their area. However, the insurgents specifically targeted and destroyed several primary and secondary schools, leaving many pupils and teachers dead, and leading to the temporary closure of schools. The state recorded three major attacks on institutions of learning which attracted wide attention and condemnation. The first was the July 6th 2013 attack on Government Secondary School Mamudo which left 31 staff and students dead, while the second deadly attack took place on the 30th of September 2013 at Yobe State College of Agriculture Gujba in which over 50 staff and students lost their lives. Thirdly, the attack on FGC BuniYadi in February 2014 killed 43 students while the school was completely razed to the ground. As recently as 10th November 2014, there was another major attack in Potiskum targeting the Government Science Secondary School Potiskum in which 48 students were killed and over 100 wounded during a morning assembly. These and many other deadly insurgency attacks have affected the education sector in the state. To reverse the

situation, the state government adopted a deliberate strategy of fighting the insurgency with the arsenal of very same education, the destruction of which is at the core of its warped ideology. So far, the state government has renovated several schools in most parts of the study area. In the last three years it has constructed over 1,251 classrooms in different primary schools across the state, distributed 111,808 books and assorted library materials and 21,048 pieces of furniture, in addition to renovating and fencing of schools. It also recruited over 2000 NCE teachers and it is on record that Yobe State is the first state in Nigeria to implement the ₦18, 000 minimum wage for primary school teachers.

Figure 1: Availability of Basic Services



Source: Fieldwork 2014

Successive governments have made robust attempts to alleviate poverty through initiatives such as NAPEP 2001; Yobe Socio-Economic Reforms Agenda II (YOSERA II being the state version of SEEDS.) The YOSERA II sets out clear and comprehensive policy priorities which include the creation of

employment opportunities and support for infrastructural growth along with several other objectives. In the last few months, the state government has distributed machines and other poverty alleviation materials worth 99 million naira to small scale entrepreneurs, community based organizations (CBOs) and retired civil servants (Daily Trust August 15, 2014).

Figure 2: *Level of Satisfaction with Basic Services*



Source: *Fieldwork 2014.*

Despite the tremendous effort on the part of government in providing basic services as observed in the last section, it appears that people are generally not satisfied with the services as shown in Fig 2. This may not be unrelated to the lack of accountability and transparency or lack of involvement of all stakeholders in the process. In any given community, there are usually several actors with differing viewpoints and interests and it is a feature

of good governance to accommodate these varied interests, and reach a broad consensus on how to achieve goals. This requires that all categories of people particularly the vulnerable groups have the opportunity of participating in the determination of what will best improve their wellbeing. The absence of such platforms generally leads to dissatisfaction and disenchantment.

Conclusion and recommendations

This study assessed the character of governance and its linkages to increasing insecurity in Yobe State. Based on the assessment of the various dimensions of governance, it was observed that there is a general dissatisfaction with the performance of elected officials at all levels. This is largely attributed to lack of transparency and accountability among government officials and as a result, the level of corruption in the state is perceived to be extremely high. There is a low level of education, high unemployment, widespread poverty and an unequal distribution of economic and social benefits. The insurgency was able to exploit these political and socio-economic fault lines to recruit the economically vulnerable to its cause. While socio-economic deprivation is clearly a powerful tool in the insurgency crisis, the predominant narrative points to the failure of governance to deliver on the so-called dividends of democracy. The present administration is however making concerted efforts from several fronts to remediate the insecurity particularly through economic incentives.

Based on the findings, the study makes the following recommendations:

- Violent extremists exploit the economically vulnerable in the state: it is therefore necessary to improve governance, strengthen the rule of law and to stem the tide of corruption. To achieve this, government must be more transparent and must invest more resources in providing the basic needs of citizens, as this will go a long way in denying the insurgency its appeal and potential recruits.
- The government should improve on the mechanisms of accountability by making it more participatory and inclusive to achieve a broad-based legitimacy. This will increase the level of confidence in governance.
- Despite the efforts of the state government to strengthen the education sector, much more still needs to be done, particularly in regard to the recruitment of pupils and monitoring of dropouts.
- Government needs to provide skills acquisition programmes and employment opportunities and other means of livelihoods to reduce the number of unemployed youths who are frustrated due to economic deprivation. This will reduce poverty and the attraction to join violent extremist groups such as Boko Haram.
- The government also needs to strengthen grassroots organizations and stake holders at the LG level. Though they cannot replace formal agencies, building on the capacity of NGOs and CBOs in security and conflict management may assist government to work more inclusively and effectively. In this regard, the success of the Civilian Joint Task Force (CJFT) in Borno State in stemming the tide of the insurgency easily comes to

mind. To achieve this goal, national and international NGOs and donor organizations can support the leadership training and capacity building of these local organizations.

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