GOVERNANCE AND INSECURITY IN SOUTH EAST NIGERIA

Edited by:
Ukoha Ukiwo and Innocent Chukwuma

CLEEN Foundation

The mission of CLEEN Foundation is to promote public safety, security and accessible justice through empirical research, legislative advocacy, demonstration programmes and publications, in partnership with government and civil society.

Table of Content

List of tables

Acknowledgement

Preface

Thirteen years after the restoration of elected civilian government in Nigeria, serious existential challenges persist at the federal, state and local levels. These include persisting low public confidence in the capability of the electoral system to produce truly elected political leaders at various levels. Implementation of economic reform programmes that have neither improved public services nor produced jobs for thousands of young people graduating every year from higher institutions. Pervasive corruption, which has reduced government's annual budgetary pronouncements and development targets to hollow rituals scuffed at by a cynical public. Above all, an alarming spate of armed violence and terrorism over widening space and territories and apparent inability of the security forces to restore law and order, bring the perpetrators to justice and reassure a traumatised citizenry.

The result is that in spite of Nigeria's impressive macroeconomic growth and stability (thanks to oil income), the country still ranks very low on major global and even sub-Saharan African governance indicators such as infant mortality, maternal mortality, quantity/quality of education, job creation, poverty eradication, security of life and property; and high on corruption profile and cost of doing Business (Chukwuma, 2011). Of all the challenges confronting Nigeria, it is arguable that security challenge is the most acute. From Maiduguri and Bauchi in Northeast to Jos in North-central and down to Aba in Southeast, Nigerians are at a loss about the inability of security authorisers and providers in the country to arrest the increasing drift to a state of lawlessness where almost anybody can get away with the most heinous of violent crimes as long as it involves mass number of victims.

An explanation of why this state of affairs has festered for so long in Nigeria requires an understanding of its linkage with poor political governance. In spite of the efforts of the current leadership of the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) under Attahiru Jega, which in some ways have brought a modicum of credibility to the electoral process, the truth is that the votes have not really counted in the emergence of political leaders in Nigeria.

In deed, elections have more or less become an organized crime in various parts of the country. In this criminal enterprise, politicians go into electioneering contests with a fixation not on service but on capturing state power and access to public resources meant for overall development of the people for personal gains.

While no region or state in Nigeria is immune from the above grim picture, political and security governance in the southeast has continued to be a source of major concern to many stakeholders in the region. It is indeed an irony of history that a region with the most advanced traditional features of democracy, accountable and transparent governance system exemplified in its *amala* community governance system has today become a bastion of criminal autocracy, opaque and imperial governance style. Statistics from the 2010 edition of the annual National Crime and Safety Survey (NCSS) conducted by the CLEEN Foundation indicate that Ebonyi, Abia and Imo States have highest levels of kidnapping in Nigeria (CLEEN Foundation, 2010). Similarly, in the 2006 edition of the survey Abia State ranked first in armed robbery (Alemika and Chukwuma, 2007). Between 2009 and 2010, there was hardly a day that passed without cases of violent robbery and kidnapping reported in the area. The villages are no exception as there is increasingly no statistically significant difference between the levels of crime (especially armed robbery and kidnapping) recorded in the cities and those in the villages (Chukwuma, 2009). For the indigenes, going home has become an ordeal and preparations for it require the kind of security arrangements you would expect in war torn places.

Consequently, public and private enterprises that operated in the region and provided jobs to the youths in the past are closing down in droves and thus complicating youth unemployment. While private businesses are leaving because of security situation and poor physical infrastructure, their public counterpart are shutting down mainly as a result of mismanagement, corruption and poor corporate governance among other malfeasance. To compound situation, the Federal Government of Nigeria, since the end of the civil war in 1970 has not been fair to the southeast in rebuilding its infrastructure and services destroyed during the war, which would have enabled the region to

rebuild its economy and provide jobs for its army of young people. The government has consistently short-changed the region in the citing of major public works programme such as construction of power stations, expansion of road networks, water and irrigation projects and other social investments that would have contributed in turning the economy around.

Furthermore, law enforcement agents posted to the region have continued to conduct themselves in manners that suggest that they are an occupation force preying on the people rather than protecting them. Prior to the emergence of Mohammed Abubakar as the Inspector General of the Nigeria Police Force in January 2012 and his subsequent banning of police checkpoints/road blocks, you could hardly drive for more than one kilometre on any major road in the region without being stopped by yet another roadblock/checkpoints mounted by police officers to extort the people in the name of fighting armed robbery and kidnapping.

Therefore, responding to governance and security challenges confronting southeast Nigeria require concerted efforts by a multitude of stakeholders in government, business and civil society and interventions at several points intersecting political, economic and security governance. Taking up the challenge, the Southeast regional office of the CLEEN Foundation, facilitated a stakeholders meeting in Owerri in June 2011 to enable participants from diverse backgrounds and callings encompassing business, academia, human rights advocacy, religious organizations, legal practitioners, media, politicians and other professional groups, to discuss and articulate organizational and programmatic responses to governance challenges facing the region as well as fashioning out ways of broadening the dialogue with other groups within and beyond the region. Among the resolutions of the meeting, which included establishment of the South-East Forum (SEF) a nonpartisan platform with a mission to promote democracy, good governance, development and security in the southeast, was a mandate to the CLEEN Foundation to conduct an action research on security and governance challenges in the southeast with a view to establishing an empirical basis for advocacy on the issues as well as a baseline against which progress of intervention programmes can be measured.

The communiqué of the meeting can be found in Appendix II of this publication.

This publication is therefore both a follow-up to the Owerri meeting and a product of CLEEN Foundation's integrated project on security and governance in the southeast, which seeks to galvanize various role players and interest groups in the region to pay close attention to the governance of the region and to promote right- based approach to community development. The publication is divided into six chapters. Chapter one highlights the main findings of the study and tries to distil relevant policy implications. Chapter two explores the governance and security challenges in Abia State by examining the various factors that are contributory to governance and security challenges and the ways in which state and non-state actors have responded to the challenges. The subsequent chapters present the case studies for Anambra, Ebonyi, Enugu and Imo States.

Innocent Chukwuma
Executive Director

CHAPTER ONE

Framework For Improving Governance and Security in South East Nigeria
By
Ukoha Ukiwo

1.1   Introduction

This chapter seeks to highlight the main findings of the study on governance and security in South East Nigeria and to distil relevant policy implications. The study was aimed at filling a gaping vacuum in contemporary Nigeria Social Science, namely the paucity of systematic academic investigation to the governance and security challenges that have confronted the South East region in the last decade. The chapter is divided into four broad sections. Part One presents the context of the study. It sets out the state of insecurity and governance deficits in the region and draws attention to popular responses to these challenges. Notable among the responses discussed is the resort to vigilantism and attribution of failures to extraneous forces, especially the federal government. In Part Two, the Chapter presents the point of departure of the study. It discusses the approach adopted by the study and the key assumptions underlying the approach. The key justification for the approach is the need to look inwards for prognosis and prescriptions while not underestimating the salience of macroeconomic and political forces. Part Three presents the key findings of the case studies that form successive chapters of the book. The section shows that the case studies confirmed the main hypothesis of the study that the governance deficits and pervasive insecurity in the region are inter-linked and mutually reinforcing. The chapters also unravel key sources of governance and security challenges such as perverse manifestations of patronage politics, absence of governmental accountability, economic decline and youth unemployment and the failure of public security institutions and actors. This section of the chapter also discusses some of the responses by state and non-state actors and their limitations. In part four, the policy implications of the study are presented. The policy options presented are the need to adopt a human security perspective and the need to strengthen

state civil society partnerships in security provisioning and build capacity of institutions and networks in both state and civil society. The study also advocates the adoption of a post conflict approach to economic recovery and the need to deepen democracy and social citizenship.

1.2   The Context: Decline and Marginalization

Since the return of Nigeria to civil rule in 1999 the South-East geopolitical zone, which is peopled by populations of people that still self-identify as Igbo, has been the site of arguably the worst forms of violent crime in the annals of the country. The five states in the zone have in varying degrees witnessed total breakdown of law and order as organized criminal networks have through deployment of a combination of stick and carrots undermined the operations of law enforcement agencies, especially the police. At various points during this period, the people of the South East have resorted to self-help measures to stem the rising wave of crime, which gravely undermined their survival. For instance, faced by the threats posed to their life, property and prosperity traders in the commercial city of Aba introduced a vigilante group to face up to organized criminal networks that terrorised residents and visitors. The famed Bakassi Boys recorded impressive successes in checkmating the criminal groups leading to the adoption of similar structures in other cities in the region as well as contributed increasing political violence and egregious rights violations.

This period of heightened insecurity has contemporaneously been characterised by virtual collapse of governance. Some states in the zone were outsourced to political barons that turned government into their personal fiefs. As a group of concerned citizens observed, the zone has witnessed a 'crisis of leadership' and 'criminalization of politics and governance':

> The Southeast has been afflicted by a group of political leaders who are mostly opportunistic, self-serving and lacking in vision for the public good… In most parts of the region, elections have become an organized crime in which political actors deploy violence, bribery and subterfuge to hijack state power for the sole purpose of diverting

public treasuries to satisfy personal ends. This creates an environment in which governments are neither accountable nor responsive to the aspirations of the people (South East Summit 2011:3).

The zone has been consistently experiencing a downward slide in most development indicators, trailing behind other southern zones in measures of poverty and inequality. The poor performance of the South East has been a source of concern because of the past history of outstanding performance in educational attainments, human capital, industrialization and growth in the region. Since the advent of colonialism which marked the agglomeration of peoples in the region under the shared Igbo identity, social scientists have been astounded by the progress recorded by the people in the region.

The first set of scholars attributed the progress of the Igbo to their positive orientation to modernization. For instance, Simon Ottenberg (1959:130) suggested that the 'Ibo are probably the most receptive to cultural change and the most willing to accept Western ways of life, of any large group in Nigeria'. The progress recorded by the Igbo in the colonial period was traced to aspects of their culture, notably their appreciation of individual attainments and initiatives, equality of opportunity, competition in all fields of human endeavour, willingness to accept changes, pragmatism, materialist orientation and participant political culture (see Smock and Smock 1969:500). Compared to other groups in the country, the Igbo were said to have a high achievement orientation (see Morrill 1963, Le-Vine 1966).

There is no gainsaying that Igbo generally accepted these characterizations. Apart from the anthropological stereotypes engendering a self-fulfilling prophecy, it elicited among the Igbo a sub-conscious superiority complex. This explains the messianic aspirations of the emergent Igbo elite in late colonial Nigeria that in no small measure engendered envy and fear among their contemporaries from other identity groups in Nigeria and elsewhere in the continent. For instance, Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe, had at his baptism into the political vocation expressed the belief that the Igbo had a manifest destiny to lead the Black race (see Sklar 1963). It is hardly surprising therefore that he

became the only political leader in the continent who was identified with a continental sobriquet –'Zik of Africa'.

The sense of grandeur, predilection for primus inter peres status and self-imposed messianic mission also explain some of the roles that Igbo political elites played in the First Republic and indeed why Igbo military officers played leading roles in Nigeria's first coup de tat. It was inevitable that in the context of competitive political ethnicity that prevailed during the period the cravings for leadership and aggressive materialism among the Igbo would attract envy, fear and resistance from other ethnic groups. Frustrations over failure to fulfil the self-acclaimed manifest destiny to lead ultimately contributed to the decision to secede from Nigeria and prolongation of the secessionist mobilizations.

Since the end of the civil war, the Igbo have worked individually and corporately to recover lost grounds. By the end of the 1970s, it was evident that the region had, despite unfavourable politics and policies, made significant strides toward economic recovery. For instance, Brautigam (1997) shows that the South East was experiencing economic boom in the 1980s when the country as a whole was facing recession with manufacturing output falling. She argues that the economic growth and industrialization recorded in the region occurred in the midst of unfavourable state policies. The emergence of Nnewi, Onitsha, Aba and Enugu as veritable industrial centres was the product of the capacity for innovation and adaptation and extant social capital which produced low transaction costs. There was no doubt also that the commitment by the political elite in the then Anambra State and Imo State to import substitution industrialization played a key role. However, by the end mid 1990s economic recession had set in in much of the region. A review of public enterprises established in the 1980s indicated that many of them had packed up by 2003 (see AIEC 2006:20). Another assessment notes that:

> The region has become de— industrialised by bad governance and violent politics. At the last count over 30 state— owned and private investments located in the region have gone under (South East Summit 2011:2).

A clear indication of the decline of the region is that while scholarship on the region up till the 1990s has been inspired by attempts to explain the remarkable progress recorded by the South East before and after the civil war, most of the post 1990 studies have focussed largely on the descent of the region to anarchy, criminality and criminal politics (see Morrill 1963, Smock and Smock 1969, Brautigam 1997, Smith 2004).[1] . Another indication of the decline of the region is its declining performance on human development indicators when compared to other southern geo-political zones. For instance, the percentage of the population living in poverty in southern Nigeria in 2004 was South-East (26%), South-South (35%) and South-West (43%) (see UNDP 2009: 64). The 2010 poverty report shows that the other southern zones are performing better than the South East. It shows that poverty rates in the southern zones are: South-East (67%), South-South (63%) and South West (59%).[2]

The socio-political and economic decline especially the insecurity in the region has become a source of concern to the people of the region. However, the post-civil war context of balkanization and marginalization of the Igbo has generated a tendency to attribute the woes of the region to external forces. Most of the analysts have blamed the federal government and specific Nigerian leaders for implementing policies that are injurious to the economic growth of the region and for starving the region of requisite infrastructure. This perspective to the crises in the region is evident in the suit filed by Mr. Olisa Agbakoba, former president of the Nigeria Bar Association (NBA) against the Federal Government. In the Fundamental Rights Class Action suit filed at the Federal High Court, Enugu the plaintiff accused the Federal Government of neglect in allocation of federal projects, non-maintenance of federal roads and bridges, non-development of oil and gas resources, abandonment of the Enugu colliery, poor development of ports and airports and over-policing that all negatively affect the investment in the region.[3] The petition which

---

[1] Exception is Meagher (2010) which focusses on the vitality of informal economy amidst economic decline.

[2] See, A. Abdulraheem 'Again, North tops poverty index', *Peoples' Daily*, 14 February 2012. Accessed at http://www.peoplesdaily-online.com/news/national-news/30063-again-north-tops-poverty-index on March 23, 2012.

[3] See, http://www.agbakoba-associates.com/news_detail.php?id=12 accessed on February 20, 2012.

also alleged discrimination of the geo-political zone in successive state creation exercises and access to federal political appointments demanded payment of the sum of one trillion naira as compensation to the region.

There is sufficient evidence that the South-East does not get its fair share from the Nigerian patrimony. For instance, the geo-political zone has the least kilometre of federal roads (see Table 1.1). Moreover, the South-East is the zone most dependent on private initiatives for service delivery in the social sector. As Table 1.2 shows the zone has the highest number of private health facilities and lowest number of government-owned health facilities. Also survey on investment climate in Nigeria shows that the South-East is the most unfriendly geo-political zone to do business. All the five states have the lowest ranks in the aggregate score on business environment (see Table 1.3). Although the main indicators for measuring investment climate were mostly the nature of tax regimes and the time gap for securing licenses and government approvals, it is most likely that the parlous security situation in the region featured in the calculations of the assessors.

Table 1.1: Length of federal roads by geopolitical zone, 2006 & 2008

Zone	Length in 2006	% in 2006	Length in 2008	% in 2008
North Central	7,831.20	22.8	7,874.20	21.0
North East	7,803.40	22.7	7,850.40	21.0
North West	6,668.90	19.4	6,876.20	18.4
South East	3,121.70	9.1	3,642.0	9.7
South South	4,150.89	12.1	6,066.60	16.2
South West	4,528.26	13.2	4,848.50	13.0
FCT	236.60	0.7	244.60	0.7
Total	**34,340.95**	**100**	**37,402.5**	**100**

Source: Adapted from National Bureau of Statistics 2009, pp. 369-370.

Table 1.2: Ownership of health care facilities by geo-political zone, 2004

Zone	Public	Private
North Central	3,306	1,852
North East	2,225	353
North West	3,874	420
South East	912	2,416
South South	1,841	1,285
South West	2,439	2,481
FCT	10	225
Total	**14,607**	**9,032**

Source: National Bureau of Statistics 2009, p. 183.

Table 1.3: Rank of South-East States

STATE	RANK
Abia	32
Anambra	35
Ebonyi	31
Enugu	30
Imo	36

Source: World Bank and IFC, 2010: 39-46

Table 1.4 Location of policemen by geo-political zones

Zone	Number Police Stations	% of Police Stations	Number Police Posts	% of Police Posts	Number of Police Divisions	% of Police Divisions
North Central	349	21.7	604	22.93	166	15.96
North East	269	16.73	568	21.56	149	14.33
North West	188	11.69	671	25.47	216	20.77
South East	176	10.95	130	4.94	127	12.21
South South	288	17.91	282	10.71	185	17.79
South West	292	18.16	302	11.47	162	15.58
FCT	11	0.68	44	1.67	16	1.54

Source: National Bureau of Statistics, 2009: 266

Table 1.5 Police formations by geo-political zones, 2006

Zone	Number Police Stations	% of Police Stations	Number Police Posts	% of Police Posts	Number of Police Divisions	% of Police Divisions
North Central	367	22.96	708	26.9	184	17.69
North East	269	16.83	498	18.93	154	14.8
North West	188	11.76	671	25.5	216	20.78
South East	161	10.08	134	5.09	127	12.21
South South	258	16.15	202	7.68	167	16.06
South West	307	19.21	298	11.33	162	15.58
FCT	11	0.69	44	1.67	16	1.54

Source: National Bureau of Statistics, 2009: 263

Table 1. 6. Prison capacity by geo-political zones

ZONE	2002	%	2007	%
North Central	4613	12.68	6173	13.19
North East	7888	21.68	10938	23.38
North West	7967	21.9	10922	23.34
South East	4025	11.06	4814	10.29
South South	5915	16.26	7340	15.69
South West	5641	15.51	5932	12.68
FCT	330	0.91	570	1.22

Source: National Bureau of Statistics, 2009: 260

A cursory examination of public investment in security across the geo-political zones also shows that the South-East lags behind other zones. The South East had the lowest number of policemen in 2006 and 2007. In fact, number of policemen deployed to region declined from 9 per cent in 2006 to 7 per cent in 2007, which was a crucial election year (see Table 1.4). This was in spite of the rising crime wave in the region and fears of political violence given the intense competition for political positions. During this period also the South-East had the lowest number of police formations in the country (see Table 1.5). The same pattern was replicated in the area of prison capacity where the South-East also had the lowest (Table 1.6).

There is widespread belief in the region that the poor investment in public security in the region has adversely affected the capacity of security agencies to respond to reports of crime. For instance, the zone became a haven for bands of kidnappers throughout 2009 and 2010 without any effective response from the Federal Government, which constitutionally is responsible for internal security and controls the police and armed forces. The Federal Government was pressured to intervene only after the national consternation generated by the kidnap of officials of the Nigeria Union of Journalists (NUJ). The relatively poor security infrastructure is seen as symptomatic of the region's marginality

in Nigerian politics. The South-East is also the least represented in federal executive posts (see Mustapha 2006). The widespread perception that the travails of region partly stems from political marginalization has inspired the advocacy for Igbo presidency in recent years. It has also promoted the tendency to look outwards for explanations and attributions for the region's woes.

1.3   The Approach: Focusing on internal dynamics

While not discounting the salience of national macroeconomic policies and identity politics on developments in the region as elsewhere in the country, this book seeks to focus on internal factors and dynamics. It seeks to explore the extent to which the governance and security challenges in the region are interlinked and their implications for economic growth and human development.   The study is the first attempt to provide a holistic analysis of the development experiences of the region in the last 20 years. Previous studies have focussed on specific towns and communities in the region, especially the commercial and industrial triangle of Aba, Onitsha and Nnewi (see for example, Brautigam 1997, Meagher 2010). The research questions that informed the studies included the following:

1. What are the governance challenges facing this state?
2. What are the sources of these challenges?
3. What are the responses of successive governments to these challenges?
4. What are the security challenges facing this state?
5. How would you assess the response of government both past and present to these challenges?
6. What, if any, are the linkages between the governance and security challenges in this state?
7. To what extent are these challenges peculiar to the South-East region?
8. In what ways have citizens and citizens groups responded to the governance and security challenges in the state.
9. To what extent have non-state responses improved governance and security in the state?
10. What is the state of governance at the community level in this state?

11. What are the historical and contemporary roles of town unions in governance and security in the state?
12. What are the current challenges of town unions in the state?

It was envisaged that framing the questions in such broad formats would help the researchers to unravel different aspects of the governance and security challenges in the region.

The chapters in this book are based on case studies of the five states in the region. The cases studies adopted social survey methodology. Data was collected through a range of sources including interviews with key informants, focus group discussions, observation techniques and published and unpublished documents. Key informant interviews were conducted with government officials, security officials, leaders of civil society organizations and religious institutions, academics and community leaders. The objective was to elicit views of elites and persons in leadership positions. The focus group discussions targeted women groups, youths and groups of informal sector operators. The intention was to get a representative view of these social clusters that are often unrepresented in decision making processes. Observation was used to gather information from public events and meetings of civil society groups.

Although the sampling criteria was purposive and targeted particular clusters, another selection criterion was adopted to ensure that the sample is representative of the population. Consequently, study sites were selected from all three senatorial districts in each state and equal numbers of urban and rural areas were sampled. As earlier noted this consideration also informed the targeting of women and youth in the FGDs. Finally, government publications, media reports and publications of civil society organizations were sourced for social statistics, government programmes and policies and activities of civil society groups. Notable among this is statistical data from the National Crime and Victimization Survey (NCVS) conducted by CLEEN Foundation on a periodic basis.

1.4   The Key findings: Politics and Governance produce insecurity

The chapters in this volume point to certain conclusions about the nature of governance, the nature of security challenges and the inter-linkages between governance and security; and the role of non-state actors especially community based organizations in enhancing security and governance. The main finding is the complex inter-linkages between governance failures and insecurity.

The Chapters show that the 5 states of the South East have in the past 10 years experienced the worst forms of organized crime. In the early 2000s, armed robbers laid a siege on important urban centres such as other semi urban communities. The impact of the security situation on the economy of the region, which is driven by commercial activities, was colossal. Lack of accountability in the years of military rule had encouraged entrenchment of a culture of political impunity. Amidst economic crisis and rising unemployment, the public security system was utterly dysfunctional. The police officers were not only deemed to be ill-equipped, poorly paid and mal-motivated but also corrupt and treacherous with some officers alleged to be on the pay-roll of organized criminal gangs.

Against the background of the inefficiency and lack of public trust in public security, different communities and occupational groupings initiated self-help measures to provide security services. The most successful model appeared to be that introduced by one of the thriving businesses in Aba's Ariaria Market, Abia State, which was called Bakassi Boys. The crime reduction results associated with the introduction of the vigilante group led to its replication in neighbouring Anambra and Imo States. However, the vigilantes also became dysfunctional due to politicization, privatization and erosion of public oversight and control.

Another key finding shared by the chapters is the fact that politics and political violence were serious threats to security in the region during the period. The elections of 1999 threw up politicians that owed their occupancy of political positions to factors other than popular mandate. Electoral fraud meant that popular wills were subverted and beneficiaries of the stolen mandate worked

to perpetuate their hold on power through repression of political opposition. In many cases, thugs and vigilantes were recruited to assassinate and kidnap persons considered threats to the interests of incumbents. The result, as the chapters demonstrate is the unholy alliance between some politicians, government officials and organized criminal networks.

While the impact of the reign of terror on security of live and property was serious enough, the tussle for power between elected officials and their political patrons crippled governance and further undermined security. The worst case scenario was in Anambra State where some senior police officers and the state legislators connived with a political godfather to illegally unseat the Governor Chris Ngige. The alleged involvement of the police in the failed impeachment saga influenced the state government to side-line the formal police force and to depend on vigilante and private security. The result was the existence of two parallel security governance systems in the state, which heightened public disorder.

Godfather politics also undermined governance in Enugu State during the first tenures of successive governors in the state. Dr. Chimaraoke Nnamani had a running battle with his Godfather Chief Jim Nwobodo. Nnamani soon fell out with his God-son and successor Barr. Sullivan Chime. Also Chime had to contend with Dr. Okwezilieze Nwodo who sought to establish a political base in the state after becoming National Chairman of the ruling Peoples Democratic Party (PDP).

Although Governor Orji Uzor Kalu (1999-2007) was not under intense pressure from any Godfather, governance and security in the state were adversely affected by his long-running battle with President Olusegun Obasanjo. The feud ultimately culminated in Kalu decamping from PDP to establish the Peoples Progressive Alliance (PPA), the platform he used to install his protégé as successor. However, Kalu's alleged overbearing attitude evidenced by the rumoured initiation saga involving his former chief of staff and protégé Governor Theodore Orji subjected Abia to similar experiences of other states where governance and security were affected by tussles between Godfathers and Godsons. Governor Oji spent his entire first term in office

seeking for political relevance and independence, which only became possible at the eve of the 2007 elections. To lesser degrees, both Ebonyi and Imo states were also victims of Godfather politics. However, the two states witnessed bitter factional party and inter-party conflicts that undermined security. Against this background, it is not surprising that the study found that the people of the South East considered politics as contributing to governance deficits and insecurity.

The negative impact of politics also manifested in rapid regime turnovers and policy inconsistencies. The bitter politics of succession engendered the tendency for successor administrations to throw away the baby with the bathwater. While some of the changes were informed by the need to dismantle and devalorize unfriendly patronage networks and political machines, others were simply aimed at charting new courses that would yield political capital for the new governor. This is because the personalization of government programmes by the governor produces the tendency for every governor to embark on new endeavours that would bear his own emblem. In some cases, this was costly for the sustainable development of the state as evidenced in the decision of the Elechi administration in Ebonyi to abandon the progressive investments in education and health pioneered by his predecessor (see Chapter 5).

Another important finding of the case studies is that some of the policies adopted by the government to improve governance and security were perceived to be achieving the exact opposite result. A key example which appeared to resonate in most states is the urban renewal and environmental sanitation programmes that often resulted in demolition of so-called illegal structures. Also counterproductive is the banning of commercial motor cycle operators ('Okada', 'Inaga') in major towns and cities in the state. These policies were considered regressive as they tended to throw more people into the job market and endanger livelihoods. The impact appeared to be greater on some of the cyclists and squatters who had returned 'home' after being sacked from their previous locations as a result of urban renewal programmes and religious conflicts. The programmes contribute to insecurity by creating young idle

persons that can easily be lured into criminal networks. Moreover, the enforcement mechanisms that are adopted by state governments and local government councils are perceived as draconian and oppressive. Many governments outsourced enforcement to 'task forces' manned by political thugs and hired soldiers and policemen who often get involved in extortion and looting.

The enforcement teams are hardly accountable because they consider their appointments and selection as pay-off of roles they played for the election of the principal public office holder. The operations of the groups therefore tend to alienate non-partisans or members of opposition parties. This picture also holds for the employment and empowerment programmes initiated to tackle youth unemployment and destitution. The practice in most of the states is that the programmes have become instruments for dispensing political patronage. The privileging of partisan youths as beneficiaries promotes social exclusion which undermines security. The politicization of poverty alleviation and youth employment programmes increases the likelihood that unemployed youths would become political thugs in order to benefit from the largesse.

The case studies equally demonstrate that vigilantes and neighbourhood watch groups established with the expressed aim of combatting of crimes have had mixed results. While in some contexts the presence of these ancillary security service providers has contributed to reduction of crime it has also produced other forms of security challenges. Foremost, among these challenges is the privatization of some of the vigilantes by influential persons who use them to threaten, maim and kill their perceived opponents. The context of privatization is the arrangement whereby communities are encouraged to form vigilantes and neighbourhood watch groups who are then licensed by government to operate. Securing the government license often requires the imprimatur of a traditional ruler or prominent community leader. This registration requirement and the financial burden of maintaining the vigilante provide opportunities for elite capture of the community initiative.

The chapters also show that some of the governance challenges afflicting the public sector are also undermining social capital in communities and communal organizations. Developmental programmes were stalled by acrimony and conflicts between officials of town unions and traditional rulers. The tussle for pre-eminence often stemmed from the politicization of both institutions with actors seeking to position themselves as brokers of relationship between the state and community. Town unions and community development associations were found to be ridden with internal conflicts and corruption. Some of the community associations and unions that were spared the internal strife are ambushed by poverty. Economic hardship has also undermined the capacity of members of contribute to community development projects. Inability to raise funds for designated projects implies that the community has lost the only opportunity of attracting government's counterpart funding for the project.

1.5   The policy implications

The study raises the following issues and options for policy:

Human security approach is imperative

The case studies show that the dominant response to the security challenges by both state and non-state actors in the region is to mobilize resources to fight crime by eliminating or containing criminals.[4] This approach, which is based on the perception that persons involved in criminality are social misfits driven by greed, contradicts the key finding of the study that insecurity in the region is linked to governance failures. The complex linkage between governance and security suggests the imperative of adopting a human security approach. Human security is different from conventional conception of security, which is often conflated with state security. It aims to 'safeguard the vital core of all human lives from critical pervasive threats in a way that is consistent with long-term human fulfilment' (Alkire 2003:3). The approach is protective and seeks to respect the human person. It enjoins all institutions charged with security to offer protection in ways that are 'institutionalized rather than episodic, preventative rather than reactive and responsive rather than rigid' (Alkire 2003:4).

---

[4] Exception is the amnesty offered by Governors Theodore Oji (Abia) and Rochas Okorocha (Imo) to criminals to disarm or be damned.

In terms of strategies, the approach necessitates involvement of institutions that are not only overtly established to promote security but also institutions whose effects unintentionally undermine human security. These institutions should be seen to be working to prevent threats from occurring, mitigating impacts of threats that have already occurred or are inevitable; and helping all victims to cope better. This, therefore, calls for a holistic intervention that seeks not only to fight crime but also to address structural and facilitating drivers of insecurity.

Partnerships between public and community security institutions are imperative
The case studies rightly identify failures in both governance and security institutions as mainly responsible for insecurity in the region. Thus, the state governments and police authorities are blamed for both generating insecurity and being unable to address security challenges. Most of the studies suggest that community security initiatives and private security are gradually filling this vacuum. In this respect, the case studies seem to confirm experiences globally where the state, as conceived in liberal democratic theory, has since the end of the twentieth century demonstrated palpable incapacity for meeting its self-imposed role of maintaining public order. Analysts have pointed to the redrawing of boundaries between the public and private spheres that declining capacity of the state for law enforcement necessitates. As Crawford (1999:296) notes:

> We are witnessing a redrawing of what constitutes the legitimate responsibilities of individuals, collectivities and the state. Community and partnerships constitutes the sites at which the re-articulation of the new socio-political relationships are being played out and contested and out of which new forms of local governance of crime are emerging.

The main features of this change are seen as the end of the era of monopoly where the police was solely responsible for public security and the increasing trend toward pluralisation of security provisioning (Baley and Shearing 2005). Intervention of other non-state security providers is seen to contribute to improvement in security provisioning in many localities. For instance, Asiwaju

and Marenin (2009) report that a pilot assessment of a project on community policing in Enugu State showed that the project contributed to the decrease in citizens' fear of crime, fall in citizens' experience of crime, reduction in incidence of police corruption, and marked improvement in performance of the police. The experience of developed countries, however, is that crime and insecurity generally have increased rather than decreased amidst pluralisation (see Baley and Sheering 2005:726). This suggests that it is not enough to blame the police and other public security agencies for rising insecurity and recommend the intervention of private and community institutions.

Rather it is important to deploy a wider perspective that looks at the roles of what Jones and Newburn (2005) have called 'natural surveillance institutions'. These are private and parochial networks and institutions that operate at the community level. While the parochial networks and institutions refer to those that service the needs of local residential communities such as the local church, the local school, community development association, the private networks and institutions are those involved in inter-personal friendship and kinship. Jones and Newburn (2005) argue persuasively that the challenge of policing need not be seen in terms of malfunctioning or overload of the public policing institutions but also dereliction of responsibility by parochial and private policing institutions. The decline of intermediate and secondary forms of social control is partly to blame and what is referred to as pluralisation and privatization is actually the formalization of intermediate and secondary social control activities.

The case studies in this book tangentially depict the decline of natural surveillance institutions in accounts of feuds in community development associations, corruption in town unions, decay of family values, erosion of social capital and the decline of moral fervour in the church. The tendency to resort to vigilantes and neighbourhood watch groups is also tantamount to formalization of the functions performed by intermediate and secondary institutions of social control. It is consequently evident that there is need to also focus on reviving natural surveillance institutions. The current security and justice sector reform programmes that aim to build capacity, discipline

---

and morale in the public police and solicit community partnership through community policing should be extended to target these institutions directly.

Adopt a post-conflict approach to economic recovery
Policy pronouncements on addressing the governance and security challenges of the South East should include designating the region as a post-conflict zone. The South-East qualifies as a post-conflict zone not just because of being the battlefront of the Nigeria Civil War but also being the constant destinations of internally displaced persons (IDPs) fleeing religious and ethno-regional violence in mostly northern parts of the country. No other zone in Nigeria has suffered the consequence of violent conflict as the South-East. The phenomenal growth of the informal sector of the economy of the zone is partly the product of adaptation and resilience that violent conflict imposes on its victims.

If seen rightly as a post conflict environment, adopting the requisite economic recovery programme would be necessary. As the Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery of the UNDP (2008) has shown the most successful cases of recovery from violent conflict has been recorded in contexts where the focus was on strengthening the indigenous drivers of growth. Strategies that have produced the best results include prioritizing rehabilitation of infrastructure, emphasizing reinvestment in human capital development and investing in reintegration of former combatants and militants. It also requires enhancing access to financial resources, strengthening local institutions and emphasizing programmes that secure economic opportunities and create jobs. What these strategies amount to, is creating the enabling environment for individual enterprises to operate and enabling local ingenuity.

Deepen democracy and social citizenship
The case studies confirm that politics and governance have become major sources of security threats in the South-East. The transformation of election into organized criminal activity and governance into repression has engendered a low participant culture in a region traditionally reputed for the practice of village democracy. This low participant culture is evident in poor voter turn-out and inertia towards collective action. For instance, the South East was

reputed to have the fewest demonstrations against the removal of petroleum subsidy in January 2012.[5] The commercialization of politics in the region has also engendered a patronage based state-citizenship engagement. The critique of current community development approaches which sees town unions taxing community members to develop projects to which the state only makes token contributions is that it undermines rights based state citizenship engagement.[6] South-easterners are treated as second-class citizens at home by their governments and as 'settlers', 'non-indigenes' and 'Christians' in other parts of the country.

There is need to renew the social contract at these two levels. There is need for civil society organizations to target the region in active citizenship, voice and accountability programmes in the region before the 2015 elections. This programme stream should be aimed at catalysing mass participation in the elections and electing popular candidates. The second social contract should be contracted between the South East Governors Forum and the Northern Governors Forum. It should be aimed at influencing the northern governors to take more proactive measures in safeguarding and respecting the lives of Igbos who have become the soft targets of violent conflicts in Northern Nigeria.

References

African Institute for Applied Economics (2006) *Memorandum for the establishment of South East Nigeria Economic Commission,* Enugu: AIAE

Alkire, S. (2003) 'A Conceptual Framework for Human Security', *CRISE Working Paper, No. 2,* Oxford: Queen Elizabeth House.

Asiwaju, K. and O. Marenin (2009) 'Policing Nigeria: Challenges and Reform' in M. Hinton and T. Newburn (eds.) *Policing Developing Democracies*, London and New York: Routledge Francis Taylor Group, pp. 280-306

---

[5] See, Mike Ubani 'Non-participation in subsidy protests elicit fury in Igboland', Leadership newspapers, January 15, 2012 accessed on March 22, 2012 at http://www.leadership.ng/nga/articles/13351/2012/01/15/non-participation_subsidy_protests_igboland_elicits_fury.html

[6] See, Comments of Prof. Okwudiba Nnoli at the Ford Foundation Conference on Democracy organized by CLEEN Foundation, Owerri, 2011.

Bayley, D. L. and C. D. Shearing (2005)'The Future of Policing' in T. Newburn (ed.) *Policing : Key Readings*, Devon: Willan Publishing, pp. 715-732.

Crawford, A. (1999) *The Local Governance of Crime: Appeals to community and partnerships*, Oxford: Oxford University Press

Jones, T. and Tim Newburn (2005) 'The transformation of policing? Understanding current trends in policing systems', in T. Newburn (ed.) *Policing : Key Readings*, Devon: Willan Publishing, pp. 733-750.

Le-Vine, R. (1966) *Dreams and Deeds: Achievement Motivation in Nigeria*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press

Meagher, K. (2010) *Identity Economies: Social Networks and the informal economy in Nigeria,* Oxford: James Currey

Morrill, W. T. (1963) 'Immigrants and associations: The Ibo in Twentieth century Calabar', *Studies in Society and History,* Vol. 3, pp. 424-448.

Mustapha, A.R. (2006). Ethnic structure, inequality and governance of the public sector in Nigeria. *Democracy, Governance and Human Rights Programme Paper Number 24*. Geneva: The United Nations Research Institute for Social Development (UNRISD).

National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) (2009). *Social Statistics in Nigeria,* Abuja:NBS

Otenberg, S. (1959) 'Igbo receptivity to change' in W. Bascom and M. Herskovits (eds) Continuity and change in African Cultures, Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Sklar, R. L. 1963. *Nigerian Political Parties: Power in an Emergent African Nation.* New Jersey: Princeton University Press.

Smith, Daniel J. (2004). "The Bakassi Boys: Vigilantism, Violence and Political Imagination in Nigeria", *Current Anthropology*, 19(3): 429-455.

Smock, A. C. and D. R. Smock (1969) 'Ethnicity and attitudes toward development in Eastern Nigeria', *The Journal of Developing Areas*, Vol. 3, No. 4, pp. 499-512.

South East Summit (2011), 'Communique Issued at Strategy Meeting on Democracy and Governance in the South East', held on 11 July 2011 at Owerri, Imo State.

United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) (2008) *Crisis Prevention and Recovery report 2008: Post Conflict Economic Recovery-Enabling Local Ingenuity*, New York: UNDP

United Nations Development Programme(UNDP). (2009). *Nigeria National Human Development Report*. Abuja: UNDP.

World Bank and International Finance Corporation (2010) *Doing Business in Nigeria 2010: Company Regulation in 36 states, Abuja FCT and 183 Economies*, Washington DC: World Bank.

CHAPTER TWO

Governance and Security in Abia State
By
Ukoha Ukiwo, Ada Henri-Ukoha and Magdalene O. Emole

2.1   Introduction

For several months in 2009 and 2010, armed bandits literary turned Abia State into a Hobbesian state of nature where life was short, nasty and brutish. Aba, the once bustling commercial capital of the state that attracted merchants and buyers from across West Africa became a ghost of itself as its new image as den of kidnappers and robbers repulsed visitors and forced its rich residents to relocate to safer places. The anomie in Abia went largely unnoticed by most Nigerians apart from the hapless residents of the state and residents of neighbouring south-south and south-east states who occasionally visited or travelled through the state.

 The nation's attention had, for some years, largely concentrated on the core states of the Niger Delta where insurgents had virtually crippled Nigeria's oil industry, which guaranteed the fiscal integrity of the Nigerian federation. The successful take-off of the presidential amnesty for Niger Delta militants in October 2009 was expected to give the nation a breather from shocks associated with countless numbers of hostage-taking and attacks on oil infrastructure. In the celebratory mood of the cessation of hostilities in the core Delta, the Nigerian state apparently appeared reluctant to be drawn into fighting criminals in Abia and some neighbouring south-east states as it reckoned the security threat could be easily handled by the local police.

The federal government was forced to intervene when it became clear to all Nigerians that the matter was beyond the capacity of the police. The insecurity in Abia was catapulted into a national security concern deserving the attention of the President and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces when it was reported that kidnappers had taken hostage a bus load of school pupils and a contingent of Nigerian journalists travelling back to their Lagos base after

attending a national executive council meeting of the Nigeria Union of Journalists (NUJ) at Uyo in neighbouring Akwa Ibom State.[7] The armed banditry was brought under control after the president ordered troops into the state. Although the level of criminality was unparalleled this was not the first time that the state and the south-east region had been held hostage by criminals. In the early 2000s upsurge in incidents of armed robbery virtually crippled commercial activities in Aba until residents took their destinies into their hands by creating Bakassi Boys, a vigilante group that squashed the gangs of robbers. The chequered experience of the state with crime has led some commentators to argue that Abia fondly known as 'God's own state' has transmogrified into the 'Devil's own state'.[8]

This chapter explores the governance and security challenges in Abia State. It seeks to examine the various factors that are contributory to governance and security challenges and the ways in which state and non-state actors have responded to the challenges. The chapter is based on a social survey conducted in Abia State between August and November 2011. It is divided in seven main sections. Section two after this introduction provides background information on the state. This is followed in section three by an examination of the methodology adopted for the study. Session four focuses on the key governance and security challenges as well as their causes identified in the study. In section five of the chapter, responses of the state to governance and security challenges are discussed. Section six examines the responses of citizens and civil society to the governance and security challenges. The section also examines the roles of community development associations in governance and security. Finally, the seventh section contains the conclusions and recommendations of the study.

---

[7] See, The Untold Story: Aba in the hands of kidnap militia', http://saharareporters.com/report/untold-story-aba-firm-grip-kidnap-militia accessed on 2 October 2010.

[8] See, 'Abia: Shame of Igboland!', http://www.elombah.com/index.php/1/hi/world/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=8250:abia-state-shame-of-igboland&catid=3:newsflash accessed on 11 November 2011. The irony of the name was first raised in 2009 when it was alleged that the new governor had sworn oath of allegiance to his benefactor in a shrine. See, 'Abia: No longer God's own state' http://saharareporters.com/article/abia-no-longer-god%E2%80%99s-own-state accessed on 15 October 2011.

2.2 Study Setting: Background to Abia State

On August 27 2011, the Abia State Government commemorated the 20th anniversary of the creation of the state. The state was created out of old Imo State in 1991. It derived its name from the initials of Aba, Bende, Isikwuato and Afikpo, which were the constituent culture areas of the state. In October 1996, the Afikpo culture area was excised to join the Abakiliki culture area to form Ebonyi State. The indigenous population of the state is mostly Igbo and various Igbo dialects of Igbo such as Ngwa, Umuahia, Ohafia, Abiriba are commonly spoken. The culture zones of the state are Ukwa Ngwa in the South, Umuahia in the centre and Bende in the North.

Most residents of the state are Christians. Historically, the Catholic Church and protestant denominations of Anglican Communion, Presbyterian and Methodist divided the different portions of present day Abia State among themselves. Pentecostal churches such as Assemblies of God and Apostolic Church attracted followership from the 1950s. Seventh Day Adventist Church and the Jehovah Witnesses have strong membership in the southern sections of the state. However, in the rural areas across the state, African traditional religion is commonly practiced.

Abia is located in the South East geopolitical zone. It occupies a total area of 6,230 Km^2 and is bounded by Anambra, Ebonyi and Enugu states to the North, Akwa Ibom and Cross River states to the East, Imo State to the West and Rivers State to the South. It has a population of 2,833,999 and a high population density at 448.4/km^2. Most of the population live in rural areas. However, a considerable proportion of Abia population live in Aba and Umuahia respectively the commercial and administrative capitals of the state. Moreover, a sizable proportion of Abia indigenes live outside the state.

The state is made up of 17 LGAs and three senatorial districts. It has 8 federal constituencies and 24 state constituents and a total of 291 electoral wards.

Figure 2.1: Map of Abia State

NAME OF SENATORIAL DISTRICT	LGA COMPOSITION
ABIA NORTH	UMUNNEOCHI, ISUKWUATO, OHAFIA, AROCHUKWU, BENDE
ABIA CENTRAL	UMUAHIA NORTH, UMUAHIA SOUTH, IKWUANO, ISIALA NGWA NORTH, ISIALA NGWA SOUTH,
ABIA SOUTH	ABA NORTH, ABA SOUTH, UGWUNAGBO, OBINGWA, UKWA EAST, UKWA WEST & OSISIOMA

The state is mostly agrarian and has three agricultural zones, namely Aba, Umuahia and Bende. Aba, one of the main commercial centres in the country however attracts a lot of commerce and small scale manufacturing to the state. This local manufacturing has earned the town the epithet of 'Japan of Africa'. Abia State is also one of the oil producing states in the country. Most of the population of the state (70 per cent) are employed in agriculture. Other major sources of employment are the civil service, commercial activities and small scale manufacturing- mostly concentrated in Aba. However, high population density and poor agricultural yield as well as high level of educational attainments make the state a net exporter of labour. The safety net of manpower export is, however, increasingly threatened by perennial violent conflicts in northern Nigeria and urban renewal programmes that have displaced marginal populations in major cities in the country.

Table 2.1   **Selected Social Statistics for Abia State**

Population (2006)	Female	1,415,082
	Male	1,430,298
	Total	2,845,380
Education	Primary school enrolment	295,151
	Secondary school enrolment	70,530
	No. of Primary School Teachers	13,847
	No. of Secondary School Teachers (2005)	3,216
Health	Number of registered doctors	28
	Number of registered nurses	414
	Number of registered pharmacists	16
	Total health facility (2004)	748
	Ratio of population per Health	
	facility (2004)	3,678
	HIV prevalence rate	5.0

Security	Number of policemen	5,384
	Number of police stations	22
	Number of police posts	32
	Reported armed robbery	89
	Prison inmate	1,219
	Prison capacity	1,080

*All figures are for 2008, unless otherwise stated.
Source: National Bureau of Statistics 2009

Table 2.2   Abia Human Development Indicators

Human Development Index (HDI	0.515
Human Poverty Index (HPI)	21.9
Gender Development Measure (GDM)	0.527
Gender Empowerment Measure (GEM)	0.383
Inequality measure	0.30

Source: UNDP 2010: 92

Since it was created, Abia has had 5 military administrators and 3 executive governors (see box). The state governor is the chief executive and presides over the executive council of the state as well as the state security council. He is chief security officer of the state. The chairpersons of the 17 LGAs also preside over the affairs of their local councils and LGA Security Committees. Governance at the lowest level is organized around the autonomous communities. The communities are presided over by paramount rulers selected according to their different traditions and given official recognition of the State Government. Traditional rulers also hold membership of the State Council of Traditional Rulers. The Traditional Rulers Council plays an advisory role to the state government on customary and security

matters. The state legislature is made up of elected legislators who represent their constituents. The legislature is responsible for law making, approval of appointments and oversight of the executive arm of government. The state judiciary is headed by a state chief judge and includes high courts, magistrate courts and customary courts. Constitutional provisions ensure separation of powers as well as checks and balances between arms of government.

Box 2.1: Political leaders of Abia State

Administrator	
28 Aug 1991 - Jan 1992	Frank Ajobena
Governor	
Jan 1992 - Nov 1993	OgbonnayaOnu
Administrators	
9 Dec 1993 - 14 Sep 1994	C. Ike Nwosu
14 Sep 1994 - 22 Aug 1996	TemiEjoor
22 Aug 1996 - Aug 1998	Moses Fasanya
Aug 1998 - May 1999	Anthony Obi
Governor	
29 May 1999 28 May 2007 -	Orji UzorKalu
29 May 2007 -	Theodore A. Orji

Control of the state has oscillated between the Peoples' Democratic Party (PDP) and the Progressive Peoples Alliance (PPA) since 1999. The PDP governed the state from 1999 to 2007. However, following factionalization within the party, Oji Uzor Kalu, the governor decamped to PPA, a party he founded. With the advantage of incumbency, PPA won the 2007 gubernatorial elections. Theodore Orji, who until his election was Chief of Staff to Governor Kalu defeated Onyema Ugochukwu of the PDP. However, Governor Orji defected back to the PDP after a long-running battle with his political Godfather. With the defection, the PDP faction made up of Orji and his fellow PPA decampees won handily in the state gubernatorial and legislative

elections of 2011. As shall be seen shortly, the political crises that engulfed the state especially since the 2003 elections had negative consequences for governance and security in the state.

2.3   Methodological issues

The study is based on social survey conducted in the state over a period of 4 months in 2011. The main sources of data adopted in the study were key informant interviews (KIIs), focus group discussions (FGDs), observation techniques, documents and statistical data from the National Crime and Victimization Survey (NCVS) conducted by the CLEEN Foundation and social statistics compiled by the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS). Interviews were conducted with persons occupying leadership positions in government, civil society as well as the private sector. On the whole, 30 KIIs were conducted. The three FGDs targeted youth, women and informal sector operators. Purposive sampling technique was adopted for the KIIs and FGDs. The researchers adopted both participant observation and non-participant observation techniques. Participant observation involved one of the researchers observing and reporting on proceedings of community based associations she holds membership. Researchers also observed government events and activities of civil society organizations that were considered relevant for the study.

The study locations were also purposively selected. The key criteria for selection were geographical spread and representation of both rural and urban settings. Consequently, one urban and one rural community were selected in a LGA in each of the 3 senatorial districts (see Table 2.4). A checklist of questions was used for both the FGDs and KIIs. Interviews were tape recorded and transcribed. In cases where respondents desired to remain anonymous and did not accept being tape recorded, researchers took extensive notes.

Table 2.4: Study locations

Senatorial District	LGA	Urban	Rural*
Abia Central	Umuahia North	Umuahia	Ohuhu
Abia North	Ohafia	Isiama	Okagwe
Abia South	Aba North	Eziama	Ehere

*Ehere and Ibekwe are rapidly urbanizing.

Data analysis is mostly qualitative. It involved content analysis of interviews and discussions. The researchers made citations to buttress arguments and discussions presented in the study. There is no disaggregation of discussion according to data sources. On the contrary, all available data were used to support each of the arguments. The statistical information from the NCVS and the NBS were also presented as already analysed data to support discussions and arguments.

A major constraint of the study was the reluctance of key informants, especially civil servants to grant interviews. This stemmed from fear of victimization. Researchers were informed that some independent minded persons had suffered loses or been victimised. This reluctance was particularly pronounced in more cosmopolitan towns with greater government presence such as Aba and Umuahia. In Ohafia, which appeared more remote from the reach of officialdom, respondents were enthusiastic about the research and willing to air their opinions without entertaining much fear. Given the concern for security of respondents, the researchers have taken a conscious decision not to quote the respondents. On the contrary, the respondents have been given numbers which are known only to the researchers. A list of respondents is however presented as appendix.

2.4   Governance and security challenges
In a speech to commemorate the 100 Days of his 'New' Administration, which coincided with the 20th anniversary celebrations, Chief Theodore Orji outlined his priority vision as follows:

We have embarked on the creation of a more secured and sustainable environment for the economic growth, investment, and promotion of the ingenious entrepreneurship of our people, and where the protection of our citizens' lives and property is dominant. We have created synergy with the Military Barrack in Ohafia and the Naval Base in Owerrinta, to provided logistic support to enable these Forces to back the preservation of security and combat crime in our State. This is because we believe that development can only thrive in the atmosphere of peace and tranquility.[9]

This puts in bold relief the centrality of security as the key governance challenge of the state. Between 2009 and 2010, the state was held to ransom by bands of dare-devil kidnappers, armed robbers and hired assassins. Worse affected in the state was Aba, the hub of commercial activities in the south-east and south-south zones. The bustling commercial 'Enyimba City' was virtually deserted with business closing down and residents relocating in droves. As a group of concerned citizens rightly observed:

All the major players in the society have left town, houses are padlocked, offices closed, banking activities scaled down, hospitals closed. As we write no single new building is being developed in the entire city. All prominent doctors are gone, all major lawyers are gone, all prominent importers are gone, all prominent industrialists are gone, all major entrepreneurs are gone, and all foreign technical factory experts are gone. No sane person allows any of his or her family members to be posted to Aba any more. Non indigenes are leaving in droves.[10]

---

[9] 'Speech presented by Chief T.A. Orji (Ochendo)Governor of Abia State on the occasion of the grand finale of the 20th anniversary celebrations of creation of Abia State at Umuahia Township Stadium on 8th September 2011' accessed at
http://www.abiastate.gov.ng/2011/09/a-speech-presented-by-his-excellency/ on October 15, 2011.
[10] Save Abia Now Group 'The Aba Time Bomb' accessed at http://www.elombah.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=4200:kidnapping-the-aba-time-bomb&catid=25:politics&Itemid=92 on October 5, 2011.

In fact, no department of society was left unscathed as the robbers and kidnappers invaded and desecrated worship centres, schools, hospitals, palaces and highways. Social life was adversely affected as the criminals preyed upon burial, marriage and child naming ceremonies. Against this background, it is not surprising that most of the respondents mentioned criminality especially kidnapping and armed robbery as the main governance challenge facing the state. Other governance challenges mentioned by respondents are unemployment, corruption, inadequate public revenues, Godfather politics and decaying public infrastructures. Although, the state's unemployment rate (14.5 per cent) is relatively lower than the national average (19%), most respondents felt unemployment levels are very high. The respondents opined that unemployment was a contributing factor to criminality and destitution in the state.

Corruption was also emphasized by most respondents as a major challenge of governance. Although, the state as the 7th largest oil producing state collected less revenue from the Federation Account than its Niger Delta neighbours, there was the perception that the monies collected were not being utilised for the public good. Government officials at all levels were accused of mismanagement and diversion of funds for selfish and political reasons. Many respondents also felt that corruption was exacerbated by the phenomenon of Godfather politics. Some respondents alleged that Godfather politics afflicted the state during the Oji Uzor Kalu administration and in the first tenure of Governor Theodore Orji. Godfather politics is deemed to have undermined good governance because it raised unqualified persons into positions of authority and led to diversion of scarce public resources to servicing of patronage networks. For instance, most residents of Abia believe that Orji fell out with his Godfather and benefactor Kalu because he refused to honour an alleged agreement to transfer substantial proportions of the state's monthly revenues to service the Kalu family business and political empire.

In the circumstance, respondents said there are little resources left to provide and maintain public infrastructures. For instance, the number of classrooms in secondary schools in the state remained static at 2,628 between 2004 and 2008 amidst increasing enrolment (see National Bureau of Statistics 2009:65).

The state of the roads is in such deplorable condition that reportedly caused Governor Orji to weep in public. The governor claimed he was not ashamed of crying over the state of the roads because Chief Sam Mbakwe, the executive governor of old Imo State had similarly over wept over the state of roads especially in Aba.[11] It is significant to note that residents of the town claim Mbakwe's administration which ended almost three decades ago is the only one that paid attention to roads in the state. Respondents also mentioned poor sanitation as a governance challenge. In Aba for instance, refuse and household waste litter the streets without being disposed. Some respondents said corpses of destitute or unknown persons are often left on the roads for days thereby causing harm to public health and safety.

While the respondents felt there is depreciation in the supply function of the state, they were appalled by the rising demands from the state in the forms of high taxation and tenements rates, vigilante levies, etc. Women and informal sector operations appeared to be most concerned about extortion by public officers as a governance challenge. For instance, market women FGD participants in Ehere, Aba North LGA complained of daily raids by local tax collectors and touts that claim to represent the Local Government. Multiple taxation is regarded as extortion since the local councils that send the collectors are not interested in the sanitary conditions and security of the market. In the words of one participant:

> We as market women pay all manner of levies to government. We have been complaining and lamenting about challenges without anyone listening to us. You pay for school fees but teachers are not paid, you pay for electricity without seeing light…people are disgusted by the activities of the Police who cause hold-up and accidents on our roads because of N20. Nobody listens to us and nothing is done about it. In fact, we are not happy about the style of governance in the state.[12]

---

[11] Victor Ugborgu 'Aba after the kidnap saga', accessed at http://www.newswatchngr.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=3475&Itemid=47 on October 22, 2011.
[12] FGD, Aba, 14th November 2011.

Respondents in the survey considered governance to be very poor at all levels. The perception was that with poor governance at the federal level and state level, operators at these higher tiers lack the credibility and will to insist that local councils and community leaders govern well and deliver public goods. This low affective orientation towards government agencies is confirmed by the NCVS, which showed that Abia respondents rarely contacted institutions ranging from state and national legislature, anti-corruption bureaux, road safety commission, customs and immigrations, civil defence corps, etc. The institutions that respondents remembered encountering or contacting for service were the Power Holding Company of Nigeria (53%) and the police (12%).

Some of the issues raised as governance challenges were also mentioned as security challenges. Notable among these is the spate of killings and armed robbery, which have cost the state many lives and property as well as lost business opportunities. Another major security challenge mentioned by respondents is the use of hard drugs. A bureaucrat explained at length the impact of illicit drug use on security:

> These drugs have centres where they are sold. They have peddlers and barons who sell them. It has gone to a point where Indian hemps are smoked on the streets like cigarette without control. And even the law enforcement agents engage it. They sell it. Even in villages or communities they have farms where the weeds are cultivated, the traditional rulers know about it, Local government Authorities know about existence of these farms and there are real suspicion and accusations that some of them receive returns and for which reason they protect these drug pushers. The high rate of drug consumption has led to crime. We have high incidence of rape, high incidence of robbery, burglary and even manslaughter or murder.[13]

However, this perception of high rates of crime in the state is not supported by statistics from the NCVS. The survey showed that most respondents said

---

[13] KII No. 3, Aba, 1th October 2011.

they have not experienced crime of any sort or had a household relation that had experienced crime. . Only 22 per cent of this accepted having relations who were victims of crimes in 2010. The survey showed that of the respondents whose household relatives were victims of crime, the crimes suffered were robbery (18%), physical assault (13%), theft of mobile phones (6%), and burglary (5%). Significantly no respondent had a relative who was a victim of kidnapping. Respondents claimed that most of the crimes were suffered at home or near home of victims, indicating that peoples' home were no longer sanctuaries and safe spaces.

The NCVS also showed that among the 22 per cent that were direct victims of crime, the prevalent crimes they were victims of were robbery (59%), attempted robbery (14%), theft of mobile phone (18%), theft of money (14%), car theft (5%), rape (5%), kidnap (5%) and attempted kidnap (5%). The same pattern in which most crimes were committed at home or near home of victims was also recorded.

The study also found that poor capacity of security agencies and poor relations between security agencies and the public were considered security challenges. The training and equipment of security agencies especially the police were considered inadequate. The enormity of this challenge is better appreciated when it is considered that by 2008 there were only 22 police stations and 32 police posts in the state. Moreover, there were 5,385 policemen in the same year (see National Bureau of Statistics 2009:263). When this figure is juxtaposed with the population of the state, it means that one police officer was effectively responsible for protecting 528 persons. Consequently, the police are overstressed and cannot cope with the challenges of law enforcement. Rural areas are particularly not well serviced by the security agencies with negative implications for law enforcement. For instance, during the siege on the state by criminal gangs in 2010, a concerned member of the public noted in a letter to a newspaper editor:

> One area of concern is that security agents like the police, SSS and others are not on ground in the remote areas where most of these criminal activities seem to emanate from. This makes it difficult for

them to gather the necessary information that will enable them tackle the problem.[14]

A security expert in the state buttressed the myriad challenges of security agencies:

> On the part of our security agencies, there is lack of modern security equipment, no sophisticated equipment. The ones they have are sub-standard. There are no modern communication equipment, which results in poor communication network.
>
> There is also lack of effective co-ordination and control of men. There is disobedience and indiscipline in the society. There is also the issue of poor relationship between the public and the law enforcement agents and among the security operatives. There is also the issue of lack of mobility. There are not enough vehicles with which to provide effective policing. You need vehicles with which to respond to distress calls and for reaching to crime scenes on time. Also, within the police, there is the issue of God-fatherism — whereby your promotion may not come as at when due and is largely dependent on who you know. You know, these dampen the moral of the operatives and invariably affect their performance and efficiency.[15]

Many respondents also considered security agencies deployed to maintain order as a major security challenge. There were allegations that security agencies embarked on extortion and other counter value actions against host local populations. For instance, residents of Okagwe Ohafia complained that soldiers in the new Army barracks in Ohafia lured young girls into immorality. The issue of soldiers having illicit relationship with young girls was a subject of discussion in the August meeting of Okagwe Women's Association and it was reported that the women have complained to the army authorities who promised to look into the matter. [16]Moreover, in Aba residents complained of extra-

---

[14] See, Ikechukwu Ogbonna 'Security Challenges in Abia State' accessed at http://thenationonlineng.net/web2/articles/50636/1/Security-challenges-in-Abia-State/Page1.html on September 5, 2011.

[15] KII No. 10, Aba, 22 September 2011. The suggested needs of the police are confirmed by the NCVS, which showed that most respondents felt the police needed 'better equipment and facilities' (27%), 'more discipline and supervision by government' and 'adequate funding' (13%).

[16] See, Report on Okagwe Women's Association meeting of 24th September 2011.

judicial killings, rape and extortion by both members of the state security agencies and vigilante groups deployed to check criminality.[17]

The poor public trust in the police was also captured by NCVS. When asked whom they preferred reporting crimes groups mentioned were family and friends (27%), police (23%) and vigilantes (7%). No respondent agreed reporting to community leaders or religious leaders. This is a significant finding as it goes contrary to beliefs that people feel closer to traditional and religious leaders. However, most of the respondents who reported to the police were not satisfied with police response. Reasons for dissatisfaction with police response ranged from slow response, inability of police to recover lost property, failure of police to apprehend culprits to persistent demand for money by police. Consequently, when asked to rate the job the police were doing in the NCVS, a cumulative 42% answered 'very poor job' and 'poor job' as against a cumulative 39% that answered 'very good job' and 'good job'. Another 16% answered 'neither good nor bad job'.

Most respondents in the study felt governance and security challenges were interlinked with each causing and or reinforcing the other. For instance, they attributed the high crime rate to high levels of unemployment. Also respondents claimed lack of good governance and high level of corruption have led to the decay of moral values thereby creating a hospitable social environment for criminality. The culture of materialism, where the end of wealth justifies the means of getting wealthy have contributed to a situation where people are willing to defraud, maim and kill in order to become wealthy. This culture has also encouraged crime as society offers rewards and recognitions to people of questionable character and suspicious sources of wealth. A religious leader blamed the Christian leaders for not condemning the corrupt practices of politicians who attend their congregations.[18]

---

[17] KII No. 11, Aba 24th September 2011. Also FGD, Ehere Market Women Association, 14 November 2011.

[18] KII No. 7, Aba 15th September 2011.

The governance underpinnings of the security challenges were further exposed when some of the kidnappers claimed they resorted to the criminal act because officials of Abia State Government had allegedly misappropriated the amnesty funds disbursed for militants from the state. Although this allegation has not been established, the concentration of the kidnap gangs mostly from the oil producing LGAs of the state suggests that grievance of being left out of benefits from the amnesty programme may have been a mobilizing factor.[19]

Respondents were also unequivocal in asserting that security challenges facing the state were also negatively impacting on governance regimes. For instance, the pervasive insecurity in the state in 2010 was deemed to have led to capital flight and aggravated the unemployment situation. The complex interaction between governance and security in the state is captured in the following statement by Governor Theodore Orji:

> Recalling from the recent experiences of my own State of Abia, when factors beyond economic imperatives (sic), threatened to completely shut down the economic nerve-centers of our State, I feel concerned that our discussion of the Economies of the South-East Region, may not have paid enough attention to the adverse role of Violence and Conflicts, and how these are capable of truncating our economic potentials and dreams, by challenging our future cooperative and collective strategy, to survive as a Region. While I am not unmindful of the fact that the deplorable state of our economy and other infrastructural challenges have themselves, in the first place – encouraged some level of violence and conflict activities in our

---

[19] See, Biola Uzeez and Leon Usigbe 'Our kidnappers are well connected..', *Nigerian Tribune,* 19 July 2010, accessed at http://www.tribune.com.ng/index.php/front-page-news/8425-our-kidnappers-are-well-connected-released-journalists-recount-ordeal-abia-govt-suspends-traditional-rulers-places-one-under-house-arrest-jonathan-govs-nigerians-react- on August 30, 2011.

[20] Speech by His Excellency Governor Theodore Orji at the South East Economic Forum, 31 August – 2 September 2011, Enugu accessed at http://www.abiastate.gov.ng/2011/09/executive-policy-dialogue-platform/ on November 10, 2011.

Region, I still believe that, it is time for us to begin to highlight these, as serious challenges, inhibiting our economic potentials.[20]

2.5   State responses to governance and security challenges

Since 1999, successive administrations have adopted several programmes to address security and governance challenges. The Orji Uzor Kalu administration claimed it prioritised economic growth. The development outlook of the government is encapsulated in the Abia State Economic Empowerment and Development Strategy (ASEEDS). The vision and mission stipulated in ASEEDS was inter alia:

> The *vision* of the State is to transform it into a prosperous and self-sustaining economy, characterized by high standards of living among the people. In this regard, it is the mission of the State to fight poverty, hunger, penury and ignorance as well as enthrone good governance marked by openness and accountability at all levels for the good of its citizens (Abia State Government 2005:8).

The key policy framework for attaining this vision and mission were stated as follows:

(i)   Economic empowerment of the people automatically creates employment and reduces poverty. The employment generation and poverty reduction strategies of government shall be sustained

(ii)   Aggressive infrastructural development through massive roads rehabilitation and reconstruction

(iii) Rural electrification and provision of urban and rural water

(iv)   Promoting enabling environment for the growth of small and medium enterprises and privatization of government industries and ailing enterprises

(v)   Sustaining a healthy citizenry through the government free health scheme

(vi) Maintaining an uncompromising assault on school drop-out syndrome and encouraging qualitative and quantitative education at all levels

(vii) Public sector reforms (PSR) to promote efficiency, transparency and accountability and mounting a frontal attack on corruption

(viii) Ensuring private public partnership for a sustainable development (Abia State Government 2005:26)

One of the threats mentioned in the ASEEDS document was youth unemployment which purportedly contributed to high rate of crime. In fact, the inauguration of Orji Uzor Kalu administration was followed by the resurgence of crime and proliferation of gangs which threatened the main commercial centre of the state. As a result of the failure of the police to rein in the criminals and indeed following allegations that some members of the police force were conniving with criminal elements, some sections of the Aba traders who were affected by the crisis established a vigilante group called Bakassi Boys. The Bakassi Boys were initially successful in checking armed robbery, burglary and pickpocketing. The success of Bakassi Boys led to its popularization and spread to other eastern states, notably Anambra and Imo State (see Ukiwo 2002). In the bid to create an enabling environment for business, the government felt it was necessary to ensure there was adequate security in the state.[21]

It is against this background that the government co-opted Bakassi Boys into the state's security apparatus. The informal security organization was legalized through the passage of the Abia State Vigilante Service Edict. Legalization meant that the vigilante organization would collaborate with the police and receive stipends and equipment from government. The legalization of the security outfit was alleged to have contributed to its politicization. There

---

[21] 'The Orji Kalu 6 years in Abia State'

were claims that the group was implicated in incidents of political assassination which increased towards the 2003 elections. Such claims of extra-judicial killings allegedly perpetrated by the group and similar ethnic militias and vigilante groups across southern Nigeria led the Obasanjo administration to proscribe non-state armed groups (see Human Rights Watch and CLEEN Foundation 2002, Ukiwo 2003, Meagher 2007).

Against this background, it is not surprising that respondents were divided over the contributions of the Orji Kalu administration in addressing governance and security challenges. Most respondents claimed that Governor Kalu tried during his first tenure in the area of infrastructural development and security. He was however distracted during his second tenure as he entered into a battle with the Obasanjo led Federal Government.

The Theodore Orji administration faced similar security and governance challenges when he was elected governor. The first term of the government was virtually spent on fighting battles on different fronts. First, Orji had a long-running legal battle over results of the governorship elections which were disputed by the PDP candidate Chief Onyema Ugochukwu. Orji emerged victorious after the Appeal Court declared him the duly elected candidate in the April 2007 election. Second, after winning the legal battle, Orji was increasingly faced by the political battle of securing independence from his predecessor and Godfather Orji Uzor Kalu. Orji succeeded in dismantling the political structure of his predecessor by aligning with President Goodluck Jonathan who strongly promoted Orji's return to the PDP fold to the chagrin of 'loyal' PDP members in the state. Thirdly, the Orji administration was faced by the upsurge of criminality evidenced by the proliferation of gangs of kidnappers across the state. He addressed this challenge by seeking assistance of the federal government and granting amnesty to repentant criminals. The federal government was moved to deploy 2000 soldiers to Abia State when the nation was alarmed by the dare devil kidnap of school pupils and journalists. The Joint Task Force succeeded in ridding the state of the kidnappers in an operation which led to the killing of over 170 suspected kidnappers and arrest of over 400 suspects.

The criminal, political and legal battles posed legitimacy challenges to Orji's regime. This was especially the case after the publication of a video which allegedly portrayed the governor participating in a ritual ceremony of oath of allegiance to his political benefactor in the controversial Okija Shrine. As a result of the controversies that dogged his first coming, Orji has tried to create a new image for his administration since he won the 2011 elections under the platform of the PDP. Against this background, statements by Abia government officials are suffused with mention of 'the New State Government' in a bid to distance the administration from what many consider as the Orji Uzor Kalu era and dynasty.

Consequently, the government is promoting 'the New Face of Abia's Socio-Economic Development'. Highlights of the New Government's policies include youth employment and empowerment, infrastructural development, equitable distribution of public service posts, establishment of small scale manufacturing enterprises in all 17 LGAs, replacement of non-indigenes with indigenes in the state's civil service and urban renewal programmes.[22] Some of these programmes notably the so-called 'back-loading' of non-indigenes especially teachers to their states of origin and the urban renewal scheme have generated controversies. The government and other supporters[23] of the policy have justified the sacking of non-indigenes on the need to trim the state workforce and create room for Abia indigenes that have been displaced elsewhere[24]. However, critics consider it to be ill-conceived, because it is

---

[22] See, 'Broadcast message of His Excellency Chief Theodore A. Orji at the 20th Birthday Anniversary of the Creation of Abia State on 8th September 2011 at Umuahia', accessed at http://www.abiastate.gov.ng/2011/09/broadcast-message-to-the-good-people-of-abia-state/ on November 11, 2011.

[23] See for instance, Niger Delta Youth Movement Abia State Chapter 'The ill-informed ripples over transfer of non-indigenes from Abia State Civil service' accessed at http://www.abiastate.gov.ng/2011/10/niger-delta-youth-movement-abia-state-chapter-n-d-y-m-the-ill-informed-ripples-over-the-transfer-of-non-indigenes-in-abia-state-public-service/ on November 5, 2011.

[23] See, 'Backloading of non-indigenes: the true facts' by Barr. Dr. A. C. Agbazuere, Special Adviser to Governor on Conflict Management, accessed at http://www.abiastate.gov.ng/2011/10/backloading-of-non-indigenes-the-true-facts-by-barrister-dr-a-c-b-agbazuere/ on November 15, 2011. See also. 'Nigeria and the question of indigeneship' by Bonnie Iwuoha, special adviser to governor on media accessed at http://www.abiastate.gov.ng/2011/10/nigeria-and-the-question-of-indigeneship-mr-bonnie-iwuoha-media-adviser-to-the-executive-governor-of-abia-state-october-2011/

divisive of Igbo 'unity'; politically motivated in order to open spaces for election foot-soldiers; and likely to trigger reprisal action against Abia indigenes employed in other states.[25] Moreover, although the government promotes urban renewal as a human security imperative, many in the state view the dislocations arising from the programme as anti-poor and anti-people. Reactions such as the one given by a FGD participant are typical:

> The government has rendered a lot of people helpless and frustrated by demolishing their purported illegal structures and make-shift shades where people stay to look for their daily bread. The petty traders who use such places to fend for themselves and their families are now frustrated. Government did this in the pretence that they are going to start work on roads but up till today nothing has been done. T. A. Orji should allow people to return to their attachment shades to look for their daily bread until he is prepared to work.[26]

Sources also claimed that sacking of workers and irregular payment of salaries as well as displacement of informal sector operators occupying illegal structures contradicted government's economic empowerment programmes as more persons were being thrown into the army of the unemployed. They claimed that the actions and inactions of government is thus likely to endanger public safety as the persons who have lost their sources of livelihoods may be tempted to join criminal gangs. Some respondents also expressed dissatisfaction at the inequitable distribution of youth empowerment schemes. For instance, participants at the urban youth FGD in Umuahia claimed the youth empowerment schemes of the government has favoured youths that are members of the ruling PDP party or are related to party stalwarts. [27]This allegation may have some basis. Although, it is evident that demographic

http://www.abiastate.gov.ng/2011/10/nigeria-and-the-question-of-indigeneship-mr-bonnie-iwuoha-media-adviser-to-the-executive-governor-of-abia-state-october-2011/on November 22, 2011.

[25]See. Dan Onwukwe 'T.A. Orji's seed of paranoia' accessed at *www.sunnewsonline.com/.../opinion-08-11-2011-001.html* on November 16, 2011;

[26] FGD, Ehere Market Women's Association, 14th November 2011.

[27]FGD, Urban youths, Umuahia, 10 November 2011.

considerations were used in the distribution of the 4,430 slots to the local councils, party considerations ultimately determined individuals that were likely to benefit from the programme. In fact, the government did not disguise the political consideration as evident in the following except from the Government Announcement of the Abia Youth Empowerment Programme:

> The State Party Chairman and his Executives are hereby directed to mandate the Local Government Party Executives to convey a meeting of the relevant Local Government Stakeholders to compile and submit names of youths as assigned to their Local Governments to the Office of the Honourable Commissioner for Chieftaincy Affairs on or before 24th October 2011.The total number of youths from each Local Government must be shared equitably amongst the wards of the Local government using ABSIEC Ward.[28]

Some of the respondents in the survey tried to compare and contrast the performance of the two governments in the state since 1999. However, it was evident that comparisons were not based on any objective criteria. On the contrary, affiliation with the two administrations seemed to determine comparison assessments. This is not surprising as there are no major policy differences between the two administrations. The only discernible difference in style of governance can be traced to different political ambitions of Orji Uzor Kalu and Theodore Orji. For instance, a local council officer claimed that Orji Uzor failed to lay off non-indigenes in the State Civil Service against the prevailing practice in other Igbo states because of his political ambitions.

> We were all in bondage and captivity under Governor Orji Uzor Kalu who ought to have done this but never did as he was only interested in his political ambition and never wanted to do things that would deny him of their votes.[29]

---

[28]See, 'Government Special Announcement: Abia Youth Empowerment Programme' accessed at http://www.abiastate.gov.ng/2011/10/government-special-announcement-abia-state-youth-empowerment-programme/ on November 23, 2011.
[29] KII No. 5, Ohafia, 21 September 2011.

This allegation appears plausible because Orji Uzor openly nursed the ambition to become Nigeria's president and contested for the presidency in 2007 after completing his gubernatorial tenure. It is not unlikely that his craving for national visibility through preferential funding of Enyimba Football Club, advocacy of pan-Igbo unity and Irredentism, and support for the agitation of Igbo presidency were aimed at realizing his presidential ambitions. In the circumstance, sacking non-Indigenes from sister Igbo states would have robbed him of the affection and support of Igbo masses. Moreover, Orji Uzor Kalu's Igbo leadership ambitions is evident in the fact that his preferred chieftaincy title among 340 odd titles is *Mili Lara Enyi* (the river that drowned the elephant) conferred on him by the Igwe of Enugu-Ukwu and Umunri, regarded as the cradle of the Igbo civilization. This contrasts with Theodore Orji's less ambitious interest of projecting himself as protector of Abia people as is evident in his chieftaincy title of 'Ochendo Abia' (Umbrella of Abia).

2.6   Responses of citizens and citizen groups to security and governance challenges

The study explored the responses of citizens and citizen groups to governance and security challenges in the state. With respect to response to governance challenges, some respondents felt there was a low participant political and civic culture in the state with citizens not enthusiastic about participating in politics and the public sphere generally. Evidence presented to buttress this position included unwillingness of citizens to pay taxes as well as the indifference of members of the public to demanding accountability and good governance from government officials. There was the perception that the people were individualistic and were not motivated to engage in public affairs. For instance, a labour union leader opined that:

> In terms of governance problem, people have problems, they know that there is problem but no one really wants to talk, nobody wants to say anything, because people are afraid. So I wouldn't say that the masses have actually responded in such a way they ought to have. There are no checks and balances. One of the ways of checking

government is by being vocal, speaking out and mentioning some of the ills, talk about them, write about them so that government will know these are the areas.[30]

It could be argued that an evidence of low participant culture is the relatively low voter turnout recorded in the 1999 and 2003 elections (see National Bureau of Statistics 2009). Instructively also the state poverty reduction strategy paper identified unwillingness of residents to pay taxes as a weakness (see Abia State Government 2005). However, while accepting the reality of low participant culture in the state, some other respondents focused on the factors that contribute to poor civic culture. The low motivation to pay taxes, for instance, was attributed to the poor service delivery and lack of accountability of successive governments. Others claimed that citizens shy away from making their voices heard and criticizing government and public officers for policy failures and misdemeanors because of the intolerant disposition of powerful figures. The alleged disappearance, killings and victimization of outspoken persons and social critics have created a deafening culture of silence in the state. Respondents claimed the emergent passive and apathetic political culture derives from the fact that the people agree with the character in Chinua Achebe's *Things Fall Apart* that the coward always survives to point at the grave of the brave.

A few respondents also pointed out that the climate of political intolerance has encouraged sycophancy and other opportunistic behavior among the citizenry. According to this group of respondents, poverty and greed have motivated some persons and groups to become professional praise singers and rented crowds ready to offer themselves for hire to massage the ego of legitimacy hungry politicians. One feature of this tendency is the gradual eclipse of principles as people unconscionably show support to any government in power. Finally, some respondents noted that there are a number of people that have responded to the governance crisis by indulging in anti-social and criminal activities.

---

[30] KII No. 4, Aba. 22 October 2011.

Table 3.1   Selected Social Statistics for Abia State

Respondents also felt that responses of citizens and citizen groups have been mixed in the area of response to security challenges. There is the perception that people adopted several coping strategies in the face of kidnapping and robbery. These included appearing modest and not openly displaying wealth, using public transportation instead of driving private cars, avoiding public ceremonies and relocation from areas considered vulnerable to criminals. When such coping strategies failed as the kidnappers and their informants saw through the disguises, the rich who could afford the cost of relocation moved out of the state altogether or resettled in other parts of the state that were considered safer. The class dimension of this option was apparent as only persons that had the means could relocate. The poorer elements of society who could not relocate bore the brunt as the desperate criminals embarked on indiscriminate kidnapping.

Some respondents claimed the citizens did not contribute to combatting the menace of criminals as they failed to provide information and intelligence to law enforcement agencies. According to a security practitioner:

> On the issue of security, citizens have failed to realize that security issues should not be entirely the business of government alone. Everybody should be involved by reporting people of unquestionable characters in their neighbourhood.[31]

However, other respondents were more sympathetic to the ordeals of citizens by arguing that in the pervasive state of insecurity people no longer knew who to trust. The widespread suspicion that the criminals have accomplices in the security agencies discouraged people from providing vital information needed for law enforcement. As one civil servant put it:

> When you report a matter to the security agencies, these security agencies turn around to expose the informant to the criminal and these criminals carryout reprisals on these people, you know and

---

[31] KII No. 7, Aba, 22 September 2011.

tomorrow nobody is prepared to report any of these things to law enforcement agents. You know – corruption – and even when a criminal is arrested and handed over to the police, the next thing, in the next one week, you will see the same criminal walking on the streets free and beating his chest and boasting, you know. So we believe that corruption is at the root of that.[32]

Apart from suspicions of complicity by some security agents some sources claimed people could not approach the authorities with information on criminals because they believed some of the 'bad boys' were allied to influential politicians and big men. One respondent actually alleged that the insecurity in the state was orchestrated by elements in government to eliminate or scare away potential opposition elements in the run up to the 2011 elections. He argued that this explains why all the boys had to be eliminated when the security situation degenerated. The shoot-at-sight order was allegedly given so that the boys would not mention names of their patrons during investigation and trial. This is because some of the kidnappers who were arrested had mentioned names of their patrons, which included prominent traditional rulers. The suspicion of collusion of some security agents and influential persons with criminal gangs was clearly encouraged by testimonies of released victims of kidnapping and the decision of the Abia State government to suspend some traditional rulers for alleged complicity in kidnapping. For instance, one of the kidnapped journalists who were released in July 2010 said of their captors: "These people are well connected and are aware of every bit of police movement both internal and external[33]

The perception of insider dealings in the security agencies and leadership has a long history in the state. As earlier noted, it contributed to the evolution of community security in different parts of the state and the emergence of Bakassi Boys. Consequently, vigilantism and community policing was identified as the

---

[32] KII No. 4, Aba. 22 October 2011.
[33] See, BiolaUzeez and Leon Usigbe 'Our kidnappers are well connected..', *Nigerian Tribune,* 19 July 2010, accessed at http://www.tribune.com.ng/index.php/front-page-news/8425-our-kidnappers-are-well-connected-released-journalists-recount-ordeal-abia-govt-suspends-traditional-rulers-places-one-under-house-arrest-jonathan-govs-nigerians-react- on August 30, 2011.

major proactive response. Most respondents said communities had formed vigilante groups and neighbourhood watch groups to fight crime. Other crime fighting measures adopted include mounting of road blocks, constructing speed-breakers on roads, requiring commercial motor cycles (*Okada*) and tricycles (*keke* NAPEP) to register and have identification numbers, and handing over or reporting suspicious persons to the police. A few communities have also had to excommunicate or ask notorious characters to leave their neighbourhoods. Some respondents claimed corporate organizations such as banks have provided vehicles to the police to enhance their capacity for law enforcement. Finally, some neighbourhood watch groups and vigilantes were reported to have taken the laws into their arms by lynching suspected criminals. The NCVS finding which shows that a considerable portion of respondents did not object to extrajudicial killings of criminals possibly explains why lynching of criminals is rampant.

A number of respondents also mentioned the fact that many religious organizations organized prayer and fasting programmes to pray over the security and governance challenges. The rationale for such prayer programme was the belief that divine intervention was needed to take away the cover of darkness.

Beyond some of the short term measures taken to address security challenges, some respondents pointed to efforts of communities to address the root causes of crimes. It is in this context that the roles of town unions, community development organizations and age grades were discussed. The self-help culture of the Igbo people, which dates back to colonial periods when town unions supported education and health projects in their communities, has been sustained in some communities. Respondents pointed at initiatives such as construction and maintenance of civic centres, schools, health centres, market stalls, skills acquisition centres, public toilets, bore holes, bridges and drainage systems among others by community development associations. Some of the unions provide scholarships to students in formal and informal educational institutions and micro-credits to entrepreneurs.

The organizations were also credited for supporting community governance institutions through supplementing salaries of traditional rulers and chiefs,

maintenance of palaces and paying stipends to community vigilantes. They also contribute to community governance directly through settlement of disputes among community members. This is particularly important for diaspora branches of the town unions who are far away from home. The associations and unions were also credited for providing funding for purchase of arms for community vigilantes and warriors and payment of legal fees for litigations involving the community. In some communities, the town unions and community development associations have contributed to attracting projects by government and donor agencies by offering to provide matching grants for the execution of the projects. For instance, the Okagwe Development Union (ODU) was reported to have provided matching grants for a classroom project by the Education Tax Fund (ETF) and health centre by a donor agency[34]

The activities of community development associations were considered to be more intense in the Abia North Senatorial District where most communities practice the age grade systems. The traditions of these communities expected each age grade to embark on specific projects as part of their community service. The spirit of the tradition promotes healthy competition among the different age grades to beat the record of each other.

The study also found increasing involvement of women associations in community development. Respondents noted that in many communities in the state, women organize themselves and travel to their communities during the long vacation periods (between July and September) to meet and deliberate on community affairs. Through the homecoming, women based in urban areas attempt to contribute their quota to addressing the needs of their mothers, sisters, children and community at large. They have supported community development through civic education, health education, counseling, sex education, and direct project execution. For instance, the Okagwe Women Association (OWA) organized a HIV/AIDS awareness programme during their meeting in September 2011.[35]

---

[34] KII 4, Okagwe, 24 September 2011.
[35] Report of participant observer.OWA meeting September 2011.

From a historical perspective however, it was found that many community development associations are in decline when compared to their heydays between the 1950s and 1980s. Respondents pointed to a number of challenges facing the development associations. The first major challenge identified by most respondents was lack of finance. It was noted that many associations are no longer able to complete their projects on schedule due to lack of finance. Poor finance was attributed to economic difficulties which have affected most members. Decline in business opportunities, which has rendered many people jobless, means union members could not keep up with payment of levies. It is instructive for instance that inability of members to pay levies was a recurring issue in meetings of associations observed by the researchers. In one case, the town union could not complete a town hall project that has lingered for 5 years. The enormity of the economic challenges is better appreciated when it is realized that members could not pay the building and security levies which amounted to one thousand six hundred naira per year.

The second major challenge militating against the development roles of the associations and unions is community conflicts. It was noted that many communities are experiencing intra-communal conflicts of varying intensities. Town unions and community development associations are affected because many of the conflicts arise from leadership succession disputes and or supremacy contests between different community governance institutions. Notable among this is the conflict between the educated elite leadership of the town unions and the traditional authorities. Unions are ineffective during conflicts because they can no longer work as cohesive force for good amidst factionalization and fractionalization.

The third challenge identified by some respondents is corruption among the leadership. Perception that leaders are corrupt or have mismanaged community funds have put off many community members from participating in the community associations. Some respondents said that the privatization of community development associations by some leaders have scared people from participating. Since effective membership entails some sacrifice people are not willing to make contributions that are misappropriated to serve economic interests of few leaders. As one religious leader opined:

> Insincerity and non-judicious use of funds is a major problem. When the leaders of the age grades are not faithful they discourage the spirit of the people. This is because people refrain to make further contributions for fear of embezzlement and fund misappropriation by the leaders.[36]

The finding that corruption has penetrated and permeated civil society is particularly striking as previous studies had heralded community development associations as realms of morality impervious to corruption that was the order in the state (see Ekeh 1975).

The fourth challenge of community development associations is their unattractiveness to the increasing Christian population of the communities. The spread of Pentecostal Christianity is reported to have contributed to eroding the membership base of community based associations. Born again Christians who now constitute a considerable proportion of the population of some of the communities decline to join the associations due to some traditional practices such as pouring of libations and use of vulgar languages during meetings that their religious beliefs abhor. The rising tension in relations between Christian faith based organizations (FBOs) and community development associations is noteworthy because some of the associations evolved from the demands of early Christian missionary organizations to partner with communities for the purposes of establishing schools and hospitals (see Smock 1971). However, there were indications that some of the differences were being resolved as some community organizations are removing the practices that scare Christians from their midst.

Finally, respondents considered the uncooperative attitude of some state governments and local councils towards community development associations as a major challenge. Some associations have lost favour with governments because the office holders felt their leaders belonged to an opposing camp. Some respondents also felt that some elected government officials avoided community associations because they are not interested in delivering service.

---

[36] KII 5, Okagwe, 24 September 2011.

One community youth leader attributed the evasive attitude of some government officers to corruption and lack of transparency. According to him, public officers who want to inflate contracts avoid liaising with communities for developmental purposes because communities that contribute to projects would ideally be interested in ensuring that funds are judiciously spent.[37] The practice under the current political dispensation where government mobilized communities through ruling party structures at LGA and ward levels was also blamed for the increasing disconnect between community development associations and governments.

Given the decline in appeal and effectiveness of town unions and community development associations, the study showed that many communities increasingly seek to attract government projects to their communities through the agency of their sons and daughters in government. This practice however makes government to be run as patronage on ad hoc basis without coherent plans. It is also responsible for alienation of communities without influential sons and daughters from the government.

2.7   Conclusions and recommendations

The study explored the governance and security challenges in Abia State. It sought to unravel causes of the challenges as well as responses of both state and non-state actors to the crisis. A number of key findings deserve emphasis in this concluding section. First, the study showed that governance and security challenges were interlinked and mutually reinforcing. In other words, lack of good governance contributed to insecurity while insecurity undermined the prospects for good governance.

Second, the study showed that although government has taken measures to address both governance and security challenges there is a feeling among the population that such measures are not delivering the desired results. Poor policy outcomes appear to be linked to weak public institutions and corruption.

---

[37] KII 4, Umuahia 2 November 2011.

Third, the study showed that citizens and civil society are hardly engaging the state to demand service delivery and accountability. There is a low civic culture as people try as much as they can to avoid the state. There is preference among citizens to do things for themselves. However, viability of self-help efforts is compromised by declining economic security. Moreover, absence of demand for accountability promotes insensitivity and impunity by state officials.

Against this backdrop, reform measures are needed to strengthen capacity of state institutions to deliver public goods. This would require revamping the public service and insulating it from politics. The current dispensation where strategic leadership of the civil service is considered part of the political class has not helped in delivery of public services and tackling of corruption.

There is also need for strategic intervention to support voice and accountability initiatives. The citizens should be supported to understand and demand their rights for good governance. The low civic culture and disengagement of citizens from government is a long term threat to the sustenance of democracy.

References

Abia State Government (2005) *Abia State Economic Empowerment and Development Strategy (ASEEDS) ,* Umuahia:Abia State Government

Ekeh, P.P, (1975) "Colonialism and the Two Publics in Africa: a Theoretical Statement", Comparative Studies in Society & History, 17 (1), pp. 91-112.

Human Rights Watch and CLEEN Foundation (2002) *Nigeria: Bakassi Boys: the legitimization of torture,* New York and Lagos: HRW and CLEEN Foundation

National Bureau of Statistics (2009) *Social Statistics in Nigeria,* Abuja: NBS

Meagher, K. (2007). "Hijacking Civil Society: The Inside Story of the Bakassi Boys Vigilante Group of South-Eastern Nigeria", *Journal of Modern African Studies*, 45(1): 89-115.

Smock, A. (1971) *Ibo Politics: The role of ethnic union in Eastern Nigeria*, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Ukiwo, Ukoha. (2002). "*Deus ex machina* or Frankenstein Monster: The Changing Roles of Bakassi Boys in Eastern Nigeria", *Democracy and Development: A Journal of West African Affairs*, 3(1): 39-51.

Ukiwo, U. (2003) "The Politicization of Bakassi Boys in Eastern Nigeria" in Tunde Babawale (ed.) *Ethnic Militia, Urban Violence and the Challenges of Democratic Consolidation in Nigeria,* Lagos: Malthouse Press, pp. 130-151.

United Nations Development Programme (2009) *Human Development Report Nigeria 2008- 2009: achieving growth with equity,* Abuja: UNDP

CHAPTER THREE

Governance and Security in Anambra State
By
Chijioke Kelechi IWUAMADI

3.1   Introduction

Since the beginning of the Fourth Republic in 1999, politics in Anambra state has been characterized by intrigue, greed, violence, and unhealthy competition. A lot has equally been written about security and governance situation in the State. However, much of the writings (mostly newspaper articles) have been based on anecdotal evidence and tended to account for rising perception of insecurity in the state and governance practices as if they are separate and separable. Until the time of writing, there is no extant empirical attempt to chart the nexus between governance and insecurity in Anambra State with a view to drawing out the necessary implications for policy and advocacy.

This chapter therefore examines the link between governance and security challenges in Anambra State and the impact on development. The chapter is divided into five sections, including this introductory section. Section two provides background information on the state. These include historical and contemporary developments in the state as well as political, socio-cultural, religious and economic factors that are likely to impact governance and security in the state. Section three discusses briefly the methods of data collection. In section four, the findings of the study are presented. Finally, the conclusions and recommendations are discussed in section five.

3.2   Background information

Geo-political History of Anambra State:

Anambra State occupies a strategic geopolitical and economic position in the southeast of Nigeria (ASEEDS: 2002). It is not only a gateway state by road to the east; a major centre of commerce (with towns like Onitsha and Nnewi) but has also produced some of the most illustrious political, entrepreneurial and literary figures of the zone and Nigeria in general.

The current Anambra state emerged from the restructuring of the old Anambra following the states creation exercise of August 27, 1991. It has 21 Local Government Areas (see fig. 3.1 below). It is bordered by Enugu State and Imo State and the River Niger is the natural boundary that separates the state from Delta state. The 2006 National Population Census (NPC) indicates that Anambra state has a total population of 4, 182, 032, comprising 2,007,391 male and 2,174,641 female. The National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) 2010 household survey reveals that household distribution of employed persons in Anambra are 1,867,469 out which 298,215.29 are informal sector owners. It further shows that 21.1 percent of Anambra population is unemployed, among whom 18.6 percent are males while 23.6 percent are females.

Fig. 3.1: Map of Anambra State

Politically, the state has had an interesting history and comparatively high turnover of political leaders. In its 21 years history, the state has been led by 6 civilian governors, 4 military administrators and 1 police commissioner (see Table 3.1 below). Given the State's turbulent political history, it is not surprising that with the exception of the current governor, Peter Obi, none of its civilian Governors ever stayed in power for more than one term of 4 years.

Table 3.1: Governors of Anambra State since 1991

S/N	Name of ruler/leader	Period
1	Navy Captain Joseph Abulu	27 August 1991 – January 1992
2	Dr. Chukwuemeka P. Ezeife	2 January 1992 – 17 November 1993
3	Police Commissioner Dabo Aliyu	November – December 1993
4	Co. Mike Attah	December 1993 – 21 August 1996
5	Group Captain Rufai D' Garba	21 August 1996 – August 1996
6	Wing Commander Emma Ukaegbu	6 August 1998 – 28 May 1999
7	Dr. Chinwoke Mbadinuju	27 May 1999 – 29 May 2003
8	Dr. Chris Ngige	29 May 2003 – 15 March 2006
9	Mr. Peter Obi	16 March 2006 November 2006
10	Dame Virgy Etiaba	November 2006
11	Dr. Andy Uba	29 May 2007 – June 2007
12	Mr. Peter Obi	June 2007 - date

Socio-cultural and ethno-religious situation in Anambra State:
Anambra State is ethnically homogenous and the people mostly share common religious, social and cultural beliefs and practices. The predominant language

is Igbo with dialectical differences as you move from one part of the state to another. The people are famed for their resourcefulness in trade, commerce and industry. The high level of commercial activities in the state attracts people from different parts of the southeast and beyond, which perhaps explain the cosmopolitan nature of its major city – Onitsha. The people of the state have rich and diverse cultural festivals some of which have become major tourist attractions such as *Ofala and masquerade festivals*.

The predominant religion in Anambra state is Christianity, dominated by Roman Catholic adherents. With diminished status of indigeneship as a major factor in political contestation in the state (following the creation of Enugu out of the old Anambra State), the hegemonic politics of powerful interest groups such as businessmen/contractors and religion have become the main factors driving the politics of the state (Obianyo, 2010; Amucheazi, 1986). For instance, as a political aspirant, your denomination in Christianity is major factor in rallying popular vote.

In 1999, Mbadinuju's emergence as governor was believed to be as a result of his Christian denomination. As a governor, he promoted Pentecostal Christianity and during his tenure (1999-2003) every government's function was often started with loud prayer sessions including speaking in tongues. Monday mornings were usually a spectacle in the Government House with praise worship and all civil servants in the state's bureaucracy were expected to attend, which was broadcast live on state television. Sometimes the praise worship was organized at the Onitsha main market putting business transactions on hold until the exercise was over. This trend of dragging religion into politics was also witnessed during the 2003 and 2007 elections where the Roman Catholics were said to have supported the incumbent Governor Peter Obi, who is a Catholic[38].

Culturally, Anambra state is patrilineal as the man is regarded as the head and leader of the family or household, leading to strong preference for male children in order to continue and sustain patriarchy. Children are perceived as belonging

---

[38] KII, Awka, 6/09/11; Obianyo (2010)

to the extended family, which has collective responsibility for their socialization, even though the immediate domestic units of the nuclear family into which children are born have specific child rearing tasks. The extended family still provides a mechanism for mutual support, underpinned by a moral code that encourages individuals to see themselves as extensions of a social unit (Obianyo: 2010, KII: Awka, 2011). Therefore, it functions also as a social security system. On the other hand, both government and civil society sources during the study confirmed that community-based groups like local town unions and village meetings, age-grades, men and women groups are strong platforms for initiating self-help development activities, instilling discipline, maintaining law and order and the transmission of culture[39].

Structure of Anambra State Economy:
Anambra State's economy is characterized by primary production activities in agriculture, industry and a great deal of commercial activities. There is movement towards industry, service-oriented small-scale enterprises (particularly within the informal sector) and denser commercial activities even within the semi-urban areas. The major industries are textile, metal fabrication and blacksmithing located mainly in Onitsha, Nnewi and Awka. There are also rubber based industries like plastics, foams etc. Opportunities abound for mineral and agriculture based industries across the three senatorial zones of the state. Private commercial industrialists abound with manufacturing activities spanning a wide range of areas (ASEEDS: 2002). Nnewi, the home of many industrial establishments is one of the fastest developing industrial communities in Africa. The main stay of the economy is arguably, commercial activities and this contributes significantly to the state GDP and internally generated revenue. About 60 percent of the entire workforce is engaged in distributive trade at different levels, while the others are made of public servants, artisans in wood works, masonry, footwear and those in the informal sector. The state is also endowed with natural resources like iron deposits, crude oil, limestone, coal and clay. However, subsistence agriculture remains the predominant occupation in rural areas, engaging more than 70% of the population. The potential of the state for industrial agriculture is significantly

---

[39] KIIs, Awka, 26/10/11; and 27/10/11

diminished by soil erosion. There are about 550 active gully erosion sites of varying sizes. Commercial level agricultural production strives mainly around the riverine areas of Oyi, Ihiala and Orumba North and South LGAs, etc (ASEEDS: 2002).

Revenue and Expenditure Profile of Anambra State:
Like most states in the country, Anambra state is heavily dependent on the allocation from the federation account for its revenue. This is slightly augmented by internally generated revenue (IGR) from taxes, fines and fees, licenses, earnings and sales etc. The continued dependence on the federal allocation in Nigeria is structurally inevitable given that the federal government presides over most of the revenue sources in the states. The total state budget for year 2011 is N66.676 billion as against N67.786 billion budgeted for 2010. This represents a reduction of 1.66% over that of 2010. This amount is made up of N33.691 billion and N32.985 billion for capital and recurrent expenditures, respectively. Table 3.2 shows revenue allocated to Anambra state from the Federation account between 2008 and 2010.

Table 3.2 Revenue Allocation to Anambra State

Year	Amount
2008	36,567,495,131.03
2009	34,857,940,392.75
2010	40,602,487,087.83

Source: FAAC, 2012

However, while the federal government cannot be exonerated from the poor revenue profile of most states in Nigeria given its dominance of exploitation of natural resources, the states (including Anambra State) cannot be spared in the examination of how they have managed allocations from the Federation Account if their budgetary pronouncements are anything to go by. In 2012 the budget of Anambra State went up to N82.5 billion as against N66.9 billion

in 2011, representing a 23.2 per cent increase. You would think this increase in the budget would come with prioritization of sectors that drive economic growth and create jobs, such as agriculture, education and health? This was not the case. In a scathing analysis of the budget, Nasir Elrufai, a columnist with This Day Newspapers, had this to say:

> A meagre N1.4 billion is budgeted for health, and considering that health should be the core focus of any state government, this amount is barely adequate…. Agriculture is apportioned N1.4 billion.… With figures like these, it is no surprise that unemployment in the state is high. How can a state government allocate only 1.7 per cent of its entire budget to agriculture in a rural state? ….What is clear from this analysis is that the state (Anambra) like most states of the federation is not allocating funds to adequately address the key social challenges that confront its people (Elrufai, 2012: 70).

The poverty prevalence rate in Anambra state is really shocking despite its huge potentials evidenced by the entrepreneurial spirit of the people and large presence of skilled manpower. The Nigeria Poverty Profile as recorded by the Nigeria Bureau of Statistics (NBS) in 2012 reveals (see table 3.3 below) that as at 2010 using derived subjective measure, only 7.4% of people in Anambra fall within the category of non-poor while 47.6% are core poor and 45.0% are moderate poor. In the same vein, in terms of household assessment of livelihood, 10.1% are very poor, 37.5% are poor, 45.0% are moderate poor, 5.1% are fairly rich then only 2.2% are rich.

Table 3.3: Poverty and livelihood in Anambra state as at 2010

Derived Subjective Poverty Measure	Core Poor - 47.6%
	Moderate Poor - 45.0%
	Non-poor - 7.4%
Household Assessment of Livelihood	Very poor - 10.1%
	Poor - 37.5%
	Moderate poor - 45.0%
	Fairly rich - 5.1%
	Rich - 2.2%

Source: National Bureau of Statistics, 2012

3.3   Methodology

The methods of data collection used in the research were qualitative and quantitative techniques. The qualitative component included review of existing literature; observation, key informant interviews (KIIs) and focus group discussions (FGDs). The quantitative data were sourced from the result of the 2011 National Crime and Safety Survey conducted by CLEEN Foundation, and other related and relevant statistical data to the study. The research instruments were standardized to ensure uniformity in data collection and analysis.

Two key steps were critical in the conduct of the study:
- Selection of research locations using a sampling strategy that ensures that one local government area is selected in each of three senatorial districts in Anambra State.
- Ranking of communities (Urban and Rural) within each of the selected LGAs and identifying knowledgeable local informants for interviews.

Interviews were conducted in the following locations:

Table 3.4: Research locations

S/N	Senatorial zone	Local Government	Urban	Rural
1	Anambra North	Onitsha North	Onitsha (Awka road to main market)	Ogbolieke, Ogbousi, Obosi
2	Anambra	Awka South	Awka (state capital environs)	Central Okpuno, Ifite
3	Anambra South	Nnewi North	Nnewi (Umudim)	Otolo, Uruagu

3.4   Findings of the study

The key objective of the study is to explore the nexus between governance failures and insecurity in the South East with reference to Anambra State. The key informants interviewed have lived in the state for more than eleven years, while each of the participants at the focus group discussions has also lived at least nine years in the state. There is a general perception that security is major challenge affecting delivery of good governance in the state. The following findings summarize the outcome arising from the study.

1.   State of Security and Governance in Anambra State since 1999

In spite of the potentials of Anambra State for rapid socio-economic advancement, FGD participants[40] in Awka, Nnewi and Obosi maintained that economic development of the state has been slow as a result of insecurity and crime rates. In order to confirm this, we gathered from key informants[41] interviewed in the state capital and Onitsha that Anambra state has been a theatre of armed conflicts in the past notably in Aguleri and Umuleri in early; extra-judicial killings during the era of Bakassi Boys; protracted industrial

---

[40]The views expressed here are majorly that of participants during the FGDs: Obosi (24/9/11), Nnewi (14/9/2011) and Awka (7/9/2011)

[41] KII, Awka, 20/9/2011; and KII, Onitsha, 17/8/2011

unrest and labour problems; and unprecedented forms of political instability and tension, and general insecurity. Expectedly, these years of crises were not without adverse effects on governance, socio-economic development and livelihood in the state (KII, Awka: 2011, ASEEDS: 2002). This led to investors moving away from the state and also closure of factories and industries. In 2006, the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) Core Welfare Indicator Questionnaire (CWIQ) Survey Zonal Summary for South East Nigeria reported that crime and security situation in the entire South East region was worse in the urban areas[42].

Analysis of 2011 edition of the annual National Crime and Safety Survey conducted by the CLEEN Foundation indicate that violent crimes such as attempted/armed robbery (24%), domestic violence (12%), physical assault (11%) and attempted/kidnapping (8%) and attempted/murder (5%) are high in Anambra State (Table 3.5). However, the number one crime in the state is theft of mobile phone (35%).

Table 3.5: Household crimes in Anambra State in 2010

S/N	Type of Crime	Yes (%)	No (%)
1	Theft of Mobile phone	35	65
2	Attempted/armed robbery	24	76
3	Domestic Violence	12	88
4	Physical Assault	11	89
5	Burglary (Breaking and Entering)	11	89
6	Attempted/Kidnapping	8	92
7	Attempted/Murder	5	95
8	Rape	1	99

Source: CLEEN Foundation, 2011

---

[42] Excerpt from the Anambra State Economic and Empowerment Development Strategy (ASEEDS) document, 2002.

Participants at both the FGDs and KII expressed disappointment at the inability of security agencies adequately to guarantee their safety and security needs. One of the civil society spokesperson and a university don in the state expressed stated:

> Anambra state was among the first in the southeast region to experience the gradual take-over of security by vigilante groups following the failure of the formal state security agencies to provide security as armed robbers and other criminal activities virtually took over control of key commercial centres and towns like Onitsha, Nnewi, and the state capital Awka[43]

Incidentally, these towns (Onitsha, Nnewi, and Awka) are known for having extensive illegal and unregulated building patterns. Buildings are put up in these areas without regard to existing building and health codes or zoning and sub-division regulations – thus creating slum and squatter conditions in which hoodlums reside in[44]. According to the United Nation Habitat (2002), slums create the conditions for poor health and insecurity and are the most visible forms of poverty in the city. Regrettably, the cities have been described as sprawling slums of chaos and disorder as well as converging centers for jobless youth from other South East states that most times pretend to be engaged in buying and selling, but are involve in criminal activities[45].

In spite of these security challenges, Anambra State compared to other states in the southeast region is the second state where most victims of crime in the region are resident. However, one of the respondents in Onitsha opined that:

> crime is everywhere. Incidence of crime or violence could be higher in Onitsha than other parts of Anambra owing to its commercial nature and dense population. In like manner,

---

[43] KII, Awka, 30/08/11 and 31/08/11
[44] Ibid
[45] See United Nations Human Settlements Programme (UN-HABITAT), 2009, titled "Structure Plan for Awka and Satellite"

there could be more security challenges in Anambra than Enugu and because of same reason of commerce and dense population...[46]

On the other hand, the result of the 2011 National Crime and Safety Survey conducted by CLEEN Foundation unravelled that 11% of Abia, Enugu and Imo state residents respectively admit that they have at some point in 2010 became victims of crime while 45% of Ebonyi and 29% of residents Anambra said they have also fallen victim of crime in the region (Table 3.6). This implies that Ebonyi state has the highest crime rate in the region followed by Anambra then the other three states. This is probably the basis of the assertion by one of the points a respondent who attributed rising crime rates in Onitsha to influx of Ebonyi indigenes in Onitsha.

Table 3.6: Have you been a victim of any type of crime during the year 2010?

	Abia	**Anambra**	**Ebonyi**	**Enugu**	**Imo**
Yes	11%	29%	45%	11%	11%
No	88%	71%	55%	89%	88%
Refused/ No response	1%	0%	0%	0%	2%

Source: NCVS 2011

The study further revealed that people in the state feel strongly that the incessant lack of peace or order in the state have affected economic development in the state over the years. Most Anambra people opined that Mbadinuju's government underperformed in the area of security. They feel that the Ngige administration made serious efforts to address infrastructural challenges. The administration constructed some roads, paid workers and pensioners their entitlements The incumbent governor Peter Obi is adjudged to have performed better than his predecessors as he pays workers as at when

---

[46] KII, Onitsha, 16/08/11

due, promoted those who were due for promotion and also improved the security situation in the state. This perception was further confirmed by one of the respondents interviewed in Onitsha:

> In the area of crime and security all of them (past governors, 1999 - 2006) tried. When Mbadinuju came into power, insecurity was very high in the state – Armed robbery, kidnapping, etc. People were been arrested by 'Security agents' who detained them without trial. But in recent time, we can say Mr Peter Obi has tried to reduce kidnapping in the state...[47]

While some other respondents during the KIIs and particularly FGDs for unemployed youth observed that,

> Many 'security agents' in the state are not well trained especially vigilante groups. Even some police and vigilante are not properly equipped to match the level of crime and criminals in Anambra. Another challenge confronting the state is unemployment. Many young people do not have jobs to take care of themselves. And you know the idle mind is the devil's workshop. Many of them steal and kidnap to survive, others become thugs[48]

However, it is interesting to note that in October 2011 the impasse between the Peter Obi led government and members of the organized labour snowballed into full-blown crisis. The state bureaucracy was grounded. The conflict prompted over 5,000 women to converge at Ekwueme Square in Awka, the state capital, demanding that the crisis be resolved to save the people from further hardship[49].

---

[47] KII, Onitsha, 12/08/11
[48] KII, Onitsha, 13/08/11; and FGD (unemployed youth), Awka, 07/09/11
[49] See article titled 'Minimum Wage War Grounds Anambra' published in Leadership Newspaper, Tuesday, 11 October 2011.

2.   Causes of Security and Governance challenges

To understand the root causes of security and governance challenges facing Anambra state since 1999, it is important to go back to the story of Aguleri – Umuleri communal war of the early 1990s. During the crisis, Umuleri people reportedly hired mercenaries from Onitsha to fight their Aguleri opponents, who were obviously much more numerous and stronger. It is said that during ceasefire periods in the clashes between the two communities Onitsha mercenaries especially would return home and start criminal activities in Onitsha. They were exposed to arms, charms and hard drugs. They also recruited many young and idle boys, who looked up to them as heroes and role models. When the war eventually ended, those mercenaries who survived returned home and began full-scale armed robbery and many young men followed after them. In the words of a respondent:

> One of the greatest challenges facing Anambra State is insecurity although there seem to be an improvement recently. But you see to understand the root causes. You have to go back to the Aguleri – Umuleri communal war of the 1990. The Umuleri people had hired mercenaries from Onitsha to fight the Aguleri opponents, who were obviously much more numerous and stronger. Any time there was a break in the war or crisis, those Onitsha mercenaries notorious among who were Chiejina and Deriko, would return home and start criminal activities in Onitsha and environs...[50]

Similarly, the study found the security outfits established by governments and occupational groups ironically contributed to undermining security. This was especially the case when the successive governors found political functions for the security outfits. A case in point is the Bakassi Boys originally established by traders to police their markets, which was politicised under the Mbadinuju

---

[50] Key informants interviewed in Onitsha, 18/08/11

administration.[51] Furthermore, we gathered from the study that members of the disbanded security outfits (Bakassi boys) increasingly turned to criminality for survival. Thus, respondents during the FGD in Obosi and from KIIs in Onitsha and Akwa[52] considered the involvement of security operatives in criminal operations as another cause of the security challenges in the state.

The study also revealed that a cause of security challenges is the poor training and poor equipment for security agencies. Respondents complained about the paucity of well-trained security personnel in the communities. The police and some vigilantes were perceived as lacking the requisite skills, experiences and equipment to effectively combat crime and violence in the state[53].

The study further found that both the government and the families are also to be blamed for the insecurity in the state. There is a perception of the failure of social and educational institutions, including the family, to teach moral values to children and young people[54]. Consequently, these young people grow up with a wrong value orientation, and carry it to their respective work places and position of authority, including government. Respondents[55] reported that the state government had not paid good attention to addressing the security and the welfare of the citizens, which constitute the cardinal constitutional responsibility of government.

Unemployment was also identified as a cause of security challenge in the state. Interview and FGD sources (Akwa, 2011) reported that claimed that many young people in the state including graduates of tertiary institutions and school leavers have no means of livelihood. The imperatives of survival predispose the unemployed to engage in unlawful and criminal activities[56]

---

[51] The data analysed here were extracted from views of key informants (community opinion leaders) interviewed in Onitsha during the survey (KII, Onitsha,18/8/2011)
[52] Views expressed here are from FGD participants in obosi (20/9/11) and KII Onistha (12/08/11), KII Awka (31/09/11)
[53] KII, Onitsha, 16/08/11
[54] KII, Awka, 11/09/11
[55] Respondents here cuts across FGD participants in Obosi (24/09/11), Akwa (7/09/11), Nnewi (14/09/11), and KII , Awka (12/09/11), Onitsha (16/08/11, 17/08/11) and Nnewi (18/08/11, 24/08/11)
[56] FGD, Awka (unemployed youth) (7/09/11); KII, Awka , (7/09/11, 8/09/11)

Lack of knowledge of right-based approach to community development on the part of civil society in the state was a highlighted as a contributor to bad governance, which feeds insecurity. For many respondents in the study, the citizens do not know their rights and therefore cannot exercise them. They argued that people seem not to understand the responsibilities and obligation of government in providing security and welfare to the people. As a result, citizens have failed to hold the government accountable for its actions.

Moreover, government neglect of community development and security was considered a cause of insecurity. Government neglect forces the communities to seek their own welfare and security. The implication here is that the impact of government in the state is not really felt by the people at the grassroots. The people at the grassroots take care of themselves and government does not reach them well. People of Anambra complain that Government is far from them considering the fact that the last Local Government election held in the state was in 1998. The failure of successive government to conduct Local Government elections since 1999 has distanced the government from the people. Appointed chairpersons and caretakers answer to those who appointed them and do not represent the people at the grassroots.

The study also showed that some respondents considered instability in government as a cause of security challenges. They argued that the frequent litigations and changes in leadership of the state leads to poor implementation of policy, lack of continuity in development programmes, and waste of state resources in litigations. The frequent changes in administrations have undermined efforts for sustained action against insecurity and its underlying causative factors.

Finally, participants at the Nnewi women FGD considered lack of care and support to victims of violent crime as feeding into new cycles of violent crimes. Majority of the FGD participants argued that the "inability of government and the society to cater for widows and orphans who lost their

husbands and fathers to violent crimes feeds into new cycles of violent conflicts and crime in the state."[57]

3.   Responses of State and Non-state Actors to Security and Governance challenges

Historical standpoint of majority of the key informants interviewed and participants of the focus group discussions confirms that one of the first responses to security challenge in the Anambra State was the introduction of Bakassi Boys led by Late Chuks Anah who was former chairman of Onitsha North Government Area. For them, the Bakassi Boys helped a great deal to curb the crime rate in Onitsha and the state in general. The Government of Chinwoke Mbadinuju took over the Bakassi Boys and extended their services to the entire state[58]. The study further unravelled that:

> The Bakassi Boys achieved great results initially but could not manage its successes as it drifted into civil matters, including family and land disputes, unlawful arrest, and detention in some cases, extra-judicial execution of suspects[59]

Unfortunately, the politicization of the outfit and its alleged involvements in politically motivated killings led to its proscription alongside other ethnic militias and vigilante groups in the country on the orders of the Federal Government. The exit of the Bakassi created a vacuum, which eventually resulted to criminals taking over the streets of Onitsha and Anambra at large[60].

Another major response to the security challenge has been from faith-based organizations (FBOs). Apart from organizing prayer sessions for members

---

[57] This is the view of most of participants during the FGD conducted in Nnewi for women group, 14 September, 2011

[58] The analysis capture the view point as most of the respondents regards response to security challenges in the state. Data from KIIs, Akwa/Nnewi/Onistha, August – October, 2011; FGDs, Awka/Nnewi/Obosi, September, 2011

[59] Ibid

[60] Ibid

and the state, the groups have also engaged in value re-orientation of their adherents, away from materialism, which they said is the bane of corruption and criminality. The FBOs also organize youth empowerment, seminars and workshops through which many young people are equipped to be self-employed[61]. Some respondents also pointed to efforts by NGOs to promote and implement programmes such as economic empowerment programmes, sexual and reproductive health education, and drug abuse programmes among others to vulnerable youths in order to help them resist the lure of getting involved in criminality[62].

Another issue observed in the study was the level of distrust between the police and the communities they serve in the state. People tended to have more confidence in vigilante groups than the police itself. This is not surprising because the 2011 NCVS shows that most people in southeast region expressed high level of dissatisfaction with the manner police handle cases. During the fieldwork it was observed that the Electronics Market in the commercial city of Onitsha, Anambra State was thrown into pandemonium on Wednesday, August 17, 2011 when traders invaded the major streets within the city as they violently protested the death of a colleague. The traders were protesting the killing of a fellow trader, a man popularly known as Okija who was allegedly shot dead by some officers of the Anti-Terrorism Squad (ATS) from the Delta State Police Command. We gathered that the police in connection with some crimes allegedly committed in the market had earlier arrested the deceased, but he tried to escape and the police shot at him, resulting in his death. The Chairman of the electronics market, Chief Okechukwu Okoli said trouble started when one of the street urchins popularly known as (Ndi-Oso-Afia), which was earlier arrested by the police, tried to escape but was shot by the police[63].

The study also showed that community development associations and town unions are proactively responding to the security challenges in the state. Before

---

[61] KII, Onitsha, 31/08/11

[62] KII, Awka, 23/08/11

[63] This is the summary of security issue observed during the field work on August, 17, 2011 when there was crisis at the electronics market in Onitsha.

now, community based organizations (CBOs) like town unions were not officially recognized. The Peter Obi administration recognized the body as a tool for development and allocates funds to the town unions through the Anambra State Association of Town Unions (ASATU), which in turn funds the activities of vigilant groups. The functional town unions have been proactive in securing their communities (FGD, Nnewi: 2011). For instance, Nnewi, town unions are very strong and effective. Here, we observed the meeting of "Izukaora" that is, the general town union meeting of Nnewi people. The union assists in the funding of the vigilante. It also sensitizes indigenes and business people to pay their taxes and rates when due. Also in Nnewi, there is a meeting of "ndi obia (non-indigenes) and also meeting of "ndi obodo (indigenes)". It is at these meetings that the issues of governance and security are discussed (KII, Nnewi: 2011). There is also the joint meeting of 'ndi obodo' and 'ndi obia', which provides avenue for 'ndi obia' to lay their complaints and actually receive favourable response to their problems[64]. These efforts contribute in improving people's perception of safety and security in the state.

4. *Challenges of State and Civil Society responses to insecurity and governance issues in Anambra State*

The study revealed that some of the responses of both the state and non-state actors to the security and governance challenges in the state are fraught with some challenges. First is the fact that some of the initiatives of the state government are considered to be heavy handed and anti-people. For instance, informal sector operators who constitute a critical proportion of the productive population of the state complained about the numerous task forces established by the government. A major complaint is that the task forces are made up of political thugs who act in ways that undermines public security. The desperation of the task forces to raise money and the perception that they have the backing of their political patrons make them to violate the rights of citizens and corporate organizations in the guise of maintaining security.

---

[64] The views analyzed here are mainly that of FGD participants (FGD, Nnewi, 14/9/11) and key informants interviewed in Nnewi (KII, Nnewi, 18/08/11)

Another challenge associated with the task forces is the conflict of roles among two or more agencies and the struggle for turf, which negatively impacts on the public. A case in point, which was witnessed by the study team, was a clash between the Anambra State Transport Agency (ASTA) and the Task Force on Street Trading, which left up to 47 persons injured. The clash stemmed from directives purportedly issued by Mar. Robert Okonkwo, Honourable Commissioner for Special Duties and Transport that restrained other Task Forces except the ASTA from operating. The political cover given to the task forces allow the task force members to act with impunity since the security agencies are reluctant to risk confrontation with the teams that are close to the corridors of power.

The study also showed that a major challenge of state responses to security and governance problems is poor record of implementation. It was found that the government has introduced several initiatives without following them up with robust implementation plans. For instance, Anambra Integrated Development Strategy (ANIDS) initiated in 2006 is a strategy supposed to involve communities and other stakeholders in working towards the attainment of Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). However, there is no indication that this is being done and the prospects of attaining the MDGs by 2015 remain very bleak[65]. Poor implementation is also manifest in abandoned projects, poorly maintained infrastructures and frequent policy changes.

The community and civil society responses were also found to experience some challenges. For instance, community development associations and town unions were perceived in many communities to be ineffective and enmeshed in conflicts. The study identified two major challenges that confront town unions in Anambra. These are leadership tussle and the hostile relationship between town unions and traditional rulers. In many instances, leadership tussle and conflicting relationships with traditional rulers have triggered violent conflicts[66]. The study found that the conflicts stem from poor delineation of

---

[65] More details about ANIDS programme can be found in ANIDS document, 2006.
[66] Culled from respondent's view on the state of town unions in Anambra State (KII, Onistha, 16/08/11).

responsibilities and powers of town unions, which make many a traditional ruler becoming apprehensive of losing power and influence to the unions. The problem with these challenges is not just that it undermines security but it constitutes a cog in the wheel of progress. As a respondent rightly said:

> Kidnapping is very prevalent these days especially here in Nnewi. Armed robbery, thuggery and other forms of violence are still witnessed in several parts of the state. And as it is, there has not been a systematic approach towards addressing security challenges in the state.
>
> There is no denying the fact that some efforts are being made by the state agencies to curb the menace of kidnapping and other forms of violence, but such efforts are not synchronized and are consequently, not very effective[67]...

The study also found that extraneous forces such as market forces undermine some government and non-governmental initiatives. Thus, while government seeks to alleviate the sufferings of the people by embarking on empowerment programmes the gains of such initiatives are often eroded by inflation and rising rents and power charges. The private sector is reticent about investment due to erratic policy changes and high costs of production imposed on them by poor infrastructure and low cost of goods made in China.

Finally, entrenchment of corruption in the system is perceived as making it difficult for government to have workable schemes that ensures good governance in the state. Politicians appointed to manage such schemes tend to see their appointments as settlement for their roles during elections.

---

[67]KII, Nnewi, 31/08/11

5. Conclusion and Recommendations

The study examined factors that undermine security and governance in Anambra State. In particular, the study explored the governance underpinnings of insecurity in the state and arrived at a number of findings. We found out that there is a huge gap between the government and the governed in terms of understanding and reconciling what the government's governance agendas are and what the people need. It is clear from our findings that the majority of the Anambra people, particularly the non-government officials, are ignorant of government programmes. Generally, there is poor citizen's perception of the government. For instance, it was observed that residents of Onitsha and Nnewi are predominantly businessmen, and generally do not care about government actions and inactions that have no direct bearing on their business activities.

The study showed that there has not been a systematic approach towards addressing security challenges in the state by government. The efforts being made by the state agencies to curb the menace of kidnapping and other forms of violence are not synchronized and not very effective. Over the years, successive governments have not been committed enough to addressing issues of development, which impact public perception of security.

The study found that town unions have potentials of promoting security and development of the communities. Town unions have a unique origin in Igbo community and constitute the nucleus around which community life revolves. However a number of community and individual efforts are ad hoc and therefore limited to that extent. The vigilante group, which is a brainchild of town union or community effort sometimes, exceeds their bounds. They could arrest, detain and execute judgment rather than handing over the suspects over to the police in the security and governance of this state. Apart from the vigilante service, the town unions have helped in equipping some health centres, rehabilitating schools and employing teachers to make up for shortage of teachers in many schools.

Although vigilantes have helped in checking activities of criminals, they in many cases also constitute a threat to security of ordinary citizens. There is a new development where the vigilantes have become guards of rich and powerful persons in society who use them to terrorise members of the public.

Our findings also indicate that taskforce teams are contracted to politicians and this makes it difficult to have peace in the state. The taskforce use coercion to generate revenue by extorting money from people. Police on their part find it difficult to intervene in any unlawful activity of the taskforce since the politicians recruit them. In a similar vein, respondents also accuse the police of terrorising the citizens, victimizing people and collecting money from them illegally. They decried the rampant extra-judicial activities by the police. Rule of law and respect for human rights are completely neglected by the police in the state. Majority of the respondents expressed serious concern over the idea of not having elected Local Government administration in the state since 1998. This situation they say distances the people from the government. Respondents also accuse the government of not having a listening ear and not coming up with people oriented programmes. People do not tell government their needs rather it is the government that tells the people what it feel is people's need. For instance, the hope that local council polls would hold in Anambra State on September 15, 2011 was dashed as the state governor swore in 21 local government transition chairmen for another three months. The last local council election held in the state was in 1998.

Recommendations

From the foregoing, certain measures need to be taken to address the challenges of security and governance. First, we suggest that the government should make sure that its policies are implemented effectively. It is not enough to make good policies while implementing it is a problem. Government must realize that it has a limited time and should therefore use it effectively. Secondly, government agencies like the National Orientation Agency (NOA) should be made to be functional in carrying out their responsibilities. Here, government can partner with the civil society in enlightening citizens on government programmes.

The citizens on their part are expected to play roles that will complement government efforts. The citizens need to be more security conscious. Citizens should be sensitized and mobilized from time to time, to fulfil their civic obligations. They should be law-abiding, pay their taxes and other dues correctly and promptly. Citizens should be courageous to criticize or engage the government constructively. In doing this, public facilities and projects should be properly maintained and sustained, and both government and the citizens have roles to play to achieve this.

References

Anambra State Government (2002) Anambra State Economic Empowerment Development Strategy (ASEEDS) Document, (Awka: ASG)

Amucheazi, E., (1986), *Church and Politics in Eastern Nigeria: 1945-1966*, Lagos: Macmillan.

Arisi Regina O. and Ukadike O. J. (2011), "Good Governance, A Panacea for Peace and Stability in Nigeria Nation", *European Journal of Scientific Research*, Vol.55 No.3 (2011), pp.413-418

Coleman, J. (1965) *Nigeria Background to Nationalism*. Los Angeles: University of California.
Dower, A. (2000) *Good Governance: Guiding Principle for Implementation*. Australia: Ministry for Foreign Affairs
Federal Republic of Nigeria (FRN) (2006) Population Census, Official Gazette (FGP 71/52007/2,500(OL24),

Nasir Elrufai (2012) 'Anambra's Budget of Misplaced Priorities' published in This Day Newspapers, 08 Jun 2012.

The National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) (2006) *Core Welfare Indicator Questionnaire (CWIQ) Survey Zonal Summary - South-East*, Abuja: NBS

Obianyo, Nkolika E. (2010) "Behind the Curtains of State Power: Religious Groups and the Struggle for Ascendancy in Nigerian Public Institutions - A Critical Appraisal". *Africa Development,* Vol. XXXV, No. 4, pp. 141 –164.

Ogunbanwo, S. (1997) "Electoral Violence and National Security in Nigeria." sited in Arisi Regina O. and Ukadike O. J. (2011), "Good Governance, A Panacea for Peace and Stability in Nigeria Nation", *European Journal of Scientific Research*, Vol.55 No.3 (2011), pp.413-418

Onu G. and Biereenu-Nnabugwu M. "Dialectics of Patronage Politics & Representative Democracy: The Case of Anambra State of Nigeria". Unpublished article posted on www.http://books.google.com.ng/books?

Oromareghake. P. (2009) *National Security, Political Stability and the Implementation of the Millennium Development Goals,* Abuja: UNDP Regional Bureaux and Country Office, Nigeria.

United Nations Human Settlements Programme (UN-HABITAT), 2009, "Structure Plan for Awka and Satellite". Website: http://www.unhabitat.org

CHAPTER FOUR

Governance and Security in Ebonyi State
By
Smart E. Otu

4.1   Introduction

Nnamani (2010) argues that all the promises of accountable and good governance cannot be realized without stability, peace and security, and that all the promises of democracy will evaporate with our dreams of a better future. Governance is deeply connected to security, peace and stability. Since 1999, contemporary southeastern states of Nigeria have literally become an epitome of bad and/or unaccountable governance. Until the recent upsurge of Boko Haram violence in northern Nigeria, the southeast has been the epicentre of insecurity in the country. Crimes such as armed robbery, kidnapping, ritual killings, advance fee fraud (419), bribery and corruption, youth restiveness and political thuggery and violence are some of the major manifestations of the security challenges facing the region.

The people of southeastern region were historically known and respected for their "*Ubuntu*" - a sense of collectivity and brotherhood. This philosophy was expressed in common slogans such as '*onye aghala nwanneya'* (no relative should be left behind) and so on. The people were known for progressive self-help development projects. This was the days when Igbo people looked forward to the end of the year to join their kith and kin at home without any fear whatsoever of either being kidnapped, robbed, raped, molested or defrauded by fraudsters in any manner. Currently, however, the region could be best described as suffering from 'arrested-development' (Otu, 2011).

With myriads of governance and security challenges facing the region, there is a renewed interest in examining the overall pattern of governance in the region as well as the roles of non-state actors in engendering good, accountable and transparent governance process (instance, Olowu and Erero, 1996; Honey & Okafor 1998; Adelugba and Ogo Ujomu, 2008; Nwaka, 2008; Nwolise, 2010. Ogundiya, 2010; Otu, 2011).

This chapter aims to examine the connection between governance and insecurity in Ebonyi state. An examination of the various factors that coalesced to undermine good governance and security in Ebonyi State is undertaken. The central question is 'to what extent are governance deficits drivers of the security challenges which have exemplified Ebonyi state like the rest of the states in the region? It is hypothesized that the security challenges facing Ebonyi state are not unconnected to the state and pattern of governance in the state. The chapter is divided into five sections. The introductory section is followed by the background section, which examines the critical historical and contemporary development issues in the state. The section also highlights the political, socio-cultural and economic factors, which have significant impact on governance and security in the state. The methodology adopted in this study is discussed in section three. The section explains the research design, which includes relevant methodological issues such as the sources of data, the sampling frame and technique, scope and limitations of the study and the method of data analysis. This is followed by discussions of findings in section four. The final section of the chapter presents the conclusions and recommendations of the study.

4.2. Background to the study area
Ebonyi State was created on 1ˢᵗ October 1996, alongside five other states. The old Abakaliki Division (coming from Anambra-Enugu axis) and the old Afikpo Division (Imo-Abia axis), as they have come to be known in political lexicon, were merged together to form the present day Ebonyi State—with Abakaliki as its capital. The official sobriquet 'salt of the nation' was adopted to capture the distinctive natural endowment of the state. Geographically, Ebonyi state is bordered by Benue State to the north, Enugu State to the west, Imo and Abia States to the south, and Cross River State to the east. Like all other states in the federation, Ebonyi state is divided into three senatorial zones; the state has thirteen local government councils.

People and population in focus
Ebonyi State is predominantly occupied by the Igbo wawa speaking people of contemporary Nigeria. In all, there are nine major languages spoken in Ebonyi State: Afikpo, Mgbo, Izzi, Ezaa, Ikwo, Kukele, Legbo, Mbembe, and Oring[68].

These languages are all subgroups and distinguishing dialects of the 'Igbo language' However, the latter (Oring language) appears to be one of the few other non-core Igbo speaking groups that can be found among communities in the northern part of the state that are bordered by communities in Benue State.

Ebonyi state can be categorized into about three cultural zones based on local dialectical and choreographic patterns, namely the Abakaliki, Afikpo and Ohaozara zones. Notwithstanding these observed nuanced cultural divergences, these zones and the communities share similar cultural features, namely, communal ownership of the means of production (land), the family as the basic social unit, social stratification system, the belief system , and the system of political organization that is based on age-grade system.

The 2006 National Population Census put the population of Ebonyi state at 2,176,947. This is made up of 1,064,156 males and 1, 112, 791 females[69]. While 75% of the population lives in the rural areas, only 25% are found in the urban areas.

Figure 1. Map of Ebonyi state showing the 13 LG Councils.

---

[68] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ebonyi_State

[69] see http:www//.population.gov.ng).

Table 1: Senatorial zones and Local Government Councils with their Headquarters

S/N	Senatorial Zones and Local Government Areas in Enugu State	
	Ebonyi Central Senatorial Zone	**Headquarters**
1	Ezza North LG	Ebiaji
2	Ezza South LG	Onueke
3	Ikwo LG	Onu_Ebonyi
4	Ishielu LGA	Ezilo
	Ebony North Senatorial Zone	
5	Izzi L G	Iboko
6	Abakaliki LGA	Abakaliki
7	Ohaukwu LGA	Ezzam-mgbo
8	Ebonyi LG	Ugbodo
	Ebonyi South Senatorial Zone	
9	Afikpo North LG	Afikpo
10	Afikpo South LG	Nguzu-Edda
11	Ivo LG	Ishiaka
12	Ohozara LG	Obiozara
13	Onicha LG	Isu

Governance and administrative structure
Ebonyi State has had 4 governors since it was created (see Table 2). The governor is the chief executive officer of the state.

Table 2: Governors of Ebonyi state (1996-date)

Names	Periods
Navy Comdr. Walter Aye Feghabo	1996-1998
AIG Simeon Oduoye	1998-1999
Dr. Sam Ominyi Egwu	1999-2007
Mr Martins Nwancho Elechi	2007 to date

The Governor is the chief security officer of the state and is responsible for maintaining security of life and property in the state. The governor is expected to work with the state Commissioner of Police (CP), the state Director of State Security Services (SSS), Commandant of Military Cantonment Abakaliki, Controller of Prisons, Immigration, and lately the commandant, Nigeria Civil and Security Defence. Traditional rulers and chairmen of local government councils are sometimes involved in the expanded state security committee meetings. To perform this function, the governor controls the unaccounted for 'security vote/fund'. The State House of Assembly is the main law-making body of the state. The Speaker heads it. Besides law making, the state legislature is also charged with oversight of government activities and promoting good governance.

Each of the 13 Local Government Areas (LGAs) in Ebonyi is headed by a democratically elected chairman who is assisted by a Deputy Chairman and a number of Supervisory councillors. Each Local Government area has its own legislature composed of councillors who represent the various wards making up the council. There are also development centres within the local government with coordinators at the helm of affairs and quite a handful of state-appointed 'management staff' who play both the executive and legislative roles. The underlying motive for the creation of these development centres is to devolve power and bring government and development nearer to the people. To what extent the development centres have really brought developments closer to the people remains to be seen apart from the huge overhead burden they

impose on the resources of the state. Currently, there are 64 development centres in the state.

In addition to the above governance arrangements, most rural communities have a system of communal administration under an Elders' Council. One of the members, often the eldest, is designated the community Head or Chief or Traditional Ruler. He works with the cabinet members who represent the various villages in the community. Each community also has a Town Union or Community Development Association, which is headed by a President or chairman. Town unions represent a very important plank for community self-help effort in developmental activities—a position and role that has a long history in Igbo land. In some parts of the state especially in the Afikpo area of the state, age grade system of administration is widely used, and works hand-in-hand with the town unions.

The economy/occupational pattern

The main stay of the economy of the state is agriculture and the people are predominantly farmers. The National Bureau of Statistics estimates that about 70.7% of the total population of Ebonyi state in 2005 was employed in the agricultural sector. This is against an average of 45% of the people employed in the same sector in the other southeastern states in the same year. A variety of staple and cash crops are produced in the state. They include rice, yam, cassava mainly in the Abakaliki axis of the state, palm produce, cocoa, maize, groundnut, plantain, banana, cassava, melon, sugar cane, beans, fruits and vegetables, which are widely cultivated especially at Afikpo axis of the state. Fish farming is also being carried out extensively in Afikpo and Izzi-Cross River end of the state. As land in Ebonyi state is still based on the age-long communal ownership system, there are serious limitations to the portion of land available for cultivation per farmer, thus making farming essentially a subsistence engagement with little to sell to meet other important household needs. The people of Ebonyi state also engage in other forms of traditional industries such as pottery works in Ivo, Ishielu and Afikpo zone of the state,

wood carving in Afikpo, weaving and rafting in the Izzi, Ezza, Ntezi, and Afikpo, blacksmithing at Ezza, Afikpo and Ishielu[70]

Although the young Ebonyi state is endowed with several solid mineral resources such as salt, lead, limestone, zinc and marble, clay and gypsum, they remain largely untapped. Industrial activities in the state are, therefore, low especially when compared with other states in the region. There are consequently little job prospects in the industrial sector for the teeming unemployed Ebonyi youths. However, the state civil service engage a good chunk of Ebonyi people in the ministries, parastatals and educational institutions.

Revenue generation

Despite the abundant resources, Ebonyi state has not been able to harness these opportunities to the fullest to shore up her revenue base. It is noteworthy that Internally Generated Revenue (IGR) was N1.8 million ($11.613) for three months of 1996. The state government has identified weak internally generated revenue base as a major challenge to result-oriented governance and rapid development of the state.[71]. The state government hopes to reduce dependence on Federation Account. Against this backdrop, the state is committed to urgently expand her economic activities by establishing some industries. Indeed, one of the key goals of the state's Vision 20:2020 is to improve internally generated revenue by at least 70 per cent, while another is to develop a robust Agricultural sector that will be attractive to young graduates as well as acting as driver to wealth creation and improved revenue for the state.

The state government also plans to make sure that more development projects are funded through Private-Public Partnership and Donor Partnership arrangements. For instance, the state government has concluded negotiation with a Chinese firm for partnership in generating electricity for the inhabitants of Ebonyi state using the abundant rice dusk in the state. It seems the vision

---

[70] See http://www.igbofocus.com/html/ebonyi_state.html Accessed 21st October, 2011(http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Igbo_people) and informal chats with some Ebonyians on the subject.

[71] Ebonyi state vision 20:2020, pg. 17.

of Ebony State government regarding revenue generation is beginning to yield results. Data from the office of the State Board of Internal Revenue and Department of Budget, Ministry of Finance on the state government's Internal Revenue Inflow shows a rise from N1.8 million in the last three months of 1996 to N600 million by 2007, N858 million by 2008, and N727 million for the first six months of 2009[72]. As Table 3shows, internally generated revenue and statutory allocation from the Federation account has increased from 2004-2012. The percentage increase ranges from 10.5% to 20%. The table indicates that the overall revenue of Ebonyi state government has doubled between 2004 and 2012.

Table 3: Ebonyi State Revenue Inflow (2004-2012)

YEAR	IGR	STATUTORY FROM FGN
2004	468,906,650	11,578,360,000
2005	530,092,000	14,990,669,880
2006	779,723,000	16,500,000,000
2007	1,532,311,160	18,369,000,000
2008	6,306,764,900	20,436,245,600
2009	6,857,353,360	26,491,783,000
2010	7,517,200,170	22,584,659,760
2011	8,891,373,630	27,316,000,000
2012	8,134,250,030	36,160,000,000
TOTAL	41,017974,900	194,426,718,240

Source: Office of the Head of Budget, Ministry of Finance, Abakaliki

Appraising governance in from 1999 to present
Ebonyi is the least developed state in the southeast region.

---

[72] Report from Office of the State Board of Internal Revenue.

In response to the development challenges facing the state, Dr. Sam Egwu, the first elected Executive Governor (1999 – 2007) initiated important policies in the education, human resource, health, energy/power and agricultural sectors. These policies led to the ESUT College of Agriculture in Abakaliki being upgraded into full-fledged autonomous university—with several faculties including a Teaching Hospital to address the manpower and health needs of the state. Several secondary and primary schools were also established across various towns and villages. The educational policy led to HiPact scholarship programme, which supported some Ebonyi graduates to undergo postgraduate studies abroad. The administration's specific health policy complemented the subsisting Federal Medical Centre with General Hospitals in some parts of the state and Primary Health Care Centres in the rural areas to bring health services nearer to the people.

On energy, agriculture and general development, Egwu's administration also initiated important policies. For instance, intensive rural electrification schemes were embarked upon.

The administration made concerted efforts in the provision of clean and safe water to the rural residents in the villages and in guinea worm prone areas. To boost the agricultural potential of the state, the administration embarked on significant opening of feeder roads in the rural settlements even as poor bridges connecting them to the capital and other major towns in the state hampered the benefits. The development of rural information delivery system was another important facet of the state's rural development programme. This was buoyed by the creation of several development centres out of the 13 local councils of the state to bring development nearer to the people. However, the Achilles' heel of the Egwu administration was the high level of insecurity in the state occasioned by incessant robbery, political violence, cultism and, gangterism.

The current governor, Chief Martin Nwancho Elechi, has tried to toe the path of his predecessor. For instance, his initial educational policy was to improve access to education for Ebonyians and to improve the quality of education by returning secondary schools to their owners. However, he could not sustain the free education policy started by his predecessor. In the area of

health, general infrastructural development and agriculture, there is a concordance in the policy of both administrations. Besides the development of a new city, 'Ochudo city', the Elechi administration has engaged in the construction of two major Water Schemes in Ebonyi Central and South zones respectively. There is also a renewed agricultural policy for the state that is driven by a philosophy of a comprehensive and integrated rural development scheme through the construction of 23 unity bridges. Part of this new 'agricultural policy' of the administration includes encouraging farmers to go into large scale farming through the adoption of mechanization, cross breeding of plants and livestock and commercial fish farming[73]. To this end, young Ebonyian graduates were sent abroad for training in the new techniques of agriculture. This effort may have been yielding some positive results by boosting food and livestock production in the state, and engaging unemployed Ebonyian youths.

The Elechi administration also introduced 'Attitudinal Change' policy, which is aimed at altering the general attitudes of Ebonyians in all aspects of life: respect for the other person, time consciousness, honesty etc. The administration is credited with restoring peace among warring communities within the state and neighbouring states. For instance, social order has been restored between the Izzi and their neighbouring communities in Cross River State. Similarly, the government has until the resurgence of the crisis succeeded in brokering a truce in the war of attrition between Ezza and Ezilo clans.

4.3   Methodological issues

The chapter is based on survey research. The main reason for the use of survey method   is to empirically obtain the knowledge of the stakeholders on the governance and security challenges in Ebonyi state. Since the population covered was deemed quite large enough, it was impossible to interview every member of the target population and/or all the important stakeholders in the state. To this end, we sampled purposively, some relevant stakeholders across the various segments of the state (see table below).

---

[73] State development update 2010. Ebonyi: Fulfilling the dreams of our founding fathers.

Types and sources of data

Two sets of data—the quantitative and qualitative data—are utilized in the study. The quantitative dataset was obtained from the results of a survey (National Crime and Victimization Survey) that was conducted by CLEEN Foundation in 2011. The qualitative data was obtained by means of in-depth interview (IDI), Focus Group Discussion (FGD) and personal observations on public events such as town hall meetings, parliamentary sessions, demonstrations, etc.[74]

Population, sampling frame and technique

Using the theoretically and empirically relevant social-ethical contexts as parameters for determining where to locate our respondents (sampling frame), and being guided by CLEEN Foundation Respondents Selection Chart (CFRSC), we drew our sample from three senatorial zones (see box 1).

Box 1: Sample selection Criteria

Ebonyi Central Zone	Afikpo North
Ebonyi North Zone	Abakaliki
Ebonyi South Zone	Ezza South
Urban Locations	Afikpo, Abakaliki and Onueke
Rural Locations	Amaechi, Okofia and Ozziza

The social contexts were: (1) Media study and police reports on insecurity and crime in the state (2) Key informants who are in positions to influence policy on governance and insecurity in Ebonyi state (3) willingness to participate in the study (4) accessibility and convenience. Still relying on CFRSC guidelines, a total of 30 respondents were purposively selected across the diverse areas

---

[74] See, Rist 1977 and Otu 2009 for the rationale of combining qualitative and quantitative data.

of interest in the administration of the state. These were government officials (both political appointees and bureaucrats), academics, community leaders, women leaders, youth leaders, law enforcement officers, religious leaders and leaders of civil society groups (see Table 4). Notwithstanding the shortcomings of this purposive sampling technique on issues of representativeness of sample, it is very useful in explorative studies of this nature as it encourages the researcher to go directly to respondents who have useful information that would aid the realization of research objectives (Broidy 2001:15; Otu, 2003). The research respondents were drawn from the following sectors of the Ebonyi population:

Table 4: Specified stakeholders sampled

Government/political office holders	6
Academics	3
Community Leaders	7
Women Leaders	3
Youth Leaders	3
Law Enforcement Officers (DPO and Commissioner of Police)	2
Religious Leaders	4
Leaders of Civil Society Groups	2
Total	30

Participants in the three Focus Group Discussions (FGDs) were also purposively selected in the two designated urban areas, and one rural area of the three senatorial zones. Following the rule of FGD, all participants in each of the FGD shared similar characteristics. Data obtained from the interviews and Focus Group Discussions were analysed using thematic analysis technique involving constant comparative of data after completion of the project. This process involves careful "unitizing" and "categorizing" information unit after

data have been sorted out, subjected to quality control check. These methods were complemented by randomly generated quantitative from the CLEEN Foundation's 2011 national Crime and Safety Survey.

The most important constraint was time. Time is never friendly to researchers. There was also the challenge of having to deal with the negative perception and lack of cooperation by some respondents. Some of the selected respondents misconstrued the purpose of the study and refused to participate–a development that necessitated contacting other persons to replace them.

4.4   Discussion of findings

The study covered critical aspects of governance and security challenges and the sources of these security challenges, peculiarity of these challenges to southeast region and Ebonyi state, responses and reactions to these challenges by past and present government and non-state institutions (town unions), governance at the community level, and the solutions to the challenges, among other important issues. A critical examination and analysis of the findings in of the study found an acceptable fit of the current situation and realities on ground in Ebonyi state which is about serious negative governance and security challenges confronting the state so that the hypothesized relationship between governance and security challenges seem most probably confirmed. The major findings of the analysis, and their implications for the major issue of the study, are discussed below.

Governance challenges and their sources

Several governance challenges face the relatively young Ebonyi state and the opinion of the informants varied in this regard. However, the most common challenge is the fact that people are not allowed to choose the leader of their choice. The second governance challenge identified by our respondents is the lack of sincerity on the part of the leaders. Both of these, the people alluded to, leads to pervasive corruption that has in itself constituted the most threatening governance challenge in the state. Also emerging as governance challenges in the state are insecurity (ethnic conflicts), youth restiveness, and the lack of funds as the state has weak internally-generated revenue base. The general feeling is that the laudable promises of democracy are yet to be

realized. For instance, a youth leader from Okofia Community in Ebonyi Central explained that the performance of the government especially at the rural community level is generally too poor[75]. To buttress this point, a law enforcement officer explained that people were leaving the community due to inability of the government to provide the necessary amenities needed to enhance communal living such as good road network, pipe borne water, security and electricity[76]. An ethno-political leader from Ebonyi Central argues:

> The state of governance at the community level in the state is poor because fraudulent political office holders are controlling developmental projects. They direct all the resources for their own personal gain and amass wealth for their relatives and friends. It is nothing to write home about because most of our communities have no access roads, no electricity, no hospitals talk more of good ones, some of our children are taught under mango trees; therefore, dividends of democracy are still far from most rural communities in the state since the inception of the present government[77].

The results of our survey showed that the sources of these governance and security challenges identified in the state were as diverse as the challenges themselves are. They include weak social structure, poor family background, ignorance and illiteracy, greed and selfishness on the part of the political office holders, and limited opportunities in the state. However, it does appear that the root of the challenges is the lack of parental care and supervision[78]. Another informant blamed ignorance and illiteracy among the people for the governance deficits[79]

---

[75] Youth leader from Okofia, Ebonyi Central Senatorial zone.
[76] A Law enforcement officer (IDI) from Ebonyi Central Senatorial zone.
[77] An Enthno-political Leader from Onueke, Ebonyi Central.
[78] A community leader respondent from Afikpo.
[79] A government appointed official.

Other sources of governance challenges identified in the study include poor monthly allocation from the Federation Account, opposition party politics, lack of people-oriented policies, and docility of the common people. A youth leader from Afikpo blamed everyone:

> I accuse all and sundry as being "guilty" of causing governance challenges. While the leaders are insincere and treacherous, the followers on their part always either connive with them or remain docile even in situations that demand their speaking out[80].

Analysis of the three Focus Group Discussions revealed that some Ebonyians are of the view that bribery and corruption, poverty and unemployment and the politics of *'godfathers'* were the main sources of governance challenges facing the state. They argued that these problems all indubitably undermine meaningful development, social order and progress. In the words of one participant:

> There is widespread bribery and corruption in the state. Politicians and their godfathers have hijacked the political economy of the state, leaving behind abject poverty, unemployment, underemployment and exploitation[81]…

This viewpoint conforms to the major empirical assumption and prevailing media speculations that corruption is spreading in the country including Ebonyi state and is an obstacle to development (see Odekunle, 1991; Osoba, 1996; Dike, 1999, 2008; Erero and Oladoyin, 2000;; Otu, 2011a, 2011b, Igbo 2011, World Development Reports 2005, and USAID 2003) Moreover, the NCVS showed that respondents from Ebonyi state strongly highlighted corruption and lack of dissatisfaction in the way governments do business as big governance challenges facing the state. For instance, in 2005, 39% of the

---

[80] A youth leader (FGD) Afikpo, Ebonyi South Senatorial zone.
[81] Participant 6 from FGD in Afikpo.

respondents said they have been asked to pay a bribe by a government official for a service and in 2010, the figure rose to 46%.

A considerable proportion of respondents agreed that kidnapping, cultism, armed robbery, political thuggery, and unemployment are peculiar to all the five South-Eastern States. They also added that strikes, communal crisis, and alcoholism were more common in Ebonyi State more than any other states in Nigeria. Citing the case of alcohol abuse in Ebonyi State (particularly in Afikpo, Ebonyi South), a participant observed thus:

> A typical Afikpo man, precisely youth is an alcoholic. Afikpo in particular has won mirages of "Noble Drinking Prizes (NDP)" from the Nigerian Brewery Companies (NBC)[82].

A youth leader from Ebonyi North Senatorial district laid the blame on Local Government Councils and their Development Centres. He explained thus:

> I have told you that our community now is an urban area, very close to the State Capital, yet we don't have access roads (tarred roads). We don't have good drinking water and steady power supply. These challenges are present in all communities in Ebonyi State. However, Chairmen of most Local Government and the Development centre coordinators are doing their best to enhance healthy living conditions of the rural populace[83].

Below is a summary of the major security challenges identified by our sampled respondents as facing Ebonyi State:

---

[82] A youth (participant 2) from Afikpo during a focus group discussion.
[83] A youth leader (FGD) Ebonyi North Senatorial zone.

Table 5: **Specific security challenges and their ranking**

Security Challenges	Rating
Unemployment	1st
Cultism	2nd
Drug abuse and alcoholism	3rd
Political thuggery	4th
Armed robbery	5th
Kidnapping	6th
Communal clashes	7th
Strikes	8th
Complicity by law enforcement officers	9th

Thus, there is overwhelming negative feelings about the impact of government on the communities. However, a handful of people admitted the positive impact of government on the communities in the state. For instance, a participant in the Focus Group Discussion held in Ebonyi North explained that government has done a lot in the development of communities in the state by providing basic amenities for the people. She cited unity bridges, pilot boarding schools across the state, and modernization of agriculture as some of the evidence that the people at the grassroots are feeling the dividends of democracy.

Link between governance and security challenges in Ebonyi State
Although very few respondents believed crime is unavoidable and not dependent on government, a vast proportion of our respondents hold the view that an inseparable linkage exists between governance and security challenges in Ebonyi State. Most of our respondents shared the view that unaccountable governance breeds insecurity in the state, as many youths are unemployed, while some sections of state are aggrieved for being neglected,

marginalized and persecuted. In sum, the spate of political thuggery, kidnapping, cultism and youth restiveness, border disputes and conflicts among the various communities are typical of the security challenges, which are attributed to bad governance in Ebonyi state.

In fact, the greatest security challenge facing Ebonyi state is unemployment and its related youth restiveness. Unemployment is perceived as a consequence of bad governance. Another serious challenge facing the state and which is attributed to bad governance is the Ezza-Eziulo intractable communal clash, which has lingered on for a while. Some respondents shared the view that the conflict escalated due to government's misunderstanding and mishandling of the matter. The resurgence of violence on the 31st December 2011 is attributed to lack of transparency, justice, equity and fairness on the part of the government in settling the feud necessitating the Ezzas not only to take the government to court but to have also organized, as alleged, the reprisal attack against the Ezilos. So, the findings of this study provide empirical support for our hypothesis about the relationship between governance and security challenges.

Other challenges identified by Ebonyians include intimidation, harassment and wanton arrest and detention by the police, and armed robbery. In line with the general perception of human rights violations by the police in Nigeria, most Ebonyians are victims of these violations by the police.

Finally, the study found that government's insensitivity was considered a security challenge. Reflecting on perceived insensitivity of the government, a FGD participant in Abakaliki said:

> The current government has stopped commercial
> motorcyclist from operating on dual carriageways in
> the state capital and restricted their activities to
> daytime. The previous government did not do that.
> It is not easy to survive but what can a man do? The
> government did not make any alterative provision for
> we the motorcycle riders. The government said we

should only start operation by 6.am and end by 7.pm. people. The government of Sam Egwu didn't do this. But what can one do? [84].

Another participant in the FGD in Abakaliki said:

> …Look at how the government taskforces are pursuing artisans, seizing and destroying our goods. They have destroyed our shops alleging that they are illegal structures. No compensation for the damages unlike the previous government. The previous government believed in 'live and let live'…You can see (referring to the researcher and his assistant) what the government task force is doing to we the artisans.[85]!

Responses of the Government, the Citizens and non-State actors

The study also explored the various responses of both the past and present governments and the citizenry to the governance and security challenges identified. It is clear from our data that the past and the present governments of Ebonyi state, as well as the citizens, have not effectively responded to the challenges of governance and insecurity, even as opinions vary for the two governments. Analysis of data shows that there are those who hold the view that Dr. Sam Egwu's administration was more swift and impartial than the Elechi's administration in addressing these challenges. During Egwu's administration some recruitment into the civil service were made periodically. To address the challenge of poverty and improved literacy level of Ebonyians, free and compulsory primary and secondary education was a major educational policy thrust of the government. In this light too, school fees at the tertiary level was affordable at the state university and colleges. Some of our respondents also hold the view that the administration was more labour and-citizen-friendly. On the challenge of corruption, however, the responses of both administrations have been discouraging. As one respondent explained:

---

[84] P5 FGD from Abakaliki.

[85] P9 FGD Abakaliki

The present government's efforts to address this challenges is nothing to write home about. Corruption and sheer weakness have not allowed any of them to contribute meaningfully to the development of the small state[86].

Notable responses of the Elechi's administration to the challenges of unemployment has been his attempts to harness some of the abundant mineral deposits in the state, revitalize the Nigeria Cement Industry at Nkalagu and establish a new cement industry, and supporting mechanized farming. Similarly, the administration's policy on 'Attitudinal Change' policy was aimed at reducing the widespread bribery and corruption and soliciting commitment and dedication toward attainment to the goal, value and aspirations of the government.

Most of the respondents felt the responses of the two administrations to the challenges are unsatisfactory. For instance, the Egwu administration was in some cases ambivalent as it failed to curb violence and threat to life that was rife in the state. Some respondents alleged that the past government tacitly promoted cultism, thuggery and violence created armies of unemployed youths across the various parts of the state and did little to shore up the revenue base of the state. Governor Elechi on the other hand is said to have shunned thuggery, cultism, and violence, and has continued to preach attitudinal change as a means of addressing some of these challenges.

The study also found that it was not only the government (past and present) that has been reacting to the governance and security challenges in the state. Non-state agencies and the citizens have also been responding. Some NGOs such as the Neighbourhood Initiative for Women Advancement (NIWA), Action Aid, Participatory Development Alternative (PDA), and Civil Resource Development and Documentation Centre (CIRDDOC) have continued to assist women, men and youths in both urban and rural areas of the state.

---

[86] See a respondent from Afikpo in Ebonyi south.

Although Ebonyi State has fewer watchdog civil society-based organizations in the southeast, some NGOs and faith-based organizations (FBOs) which continue to pressure the government on governance and security issues.

For instance, the Anglican Church on 3ʳᵈ November 2011 under Evangelist Ephraim, a radical middle age Anglican priest, led thousands of people on a protest march for good governance in Abaliki, the state capital. Similar protests have been organized by the various groups across the state. For example, on the 4ᵗʰ of November 2011 the Nigeria Labour Congress and Trade Union Congress of Nigeria in the state chapters called for the sacking of the State Chairman of the Universal Education Board for suspending payment of salaries of teachers that were on strike. In addition, on the 17ᵗʰ Feb. 2012, a group of men, women and young adults gathered at the Government House to register their displeasure at the plan of the state government to relocate the popular Abakaliki Rice Mill from its present central location to a remote location. All these happened against the perceived high handedness of the Elechi administration.

> There is also a general perception that the traditional and communal cherished value of 'brotherhood' and the '*onye aghala nwa nne ya'* spirit which historically helped to sustain the people have been eroded in recent past. Nevertheless, there is evidence of that vestiges of this cherished value still survive. For instance, we found age grades system, organized unions and associations focusing on either life –supporting facilities or assisting the law enforcement agencies in providing security for their members by organising themselves into vigilante group. The birth of Police-Community Relation Committee has strengthened the function of these vigilante groups. One of the respondents explained 'their co-operation across the state has made governance easy because security threat in the state and my Local Government Areas has been reduced in recent time'[87].

---

[87] A community leader from Ozizza, Afikpo Ebonyi South.

Unfortunately, despite the ubiquity of these vigilantes in the state, here is no law regulating their activities. We found that even when the State Ministry of Justice drafted the law, which was subsequently passed by the State House of Assembly, Governor Egwu withheld assent due to vested political interests.[88].

Civil society groups such as the Christian Association of Nigeria (CAN), Traditional Council of Elders, town unions and Ebonyi Founding Fathers have continued to intervene in critical issues affecting the state. For instance, according to a leader of the Methodist Church, CAN strike on the minimum wage. During the strike by the Southeast Academic Staff Union of Nigerian Universities (ASUU) several groups mentioned above intervened to bring a resolution to the industrial dispute. The citizens, through the vigilante model, have also continued to assist the government in providing security of life and property in their various areas of domicile. A participant in the FGDs conducted among the unemployed urban youths in Ebonyi South said that:

> Much has been done in this regard. We have age grades, youth organisations, and town unions, and they have played vital roles in carrying out some of the social and security functions the government have failed to perform for the people.[89]

It is in this regard that a FGD participant in Afikpo explained how the youths in Afikpo contributed in tackling the recurring armed robbery incidents in Afikpo in 2010:

> 2010 witnessed many bank robbery incidents that claimed many lives and property in Afikpo. However, the youth and vigilante groups, in collaboration with the Police, were able to rescue the situation[90].

---

[88] Interview with the Perm Sec. and a Director, Ministry of Justice, Abakalik 16th Feb, 2012.
[89] Participant 8 of the FGD, Afikpo.
[90] Participant 6 FGD, Afikpo.

In a related manner, in most part of the state, the citizens (or locals as it were) have continued to engage in several traditional ways of conflict management and resolution and also provide vital information to security agencies in their localities. In Afikpo area for instance, the 'Etos' and 'Essas age grades have settled many intra and inter familial and community disputes. . In Onueke, Ebonyi Central, a respondent said, the "council of elders, youth groups and certain age grades have contributed immensely to the maintenance of peace and security in my community; they settle conflict and forestall security threat[91]".

The downside of some non-state responses is that they sometimes undermine public security. For instance, some of the vigilantes groups trample on rights of the citizenry. An academic whose view reflected those who think that these non-state and the mechanisms of their responses may have impacted negatively on governance and security in the state said:

> I don't think vigilante per se has negative impacts on governance and security in the state, but their mechanisms appear so because most vigilante members do threaten or victimized their perceived enemies in the course of their duty. In places like village, vigilante members are sometimes jealous of some successful young men and have used the umbrella to harass and intimidate them even when they have helped a lot. Past records show that much of their efforts are geared towards ensuring peace and security in the various communities. However, recent politicization of all aspects of the people's life and its attendant consequences has directly or indirectly cast doubt on the integrity and justification of these institutions.[92]

Roles and challenges of Town Unions
Historically, town unions played a significant role in ensuring good governance. Town unions are avenues for ensuring mutual aid and leadership, providing for common welfare, security, credit, and, more importantly, offering a basis

---

[91] Participant 10 FGD, Onueke.
[92] A academic from Ebonyi State University.

for links with the rural areas. In Ebonyi State, some of the historical and contemporary role of town unions and community development associations in the process of governance include embarking on self-help projects like construction of roads and culverts, building of health centres, schools, and civic centres, and helping to guard and to watch over the communities. Town unions also remain a powerful means by which some government programmes and policies are communicated to the people at the grassroots. The existence of town unions can therefore be harnessed to facilitate free flow of information between the governors and the governed.

Although town unions occupy strategic place in the entire governance process, they are nevertheless faced with daunting challenges. The problem of inadequate funds and the inability to afford counterpart funds in order to access and attract development projects to their respective communities are serious challenges. Interference by politicians- as some of these town union leaders simply become political tools in the hand of the politicians- personal interest, overzealousness of the leaders, and massive corruption and embezzlement of union's meagre resources are additional challenges facing these unions.

The corruption and manipulation of these town unions by the politicians has eroded the trust and confidence that is reposed in them. Consequently, people are reluctant to make contributions to or to be identified with these town unions. Presently, there is hardly any town union that gives educational assistance or scholarship to indigent students of their communities as obtained between the 1930s and early 1970s.[93]   Among the challenges identified are leadership tussle and lack of effective frameworks supporting the unions. However, these challenges are not insurmountable. Suggested solutions include election of persons with integrity, insulation of unions from external influences and development of viable funding arrangements.

---

[93] Interview with an academician from Abakaliki urban, Ebonyi North.

4.5   Conclusions and recommendations

The study was aimed at appraising the governance and security challenges in Ebonyi State. To this end, we raised several research questions as guides to probe and provide answers to the important issues connected to governance and security challenges. This section provides the conclusions and recommendations of the study.

The study revealed that that there is a strong interconnection between governance and security in Ebonyi State. Governance defines the direction of security so that the apparent high level of insecurity in the state is traceable to bad, unaccountable governance. Poor revenue base, incessant strikes, bribery and corruption, cultism, political thuggery and assassinations, kidnapping, drug and alcohol abuse, unemployment and youth restiveness, and communal classes, are major indices of poor governance and they therefore, represent both governance and security challenges confronting Ebonyi State.

These challenges are not new and both the governments and citizens have continued to respond to them in different ways. The Egwu and Elechi administrations have been extolled for promoting good governance and addressing the numerous challenges facing the state.

However, the governments were also criticized for policy failures and for insensitivity. For instance, while the government of Dr. Sam Egwu (1999-2007) is reputed to have done well in providing the dividends of democracy to the grassroots, it was criticized for its inability to tackle the numerous security challenges at the time. During this period, the state university became the haven for cultism and other social malfeasances as cult clashes and killings were the order of the day.

The present Martin Elechi administration is reputed to have done better in the area of security than the past administration, though there appears to be more intense and frequent border conflicts across the state. It appears that while conventional social vices (cultism, thuggery, assassination, robbery, and intimidation) have reduced, communal and border conflicts have new sources of headaches to the state. There is also widespread unemployment, in addition

to what is generally perceived as several unfriendly-peoples' policies leading to more miseries. For instance, the present administration has implemented policies such as scrapping free primary and secondary education, banning of 'okada' in major streets of the capital, demolishing kiosks, stores and joints in major part of the capital, banning operations of artisans and informal traders by road side. The administration was only stopped from closing the state university due to funding constraints by the outcry of the people. Recently, the state lost her prized university teaching hospital, which the governor first crippled before inviting the Federal government to take it over under the newly established Federal University. The impact of this misguided policy is far than imagined when it is appreciated that Ebonyi state remains the least educational advantage state in the whole of Southeast of Nigeria. According to report, by the time the state teaching hospital was established in 2000, there were only one consultant and very few qualified medical doctors from the entire Abakaliki zone in the hospital. However, by 2007, the figures had rose to about 5 consultants and quite a number of qualified doctors.

The study showed that non-state actors such as town unions play important roles in governance and security in Ebonyi State. These roles include mobilizing, forming, organizing, coordinating and directing young men into vigilante groups for security purposes, and direct participation in community development projects as well as acting as check and balance to political leaders. However, the unions face numerous challenges, notably, government interference, lack of funds, embezzlement, politicisation and leadership crisis, Against this background, it is necessary to make the following recommendations towards improving governance and security in the state:

- There is the need for the government of Ebonyi state to improve transparency and accountability in governance processes by engaging the people in decision-making process. One sure strategic approach of doing this is to create a periodic interactive forum where critical stakeholders such as FBOs, NGOs, CBOs, academia, traditional rulers, town union leaders, NLC, TUC, artisans, women associations, market/ traders association can key in into priority issues that need urgent government attention. Here lies the importance of 'town hall meetings'

which were embarked upon by the past administration, and which has received the blessing of the present administration. In this institutional arrangement, important government policy documents (budgets), bills, and programmes should be made available and properly analysed and explained to the people. However, the current arrangement whereby the forum is centralized in the state capital with selected invitees needs to be restructured to spread to local government areas. The entrenchment of transparency and accountability would require the domestication of the Freedom of Information Act in the state.

- There is need for a forum that will specifically address the numerous insecurity challenges in the state through conducting action research on insecurity generally and the specific pattern of policing in the state. Action research rather than commission of inquiry or probe will uncover the structural and institutional defaults that have continued to engender crisis and wanton abuse of the rights of Ebonyians by the Nigeria Police Force. Discussion of the result of the study in a security summit by key stakeholders in government, security, politics, religion, economy, civil society sector, should culminate in the adoption and implementation of the 'Ebonyi Declaration on Security' by all the component units of the state.

- Ebonyi state is not only largely rural but also populated by many community development associations, town unions and other forms of culture-based unions established to promote development and enhance governance and security in their respective communities. Given these existing structures, it is pertinent that the state government should promote and mainstream rights based approach to community development in the state as an alternative to the self-help approach. This is because the self-help approach has encouraged the state government to abdicate its responsibilities of providing basic amenities. The present partnership between the Ebonyi State Social and Community Development (EBCSD) and various town unions and community development associations across the state for development

of basic infrastructural facilities should be strengthened and based on the rights principle.

- The state government should take steps to address the economic backwardness of the state. To this end, government must, as a strategic approach, promote mainstreaming of right-based approach to economic growth and development. This right based approach is all about promoting an economic-friendly environment for investors to help shore the financial base of the state and provide the much needed employment opportunities for the teeming unemployed Ebonyians.

- The state government should consciously re-enact the importance of the town unions and reposition them for better service delivery in enhancing governance process and promoting security. To this end, it is important that the leadership of these town unions should be strengthened. As finance is a major challenge facing town   unions in the state, contributions from public-spirited and rich members of the community is one sure way of re-empowering and repositioning these town unions to deliver on their mandates. Most town unions have income-generating projects like civic centre, lock-up stores, and transportation system. Institutionalizing accountability in the town unions will definitely build the trust and confidence, which will motivate people to make more contributions to the union's projects. However, in an era of increasing public and private partnership, it is suggested that government's financial assistance to town unions would go a long way in helping these town unions overcome their funding challenges. One way to support the unions is to replace the counterpart funding arrangement, which is based on the self-help model of development with whole grants based on rights model of development.

References

Adelugba, D and Ogo Ujomu, P (2008). *Rethinking Security in Nigeria : Conceptual Issues in the Quest for Social Order and National Integration*, Dakar: CODESRIA

Broidy L. (2001), "A Test of General Strain Theory". *Criminology,* 39: 9-36.

Erero, John and Oladoyin Tony. (2000). "Tackling Corruption in Nigeria", in Kempe Ronald Hope and Burnwell Chikulo (eds.) *Corruption and Development in Africa. Lessons from Country Studies.* N.Y.: Palgrave.

Eso, H. (2009). Incessant Kidnappings and the Beirutization of Nigeria, Kwenu.Com, Sunday 4 January 2009 and posted in http:/www.kwenu.com/ publications/hankeso/2009 incessant_kidnappings_beirutization_nigeria.htm. Accessed16/August, 2010.

Dike, V. E. (2008). "Corruption in Nigeria: A New Paradigm for Effective Control"www.AfricaEconomicAnalysis.org, uploaded 1/23/2008, accessed on 12th Sept.   2011.

Dike, V. E. (1999), *The philosophy of Transforming Nigeria into a Corruption-free Society: Are the probes the Solution? Online Publication*: Nigeriaworld.com/feature/ article/corruption.html, (accessed on 10th October 2011.

Igbo, E.U.M. (2011). "Corruption in Nigeria: Patterns and Trends", in E.O Alemika, and I.C. Chukwuma, (eds.), *Crime Victimization, Safety and Policing in Nigeria,*Lagos: Malthouse Press, pp101-128.

Meagher, K. (2010). 'Networking for Success: Informal Enterprise and Popular Associations in Nigeria', in B. Harriss-White and J. Heyer(eds.) *The comparative political economy of development: Africa and south Asia.* Oxford: Routledge, pp. 158-178.

Nnamani, K. (2010). 'Prospects for Nigeria's Political Stability and Sustainable Democratic Governance in the Unfolding International System', Being a Paper Delivered at the 3-day International Conference on "Political Stability and Democratic Imperatives in a Dynamic Environment" Organised by the National Institute for Policy and Strategic Studies, (NIPSS), Kuru, at Abuja on April 12th-14th 2010.

Nwaka, G. (2008). Tradition as a Modern Strategy: Indigenous Knowledge, Local Governance and National Development in Nigeria. Being a paper

presented at Eighth *International Conference on Diversity Organisations, Communities and Nations*, Montreal, Canada http://d08.cgpublisher.com/proposals/204/index_html#author-0.Accessed 26/052011.

Nwolise, O.B (2010). 'Global Peace and Security: Challenges for Emerging Democracies'. Being a Paper Delivered at the 3-day International Conference on "Political Stability and Democratic Imperatives in a Dynamic Environment" Organised by the National Institute for Policy and Strategic Studies, (NIPSS), Kuru, Held at Abuja, April 12th-14th 2010.

National Bureau of Statistics, 2005, http://www.nigerianstat.gov.ng/nbsapps/Connections/trade_statistics/CommodityData_1996-2005.pdf.gz

Odekunle, F. (1991). "Illustrations of Types, Patterns and Avenues of Corruption in Nigeria" in P. B. Ajibola, (ed.). *Perspectives on Corruption and other Economic crimes in Nigeria. Lagos:* The Federal Ministry of Justice,

Ogundiya, I, S. (2010), 'Democracy and Good Governance: Nigeria's Dilemma', *African Journal of Political Science and International Relations,* Vol. 4(6), pp. 201-208.

Okafor, S. & R. Honey (1998). 'The Nature of Hometown Voluntary Associations in Nigeria' .in R. Honey & S. Okafor (eds.), *Hometown Associations: Indigenous Knowledge and Development in Nigeria*, London: Intermediate Technology Publications, pp. 9-16.

Olowu, D. & J. Erero, (1996). 'Governance of Nigeria's Villages and Cities through Indigenous Institutions', *African Rural and Urban Studies*, 3: 99-121.

Osoba, S, O. (1996), "Corruption in Nigeria: Historical Perspective"*, Review of African Political Economy*, No.69; 371-86.

Otu, S. E. (2009). *The Sociology of Drug Trafficking and Drug Trafficker. A Perspective from South Africa,* Koln: Lambert Academic Publishing Ag & Co. KG.

Otu, S. E. (2003), "Armed Robbery and Armed Robbers in Contemporary Nigeria. A Criminological Analysis", Unpublished D.Litt. & Phil. Thesis, *Department of Criminology, University of South Africa*, Pretoria.

Otu, S. E. (2011a) *Corruption and Corrupt Nation: The Nigerian Experience*, (In Press)

Otu, S.E. (2011b) *Corruption and Corrupt Practices in Nigeria: Theoretical and Empirical Issues* (In Press).

Rist, R. (1977). "On the Relations Among Education Research Paradigms: From Disdain to Dente". *Anthropology and Education*, 8: 42-50.

USAID. (2003), *Democracy and Governance. African Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption, http://www.uneca.org/eca_resources/Publications/books/agr2/Chapter07.pdf*.

World Development Report Newsletter 2005. *Crime and Development in Africa.* http://www.unodc.org Accessed 16th July, 2011.

Internet resources.
http:www//.population.gov.ng. Accessed 20th October 2011.

http://www.onlinenigeria.com/links/ebonyiadv.asp Accessed .20th October 2011.

http://www.igbofocus.com/html/ebonyi_state.html Accessed 21st October 2011.

(http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Igbo_people).

CHAPTER FIVE

Governance and Security in Enugu State
By
Nkwachukwu Orji

5.1   Introduction

Governance can be defined as the act of governing. It depicts the process of overseeing the responsible, legal, ethical, transparent and effective achievement of national or organizational goals. To distinguish the term *governance* from *government*; "governance" can be said to be what *a* "government" does. Governments are expected to provide basic public goods including the provision of public infrastructure and protection of lives and properties of the individuals residing in their territory. This implies that security is a major public good that governments must deliver. As such the provision of security has become a key benchmark for measuring government performance. State analysts use concepts (such as "strong", "weak", "failed", "collapsed" state) to rate the capacity of a state to secure its citizens against physical danger, social disempowerment, economic impoverishment, and other threats to their wellbeing (Linz 1978, Skocpol 1985, Rotberg 2003).

In Nigeria, provision of security has been a major challenge to governments at local, state and federal levels (Marenin 1987, Ekpenyong 1989, Marenin and Reisig 1995, Agbola 1997, Otu 2003). On daily basis, Nigerians confront various forms of security challenges, ranging from domestic violence and sexual offences to armed robbery, kidnapping and murder. In South East Nigeria[94] in particular, the spate of kidnappings and high profile armed robberies has become a major threat to the livelihood and wellbeing of the people (Otu 2003). In many instances, criminal gangs have stalled social and economic activities as they raided homes, markets, banks, churches and social events such as burial and marriage ceremonies. Since Nigeria's return to civil rule in May 1999, the security situation in the South East zone has become deplorable,

---

[94] Five states make up the South East zone, namely: Abia, Anambra, Ebonyi, Enugu and Imo states.

defying efforts by state agencies to arrest the situation. The failure of formal state security agencies to contain insecurity in the South East zone has forced inhabitants of the region to seek alternative measures such as privatization and communalization of security.

In Enugu State for example, the search for alternative crime prevention mechanisms led to the re-emergence and gradual takeover of security in most parts of the state by vigilante groups. Although vigilantism has been a long-standing method of crime prevention in many parts of Enugu State, its re-emergence was accompanied by new challenges like the egregious violation of human rights by members of the vigilante groups. The nefarious activities of the vigilante groups prompted Enugu State government to initiate reforms in the operations of community-based security groups. The reforms contained in *Enugu State Neighbourhood Association and Watch Groups Law of March 2006* requires vigilante groups in Enugu State to register with Enugu State Neighbourhood Association Board. Under the new law, former vigilante groups that met the new conditions for operating security outfits were officially allowed to operate as Neighbourhood Watch Associations. Alongside communalization of security residents of Enugu State, many wealthy individuals in the state have also privatized security by procuring sophisticated security gadgets and hiring private guards to protect them and secure their homes.

Although the strategy of privatization and communalization of security has paid off in many communities in Enugu State, yet it questions the capacity of the government to govern effectively. In a bid to prop up its capacity to secure residents of the state, the Enugu State government engaged a Special Anti-Robbery Squad (SARS) to help arrest insecurity in the state. SARS has been widely commended for the bold manner it has confronted criminals in the state. However, the presence of SARS has further compounded the security situation in the state. There are allegations of brazen violation of human rights by members of SARS, especially with regards to harassment, torture and unlawful detention of suspected offenders, and extra-judicial killings.

Although the problem of insecurity in Nigeria has dominated public discourse, the subject has not attracted sufficient academic attention. Just to illustrate,

only a few studies have examined the regional, state and local dimensions of insecurity in Nigeria (Ukiwo 2002, Harnischfeger 2003, Nolte 2004, 2007, Smith 2004, Casey 2007, Higazi 2008, Fourchard 2008, Last 2008). The security situation in the South East Nigeria, in particular, is even more under-studied. To worsen matters, the few existing analyses of security in South East Nigeria have a very limited focus. Studies in this area have concentrated overwhelmingly on the case of the Bakassi Boys, attempting to understand the phenomena of vigilantism in the South East zone (Baker 2002, Ukiwo 2002, Harnischfeger 2003, Smith 2004, and Meagher 2007). No recent analysis of the overall trends and transformations of security issues in the South East region have been conducted. Even rarer are analyses that attempt to connect the issues of security and governance. The gaps in the study of security in the South East region is further demonstrated by the absence of studies that are based on field research as well as those with comparative perspective. This has denied scholars, security agencies and policy makers the benefits they could have drawn from such empirical and comparative analyses.

Against this background, this study will investigate the relationship between governance and security in the South East, focusing on Enugu State. It argues that the failure of the government to grapple with the challenge of insecurity in the state has contributed to the privatization and communalization of security. The study will examine the security situation in Enugu State since 1999, and explore the key drivers of insecurity in the state. It will analyse the responses of successive governments, the citizens as well as various citizens groups to insecurity in Enugu State. The historical and contemporary roles of non-state actors like town unions in governance and security of the state will also be examined. Finally, the study will suggest ways through which security challenges in Enugu State could be addressed.

The rest of this chapter will be divided into four sections. The first will provide contextual information about Enugu State, including historical and contemporary developments, which have implications for governance and security in the state. The second section will outline the methodological foundation of the study. The section will discuss the methods of data collection

and analysis as well as scope and limitations of the study. The third section will discuss the study's major findings, while the fourth section will run through the study's conclusion and recommendations.

5.2   Background information on Enugu State

This section will provide contextual information about Enugu State, which has implications for governance and security in the state. The section will discuss the evolution and geo-political structure of Enugu State, the state's governance system, its cultural and demographic patterns as well as the occupational pattern of the residents of the state and the state's fiscal system.

Evolution and structure of the state

Enugu State was carved out of the old Anambra State on 27 August 1991. The state derives its name from its capital city, Enugu. Enugu city is one of the oldest urban centres in the Igbo speaking area of South-East Nigeria. In fact by 1917, Enugu had acquired township status and foreign businesses such as John Holt, Kingsway Store, United Bank of West Africa, and United Africa Company had established offices in Enugu. Enugu owes its geo-political and economic significance to the discovery of coal in the area in 1909. The discovery of coal in Enugu contributed to the emergence of a permanent cosmopolitan settlement that subsequently influenced the location of the administrative headquarters of the former Eastern Region in the city. The situating of the capital of the former Eastern Region at Enugu gave the city the status of the regional administrative, industrial and business hub, making Enugu the political capital and rallying point of the Igbo people. Since then, Enugu has been the capital of East-Central, Anambra and Enugu states[95].

Enugu State is divided into three senatorial zones and seventeen administrative areas known as Local Government Areas (LGAs), six of which are largely urban (these include: Enugu East, Enugu North, Enugu South, Nsukka, Oji

---

[95] East-Central State was carved out of Eastern Region in 1967 with Enugu as the capital. In 1976, East-Central was divided into Anambra and Imo states, Enugu became the capital of Anambra State. When Enugu State was carved out of Anambra State in 1991, Enugu retained its status as the capital of Enugu State.

River and Udi LGAs). The senatorial zones and the local government areas that constitute them are listed below.

Map of Enugu State

S/N	Senatorial Zones and Local Government Areas in Enugu State
	Enugu East Senatorial Zone
1	Enugu East
2	Enugu North
3	Enugu South
4	Nkanu East
5	Nkanu West
6	Isi Uzo
	Enugu West Senatorial Zone
7	Aninri
8	Awgu
9	Ezeagu
10	Oji River
11	Udi
	Enugu North Senatorial Zone
12	Nsukka
13	Igbo Eze North
14	Igbo Eze South
15	Igbo Etiti
16	Udenu
17	Uzo Uwani

Governance system

The chief executive officer of Enugu State is the Governor, who is assisted by the Deputy Governor, the Secretary to the State Government, Commissioners, Special Advisers, and Special Assistants. The Governor, her/his Deputy, the Secretary to the State Government, and Commissioners make up the State Executive Council, which is the supreme governing (executive)

body of the state. The Governor is the chief security officer of the state – this means that she/he is responsible for maintenance of security in the state. To discharge this responsibility, the Governor, like other governors in Nigeria, maintains an increasingly notorious fund known as "security vote". Security vote represents huge sums of money budgeted by the state government for enhancing state security. In recent times, the administration and control of security vote in Nigeria have been mired by allegations of corruption (Egbo et. al. 2010). The main law-making body in the state is Enugu State House of Assembly, headed by a Speaker. The House of Assembly also has the responsibility of overseeing the governance of Enugu State, including the provision of security. Enugu State House of Assembly is organized into House Committees, including the one on Youth, Sports & Security that oversees security issues in the state.

An Executive Chairperson, assisted by a Deputy Chairperson and several Supervisory Councillors, heads the governance system at the local government area level. Like the Governor, local government chairpersons are the chief security officers of their areas, making them to be responsible for the maintenance of security in their localities. Most local government councils operate a security committee chaired by the chairperson and having as members, stakeholders in the security of the particular locality. Members of local government security committee usually include representatives of security agencies operating in the local government area, selected traditional rulers, representatives of core groups such as market traders associations, and representative of the local government legislative council. The local government legislative council is the legislative arm of the local governments and it is constituted by councillors who represent the various wards in the local government area. Wards are composed of a number of communities.

Some communities in Enugu State are governed by a system of gerontocracy in which council of elders forms the government. One of the members of the Council of Elders, usually the oldest, is designated the Community Head, Chief, or Traditional Ruler. The Traditional Ruler works with a cabinet of holders of different titles in the community as well as ordinary members of the community who represent their respective villages. Other communities

select their Chiefs or Traditional Rulers through election usually in accordance with their constitution. Most communities in Enugu State have Town Unions (also known as Community Development Association). These Unions or Associations are often headed by a President. The Town Union President works with a team consisting executive committee members who are usually selected through election. Town Unions spearhead development activities in the communities and help disseminate the state government's programmes. They serve more like the executive arm of government at the community level, the Council of Elders/Chiefs acts like the law making organ while the Traditional Ruler functions like a ceremonial president. The engine of the traditional political system in most communities in Enugu State is the first sons ('*Okpala*'), who are usually the head of various families in the community. The '*Okpala*' usually holds the symbol of political and religious authority in the families called '*Ofo*'. In some parts of the state, the age-grades, women groups (like the *Umuada*), masquerade societies and titled societies ('*Nze na Ozo*') compliment the community government, performing security and law enforcement roles.

People and population
Enugu State is predominantly inhabited by the Igbo speaking people of Nigeria. There are a few other language groups that can be found in the state such as the Igala and Idoma especially among communities in the northern part of the state that are bordered by communities in Kogi and Benue states. Enugu State can be divided into two cultural zones based on local dialectical and choreographic patterns, namely the Enugu and Nsukka zones. Despite the cultural divergences mentioned above, there are several cultural features that are common to all parts of the state, namely, the family as the basic social unit, the belief system, and the system of political organization. One of the interesting features of Enugu State is its cultural dynamism. Two important traditional festivals are observed every year: the Masquerade and the New Yam festivals. Masquerade societies are very important institution in Enugu State. In Enugu cultural zone, there are masquerades such as *Mmanwu*, *Ekpe*, *Omaba* and *Odo*, while the *Omaba* and *Odo* are popular in Nsukka cultural zone. In Enugu State, the New Yam festival is known by various names such

as *Joku*, *Ihejoku* or *Njoku Ji*. The festival marks the end of the farming season and ushers in the harvest and consumption of the new yam. There are also some specialized festivals such as the '*Hutara*' festival, which serves as a forum for bringing maidens to the marriage market.

Enugu State has a population of about 3.3 million with an annual growth rate of 3.18 % based on the 2006 National Census. The details of the 2006 Census Report on the State are shown in the table below.

2006 Census Figures Enugu State			
	Male	**Female**	**Total**
Figure	1,596,042	1,671,795	3,267,837
Approximation	1.6 million	1.7 million	3.3 million
Annual Growth Rate (Exponential) = 3.18 % Sex Ratio (Number of males per 100 females in the population) is approximately 95			

S/N	Age Group in Years	Description	No of Males	No of Females	Total	% of Total Population
1	0 – 5	Infant	233,156	228,929	462,085	14.14
2	6 - 11	Primary school age	239,328	227,374	466,702	14.28
3	18 – 64	Labour force	810,854	915,011	1,725,867	52.81
4	65 & above	Old age	81,523	65,149	146,672	4.49
5	0 – 14	Dependent	668,493	571,255	1,239,748	37.94

Source: National Population and Housing Census, 2006

The data in the table above indicate that majority (52.81 %) of the people in Enugu State are within the working age. This population structure presents great opportunities for the state. If well managed, Enugu State possesses sufficient human capital that could transform the state. However, there are doubts whether the human resources of the state are well utilized judging from the distribution of working population by activity. The 2006 Social Statistics of the National Bureau of Statistics indicates that 68 percent of the workforce in Enugu State is engaged in Agriculture and Trade, leaving the other sectors of the economy including manufacturing and services with 32 percent of the working population. There is a need to diversify Enugu State's economy and to create more jobs in the manufacturing and services sector in order to engage the teeming educated youths in the state.

Occupational pattern
As was indicated above, agriculture, particularly subsistence agriculture, is the most widespread economic activity in Enugu State. The people of the state practice diverse forms of agriculture. Agriculture on the plateau is based on the extensive cultivation of the conventional staples of yam, cassava, maize, sweet potato, grain legumes, pawpaw, banana, plantain and vegetables. The people also engage in the production of local economic tree crops like oil palm, cashew, kola nut, coconut, mangoes, breadfruit (*Ukwa*), castor beans, and oil-beans. Most of these tree crops are located on the compound land farm plots. Terrace farming is also important in the state, especially in areas with hill slopes such as Nsukka, Lejja, Udi and Mmaku. Livestock production is also a central agricultural activity of the people of Enugu State. Floodplain agriculture is practised in parts of the Niger-Anambra plains especially at Adani and Ornor. It is based on comparatively large-scale cultivation of rice and yam, and fish farming.

A substantial number of migrant farmers from the densely settled neighbouring communities such as Awka, Orlu, Owerri, Okigwe, eastern Onitsha, Abak, Ikot Ekpene and Uyo, have moved into the plains to join in exploiting the vast agricultural potentialities of the flood lands. A number of agricultural enterprises have been established to tap the agricultural potentialities. They

include the Ada Rice Production (Nigeria) Ltd. and the Enugu State River Project, which are public production projects, located at Adani in Uzo Uwani Local government Area. Others are the United Palm Produce Ltd at Ibite-Olo, Ugwuoba and Inyi, and the Premier Cashew Industry Ltd at Oghe. There is also a Palm Development Agency for tapping the vast resources of the natural palm and developing the oil palm sector generally. There are livestock and poultry facilities at the University of Nigeria, Nsukka Campus. There also significant private enterprise participation in the Agricultural sector in Enugu State. For example, the Ekene Dili Chukwu, Chidi Ebere and Umeano rice, maize and cassava farms in Adani area are large-scale privately owned agricultural enterprises.

The people of Enugu State also engage in several traditional industries such as wood carving, especially prominent at Oji River, Awgu and Nkanu; blacksmithing at Ezza, Ogbodu Aba, Lejja, Nsukka, Amaokwe and Umana, and pottery at Achi, Opi, Inyi and Ngwo. Other traditional industries are basket and mat making at Awgu, Nenwe and Oduma, and cloth weaving and dyeing based on the local cotton and traditional colouring materials such as *ufie* and *odo*. The latter activity is common among the women.

Although opportunities are lean in modern industries, yet Enugu State residents are engaged by a number of modern industries located mainly at Emene, a suburban community in Enugu, and Coal Camp within the city centre. Emene hosts key industries, including ANAMMCO (a motor assembly plant for Mercedes Benz trucks), Emenite (which manufactures building materials), and Nigergas (which produces industrial gas). There are also INNOSON Plastics, Sunrise Flour Mills, Niger Steel, and Eastern Plastics Limited. The Coal Camp industrial area harbours small and medium size enterprises. Industries in other parts of the state include Nigeria Breweries Plant at Ninth Mile Corner - Ngwo, Vanguard Industries and the Nigerian Construction and Furniture Company (NCFC), which undertake construction and also produce furniture. The general economic recession in the country has, however, adversely affected the fortunes of most of the industries. Most of them are running below installed capacity.

Enugu State has a vibrant banking and finance industry, which has become a major source of employment in the formal sector of the state. This is demonstrated by the presence of large number of banks and other financial institutions in the state. In terms of commerce, Enugu State is also notable. The main commercial centre in Enugu State is the Ogbette main market at the centre of Enugu city. Enugu State also hosts several educational institutions where large number of people work as both academic and non-academic staff. These institutions include the premier indigenous university in Nigeria - University of Nigeria with campuses at Nsukka and Enugu. There is also the Enugu State University of Science and Technology, several privately owned universities (such as Caritas University), polytechnics (such as the Institute of Management and Technology), monotechnics (like Federal College of Education, Eha-Amufu), and special schools (such as Police College and School of Health Technology at Oji River). The state has many public and privately owned primary and secondary schools in Enugu State.

Selected Social Statistics for Enugu State

Education	Primary school enrolment	377, 797
	Secondary school enrolment	159,482
	No. of Primary School Teachers	16,208
	No. of Secondary School Teachers (2005)	3,437
Health	Number of registered doctors	67
	Number of registered nurses	824
	Total health facility (2004)	716
	Ratio of population per Health facility (2004)	4,348
Unemployment	Rate of unemployment 5-24 years (2005)	31.8
	Rate of unemployment 15 years + (2005)	9.6
	Rate of underemployment 15 years + (2005)	28.5

Poverty profile	Core poor (2010)	49.4
	Moderate poor (2010)	42.2
	Non poor (2010)	8.4
Security	Number of policemen (2007)	8,939
	Number of police stations (2007)	21
	Number of police posts (2007)	50
	Reported armed robbery (2006)	44
	Prison inmate	1,560
	Prison capacity	1,394

*All figures are for 2008, unless otherwise stated.
Source: National Bureau of Statistics 2009, 2010

Revenue generation
Despite the existence of a variety of economic activities in Enugu State, the state does not generate enough internal revenue. Over the years, Enugu State has relied heavily on revenues from the Federation Accounts and Value Added Tax (VAT). In *Enugu State Vision 4:2020 Medium Term Implementation Plan (ENVMTIP) 2010 – 2013*, the state's government identified its narrow revenue base as an impediment to effective governance and rapid development of the state. In the document, Enugu State government maintained that 'it needs to urgently expand economic activities that will generate employment and increase internally generated revenue within the plan period'. In fact, one of the key goals of the state's Vision 2020 is to improve internally generated revenue by at least 50 percent, while another is to develop a robust industrial sector that will attract local and foreign investments. During the plan period, the state government plans to reduce dependence on Federation Account by improving on collection and management of internally generated revenue as one of the strategies to reduce the funding gap. The state government also plans to make sure that more development projects are funded through Private-Public Partnership and Donor Partnership arrangements. It appears the vision of Enugu State government regarding revenue generation is beginning to manifest.

Data from the office of Enugu State Accountant General on the state government's Revenue Inflow (2003 – 2009) indicate steady increase in the share of internally generated revenue in the state government's revenue profile. In the table below, internally generated revenue has increased from 9.68 percent of the total state government revenue in 2003 to 13.94 percent in 2009. The table indicates that the overall revenue of Enugu State government has doubled between 2003 and 2009. An analysis of the revenue profile of Enugu State is pertinent as it highlights the fiscal capacity of the state's government to tackle the myriad of governance and developmental challenges that confront the state, including job creation and provision of security.

Enugu State Revenue Inflow (2003 – 2009)

Year	FAC	%	VAT	%	IGR	%	Total	Growth/ Decline
2003	9,296,992, 059.00	76.78	1,639,582, 103,00	13.54	1,172,351, 798.00	9.68	12,108,925, 960.00	
2004	14,841,256, 641.00	81.89	1,950,932, 942.00	10.77	1,330,036, 125.00	7.34	18,122,225, 708.00	33.2
2005	15,822,061, 759.00	79.46	2,296,575, 310.00	11.54	1,792,450, 029.00	9.00	19,911,087 ,098.00	9.0
2006	16,653,544, 243.00	74.85	2,908,693, 155.00	13.07	2,688,724, 242.00	12.08	22,250,961, 640.00	10.5
2007	19,487,665, 812.00	77.69	3,622,529, 824.00	14.44	1,974,083, 742.00	7.87	25,084,279, 378.00	11.3
2008	22,750,610, 199.00	59.34	4,694,229, 935.00	12.24	10,898,996, 799.00	28.42	38,343,836, 933.00	34.6
2009	20,910,352, 984.45	45.29	5,063,671, 513.47	16.78	4,207,209, 505.29	13.94	30,181,234, 003.21	(21.3)
Total	119,762,483, 697.45		22,176,214, 782.47		24,063,852, 240.29		166,002,550, 720.21	

Source: Office of Accountant General, Enugu State

5.3　　Research Methodology

This study involved intensive and detailed collection of data from three purposively selected local government areas (LGAs) in Enugu State. These local government areas are Awgu, Enugu North and Nsukka. The three local government areas were selected to ensure that the study is well spread culturally and geographically. We ensured that the three local governments were selected from the three senatorial zones in the state (Awgu LGA for Enugu West Senatorial zone, Enugu North LGA for Enugu East Senatorial zone, and Nsukka LGA for Enugu North Senatorial zone). In each Local Government Area, we ensured that the views of residents of urban and rural communities were represented. To this end, we randomly selected one rural community in each LGA and juxtaposed them with the urban areas in the LGAs (the rural and urban communities are Mgbowo and Awgu Town, Ngwo and Enugu Urban, and Ibeagwa-Ani and Nsukka Urban, in Awgu LGA, Enugu North LGA and Nsukka LGA, respectively).

Our data collection method was five-fold. The first was based on tape-recorded in-depth semi-structured interviews conducted between August and October 2011 with politicians, academics, senior public servants, traditional rulers, religious leaders, leaders and officials of Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), and community leaders including heads of town unions, youth leaders, and women leaders. The interview respondents were purposively selected based on two criteria: the relevance of a respondent's official position vis-à-vis issues of governance and security, and a respondent's reputation for being knowledgeable about governance and security of a particular community.

The second data collection method was the three Focus Group Discussions (FGDs) we conducted with urban unemployed youths in Enugu Urban, Rural Women in Mgbowo community, and informal sector workers in Nsukka Urban. The average number of persons per focus group was ten people. Care was taken in selecting members of the rural women's focus group to ensure homogeneity of the group as well as the diversity of the women's age and their place of residence. In the case of urban unemployed youths and informal sector workers, we ensured that there was balanced gender, age, and

professional representation. The Focus Group Discussions were based on similar questions as those presented to interview respondents, but they were framed in such a way as to elicit the collective views and perspective of the various groups.

The data we collected through interviews and Focus Group Discussions were complemented by three other sources of data. We derived primary and secondary data from documents, including published and unpublished literature, official documents and media reports. Data were also collected from the 2011 National Crime and Safety Survey conducted by the CLEEN Foundation. Finally, we derived insights from our observation of socio-economic and political life in Enugu State since the mid-1990s.

Three issues constitute the major limitations of this study. The first is time constraints. As is usual with field research, the range of activities that we expected to carry out in the course of the field research was a bit more than time could permit. Secondly, we were confronted by the negative attitude of Nigerians towards survey in particular and research in general. For example, some prospective respondents claimed to be too busy that they could not spare time to grant us interviews. Others would accept request for interview, but would put up a disposition of impatience making the discussions to be somewhat unfriendly and sometimes shallow. Finally, the labour disputes over demands for an increase in the national minimum wage affect this study. In Enugu State, the public servants were on strike for over one month.

5.4   Discussion of Findings

This section reviews the views and responses of the individuals we interviewed during our field study and the insights they provided towards a thorough understanding of the issue of governance and security in Enugu State. Four major themes are clearly discernible from the discussions we had with respondents in the various communities in Enugu State. The themes include an assessment of governance and security situation in Enugu State, identification of contemporary challenges to governance and security in the state, an analysis of the responses of the state and citizens to governance and

security challenges, and a review of the implications of these responses to governance and security in the state. The above themes will be discussed in details in the following sub-sections.

Governance and security in Enugu State: now and then
To understand the contemporary governance and security situation in Enugu State, it is pertinent to reflect on the past and to use that as the backdrop against which the current situation can be analysed. In this context, we asked the respondents to assess the governance and security situation in Enugu State in the past and at present. Majority of the respondents believe that there is an improvement in the governance and security situation of Enugu State compared with the situation in the past. Although there is no standard definition of the "present" and "past", nearly all respondents conceptualized "past" and "present" in terms of the political regimes in the state. For them, the transition from the administration of Governor Chimaroke Nnamani (May 1999 to May 2007) to that of Governor Sullivan Chime (May 2007 till date) has marked a significant improvement in the security and governance situation in Enugu State.

Most respondents see improvements in the governance of Enugu State, particularly in the area of provision of infrastructure. For instance, a youth leader in one of the communities noted that: "the present administration did well in its first tenure [2007-2011], they did a lot of things for this community, they built a health centre for this community, they tarred some of our roads, they dug bore-holes for the community and they did lots of other things that I cannot mention now"[96]. Another respondent assessed the governance situation in Enugu State in terms of the level of the people's participation in public affairs. The respondent argued that the governance situation in Enugu State has improved:

> Today, things seem better because people are freer to express their views without the fear of harassment and intimidation, because the present

---

[96] Interview with CU IB, 18 August 2011.

administration is more accountable than the past administration and it has been carrying the people along in its programs, policies and projects[97].

This view reflects on-going reforms in the state's budgeting process. The State Accountability and Voice Initiative (SAVI) programme, supported by the UK Department for International Development (DFID) has enhanced the capacity of community members and civil society organizations to participate in the budgeting process. The programme is also strengthening the capacity of state institutions such as the state Economic Planning Commission to develop and implement annual budgets. As part of its efforts to involve community members in the budgeting process, Enugu State government initiated the Visit Every Community (VEC) project in January 2009 to help the government identify the key development needs of the 471 communities in the state and include these in the budget[98].

With regards to security, majority of the respondents also believe that the security situation in Enugu State has improved since 2007 following observable decline in rate of political violence and gang related crimes in the state. In the words of one respondent:

> The previous administration in the state used some people with questionable character as thugs while attempting to get into power and after a while these people became security threats to the state when the government could not take care of them anymore. But when the present administration came into power it sanitized the system and also empowered the security operatives in order for them to carry out their duties effectively[99].

---

[97] Interview with FA EN, 23 August 2011.
[98] See Final report of the Visit Every Community (VEC) project of Enugu State Government, 2009.
[99] Interview with FA EN, 23 August 2011.

To provide insights into the issues that shaped the security situation in Enugu State before 2007, it is pertinent to offer some background information about political affairs in the state. In the build up to the 1999 transition from military to civil rule, a group of political power brokers from all parts of Nigeria formed various political parties and selected their cronies to run for governorship elections in states. The political power brokers who were later known popularly as "political godfathers" used their political and financial resources as well as their capacity to mete out violence to ensure that their cronies won elections. However, a few months later, these cronies installed as governors began to prove that they have their own minds, and many of the governors used their positions to build their own political machines and to challenge their godfathers. Governor Chimaroke Nnamani of Enugu State (1999-2007), in particular, fell out with his godfather, former Governor of old Anambra State in the Second Republic, Chief Jim Nwobodo. Darren Kew (2004: 144) recounted the events of that period in this way: "By 2002, Enugu State was an armed camp divided between the two factions, and the state assembly was closed after Nwobodo supporters tried to impeach Nnamani". Nwobodo and his supporters used their political resources, including the use of violence, to make Enugu State ungovernable for Nnamani. In response, Governor Nnamani mobilized anyone who was willing to follow him, including a number of notable politicians, ambitious young politicians, commercial motorcycle operators (Okada riders), members of university secret cults, unemployed youths and the rural poor. In the hostility that followed, Nnamani employed brute violence to root out Nwobodo and his supporters from Enugu State. After Nwobodo retreated and Nnamani slowed down his sponsorship of violence, the members of the gangs and cult groups that participated in the fight now turned against the people, using the arms and weapons they had acquired from the political warlords to commit crimes such as rape, armed robbery and kidnapping. In all, the political violence triggered by the disagreement between Governor Nnamani and Chief Nwobodo compounded the security challenges facing Enugu State.

Governance and security in Enugu State: contemporary challenges
Although Enugu State government have succeeded in demobilizing the criminal networks that emerged in the aftermath of the rift between Governor Nnamani

and Chief Nwobodo, the people of Enugu State still encounter serious threats to their lives and wellbeing. Residents of Enugu State may not be experiencing high priority crimes like kidnapping, armed robbery and murder on regular basis, but they are faced with regular occurrence of crimes like rape, domestic violence, burglary, and theft of various properties and items including cars. Majority of the respondents to the 2011 National Crime and Safety Survey in Enugu State reported that they personally experienced theft of mobile telephone, theft of money, burglary, robbery, rape and domestic violence[100]. The continued occurrence of these crimes has forced some respondents to argue that the transition from Nnamani to Chime has not really changed anything. In Nsukka LGA, for example, one respondent maintained:

> The government has really not done much to tackle the security situation in Nsukka. The police who are the agent of government that should be protecting the lives and properties of the citizens are not doing anything. The armed robbers seem to have over-powered the police both in firepower and in intelligence[101].

Another respondent corroborates this view, claiming that "armed robbery, breaking and entering, and the burgling of shops and houses have become the order of the day and nobody is doing anything to control it"[102]. Many respondents accused the government and the entire community of placing "high priority" on crimes such as kidnapping and armed robbery, while other crimes such as rape, domestic violence and theft are not given serious attention. This is how a participant in a focus group discussion of urban unemployed youths described the situation:

> The security operatives in Enugu State have been fully mobilized by the government and they are doing well to prevent the most pronounced ["high priority"] crimes like armed robbery, kidnapping etc. But they

---

[100] See Results of the 2011 National Crime and Safety Survey conducted by CLEEN Foundation, Lagos, 2011.
[101] Interview with JO NS, 18 August 2011.
[102] Interview with CU IB, 18 August 2011.

seem to neglect the minor ["low priority"] crimes like burglary, breaking and entry and even the activities of fraudsters (known as 419) who are everywhere in the city. Also the thugs that the government employed to work for ESWAMA (Enugu State Waste Management Agency) and the Local Governments are becoming serious security concern, and the security operatives and even the government are not paying attention to all these things. Also the security operatives themselves are becoming a security concern in the sense that they extort money from the citizens through different avenues[103].

The unfortunate thing in this matter is that it is the so-called "low priority" crimes that people experience on daily basis. The perception of every day crimes as "low priority" crimes by the community members and security agencies is contrary to the situation in countries such as South Africa where civil society activists have highlighted the effects of every day crimes and authorities have given greater attention to these crimes (Kury 2002).

The main reason why the "low priority" crimes get inadequate attention is that they mostly affect the marginalized groups – the poor, women, children etc. These groups have very little capacity to attract public attention and to push their need into the policy making process. In some parts of Enugu State, women are still excluded from the society. This is perhaps why gender based violence have not been given required attention. In Mgbowo community, for example, the women decried the neglect of the womenfolk. One participant in a focus group discussion of women in that community explained the condition of the women as follows:

> In Mgbowo community, the men have no regard for the women but the women have risen to make their voice heard in the community. The men have dominated governance and every other thing in this community without making room for the women to participate in governance[104].

---

[103] FGD, 3 September 2011.
[104] FGD, 2 September 2011.

The youths also complained of marginalization in Enugu State. Focusing on the behaviour of security agents, one young person informed us that:

> The security operatives are hostile to the youths because they think that it is only the youths that commit crimes. Even at the police stations, if a youth especially a male comes to make a report at the police station, the police will harass such a person and it will only take courage and boldness for such a youth to stand his ground and make his point in such a situation. So the police treat people differently, they tend to treat the youth with shrewdness, as if all the youths are criminals but they seem to have respect for elderly people, but they forget that it is not only the youths that commit crimes, the elderly people commit crimes too and the ones they can't do themselves, they instigate the idle youths to do it for them and at the end of the day if anything goes wrong, the youths will suffer and may even die in the process[105].

One sure way of addressing the problem of insecurity is to bring in the marginalized groups especially women and youths in the planning and implementation of crime control measures. This will enable each section of the society to highlight issues of concern to it, thereby helping the government to adopt a holistic approach to crime prevention and management.

Based on our conversations with community members, we discerned a strong connection between the effectiveness of the traditional institutions, the town unions, and the church on one hand, and effective governance and crime prevention in the communities. Ideally, strong traditional and local institutions can serve as alternatives to state institutions in mobilizing the community for security and development. But unfortunately, these institutions have performed below expectation. In fact, the Enugu State government has completely emasculated the traditional and local leadership institutions. As one community leader lamented:

---

[105] FGD, 3 September 2011.

It is difficult to govern the communities because the state governor controls everything in the state, including the local government chairpersons and the traditional rulers. So, it is really difficult for the community leaders to do anything without the governor's approval. So, from my own point of view, governance at the community level has failed. It has been destroyed by politics of greed and selfishness[106].

Besides state emasculation of traditional and local institutions, we also observed that these institutions suffer serious internal weaknesses and tensions among them. This has eroded their capacity to confront the government and demand for reforms. This is how one respondent described the situation in one community:

In my village, I was the first Executive Secretary of the town union. As at that time, only graduates were allowed to pilot the affairs of the town union, but today this system has broken down. Now you have a lot of mediocre in the town union and the leadership of the town unions of nowadays are being manipulated by the traditional rulers and these has made it difficult for the town unions to carry out developmental projects. Instead, they engage in political activities and today, everything has been politicized and the selfishness of the leaders and even the followers has destroyed the bond in our communities and society[107].

In some other communities, the tensions between the traditional rulers and the town unions have led to the disempowerment of the traditional stool by the town union. Generally, what you see is that in communities where the traditional ruler is strong, the town union is usually ineffective; and where the town union is effective, the traditional ruler is normally weak. We expect that communities with strong traditional institution and effective local institutions would be able to develop effective crime prevention and management system without necessarily involving the government, but most communities function

---

[106] Interview with CO NG, 25 August 2011.
[107] Interview with OE NG, 25 August 2011.

with weak and ineffective traditional institutions and community leadership. Since effective governance and security at the community level depends on the synergy between traditional and local institutions, the present situation has become a major stumbling block to safety and development in the communities. Again, the situation has now forced the citizens to redefine their response to governance and insecurity. In the following sub-section, we will consider the ways in which state and citizens have responded to the challenge of insecurity in contemporary Enugu State.

State and citizens' response to contemporary security challenges
Enugu State government has responded to insecurity in the state by adopting a strategy we call "moulding a police state". Our observation is that the security agencies are increasingly transforming Enugu State into a "police state", in their bid to control crime level in the state. The measures applied by security agencies include indiscriminate mounting of "check points"/"road blocks"[108], aggressive "stop and search" exercise, and in some cases, the "shoot at sight" tactics. This strategy captures the overall approach of the state government to crime prevention and management, which places emphasis on the use brute force in containing insecurity. Although some might argue the use of excessive force in containing insecurity may be as a result of the excesses of over-zealous security agents rather than a deliberate state policy, the fact that the government has not publicly denounced the approach signals government's endorsement of the strategy.

The first step in the process of moulding Enugu into a police state entails massive deployment of security agents in the state. Just to illustrate, the number of police officers deployed to Enugu State increased by 67.3 per cent – that is from 5,342 in 2006 to 8,939 in 2007 (NBS 2009: 266). For the vigilant observers, the visible presence of relatively higher number of security agents

---

[108] The heavy reliance on "check points" and "road blocks" as crime prevention strategy in Enugu State in particular, and Nigeria in general, is surprising since theories of criminology and comparative experience of crime prone countries like South Africa has shown that the strategy has had only a limited success, see Naudé (2003).

in the roads and streets across Enugu State is not difficult to perceive. As one respondent observed:

> In the process of preventing crimes in Enugu State, the state has been flooded with security operatives made up of the police, the army and even air force officers, and today since violent crimes are at its lowest rate in Enugu State and these security operatives seem not to have anything to do anymore, most of them engage in things they are not supposed to engage in, in order to extort money from the citizens and most of such things are done by the police[109].

Perhaps in acknowledgement of the inability of the state-led crime prevention and management strategy to cope with the challenge of insecurity in Enugu State, the state government has embraced and is vigorously pursuing the idea of community policing. Community policing is a crime prevention and management strategy which tries to co-opt community members into crime detection and prevention. It has to do with the development of partnership between security agencies and the community in safeguarding and securing of the community, and encourages people to be more pro-active in ensuring their own safety. This strategy is actively supported in Enugu State by civil society organizations, the Department for International Development (DFID), and other development partners in Enugu State. The expectation is that it would boost the intelligence gathering capacity of the security agencies and reduce miscarriage of justice, delays in the prosecution of suspected criminals, and use of force in crime prevention.

The citizens have also framed their own responses to the challenge of insecurity in Enugu State. One common response of the citizens to the challenge of insecurity in Enugu State is the prioritization of security. The experience shared by a respondent would help clarify this point. The respondent informed us that he attended a committee of friends meeting in preparation for a friend's wedding. At the meeting the issue was to decide the way in which the committee

---

[109] FGD, 3 September 2011.

of friends would assist the intending couple. To the amazement of the respondent, it was agreed by majority vote that the committee of friends would assist their member to procure the services of effective security guard to protect the celebrants and their guests at the wedding venue. The respondent insisted that that decision indicates how much things have change. He maintained that a few years back, security would not have been the priority issue in making wedding arrangements.

Apart from prioritization of security, the citizens have depended on police, engaged private guards, fortified their homes with security gadgets, and established communal security associations. The nature of response adopted by individuals is determined by their level of income. For instance, we observed that the key response of wealthy individuals to insecurity is to fortify their homes with sophisticated security gadgets, and then engage private security guards, and finally utilize their contacts to obtain special police protection. Among the middle-income earners, the pattern of response is to procure security gadgets, obtain police protection and support (by means of providing financial resources) the communal security arrangements. Lastly, for the low-income earners, we observe that this group rely mainly on communal security arrangements, most times by getting involved personally in keeping watch over their neighbourhoods. In all, there is no doubt that a majority of the citizens rely on communal security arrangements for their safety.

Considering that majority of its citizens depend on communal security arrangements for protection, Enugu State government has tried to re-organize the mode of operation of the communal security groups. Following the enactment of Enugu State Neighbourhood Association and Watch Group Law of 2006, most communities are encouraged to establish and register communal security groups. Most communities in Enugu State have heeded the government's advice by setting up Neighbourhood Watch Associations. The Neighbourhood Watch Associations are run by an executive made up of credible members of the community. Usually, the chairpersons of the Neighbourhood Watch Associations are members of the traditional ruler's cabinet while the other members of the executive are selected from the town

union and other major organs of community leadership. Additionally, the leadership of the Neighbourhood Watch Associations is made up of people who have had some experience with provision of security. One leader of a Neighbourhood Watch Association outlined his credentials as follows: "well, I have had vast experiences in the area of security, I was a chairman of a vigilante group, I am a community leader, and am also a former school headmaster and principal"[110].

The re-organization of the communal security arrangement in Enugu State has introduced a system of oversight in the operations of the groups. Regarding the oversight system and regulation of the Neighbourhood Watch Associations, one respondent explained:

> We have laws that govern the neighbourhood watch association and the laws were made by the people that introduced the neighbourhood watch in Enugu State. As the chairman of the neighbourhood watch in this community, I am answerable to the *Igwe* and the *Igwe's* council so if I mess up, they will call me to order[111].

In turn, if any member of the association misbehaves, it is the responsibility of the executive of the association to discipline the errant member.

Although the communal security arrangement in Enugu State is now better structured and more efficiently administered, the Neighbourhood Watch Associations are faced with very serious management problems. According to one Neighbourhood Watch Association leader:

> The most pressing challenge we have are financial and logistics challenges. We don't have enough money to finance the smooth running of the organization. In terms of logistics, we don't have the sophisticated arms to combat the criminals, considering the kind of weapons they use these days, including explosives[112].

---

[110] Interview with SO MG, 27 August 2011.
[111] Interview with GO NG, 30 August 2011.
[112] Interview with GO NG, 30 August 2011.

Although the law establishing the Neighbourhood Watch Associations permitted them to raise funds through various sources such as gifts, donations from voluntary organizations, corporate institutions etc., grants from government agencies and individuals as well as levies, dues, fines and subventions from the government, most of these sources of funds have remained under-utilized. In fact, most communities have responded to the challenge of funding Neighbourhood Watch Associations mainly by imposing levies on community members. However, many communities have found it very difficult to administer the levy collection process in particular and to run the communal security arrangement in general.

Implications of heavy dependence on communal and private security arrangements

The foregoing discussion shows that residents of Enugu State rely heavily on communal and private security arrangements. This situation holds three major implications for the society. Firstly, communalization and privatization of security leaves huge number of small arms in the hands of individuals. This is very dangerous because there is high probability that the arms will enter into the hands of criminals. Secondly, communalization of security has inspired the proliferation of Neighbourhood Watch Associations whose activities are uncoordinated and lack strict monitoring. The supervision of Neighbourhood Watch Associations is left in the hands of traditional rulers, and nowadays, it is not uncommon that one can find a traditional ruler with criminal intent. In such circumstance, the noble objective of setting up Neighbourhood Watch Associations can be scuttled, leaving members of the community in grave danger. Thirdly, from an economic perspective, communalization and privatization of security entails huge economic losses. The economies of scale that a coordinated crime prevention strategy offers are completely lost under the present circumstances. Tremendous amount of resources are drawn from the commonwealth to service diverse communal and private security arrangements. Finally, the extremely high priority that citizens now attach to security erodes the social fabrics and engenders mistrust in the society. As part of the prioritization of security, individuals have erected high fences and installed different kinds of security gadgets. These security gadgets constitute a social barrier, walling of family, friends and acquaintances, and intensifying

the social atomization already occurring in Igbo society. The communal bond that is the hallmark of Igbo culture and society is weakened by social barriers that fences and other security gadgets produces.

5.5   Conclusion and recommendations

This study examined the relationship between governance and security in South East Nigeria, focusing on Enugu State. It argued that the failure of the government to meaningfully address the challenge of insecurity in Enugu State has forced the citizens to set up communal and private security arrangements, and that despite the usefulness of these arrangements; they have posed serious negative implications for the society. This study was based on data collected through in-depth semi-structured interviews, focus group discussions, observation and documents.

Based on the analysis of the data collected from our field research, three key findings were discerned. First, majority of the respondents believe that there have been improvements in the governance and security situation in Enugu State since 2007. They observed that the improvements in governance are mainly in the areas of provision of infrastructure and greater inclusion of the citizens in governance. Regarding the security situation in Enugu State, the respondents see improvements in the ability of the government to control political violence and gang related crimes. These improvements notwithstanding, the respondents believe that there are several governance and security challenges that still confront the state. One example is the failure of the government to address the issue of women and youth empowerment as well as the tendency of the government and the communities to prioritize crimes such as armed robbery, kidnapping and murder, over crimes like domestic violence, sexual offences and theft.

The second major finding of this study is that despite the opportunity that traditional and local leadership institutions such as traditional rulers and town unions hold for provision of security and development in the communities, these institutions perform below expectation. The study found two major explanations for this development. The first is the fact that the state in Nigeria

has grown too strong vis-à-vis traditional and local institutions that it emasculates them. In addition, the study notes that the traditional and local institutions themselves are weighed down by internal weaknesses and tensions among the different institutions.

Thirdly, this study found that the state and citizens of Enugu State respond to insecurity in diverse ways. The state responds to insecurity in Enugu State by adopting a strategy we call "moulding a police state". This entails using brute force to contain insecurity. The most typical manifestation of this strategy is in the ideas of deployment of huge number of security agents in the state as well as practice of indiscriminate set up of "check points" and "road blocks", aggressive "stop and search" exercise, and the adoption of "shoot at sight" tactics. On the part of the citizens, this study observes that their response to insecurity has focused on prioritization of security in everyday life. To this extent, the study notes that the citizens have responded to insecurity by engaging private guards, fortifying their homes with security gadgets, obtaining special protection from the police as well as establishing communal security associations popularly known as vigilante groups.

To address some of the issues we have raised in this study, we suggest as follows:

- That the reform in Enugu State budgeting process should be sustained and that government should adopt additional measures that would enhance inclusiveness in governance.

- That government's focus on infrastructural development should be sustained since the report of the Visit Every Community (VEC) project indicates that majority of the communities in Enugu State affirmed that road and portable water are their key development needs. However, the state government should not neglect the need for women and youth empowerment since this will play a major role in addressing the challenge of insecurity and fast tracking the development of the state.

- The government and civil society organizations should re-evaluate the effects of the different forms of crimes on the lives of the citizens, and based on this ensure that balanced attention is given to the so-called "high priority" crimes (armed robbery, kidnapping and murder) and "low priority" crimes (domestic violence, rape and theft).

- The government and the civil society organizations should give a deep consideration to the issues of marginalization of women and youths in the process of governance and crime prevention, and adopt measures that could ensure inclusiveness in governance and development.

- Since traditional institutions and community leadership are essential to good governance and crime prevention at the community level, the government and development partners should initiate reforms that would empower the traditional institutions and strengthen town union leadership.

- The overall approach of Enugu State government to crime prevention places emphasis on the use of brute force. Although this approach has helped to curb crimes in the state, yet it has come at the cost of "state violence" (harassment, illegal detention and extra-judicial killings by security agents). To address this challenge, government should initiate a comprehensive security sector reform that would incorporate the community policing strategy already being implemented.

- Although Enugu State government has successfully restructured the communal security arrangement in the state, it needs to come up with capacity building programmes that would ensure that the Neighbourhood Watch Associations consolidate and transform into sustainable security institutions.

References

Agbola, Tunde. (1997). *The Architecture of Fear: Urban Design and Construction Response to Urban Violence in Lagos, Nigeria*, Ibadan: IFRA.

Baker, B. (2002). "When the Bakassi Boys Came: Eastern Nigeria Confronts Vigilantism", *Journal of Contemporary African Studies*, 20(2): 223-244.

Casey, C. (2007). "'Policing through Violence: Fear, Vigilantism, and the Politics of Islam in Northern Nigeria", In D. Pratten and A. Sen (eds.) *Global Vigilantes: Perspectives on Justice and Violence*. London: Hurst.

Egbo, Obiamaka; Nwakoby, Ifeoma; Onwumere, Josephat; and Uche, Chibuike. (2010). *Legitimizing Corruption in Government: Security Votes in Nigeria.* ASC Working Paper 91 / 2010. Leiden: African Studies Centre.

Ekpenyong, Stephen. (1989). "Social Inequalities, Collusion, and Armed Robbery in Nigerian Cities", *British Journal of Criminology*, 29(1): 21-34.

Enugu State Government. (2010). *Enugu State Vision 4:2020 Medium Term Implementation Plan (ENVMTIP) 2010 – 2013*.

Fourchard, Laurent. (2008). "A New Name for an old Practice: Vigilantes in South-Western Nigeria", *Africa* 78 (1): 16-40.

Harnischfeger, Johannes. (2003). "The Bakassi Boys: Fighting Crime in Nigeria", *Journal of Modern African Studies*, 41(1): 23-49.

Higazi, Adam. (2008). "Social Mobilization and Collective Violence: Vigilantes and Militias in the Lowlands of Plateau State, Central Nigeria", *Africa* 78(1): 107-135.

Kew, Darren. (2004). "The 2003 Elections: Hardly Credible, but Acceptable", In Robert Rotberg (ed.) *Crafting the New Nigeria: Confronting the Challenges*. Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rinner.

Kury, H. (2002). "International Comparison of Crime and Victimization", *International Journal of Comparative Criminology*, 2(1): 1-9.

Last, Murray. (2008). "The Search for Security in Muslim Northern Nigeria", *Africa* 78 (1): 41-63.

Linz, Juan J. (1978). *The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes: Crisis, Breakdown and Reequilibration*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.

Marenin, Otwin and Michael D. Reisig. (1995). "'A General Theory of Crime' and Patterns of Crime in Nigeria: An Exploration of Methodological Assumptions", Journal of Criminal Justice, 23(6): 501-518.

Marenin, Otwin. (1987). "The Anini Saga: Armed Robbery and the Reproduction of Ideology in Nigeria", Journal of Modern African Studies, 25(2): 259-281.

Meagher, K. (2007). "Hijacking Civil Society: The Inside Story of the Bakassi Boys Vigilante Group of South-Eastern Nigeria", *Journal of Modern African Studies*, 45(1): 89-115.

National Bureau of Statistics. (2009). *Social Statistics in Nigeria*. Abuja: NBS.

National Bureau of Statistics. (2010). *Nigeria Poverty Profile 2010*. Abuja: NBS.

Naudé, Beaty. (2003). "The Effectiveness of Public Road Closures in Suburban Areas as a Crime Reduction Measure", *Security Focus*, 21(6): 34-36.

Nolte, Insa. (2004). "Identity and Violence: The Politics of Youth in Ijebu-Remo, Nigeria", *Journal of Modern African Studies*, 42(1): 61-89.

Nolte, Insa. (2007). "Ethnic Vigilantes and the State: The Oodua People's Congress in South-Western Nigeria", *International Relations*, 21(2): 217-235.

Otu, Smart E. (2003). Armed Robbery in the South-eastern States of Contemporary Nigeria: A Criminological Analysis. PhD Thesis, University of South Africa.

Rotberg, Robert I. (2003). "Failed States, Collapsed States, Weak States: Causes and Indicators." In Robert I. Rotberg (ed.) *State Failure and State Weakness in a Time of Terror*, 1-25. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press.

Skocpol, Theda. (1985). "Bringing the State Back In: Strategies of Analysis in Current Research." In Peter B. Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and Theda Skocpol (eds.) *Bringing the State Back In*, 3-37. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Smith, Daniel J. (2004). "The Bakassi Boys: Vigilantism, Violence and Political Imagination in Nigeria", *Current Anthropology*, 19(3): 429-455.

Ukiwo, Ukoha. (2002). "*Deus ex machina* or Frankenstein Monster: The Changing Roles of Bakassi Boys in Eastern Nigeria", *Democracy and Development: A Journal of West African Affairs*, 3(1): 39-51.

CHAPTER SIX

Governance and Security in Imo State
By
Chukunenye Iheanacho Okereke

6.1   Introduction

The security challenges facing Nigeria are enormous. These challenges include incessant ethnic and religious conflicts, youth restiveness, uncontrollable unemployment, economic hardship, rising levels of social inequality, terrorism, institutionalized corruption, armed robbery, kidnapping etc. Since May 1999 when Nigeria returned to civil rule, the security situation has worsened especially in the southeastern part of the country. There is no doubt that Nigerian governments are increasingly hard-pressed to effectively safeguard the lives and property of its citizens. For over three decades, the country's security apparatus has been undermined and compromised by bands of armed robbers, ethnic militias, religious militias, insurgent groups and terrorists. The insecurity is further aggravated by the poor capacity of state security agencies and the proliferation of innumerable non-state security providers. This chapter explores the socio-economic and political underpinnings of pervasive insecurity in the country with particular reference to Imo State.

Imo State has undoubtedly recorded some of the most shocking incidents of violent crime in the country. These include kidnapping and hostage taking, ritual murders, political assassination and armed robbery. The activities of criminals in the state came to the limelight in 1993 when a group of young men with unexplained sources of wealth relocated to Owerri and started kidnapping people for rituals (see, Imo State Government 1997). Discovery of one of the perpetrators in what came to be called the Otokoto saga led to rioting in Owerri and other parts of the state over the capacity of the criminal groups to operate freely without being contained by security agencies. A number of facilitating factors have been implicated for the upsurge of violent in the state, as in other parts of the country. Notable among these are proliferation of small arms and light weapons (SALW), use of thugs for political violence,

rising rates of youth unemployment, economic hardship and inequality, exposure to criminal violence through the media and the prevalence of the culture of materialism (see, Onwubiko 2000, Otu 2033, Okereke 2004, Ginifer and Olawale 2005). The inability of the state to address these security challenges led to the emergence of the Bakassi Boys and other self-help security initiatives (see Eke 2004, Okereke 2004, Haralambos and Heald 2007).

The anti-Otokoto demonstrations and deployment of both state and non-state security to the state helped to stem the tide of crimes in the state for almost decade. However, between 2008 and 2010, the state was enveloped in a cloud of insecurity that threatened economic and social activities. As media reports shown in Table 1 indicate, the major security threats in the state, which was previously armed robbery and ritual killings had changed to kidnapping and political violence. The target of these crimes were members of the upper and middle classes, including politicians, business tycoons and professionals who could afford the ransom demanded by the criminals. However, like in time past, the government appeared to have been taken by surprise by the criminals and could not swiftly respond to the emerging challenges.

The main argument of this chapter is that the prevailing state of insecurity in Imo derives from the governance failings. Inability of the state to provide security represents a major indicator for governance failure and state weakness because one of the fundamental functions of the state is to provide and guarantee security of life, property and liberty (see Haramlabos and Heald 2007, Jide, 2008). According to Natufe (2007) governance refers to the processes and systems by which a government manages the resources of a society to address socio-economic and political challenges in the polity. The chapter attempts to show the linkages between governance failures and the security challenges facing the state. The chapter also seeks to fill the gap created by the lack of in-depth of study of insecurity in the Imo State. This is because despite the worsening security situation, there are few studies that focused on the state. The study therefore seeks to complement studies of insecurity in other parts of the country (see, OMCT and CLEEN 2002,

Okereke 2004, Smith 2004, Fourchard 2008, Higazi 2008, Centre for International Cooperation and Security 2009, and Security, Justice and Growth Programme 2009).

The chapter is divided into five sections, including this introductory section. Section two presents background information of the history, socio-economic status and political and administrative set-up of the state. In section three, the chapter discusses the methodology used for the study. This is followed in section four with a discussion of the findings of the study. The section chronologically examines the perceptions of governance and security challenges in the last two administrations and the current administration of the state as well as the implications of integrating traditional rulers and community security in security policy and practice. Section five provides the conclusions and recommendations of the study.

Table 1: Media reports on violent crimes in the state

S/N	REPORT	SOURCE
1	Men of Eagle Squad of Imo State Police Command impound large cache of arms at the armoury base of criminals in a bush located at the boundary between Amaraku, Mbano and Ikeduru communities. Declare eight suspected criminals wanted for terrorizing the State	Sunday Champion, July 5, 2009.
2	Chief Achike Udenwa former Governor of Imo State and minister of Commerce and Industry allege that Governor Ikedi Ohakim hired one Samfo Nwankwo to fight him.	Daily Champion, Aug. 14. 2009.

3	Dr Alex Obi, former Chairman of the People's Democratic Party (PDP) in Imo State alleged threat to his life by officials of Governor Ikedi Ohakim led government, due to his face-off with the governor	Daily Champion, Aug. 14. 2009.
4	Police detectives from the Imo State Command rescue a 13-year-old boy, Bethel Onyekwere, allegedly kidnapped by a four-man syndicate operating in Mbaise.	Daily Sun, September 10, 2009
5	Pa Nwajuiba (an Octogenarian) father of Chukwuemeka Nwajuiba, a prominent politician in Imo State kidnapped.	Nigerian Horn, Sept. 14-16, 2009; The Nigerian Newspoint, Sept. 28-30, 2009
6	Chief Emma Owuamanam, renowned public relations practitioner in Imo State and former Commissioner for Information in the State kidnapped	The Nigeria Newspoint, Sept. 28-30, 2009
7	Members of the Imo State House of Assembly re-locate to Abuja, due to fear of being abducted or losing family members following series of kidnap whose victims included Hon. Celestine Ngaobiri, member representing Obowo State Constituency and two (2) children of Hon. Goodluck Opiah, the Speaker.	The Nigerian Horn, Sept. 14-16, 2009 and The Nigeria Newspoint Sept. 28-30, 2009

| 8	Two medical practitioners, including Dr. David Anyanwu, proprietor of St David's Hospital kidnapped in broad daylight in their clinics	Nigerian Horn, Sept. 28-30, 2009; The Nigerian Newspoint, Sept. 28-30, 2009
9	The wife of Mr. Frank Nneji, the managing director of ABC Transport Company kidnapped	Nigerian Horn Sept 14-16, 2009; The Nigerian Newspoint, Sept. 28-30, 2009
10	Pa Chukwu, father of Chief Tony Chukwu, a business tycoon kidnapped	The Nigerian Newspoint, Sept. 28-30, 2009
11	Son of Chief Marcellinus Nlemigbo, the Imo State Chairman of PDP kidnapped	The Nigerian Newspoint, Sept. 28-30, 2009)
12	Mr. Peter Orji (alias Mr. Big Do) former Commissioner and Treasurer of Imo State PDP kidnapped	The Nigerian Newspoint, Sept. 28-30, 2009
13	Ezinne Rachael Ogbonna, a 75 year old woman, from Ezeoke Nsu visiting her daughter at Owerri, kidnapped	Sunday Statesman, Sept 27-Oct. 3, 2009
14	Residents of Obi Orodo in Mbaitoli LGA seek divine intervention for the release of their monarch, His Royal Highness Eze Samuel Agunwa Ohiri, who was kidnapped in January 2010.	Daily Sun Newspaper March 4, 2010

15	The traditional ruler of Oforola Community (in Owerri West LGA), Herbert Obichere kidnapped.	Business Day March 24, 2010
16	Three persons kidnapped in Owerri yesterday around 9.45am at Assumpta Roundabout along Owerri-Port Harcourt Expressway.	Daily Sun, Oct. 4, 2010
17	Dr. Vin Udokwu, the Imo State Commissioner for Health missing for 3 months after he was abducted from his private hospital in Amaifeke, Orlu by kidnappers.	Sunday Champion, November 21, 2010
18	Imo State Command dislodges a five-man kidnap gang and rescue a 71-year-old woman held for over ten days.	Announcer Express, March 2-3, 2011
19	Imo State Police Command smashed a daredevil gang of kidnappers operating around Ngor-Okpala and Mbaise and recovered from them arms as well as rescued their victims. The Police also raided a criminal camp at Nwangele LGA where unimaginable quantity of sophisticated arms and ammunition were recovered and equally arrested four suspects.	Announcer Express, March 25-27 2011.

6.2   Background Information on Imo State

History and socio-economic background

Imo State was created when the former East Central State of Nigeria was split into Anambra and Imo states on the 3rd of February 1976. In June 1991, the eastern portion of the state was carved out to create Abia State. Imo State is located in the tropical rain forest zone of West Africa. It is bounded on the east by Abia State; on the north by Enugu; on the west by Anambra and on the south by Rivers State. Imo State is centrally located at the heart of the nine States of the former Eastern region of Nigeria; hence it is called the "Eastern Heartland". The city of Owerri is the capital of Imo State and the major cities of these nine States are equidistant from Owerri. Imo State has other cities like Orlu, Okigwe, etc.

Fig 1: Map of Imo State

The 2006 Population Census puts the population of Imo State at 3,934,899 (Federal Republic of Nigeria Official Gazette, 2007). The land area is about 5,289.49 km^2 with a population density of 872 persons per km^2, which is one of the Nigerian States with the highest population density.[113]

Imo State is homogenous and is inhabited by the Igbo people. Igbo (Ibo) language is spoken and understood in all parts of the State with minor difference in dialect. The official language of the State is English Language. Christianity is the dominant religion in the state, though some adherents of traditional religion and Islam also live in the state. The predominant family type in Imo State is the extended family, which comprises of related agnatic kins that have authority relations organized around patriarchal structures.

Most of the communities in the state practice "village democracy" where the traditional ruler and elderly male descendants of the lineages legislate and adjudicate on issues that concern their community. The traditional rulers are also the Chief Security Officers and custodians of customs and traditions of their respective communities. Sometimes, they liaise with leadership of their town unions for development projects. Other governance institutions at the community level include Age Grades, Masquerade societies, and Women Associations such as the Umuada (group of first married daughters).

The Imo people are predominantly subsistence farmers and economy depends primarily on agriculture and commerce (Emenalor and Akanwa 2007). The main cash crops include oil palm, raffia palm, rice, groundnut, melon, cotton, cocoa, rubber, and maize. The food crops include yam, cassava, cocoyam and maize. Some people are also involved in commercial poultry farming. A considerable proportion of Imo people are traders, importers and exporters, which accounts for their presence and influence in virtually every part of Nigeria and beyond. Imo State has abundant natural resources/mineral deposits that range from petroleum to clay and salt deposits. It has over 163 oil wells at 12 different locations. However, state oil production has been negatively affected by the reallocation of some oil wells to other States.

---

[113] www.wikipedia.org/imostategov.ng/info

Political and administrative structure
There are three senatorial zones, namely Owerri (Imo East), Orlu (Imo West) and Okigwe (Imo North). The zones and the 27 local government areas (LGA) that constitute them are shown in Table 2:

Table 2: Senatorial zones in Imo State and their Local Governments

Name Of Senatorial District	LGA Composition
Imo East (Owerri)	Owerri Municipality, Owerri North, Owerri West, Ngor-Okpala, Mbaitoli, Ikeduru, Aboh Mbaise, Ezinihitte Mbaise and Ahiazu Mbaise.
Imo West (Orlu)	Orlu, Orsu, Isu, Njaba, Nkwerre, Nwangele, Oru East, Oru West, Ideato North, Ideato South, Ohaji/Egbema and Oguta
Imo North (Okigwe)	Okigwe, Obowo, Ihitte Uboma, Onuimo, Ehime Mbano and Isiala Mbano.

On July 19, 2005, Chief Achike Udenwa the state Governor signed a Bill to establish 36 local government development centres in Imo State in furtherance of his campaign promise to bring government closer to the people. The development centres are shown in Table 3:

Table 3: Senatorial Zones in Imo State and their Development Centres

Zones	Development centre
Owerri	Enyiato, Oke Ovoro, Ekwereazu, Ezinihitte East, Ikeduru West, Ikeduru East, Ngor-Okpala South, Ngor-Okpala East, Owerri East, Owerri South.
Okigwe	Ihitte, Ugiri, Mbano, Isisi Ehime, Oyibo, Okigwe North, Okigwe South, Obowo West
Orlu	Ichi Isu, Njaba South, Nwangele South, Orlu South, Orlu North, Orlu West, Orsu North, Orsu Central, Ideato North Central, Alaoma, Ohaji East, Ohaji West, Oru South, Oru North

Since 1976 when Imo State was created, it has had 9 Military Governors and 5 Civilian Governors, making a total of 14 Governors (See Table 4)

Table 4: Past and Present Leaders of Imo State (1976 – Date)

Feb. 3, 1976 – Aug. 9, 1977	Commander Godwin Ndubuisi Kanu
Aug. 10, 1977 – July, 23, 1978	Commodore Adekunle S. Lawal
July 25, 1978 – Sept. 30, 1979	Col. Sunday A. Adenihu
Oct 1, 1979 – Dec 31, 1983	Chief Samuel O. Mbakwe
Jan 4, 1984 – Aug. 27, 1985	Brigadier Ike O.S. Nwachukwu
Sept. 4, 1985 – Aug 28, 1986	Navy Capt. Alison Madueke
Aug. 29,1986 – Sept. 2, 1990	Commander Amadi Ikwechegh
Set. 3, 1990 – Jan 1, 1991	Commander Anthony Oguguo
Jan 2, 1992 – Dec 12, 1993	Chief Evan Enwerem

Dec. 13, 1993 – Aug. 16, 1996	Navy Capt. James N.J. Aneke
Aug 17, 1996 – May 29, 1999	Col. Tanko K. Zubairu
May 29, 1999 – May 29, 2007	Chief Achike Udenwa
May 29, 2007 – May 29, 2011	Chief Ikedi Ohakim
May 29, 2011 – till date	Owelle Rochas Okorocha

The governor is the Chief Executive and Chief Security Officer of the State. The governor is in control of the security agencies in the State for the overall safety of inhabitants of the State, though directives from the Federal Government, which exerts ultimate control over security agencies, can undermine this control. The governor heads the executive council, which includes an elected Deputy Governor and Commissioners and the secretary to state government who are appointed by the governor. The commissioners hold portfolios in delineated ministries, departments and (MDAs) such as education, youth and sports, commerce and industry, health, justice, information and strategy, local government and chieftaincy affairs, agriculture and natural resources among others.

The legislative functions of the state are exercised by the State House of Assembly. The legislature has an executive committee headed by the Speaker and includes Deputy Speaker, House Leader, Minority Leader and other principal officers of the House. The House also has committees that exercise its oversight functions with MDAs and is supported by a bureaucracy that is led by the Clerk and Deputy Clerk. The legislature makes laws, approves appointment of political office holders and performs an oversight of the executive arm of government.

At the local government areas, the leadership rests on the Chairman of the Local Government Area (LGA), assisted by a Vice Chairman. The Chairman is both the Chief Executive and Chief Security Officer of the LGA. The legislative functions are performed by the local government council headed

by a Speaker and Deputy Speaker of the Council. There are supervisory councillors on certain designated areas such as works and transport, health, education, finance, etc that assist the Chairman for effective local government administration.

Successive governments in the state have expressed commitments to promoting industrialization and rural development. One key area that the state has made some giant stride is in human capital development. The state has one of the largest concentrations of tertiary educational institutions as well as number of graduates of tertiary institutions. The priorities of successive governments in the state can be gleaned from budgetary allocations to the two main components of the budget, namely capital and recurrent expenditure. As Emenalor and Akanwa (2007) have shown most of the governments have allocated more funds to recurrent expenditures.

Table 5: Imo State Budget (1976 – 2006) and Name of Governor at given Periods.

Governor	Recurrent	Capital	Total	% Budget Capital
Commander Ndubuisi Kanu	95,783,070	163,661,240	259,444,310	63.1
Commodore Adekunle Lawal Col. Sunday Adenihu	136,967,480	85,446,680	222,414,160	38.4
Chief Samuel Mbakwe	1,454,129,660	1,549,346,060	3,003,475,720	51.6
Brigadier Ike Nwachukwu	586,643,630	176,860,650	763,504,280	23.2

Navy Capt. Alison Madueke	380,703,090	96,215,240	476,918,330	20.2
Commander Amadi Ikwechegh	1,610,692,120	610,441,540	1,221,133,660	27.5
Commander Anthony Oguguo	1,981,607,020	548,456,990	2,530,064,010	21.7
Chief Evan Enwerem	1,838,525,480	1,928,550,870	3,767,076,350	51.2
Navy Capt. James Aneke	2,405,999,080	1,896,015,820	4,302,014,900	44.1
Col. Tanko Zubairu	7,724,677,380	3,241,758,396	10,966,435,776	29.6
Chief Achike Udenwa	111,384,716,141	75,520,277,920	186,904,994,061	40.4

Source: Adapted from Emenalor and Akanwa 2007

There was little or no emphasis on capital budgets, which involve investments in real or physical assets that could provide employment opportunities and improve living standards through provision of good roads, potable water, schools and colleges, adequate medical facilities etc. The state of development in the state can be explained by the fact that only 3 out of 12 administrations between 1996 and 2007 made up to 50 per cent allocation to capital budgets. As Table 6 shows budgetary allocation to capital projects was lowest during the administrations of Navy Captain Allison Madueke (20.2%), Commander Anthony Oguguo (21.7%) and Brigadier Ike Nwachukwu (23.2%). It was, however, highest during the administrations of Commander Ndubuisi Kanu (63.1%), Chief Samuel Mbakwe (51.6%) Chief Evan Enwerem (51.2%)

6.3   Methodological issues

Study Design
The study was based on action research methodology. The research design privileged participation and sensitization of the research community in the research process. Qualitative data were obtained through existing relevant literature, observation, focus group discussions (FGDs), and in-depth interviews (IDIs) (also known as key informant interviews (KIIs). Information was also gathered from primary sources such as government documents and newspapers. Quantitative data was obtained from the National Crime and Victimization Survey (NCVS) conducted by CLEEN Foundation and statistics from other agencies.

Sampling Frame
A sampling frame that contained all local government areas (LGAs) in Imo State was obtained from the National Population Commission (NPC) out of a random sample of six LGAs was drawn. Specifically, Imo State was clustered into three zones based on the geopolitical divisions of the three senatorial zones in the State. Given time and resource constraints and to enable an equitable representation of individuals in Imo State, two LGAs were selected from each of the zones. The selection was, however purposive with consideration for obtaining information from individuals in the rural areas and those in urban areas. Thus, Owerri Municipal that has comparatively more urban features than other LGAs in Imo East was selected; Owerri West, which in contrast is typically rural, was selected in same Imo East. In Imo West, Orlu and Nkwerre were selected as having urban and rural and features respectively. In Imo Central, Okigwe Urban and Onuimo were selected as having urban and rural features respectively. It should be noted that the minimum population threshold concept was not by any means used in the definition of an area as urban or rural. None of the LGAs had a population figure that was less than 20,000 as at 1991 population census (the penultimate 2006 census figure by localities has till now, 2011, not been released). On the contrary, the distinction between urban and rural areas was based on the availability or otherwise of basic infrastructures, including good roads, potable water, electricity and modern economic activities.

Inclusion Criteria

A locality was selected through simple random sampling method for each of the selected LGAs, such that there were three LGAs with urban features and three LGAs with rural characteristics. This strategy was justified by the desire to obtain a fair representation of diverse opinions for both rural and urban dwellers in the survey. The selected localities were Owerri in Owerri Municipality, Umuguma (Owerri West LGA) Umuna-Orlu (Orlu LGA), Nkwerre (Nkwerre LGA), Okigwe urban (Okigwe LGA) and Okwelle (Onuimo LGA).

The discussants were categorized into groups (youth, women and unorganized groups) and discussions held in specific communities for each of the identified groups. Pointedly, discussion with the youth group was held at Umuguma (a rural area); women group was at Okigwe Urban (a semi-urban area); while that of the unorganized group was at Owerri (an urban area) and at Umuna-Orlu (a semi-urban area). The rationale for the above was to capture peculiar features of individuals in the categories. FGDs were conducted on between 8-12 persons in each group (youth, women and unorganized groups in Umuguma, Okigwe and Owerri Urban/Umuna-Orlu respectively). Thus, a total of five FGDs were conducted (youth group in Umuguma, women group in Okigwe urban, unorganized group in Owerri and unorganized groups for both genders in Umuna-Orlu). The discussants were drawn through the assistance of the traditional rulers, who are technically the "gate-keepers" of their communities. They were requested to inform their subjects accordingly as to secure their cooperation.

From each of the localities (communities) selected for the study, at least, two key informants were interviewed. The key informants comprised traditional ruler; academician, youth leader, women leader, religions leader, traditional/local opinion leader, parliamentarian and government functionary. In the absence of a sampling frame that contained a list of key informants, the informants were selected through purposive non-random sampling method. The choice of the same locality was to enable comparison of governance challenges and insecurity in the selected areas. In all, three traditional rulers, six traditional/local opinion leaders, three religious leaders, three youth leaders,

six women leaders, three government functionaries, two academicians, two parliamentarians and two journalists were interviewed. In brief, thirty key informants were interviewed.

6.4   Discussion of Finding

This section presents findings from the fieldwork. Four major themes were discerned from the discussions and interviews. These are assessment of governance and security situation in Imo State; identification of contemporary challenges to governance and security in the State; analysis of the responses of citizens to governance and security challenges and a review of the implications of these responses to governance and security in the State.

Governance and Security in Imo State: Past Government

All tiers of government in Nigeria are guided by the fundamental objectives and directive principles of State Policy enshrined in the constitution. Under this fundamental objectives and directive principles, the government of Imo State has adopted the following development objectives:

- The security of lives and property of the citizens, and the overall welfare of the people, is the utmost and primary purpose/function of government.

- Effectively harness the resources of the State, promote internal-prosperity and an efficient, dynamic and self reliant economy.

- Control of state economy in such a manner to secure the maximum welfare, freedom and happiness of every citizen on the basis of social justice and equality of status and opportunity.

- The promotion of a well planned and balanced economic development.

- The material/natural resources of the State are harnessed and effectively distributed as best as possible to serve the common good of the people.

- The economic system is not operated in such a manner as to permit the concentration of State wealth or the means of production and exchange in the hands of few individuals or of a group.

- Government shall direct its policy towards ensuring that there are equal and adequate educational opportunities at all levels.

- The National ethics adopted by the government shall be discipline, integrity, dignity of labour, social justice, religious tolerance, self reliance and patriotism (Imo Tripod Vision, 2006).

Majority of the discussants and key informants believe past government in Imo State performed poorly in governance and security in Imo State. The past governments refer to political regimes in the State, notably that of Chief Achike Udenwa (May 1999 – May 2007) and Chief Ikedi Ohakim (May 2007 – May 2011).

Most discussants indicated deficits in governance of Imo State, in terms of provision of jobs and infrastructural development. Governor Udenwa (May 1999 – May 2007) contributed immensely toward road constructions that linked many places in Imo State; Governor Ohakim (May 2007 – May 2011) established the Imo State Rural Roads Maintenance Agency (IRROMA), which was eventually criticized for not working most of the roads it claimed. It hired almost all equipped and machinery for its work and paid considerable amount of money on borrowed capital. The general perception is that IRROMA was designed to siphon public funds and that explains its dissolution by the current governor (Chief Okorocha) and its duties subsumed under the Ministry of Works.

Almost all the discussants and key informants were of the view that most existing infrastructural facilities in Imo State were provided by Governor Mbakwe (the Second Republic Governor). He attracted the few existing UNICEF – Assisted water projects in some communities. Most of the residents of the state currently depend on privately-owned water-boreholes, streams and ponds for water household and industrial consumption. This is in spite of

funds budgeted annually for water provision. For instance, the people of Okigwe do not have water though late President Umaru Yar'adua commissioned the Okigwe Regional Water Project in 2008. As a key informant said: thus:

> There are certain projects that the past governments executed which have really impacted on the lives of the people, such as rural areas, the state secretariat and certain infrastructural development. But unfortunately, some of these projects are now very big challenge to the present day government… because most of the roads, most of certain infrastructure have collapsed. Those who led Imo state, especially under the leadership of Sam Mbakwe, laid a foundation that really satisfied the people. But some of those foundations are being broken now. So, the major challenge that is facing the current Governor (Rochas Okorocha) even the governors after Sam Mbakwe is that of living up to expectation and making sure that all these foundations laid by the founders of Imo State are not allowed to decay and collapse.[114].

Governor Mbakwe built several roads and established basic infrastructures in various places in Imo State. These include enterprises such as Avutu Poultry, Obowo; Adapalm (with plantations at Ohaji and Mbaise); Standard Shoe Factory, Owerri; Amaraku Power Station (which provided an alternative electricity supply to the National Electric Power Authority, (NEPA); the Aluminium Extrusion Company (ALEX), Inyishi as well as encouraged cottage industries, all of which provided job opportunities to several school leavers and graduate youths. There is consensus amongst both key informants and discussants that most of the above – mentioned enterprises are either moribund and have been privatized with numerous workers laid-off from work, thus aggravating severe unemployment in Imo State.

---

[114] IDI, Journalist,<Chairman, NUJ,> Imo State

Job creation in Imo state is seemingly a challenge as the governors after Chief Mbakwe did not give it any considerable attention. As summarized by a key informant:

> Most of the youths have no job. If the government can assist to create job for us; if government can bring companies to us there would not be any problem. In all, there is problem actually.[115]

Specifically, Iwuonu Ikenna, special adviser on media to the Speaker, Imo State House of Assembly, remarked that Governor Ohakim did not build or rehabilitate any industry to provide jobs to the unemployed youths in Imo state.[116] He established the Imo Job Centre, which towards the end of his leadership in 2010 claimed to have given 10,000 jobs to unemployed persons in the State. Most respondents claimed that the job scheme was a scam.

Moreover, the unemployment situation in the state is worsened by the fact that most wealthy Imolites (that is, Imo indigenes) cannot establish their industrial or manufacturing enterprises in the State, due to constraints of bad roads, poor electricity supply and insecurity in the State. As an FGD discussant puts it:

> Our sons find it extremely difficult and risky to site and establish their meaningful business ventures in Imo State, because of the fear of insecurity, unsteady electricity, bad roads and lack of basic amenities.[117]

This point is confirmed by a youth leader who said:

> Due to insecurity, some of our wealthy relatives don't set up industries in Imo state … Doing business in Okigwe is very expensive, due to lack of electricity. Lack

---

[115] IDI, Youth Leader <President, Youth Group> Okigwe

[116] *Announcer Express*, August, 29 – 30, 2011.

[117] FGD, Unorganized Group, Woman, Umuna-Orlu

of electricity drove LIMCA Bottling Company away from Okigwe… Business is all about profit. Because there is lack of security, lack of good roads and electricity, most of our relatives do not consider setting industries in Okigwe.[118]

With respect to security, majority of the discussants believe that it degenerated after Chief Udenwa's administration with unprecedented cases of armed robbery and kidnapping during Chief Ohakim's regime (2007-2011). As a traditional ruler noted:

Yes, bad governance makes crimes to be on the increase. As in the past administration (Chief Ohakim's) in Imo state, some people threatened that "Onye kwu o, acho ya acho" (if anyone talks, he would be lost). The leaders know the criminals and who guides them.[119]

This point was also shared in different FGDs with one female participant observing that there was no kidnapping during the Udenwa period but kidnapping started as Ohakim became governor.[120]

The National Crime and Victimization Survey (NCVS) of CLEEN Foundation (2010) corroborated rising criminality in Imo State. Specifically, 11 percent of the total population of respondents had been victims of crime in Imo State as at 2010, mostly theft of mobile phone/GSM, money and robbery. A statistical 3 percent were victims of kidnap and one percent had a family member as victim of kidnap in 2010. In brief, robbery ranked highest (10%), after theft of money (31%) and theft of mobile phone/GSM (38%).

In order to understand the context for the parlous security situation in Imo state, it is necessary discuss the approaches of the last two governments in

---

[118](IDI, Youth Leader <Vice President, Youth Group>, Okigwe)
[119] IDI, Traditional Ruler, Okigwe.
[120] FGD, Unorganized Group, Female Omuna – Orlu.

the state. Although, Governor Udenwa did not embark on remarkable job creation programmes, he built a state secretariat complex and the Imo State University Teaching Hospital that provided jobs to people. Moreover, during his administration people were at liberty to perform their lawful economic activities without intimidation. On the other hand, the immediate past Governor (Chief Ohakim) through the Environmental Transformation Commission (ENTRACO) introduced a "Clean and Green Programme" in 2009, to beautify Owerri. This inadvertently became a bitter-sweet. Commercial motorcycle riding, popularly known as "inaga" was banned in Owerri on May 30, 2009; make-shift buildings (kiosks and caravans) and extensions to major buildings were demolished. A substantial population of Imo State lost their source of economic livelihood. This exacerbated the unemployment rate as the state lacked other opportunities for job creation. There is paucity of modern industries and corporate organizations to provide jobs for the teeming school leavers and graduates.

The foregoing has implications for criminal activities as supported by several reports on high incidences of armed robbery, kidnap and threats to life since 2008[121] Within the first quarter of 2009, Governor Ohakim setup a Vigilante Group at the local government secretariat of each of the 27 local government areas (LGAs) of the state. Toyota Hiace Bus was purchased for each of the Groups, with the inscription 'Vigilante Group' and the name of the concerned LGA embossed on both sides of the buses. However, the Vigilante group did not effectively ensure security in the State. As an informant puts it, 'the state government set up vigilante to reduce crimes but they did not do much'.[122]

Okereke (2009b) had found in his study of informal policing structures (IPS) in Imo State that the State Vigilante Groups were ineffective because they did not liaise with the informal policing structures (IPS Group) in the communities. On the contrary, they appeared to be used as spies for political information and to control restive political opponents such that threats to life, kidnapping

---

[121] See Table 1. Also see, Daily Champion, August 14, 2009; Nigerian Horn, Sept. 14 – 16, 2009; Nigerian Newspoint, Sept. 28 – 29, 2009; Sunday Statesman, Sept. 27 – Oct. 3, 2009..
[122] FGD, Unorganized Group, Male, Owerri

and other forms of criminality rose. It is not surprising that the state was rated as one of the worst states in Nigeria to do business due to insecurity.[123] Also, the National Association of Chambers of Commerce, Industry, Mines and Agriculture (NACCIMA) indicated in 2011 that the security challenges in the Southeast Nigeria (which includes Imo state) had worsened the already bad and unfriendly business environment negatively affecting growth of business and socio-economic activities in the area.[124]

Governance and Security in Imo State: Contemporary Challenge
The present government of Governor Okorocha is challenged to remedy the situation. The State was often taunted to be unlucky in good governance as most of the past governments lacked the political will to improve standard of living of the people through reduction in the levels of poverty and unemployment. Job creating opportunities are scarcely available, resulting to a high rate of negative net migration due to paucity of industries and corporate organization to provide jobs to the teeming unemployed youths. There are largely un-maintained roads, dilapidated infrastructures typified in dilapidated school buildings, poor health facilities with wanton service delivery, problem of water shortage or lack of potable water and poor electricity supply among others. In the words of a key informant:

> In Imo State, we lack leaders who will make the people follow from their heart and not from their head. The leaders do not have the interest of the people and it does not take long for the people to know… No structure is being found in Imo State. Those who claim to be leaders have failed because they have always wanted to sell and betray themselves…[125]

Several discussants and key informants argued that the present government was faced with the problems of improving governance through the rehabilitation

---

[123] See. , www.nairaland.com/nigeria/topic-778170.0.html).

[124] Ibid.
[125] IDI, Academician, IMSU-Owerri.

of security. The governor identified these problems during his electoral campaign and promised to address them. Few discussants complained about unfulfilled promises of the present government. Sources in government claim that some of the criticisms are aimed at distracting the new administration. As a commissioner puts it:

> All we need in this state (Imo State) is peaceful environment. Let the opposition stop distracting this government… how can you really achieve in a very hostile environment?… From the first day of this government (Rochas Okorocha government), it has been there: Everyday… we came out from the court and we are still in one form of litigation or the other. So, is that how government works?[126]

However, some discussants and key informants commended the efforts of the present government to complete abandoned road constructions of past governments and to provide access roads to several places in the State. They also claim that the job scheme of the previous government of Chief Ohakim, which many saw as scam has been resolved and fruitful attempts made towards security.

The insecurity in Imo State could be interpreted as an outcome of the insensitive political and socio-economic policies of past governments that exacerbated sufferings through exposure of the youths to poverty, starvation and joblessness. Paradoxically, the necessity to prioritize security issues was least considered even though crime rates had risen to unprecedented levels. Both discussants and key informants are agreed that the present government has a challenging task to provide security in the State by, at least, reducing the high rate of armed robbery and kidnapping in the State.

It is generally believed that a common factor of insecurity, especially armed robbery and kidnapping is joblessness. Elechi Amadi had cautioned that the

---

[126] IDI, Government Functionary, Commissioner for LG & Chieftaincy Affairs> Imo State.

solution of kidnapping is to provide employment to the youths to make them not have time to take people to the bush to extort money.[127] Similarly, others have argued that insecurity is engendered by uneven distribution of resources, discouragement of the culture of hard work, dishonest leaders, failed leadership, mass unemployment, negligence of the plight of the masses and ineptitude of the judicial system and security agencies.[128]

Most discussants and key informants criticized the police for poor management of information, especially, in the disclosure of identity of person(s) that reported against a suspect and for not being readily available to prevent or control crime. This behaviour makes the public suspect that some policemen aid criminal activities, especially when instances exist where policemen were confirmed as allies to criminal gangs. The poor performance of the police on security in Imo State was attributed largely to corruption. In fairness, little consideration was made on how police efficiency could be compromised by absence of cooperation from the public and institutional support.

In spite of the apparent irresponsibility of some local government (LG) leaders in the management of LG Funds, most discussants and key informants argued that LGs are so financially incapacitated that they can not provide security, due to the pittance usually given them by the State from the State/LG Joint Account. The operations of this account has generated much controversies across the country, leading to support for widespread calls for its abrogation by Engr. Elias Mbam, Chairman of the Revenue Mobilization Allocation and Fiscal Commission (RMAFC).

The study also found that the imbroglio between most traditional rulers and the leadership of town unions of their communities contributed to insecurity. There is perception that some community leaders were complicit in generating insecurity. For instance, Mr. Aloysius Okorie, Commissioner of Police in Imo State command had claimed that some of the traditional rulers provided

---

[127] Sunday Champion, Feb, 1, 2009
[128] See, www.vanguardngr.com/2010/07/improving-security-situation-of -the-south-East.

sanctuaries for criminals in their domains because they used such criminals to fight their perceived enemies.[129] This perception was reinforced by a university lecturer who said:

> Imo State has a sort of worst problem when it comes to the aspect of security, because some bad characters are found in the traditional leaders who aid the unemployed youth to commit crime for their selfish interest and later shelter them from facing the wrath of the law.[130]

The study also found that some members of the vigilante groups in the communities are cronies used by dubious traditional rulers to perpetrate crimes under the guise of vigilantism. Certain instances were cited by some key informants where some members of vigilante groups sent false alarm of increased insecurity to justify their continued existence in order to defraud members of the community and to oppress political opponents of the traditional rulers.

State and Citizens Response to Contemporary Security Challenges
Security is paramount for both entrepreneurship and a happy citizenry. The belief that justice can be obtained when wrong is done to both individuals and corporate bodies, is fundamental in any society. Given the above scenario, the security of lives and property of Imo citizens cannot be compromised if the State is to achieve its objective for a private sector led growth and development. Security of life and property is therefore not negotiable. Presently the State is relatively not peaceful, the existence of in adequate and unreliable security infrastructure notwithstanding. The control and management of security apparatus is centralized at the Federal level. However, the State government is complementing Federal Government efforts through providing assistance to police and other security agencies.[131]

129See, *Newswatch*, June 29, 2009
130IDI, Academician, IMSU-Owerri.
131 www.igbofocus. co.uk.imostatesecurity.

It is apposite to note that Imo State since the emergence of democracy in 1999 has been battled with diverse security problems mostly kidnapping, assassination and armed robbery. To meet new challenges to this security threat, the Imo State government both past and present adopted diverse strategy to tackle the menace. Yet, security remains elusive to most of the residents of the state. As one youth leader opined:

> Well, people are really yearning. They want to see improvement: they want to see changes. People want to sleep with both eyes closed… people want their leaders to really put some programmes in place that would secure them. For example, recently the state governor (Rochas Okorocha) launched the "Operation Rescue Mission". So many people believed this (Rochas Okorocha) launched the "Operation Rescue Mission". So many people believed this is not enough…[132]

Various potent measures aimed at strengthening the security of lives and property in Imo State have been undertaken since the inception of office by the present Governor, Owelle Rochas Okorocha on May 29th 2011. At the community and grassroot level, a local vigilante service was set up and the local vigilante outfits now enforce an order whereby residents are stopped from operating their generator sets beyond 11pm, primarily to discourage criminals taking advantage of the noise emanating from the generator sets. Other measures taken by the local vigilante outfits include the restriction of movement of people very late in the night and monitoring of movements of some people living in the communities, particularly those whose source of livelihood are in doubt as well as those who are known to have criminal record.

Apparently impressed with the conduct of the local vigilante group in these communities, the governor, in a meeting with the State Council of Traditional Rulers recently authorized them (the traditional rulers) to supervise the job of the local vigilante outfits in their respective communities. The governor

---

[132] IDI, Youth leader, <Ndegwu Community>, Imo State

provided them with the necessary logistics and support to enable them combat crime at the barest minimum. Among the materials provided by the governor are buses, weapons and other security gadgets. In the same vein, the governor commended the local vigilante groups for their patriotism and dedication to duty, but charged them to work with more enthusiasm and also subject themselves to the authority of their traditional rulers. The logic behind the above is that the criminals live in the communities.

The government directed traditional rulers to cut (that is, to clear) all communal forests "Okohia" (a natural habitat for the conservation of wild trees, palm trees etc.) based on the understanding that they provided hide-outs for criminals. Community Development Committees (CDCs) and Community Development Leadership have been formed in all communities in the State with a direct phone line to the Anti-Terrorist Squad for dissemination of information on kidnap and armed robbery. To complement the foregoing, the government launched 'community policing' in Imo State to ameliorate the unhealthy separation between the public and police. Several studies have shown that community policing which involves effective work partnerships between the police and the community could play an important role in reducing crime (see, Skolnick and Bayley 1990, Sparrow, Moore and Kennedy 1990, and Moore 1992). In Imo State, there is a reduced Police presence on the roads, especially "road blocks": for "stop and check" of vehicles. In effect, illegal extortion of ₦20 from, especially, commercial vehicle drivers has dramatically reduced. This has potentials to encourage the police towards best practices in performing their duties and to secure public confidence in the police.

At the higher level, the present State Government also adopted series of initiatives to curb the increasing menace of armed robbery and kidnapping in the State. The government engaged a Joint Task Force (JTF) (comprising the Army, Navy, Mobile Police and SSS) to provide security in the State. Due, perhaps, to the public distrust for the police very few policemen are involved in the joint task force. The government provided support both financially and materially to various security agencies in the State to ensure that the State remains peaceful and devoid of threats to the security of lives and property of Imo citizens.

Some discussants and key informants reported the present government equipped the security agencies with, at least, 100 new HILUX Vehicles to intensify and boost their movement. Possibly with the aim of dealing a death blow to criminal activities in Imo, the government proposed an emergency meeting with all the criminals in the State and the service chiefs. The governor proposed granting Amnesty to the criminals who changed their lifestyles and ready to change for better. He also promised to provide them job opportunities.[133]

The government has appointed new high court judges, magistrates and other legal officers to ensure timely and quick dispensation of justice, as justice delayed, is justice denied. Added to the above is the fact that government has created avenues through which justice can be made affordable and accessible by establishing a department in the ministry of justice for Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR). The state government has also acknowledged that the increase in crime rates in Imo State is as result of high level of economic and social problems: high employment rate, increase in income disparity between the rich and the poor, excessive poverty and high cost of living standards, lack of infrastructures and other social facilities.

Consequently, the government has carried out diverse economic and socio-cultural development programmes to raise the living standards of the people as a way of turning them away from crime. The government of Imo State under Rochas aims at provide employment and other economic/social services to the people as a strategy for securing the lives and property of Imo people.

Finally, the Imo State government has heightened security agenda in the State by making conclusions on an arrangement to demolish all illegal buildings where Indian hemp and other hard drugs are sold and consumed in Imo State and its environs. The Secretary to the State Government (SSG) recently said that the action is deemed necessary because of the link between Youth's consumption of drugs and crime in the State, especially armed robbery and kidnapping.

---

[133] www.onlinenigeria.com/link /imostategovt

The confidence and acceptability of the JTF is demonstrated through the willingness of the public to disclose information to the JTF, to assist them reach the criminals. Most discussants and key informants reported that the JTF has killed several criminals in the State; identified several hide-outs of the criminals and recovered their weapons, smashed three (3) notorious kidnap kingpins in the State, such that crimes have abated in the State. In the words of a key informant:

> …we are having an overlap, particularly from the Orlu-Orsu axis. You know how porous that area is: you have a link road to Nnewi; you have a link road to Anambra State, Ihiala; you have some exit points there. Other places have been check-mated. We are having a loose thread at those places. The security agencies are aware of this; the governor is aware of that. For that reason, we have also encouraged him (the governor) to acquire more security vehicles and gadgets for them so that they check-mate that angle. Most of the kidnappings now happen in Orlu Zone and it is because of these areas I am telling you… In no distant time all those crimes will be check-mated.[134]

These assertions are corroborated by media reports of modest success recorded by the security agencies in apprehending criminals in the state (see Table 1).

Implications of Dependence on Traditional Rulers and Community Security
The foregoing discussion shows residents of Imo State depend heavily on traditional rulers and communal security arrangements. This has four major implications.

First, community leadership in terms of town unions could play tremendous roles in the easy identification of criminals. With a schedule that features people, the President General of a community could mention those with questionable characters. Even if such persons are not directly involved in a

---

[134] IDI, Parliamentarian, Nkwerre State Constituency, Imo House of Assembly.

particularly crime, they may be guiding their criminal friend from another community to perpetrate crime in their own community. Second, formation of vigilante groups involving youths and volunteers who have good character could reduce crimes in the communities. People would be willing to volunteer information when they see somebody with questionable character and on those they feel would be a problem to the community. Third, with security in communities entrusted on traditional rulers and as some of them have criminal intent, they could appoint their stooge into the vigilante and, in effect, obviate the very essence of vigilantism. Finally, a cordial relationship between traditional rulers and the president generals of their communities is a functional pre-requisite for security in the communities. It provides synergy for effective community leadership and for an effective fight against insecurity in the communities.

6.5   Conclusion and Recommendations

Imo State is rich in human and material/natural resources, culture and heritage, etc. However, the socio-economic reality of the State today shows a paradox of poverty amidst plenty and is correlated with the prevalent insecurity in the State.

Based on the data collected, three key findings are discernible. First, majority of the respondents believed that since May 2011 there have been improvements in the governance and security of Imo State. At least, attention has been made on infrastructural development particularly road constructions and resolution of the 10,000 job scam of the immediate past administrations.

Secondly, more attention is given to security. The Joint Task Force (JTF), comprising the army, navy, State Security Services (SSS) and mobile policemen have been engaged to aggressively fight armed robbery and kidnapping in the State. To further strengthen security in the State and to erase the fossilized distrust people have for the police, the government has launched a community policing programme. Traditional rulers have been challenged to take responsibility of security of their communities as the criminals live in communities.

Thirdly, this study found that the State and citizens of Imo State are motivated to control insecurity in the State. It has been reported that crimes in Imo State have abated, largely due to information given to the Anti-Terrorism Squad and the JTF as several armed robbers and kidnap kingpins have been killed.

To address some of the challenges of security identified in the study, we suggest the following:

1) Government should expedite effort at infrastructural development as several discussants complained that lack of infrastructures, particularly good roads and electricity prevented wealthy Imolites from establishing their job creating enterprises in Imo State.

2) The government should enlist the support of corporate organizations to site industries, establish job creating business in Imo State due to the comparative advantage which Imo State has as a transit route for most South-South States and its central location in the South-Eastern Nigeria.

3) Relevant reforms should be made to strengthen the relationship between traditional institutions (the traditional rulers and community development associations) to empower them for good governance and efficiency in the provision of security.

4) Government should reconsider its directive for cutting of the "Okohia" . This is because it did not adequately consider providing alternatives for the poor persons who earn living by tapping palm-wine, fetching shrimps, snails, firewood etc at the "Okohia". Also, it did not consider the consequence of an inevitable loss in supply of palm wine and other "Okohia- based products" in the market.

5) State security and development policy must be deepening, broadening and encompassing. It is a policy that must in recent governance take numerous factors into consideration.

6) Finally, there is need for a robust State Security objective that affirms, promotes and sustains the overall well-being and happiness of the people and also encourages foreign investors in the State. For as Harold Brown, one time United States Secretary of Defense has said, security is… "the ability to preserve a nation's internal

security, integrity and territory encourages good life among the people, as it enhances political, economic, religious and socio-cultural development of the people" (The Leader, 2011).

References

Ekeh, Peter P. 'A review of HRW's and CLEEN's Report, The Bakassi Boys: The Legitimization of Murder and Torture on State sponsored Vigilante Groups in Nigeria'. (waado.org/Nigerdelta/Documents/Constitutionalmatters/PoliceVigilante/ReviewBakassiBoys-Ekeh.html).

Emenalor, F.U. and Akanwa, P.C. (2007). From Land of Hope to Eastern Heartland: Government and People of Imo State from 1976 – 2006. Owerri: BAF Communication.

Federal Republic of Nigeria Official Gazette (2007), Vol. 94, No. 24. Lagos, Nigeria. 15th May.

Fourchard, L. (2008). 'A new name for an old practice: Vigilantes in South-Western Nigeria'. *Africa*. 78 (1): 6-4.

Ginifer, J. and Olawale, I. (2007). 'Armed Violence and Poverty in Nigeria'. March. www.brad.ac.uk/acade/cics/publications /AVPI/poverty/AVPI_Nigeria.pdf)

Higazi, A (2008). 'Social Mobilization and Collective Violence: Vigilantes and Militias in the Lowlands of Plateau State, Central Nigeria. *Africa* 78 (1): 107-135.

Hobbes, Thomas quoted in Haralambos, M & Holborn, M. (2007). Sociology: Themes and Perspectives. 7th Edition. London: HaperCollins Publishers Limited.

Imo State of Nigeria, Government White Paper. Report of the Judicial Commission of Inquiry into the Disturbances of 24-25 September, 1996 in Owerri (Government Printer, 1997).

Imo Tripod Vision: State Economic Empowerment and Development Strategy. (SEEDS) 2006. pp. 45-47.

Imo Tripod Vision: State Economic Empowerment and Development Strategy. (SEEDS) 2006. pp. 45-47.

Jide, K. (2008). Security and Safety. Lagos: Pan Books Ltd.

Moore, M.H. (1992). 'Community Policing', in Modern Policing. Tonry, M. and Morris, N. (eds). Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

National Crime and Victimization Survey (NCVS) (2010). Lagos: CLEEN Foundation.

Natufe, O.I. (2007). "Governance and Politics in Nigeria'. A Lecture Delivered in November 21, 2006 at the Staff and Graduate Seminar, Department of Political Science & Public Administration, University of Benin, Nigeria. (www.dawodu.com/natufe4,htm)

Okereke, C.I. (2004). 'Vigilantism: A Neighbourhood response and participation in crime prevention in Aba, Southeastern Nigerian', Abia State University Law Journal. Vol. 9, pp. 111-132.

Okereke, C.I. (2009a). 'Community Safety and Community Policing in Imo State, Nigeria'. Submitted to Security, Justice & Growth Programme Nigeria/ British Council/DFID.

Okereke, C.I. (2009b). 'Impact Survey on Community Policing in Imo State, Nigeria'. Submitted to Security, Justice & Growth Programme Nigeria/British Council/DFID.

Onwubiko, E. (2000). The Nigerian Government and Security. Human Writers Association of Nigeria. Pp. 16-18.

Otu, Smart E. (2003). Armed Robbery in the Southeastern States of Contemporary Nigeria: A Criminological Analysis. PhD Thesis. University of South Africa.

Skolnick, J.H. and Bayley D.H. (1986). 'The New Blue Line' Police Innovation in Six American Cities. New York: Free Press.

Smith, D.J. (2004). 'The Bakassi Boys: Vigilantism, Violence and Political Imagination in Nigeria". Current Anthropology 19 (3): 429-455.

Sparrow, M.K., Moore, M.H. and Kennedy, D.M. (1990). Beyond 911: A New Era for Policing. New York: Basic.

Internet sources
http://.www.igbofocus.co.uk.imostateandsecurity.
http://.www.igbofocus.co.uk.imostateandsecurity.
http://.www.imostategovt.ng/info.securityinthestate
http://.www.imostategovt.ng/info.securityinthestate
http://.www.onlinenigeria.com/links/imostategovt.
http://.www.onlinenigeria.com/links/imostategovt.
http://www.wikipedia.org/imostategov.ng/info.
http://www.wikipedia.org/imostategov.ng/info.

Newspapers
Announcer Express Newspaper, 2-3 March, 2011
Announcer Express Newspaper, 25-27 March, 2011
Announcer Express, 29-30 August 2011
Anonymous (a). "Improving Security Situation of the Southeast" Assessed Online on July 27, 2010 at www.vanguardngr.com/2010/07 /improving-security-situation-of-the-south-east.

Anonymous (b) "Kidnapping has become Big Business in Southeast Nigeria". Assessed Online on October 9, 2011 at www.nairaland.com/Nigeria/topic-778170.0.html

Business Day, 24 March 2010
Daily Champion Newspaper, 14 August 2009
Daily Champion: Security Agenda in Imo State. February 24 2012. Pp. 22.

Daily Champion: Security Agenda in Imo State. February 24 2012. Pp. 22.

Daily sun Newspaper, 10 November 2011
Daily Sun Newspaper, 10 September, 2009
Daily Sun Newspaper, 4 March 2010
Daily Sun Newspaper, 4 October 2010
Nigerian Horn Newspaper, October 2009.
Nigerian Horn Newspaper, September 14-16 2009.
Nigerian Horn Newspaper, September 28-30, 2009.
Nigerian Newspoint Newspaper, September 28-29, 2009.

Sunday Champion, July 5 2009.
Sunday Champion, November 21, 2010.
Sunday Statesman, September 27- October 3, 2009.
The Leader: Security and the Government of Imo State. Sunday Sept. 4 2011.
        Pp 14.

The White Paper (2011). Security in Imo State. What Next? Friday December
        16, 2011. Pp.14.

Appendix I:

NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS

Chijioke Kelechi IWUAMADI is a researcher and a Political Scientist. He holds a Masters Degree (M.Sc.) in Political Science with specialization in International Relations; B.Sc. (Hons) Political Science; and a Diploma in Social Works, all from the University of Nigeria, Nsukka. In addition, he has expertise in Quantitative Data Analysis and Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E). He is a Laureate of the Council for the Development of Social Science Research in Africa (CODESRIA) Methodological Institute of Qualitative Social Research in Africa. He has been involved in several scientific research projects carried out by various research and training institutions, national and international non-governmental organizations. He is currently a Research Fellow at the Institute for Development Studies, University of Nigeria where he is doing his Ph.D programme in Development Studies. His academic and research interests are in Democratic Governance, Civil Society, Human Security, Environment and Development related issues, among others.

Mrs. Magdalene Ozeh EMOLE is a lecturer at the Department of General Studies, Abia State Polytechnic, Aba. She is a sociologist by training.

Nkwachukwu ORJI is a Research Fellow at the Institute for Development Studies, University of Nigeria, Enugu Campus. He holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from Central European University, Budapest. He was previously a political science lecturer at Ebonyi State University Abakaliki, and has held fellowships at Nordic African Institute, Uppsala and Institute of Federalism, Fribourg. Dr. Orji has published widely in local and international journals, contributed to various edited collections, and authored and co-authored a number of books. He is an active member of Nigerian Political Science Association (NPSA), International Political Science Association (IPSA), and Council for Development of Social Science Research in Africa (CODESRIA). His research is focused on political institutions (including elections, political

parties, federalism, and power-sharing), as well as on security, conflict, peace-building, and development.

Dr Chukwunenye Iheanacho OKEREKE is a Senior Lecturer of Sociology at the University of PortHarcourt, Port Harcourt – Nigeria. He is a member of renowned learned societies, notably Union for African Population Studies (UAPS), International Union for the Scientific Study of Population (IUSSP) and European Society for Contraception and Reproductive Health (ESC). Dr Okereke has research interests on population studies and organizational behaviour and has published extensively on these areas in both local and international journals, with some of his publications easily accessible online. He has been an UNFPA Consultant on in-depth interview and focus group discussion (IDI/FGD).He has reviewed numerous manuscripts for publication considerations in international journals. Dr Okereke is the author of such mainline books as Basic Demography, Urbanization and Methods of Social Investigation.

Smart E OTU (PhD criminology) University of South Africa, PhD (Sociology) The University of the Western Cape, Cape Town. A fellow of West Africa Research Association; former intern of Drug Policy Research Centre, RAND Corporation Santa Monica, Ca. Currently, Smart teaches in the department of Sociology/Anthropology, Ebonyi State University, Abakaliki Nigeria. His research interest lies in organized crime, armed robbery, drugs, theory deconstruction and reconstruction, corruption, criminal profiling, etc and has published quite widely in these areas. He is a member of many professional associations including, Nigeria Anthropology and Sociology Association, International Association of Criminal Justice Practitioners, and American Society of Criminology (ASC), etc.

Mrs. Adanna Henri-UKOHA is a Lecturer at the Department of Agricultural Economics, Federal University of Technology, Owerri, Imo State, Nigeria. Her research interests are in the areas of Food Security, Gender, Land tenure and Climate change. She is a consultant for the World Bank (FADAMA111) Project in Abia State.

Ukoha O. UKIWO is a senior lecturer at the Department of Political and Administrative Studies, University of Port Harcourt. He earned his doctorate in Development Studies from University of Oxford, United Kingdom. He was a research fellow at Centre for Advanced Social Science, Port Harcourt. He has also been awarded visiting scholarship positions at Institute of International Studies, University of California, Berkeley and Department of Political Science and International Relations, Catholic University, Leuven, Belgium. Dr. Ukiwo has published widely on democracy, identity politics, conflict and political economy of development.

Appendix II

COMMUNIQUE
STRATEGY MEETING ON DEMOCRACY AND GOVERNANCE IN THE SOUTH EAST HELD AT LINKS HOTEL, OWERRI, JUNE 4, 2011

Introduction
In the General Elections of 2011, the people of southeastern Nigeria insisted on the emergence of political leaders who reflect the will of their people. Their vigilance in pursuit of this desire resulted in outcomes that were celebrated in some states. On the whole however, the existing political leadership of the region has been a disappointment to the people at the state and federal levels. Against this background, concerned leaders of advocacy communities from southeastern Nigeria met at Links Hotel Owerri on June 4, 2011 to deliberate on the future of democracy and governance in the region. The one-day strategy meeting was organized to enable participants from diverse backgrounds and callings encompassing business, academia, human rights advocacy, religious organizations, legal practitioners, media, politicians and other professional groups, to discuss and articulate organizational and programmatic responses to challenges facing the region as well as fashioning out ways of broadening the dialogue with other groups within and beyond the region.

Challenges Facing the Southeast
Participants, through various submissions and lively debates concluded that the southeast is confronted by problems of existential proportions, which include the following:

- **Crisis of Leadership**: the Southeast has been afflicted by a group of political leaders who are mostly opportunistic, self-serving and lacking in vision for the public good. While there are exceptions to this general trend in some States, these exceptions have not been enough to galvanize wider transformation in the leadership values of the region;

- **Criminalization of Politics and Governance**: In most parts of the region, elections have become an organized crime in which political actors deploy violence, bribery and subterfuge to hijack state power for the sole purpose of diverting public treasuries to satisfy personal ends. This creates an environment in which governments are neither accountable nor responsive to the aspirations of the people.

- **De-Industrialisation, Intolerable Transaction Costs & Mass Unemployment**: The region has become de-industrialised by bad governance and violent politics. At the last count over 30 state-owned and private investments located in the region have gone under. These include: Golden Guinea Breweries Umuahia, Premier Breweries Onitsha, Ikenga Hotels Nsukka, Anambra Vegetable Oil Products Limited (AVOP), Anambra State Livestock Products Limited, Nigergas Company Limited, Nigersteel Company Limited, Sunrise Floor Mills, Aluminium Products Limited, Premier Cashew Industries, Ezinnachi Clay Industries, Resin and Paint factory Mbaise, Adapalm Limited, Standard Shoe Industry Owerri, Avutu Poultry, Amaraku Power Station, salt factories in Ikwo, and Ebonyi Building Materials Company.

- **A Land-Locked Region**: The South-East is the only geopolitical zone in Nigeria that is landlocked without any international outlets. This impedes efforts to attract viable investments and spikes transaction cost, making the cost of manufacturing, trade and services very expensive. Together, these have led to high unemployment among a highly educated youth population, which in turn feeds crime.

- **Loss of Human Capital**: Among the six-geo-political zones of Nigeria, the Southeast is the biggest exporter of its first rate and best human capital. This denudes the region of human capital needed to service its own development and needs. A major reason for this is the absence of a viable industrial base to engage both the experienced and thousands of young people graduating every year from higher institutions.

Other serious challenges facing the southeast, which were highlighted by the participants were:

- Marginalization of women in the cultural, social, political and economic life of the people and inability to fully engage their human capital in the development of the region. In particular, married women suffer severe discrimination and impaired rights of citizenship leading to a situation where they almost become stateless once they get married.

- Lack of dialogue, interface and synergy among leaders of the region active in various sectors such as politics, economy, academia, media, human rights and governance, and gender activism; and

- Transformation of security agents to an occupation force once they are posted to the region rather than protectors of the people. Quite a number of security agents in the region have been implicated in serious crimes, including robbery, kidnapping, rape and extra-judicial killings. The sense of insecurity in the region has not been affected by the mass deployment of multiple police checkpoints across the region. Rather than protect the people, these checkpoints are routinely used by police officers to extort money from the people.

Resolutions

In response to the foregoing challenges, the participants resolved to:

- Work towards facilitating the emergence of a reoriented political leadership inspired by a value system that places the highest premium on service, accountability and selfless representation of the people. For this purpose, we will work with other interested people and organisations in the region to identify case studies and change agents around whom this can be built.

- Promote the vision of regional inter-dependence and economic integration of the States of South-Eastern Nigeria as a veritable vehicle for achieving faster economic development as an alternative to the

'silo mentality' and nondescript and disarticulated developments plans of governments in the zone.

- Engage the Federal Government of Nigeria to rethink and redress the longstanding exclusion and neglect of the southeast in the allocation of major developmental projects such as power stations, road networks, water and irrigation projects and petrochemical industries despite the oil and gas endowments of the region.

- Promote gender mainstreaming at all levels of governance in the region (executive, judiciary and legislature) and ensure that issues affecting women in the cultural, political, social and economic life of the people are adequately addressed.

- Engage legislatures and governments in the region to urgently enact a Freedom of information Law in each of the States of the region as a foundational instrument of transparent and accountable governance.

- Promote mainstreaming of right-based approach to community development among town unions and development associations in the region as an alternative to self-help approach, which has inadvertently encouraged governments to abdicate their responsibilities with the expectation that town unions would task themselves and provide basic amenities to their communities.

- Promote the organization of a genuinely representative platform where leaders of the region, including women, youth and civic leaders as well as political office holders, business leaders, academia, religious leaders, media owners, leading professionals, leaders in the Diaspora and civil society activists would meet periodically to share ideas and reach common understanding for the advancement of the best interests of the region.

- Mandate the CLEEN Foundation to conduct an action research on security and governance challenges in the southeast with a view to

establishing an empirical basis for advocacy on the issues as well as a baseline against which progress of intervention programmes can be measured.

Establishment of the Southeast Forum (SEF)

At the end of the deliberations, participants agreed to establish a forum to be known and called South-East Forum (SEF), to pursue the resolutions of the meeting. The mission of SEF is to promote democracy, good governance, development and security in the southeast.

The participants also appointed a Planning and Mobilization Committee (PMC), whose remit includes:

- Expanding the network of membership of SEF among target groups and sectors;

- Organization of a region-wide summit on Democracy, Governance and Security in the Southeast before the end of 2011;

- Establishment of a secretariat for the Forum in Owerri;

- Networking with similar organizations in other regions of Nigeria with a view to fashioning a national agenda on democracy, good governance and security.

- Members of the Committee are:

  Olisa Agbakoba, SAN
  Dr. Sam Amadi
  Ijeoma Chinakwe
  Innocent Chukwuma
  Oby Nwankwo
  Rev. Dr. Casmir Nze
  Dr. Jude Ohanele
  Dr. Chidi Anselm Odinkalu

Rev. Fr. Obinna Odinkalu
Dr. Ukoha Ukiwo
Okechukwu Nwanguma

Dr. Chidi Odinkalu
Co-Convener

Innocent Chukwuma
Co-Convener

CLEEN FOUNDATION'S PUBLICATIONS

JOURNEY TO CIVIL RULE
A Report on the Presidential Primaries of the All Peoples Party (APP) & Peoples' Democratic Party (PDP) February 13-15, 1999 Published in 1999

POLICING A DEMOCRACY
A Survey Report on the Role and Functions of the Nigeria Police in a Post-Military Era
Published in 1999

LAW ENFORCEMENT REVIEW
Quarterly Magazine
Published since the first quarter of 1998

CONSTABLE JOE
A Drama Series On Police Community Relations In Nigeria, Published in 1999

POLICE-COMMUNITY VIOLENCE IN NIGERIA
Published in 2000

JUVENILE JUSTICE ADMINISTRATION IN NIGERIA
Philosophy And Practice, Published in 2001

GENDER RELATIONS AND DISCRIMINATION IN NIGERIA POLICE FORCE
Published in 2001

FORWARD MARCH
A Radio Drama Series on Civil Military Relations In Nigeria, Published in 2001

HOPE BETRAYED
A Report on Impunity and State-Sponsored Violence in Nigeria, Published in 2002

CIVILIAN OVERSIGHT AND ACCOUNTABILITY OF POLICE IN NIGERIA
Published in 2003

POLICE AND POLICING IN NIGERIA
Final Report on the Conduct of the Police In the 2003 Elections, Published in 2003

CIVIL SOCIETY AND CONFLICT MANAGEMENT IN THE NIGER DELTA
Monograph Series, No. 2, Published in 2006

CRIMINAL VITIMIZATION SAFETY AND POLICING IN NIGERIA: 2005
Monograph Series, No. 3 Published in 2006

CRIMINAL VITIMIZATION SAFETY AND POLICING IN NIGERIA: 2006
Monograph Series, No. 4, Published in 2007

BEYOND DECLARATIONS
Law Enforcement Officials and ECOWAS Protocols on Free Movement of Persons and Goods in West Africa
Published in 2007

POLICE AND POLICING IN WEST AFRICA
Proceedings of a Regional Conference
Published in 2008

IN THE EYES OF THE BEHOLDER
A Post-Election Survey Report
Published in 2009

CRY FOR JUSTICE
Proceedings of a Public Tribunal on Police Accountability in Nigeria
Published in 2009

GOOD PRACTICE GUIDE
Establishing a School-Based Crime Prevention Programme
Published in 2009

ANOTHER ROUTINE OR FUNDAMENTAL CHANGE?
Police Reform in Nigeria 1999 till date
Published in 2009

POLICING WOMEN AND CHILDREN IN NIGERIA
Training Manual
Published in 2009

CITIZENSHIP AND IDENTITY POLITICS IN NIGERIA:
Conference Proceedings
Monograph Series, No. 5
Published in 2009

CRIMINAL VITIMIZATION SAFETY IN LAGOS STATE
Monograph Series, No. 6
Published in 2010

CORRUPTION AND GOVERNANCE CHALLENGES IN NIGERIA:
Conference Proceedings
Monograph Series, No. 7
Published in 2010

POLICING ELECTION IN NIGERIA
Assessment of the Role of Nigeria Police in Election in Nigeria
Published in 2010

ENHANCING ACCOUNTABILITY SYSTEMS IN THE NIGERIA POLICE FORCE
Conference Proceedings
Monograph series 8, Published in 2010

EMERGENCY RESPONSE TO VICTIMS OF GUN VIOLENCE AND ROAD ACCIDENTS
Conference Proceedings

Monograph series 9, Published in 2010