



CLEEN
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Justice Sector Reform | Security | Governance

ELECTION SECURITY THREAT ASSESSMENT (ESTA) SERIES

2026 OSUN STATE GUBERNATORIAL ELECTION



ESTA | **PRE-ELECTION
RISK SURVEY**



OSUN STATE GUBERNATORIAL ELECTION

ESTA Pre-Election Risk Survey


1. Overview & Sample Composition

This report presents a descriptive analysis of the ESTA Public Perception Survey on pre-election risk factors ahead of the Osun State Gubernatorial Election, following the data-cleaning exercise that standardized enumerator names and removed submissions recorded after 4:00pm (local time) on 20 July 2026.

Of the 693 valid, on-time submissions retained after cleaning, 24 respondents did not consent to participate and the survey ended immediately for them (no substantive data collected). The descriptive analysis below is therefore based on the 669 respondents who consented and completed the questionnaire.


1.1 Demographic Profile

Age Band	N	%
18-25	92	13.8%
26-35	149	22.3%
36-45	187	28%
46-55	150	22.4%
56 Above	91	13.6%



Sex	N	%
Male	363	54.3%
Female	306	45.7%

Respondent Sex Distribution (n=669)




1.2 Geographic Distribution (LGA of Residence) — All LGAs

Respondents were drawn from 28 of Osun State's 30 LGAs (no respondents recorded residence in Ilesa East or Aiyedire in this sample).

LGA	N	%
Ejigbo	58	8.7%
Ola Oluwa	46	6.9%
Ifelodun	44	6.6%
Egbedore	40	6%
Irewole	37	5.5%
Oriade	35	5.2%
Osogbo	34	5.1%
Ede North	34	5.1%
Ila	32	4.8%
Obokun	29	4.3%
Isokan	28	4.2%
Iwo	27	4%
Boripe	22	3.3%
Ife South	22	3.3%
Boluwaduro	21	3.1%
Odo Otin	20	3%
Ife North	20	3%

LGA	N	%
Irepodun	19	2.8%
Ife Central	19	2.8%
Ede South	18	2.7%
Atakunmosa West	16	2.4%
Ife East	15	2.2%
Ifedayo	12	1.8%
Atakunmosa East	12	1.8%
Orolu	4	0.6%
Olorunda	2	0.3%
Aiyedaade	2	0.3%
Ilesa West	1	0.1%


All 28 LGAs of Residence (n=669)



2. Overall Election Outlook

Respondents were asked directly: "On the whole, how do you think this election will go?"

Response	N	%
Very Peaceful	134	20%
Peaceful	241	36%
Not Sure	157	23.5%
Violent	84	12.6%
Very Violent	53	7.9%



A combined 56.0% of respondents expect a peaceful election ("very peaceful" + "peaceful"), 23.5% are unsure, and 20.5% anticipate some degree of violence. This cautious-but-net-positive outlook coexists with high perceived risk on specific, structural drivers detailed in Section 3 — i.e., respondents distinguish between the general mood and the presence of concrete risk factors.

3. Risk Driver Batteries (% Agree / Strongly Agree)


For each risk statement, respondents rated agreement on a 5-point scale (1 = Strongly Disagree to 5 = Strongly Agree). The tables and charts below report the share who agreed or strongly agreed (score of 4 or 5) that the factor could cause election violence, plus the mean score, ranked from highest to lowest concern within each battery.

3.1 Core Election-Violence Risk Drivers

These are stand-alone risk items not grouped into a themed battery in the questionnaire.

Item	N	% Agree/Strongly Agree	Mean (1–5)
Do you agree that the presence of armed non-state actors (e.g., thugs-for-hire, bandits) can cause violence in elections in this area?	669	82.5%	4
Do you agree that high youth unemployment, leading to youths being recruited as political thugs, could cause election violence in this area?	669	80%	3.91
Do you agree that the widespread availability and use of hard drugs can bring about election violence in this area?	669	77.4%	3.9
Do you agree that the activities of cult groups can cause violence in elections in this area?	669	77%	3.9
Do you agree that exclusion or discrimination of any group (minorities, women, youth, PWDs, IDPs, the elderly, religious groups) can cause election violence in this area?	669	73.4%	3.72
Do you agree that failure of religious institutions/leaders to promote peaceful conduct could cause election violence in this area?	669	73.4%	3.75
Do you agree that citizens' disaffection with government could result in election violence in this area?	669	70.4%	3.7
Do you agree that ethnic, religious, or communal conflicts can cause election violence in this area?	669	58%	3.28
Do you agree that there has been a history of electoral violence in this area?	669	56.5%	3.3

Core Election-Violence Risk Drivers — % Agree/Strongly Agree (n=669)




The presence of armed non-state actors (82.5% agree/strongly agree) and youth unemployment feeding thug recruitment (80.0%) are the two most widely endorsed risk drivers, followed closely by drug availability and cult-group activity (both around 77%). A documented history of electoral violence (56.5%) and ethnic/religious/communal conflict (58.0%) rank lowest in this group, though still majority concerns.

3.2 Party & Political Dynamics

Item	N	% Agree/Strongly Agree	Mean (1–5)
Activities of party thugs	669	88.3%	4.19
Intimidating or partisan conduct of party agents	669	81%	3.98
Undue influence of money and godfathers ("godfatherism")	669	72.9%	3.82
Defections and cross-carpeting from one party to another	669	70.4%	3.73
Lack of internal party democracy	669	62.9%	3.56
Contentious party conventions/primaries/campaigns	669	60.1%	3.45


Party & Political Dynamics — % Agree



Activities of party thugs (88.3%) and intimidating/partisan conduct of party agents (81.0%) dominate concern in this battery — both point to organized, agent-driven violence rather than spontaneous unrest.

3.3 Vote-Buying Dynamics

Item	N	% Agree/Strongly Agree	Mean (1–5)
Failure of security agencies to act against vote buying	669	84.8%	4.09
Rivalry among parties/agents over "vote-buying territory"	669	80.9%	4
Vote buying by candidates, parties, or their agents	669	78.5%	3.95
Voters' expectation of payment before voting	669	69.8%	3.79




Notably, the failure of security agencies to act against vote buying (84.8%) is rated as a bigger concern than vote buying itself (78.5%) — suggesting the perceived problem is as much about enforcement gaps as about the practice itself.

3.4 Electoral Administration (INEC)

Item	N	% Agree/Strongly Agree	Mean (1–5)
Partiality of election officials, ad-hoc and permanent	669	89.5%	4.22
Malfunction or problems with voter accreditation technology (BVAS) at polling units	669	86.8%	4.16
Incompetence or inadequate preparedness of election officials, ad-hoc and permanent	669	85.5%	4.08
Failure to prosecute electoral offenders	669	83.7%	4.09
Sudden replacement of trained/assigned electoral officials with different officials shortly before or during the election	669	81.3%	4.01
Movement and distribution of election materials	669	80.6%	3.96
Problems of underage voting	669	79.1%	3.95
Poor voter education/information	669	78.9%	3.89
Problems associated with the location and adequacy of polling units	669	77%	3.93
Problems associated with the collection of PVCs	669	74.1%	3.79
Problems with the voter register	669	74%	3.81


Electoral Administration (INEC) — % Agree/Strongly Agree these factors could cause election violence (n=669)



Partiality of election officials (89.5%) and BVAS/voter-accreditation malfunction (86.8%) top this battery — both are direct integrity-of-process concerns, distinct from logistics-only issues like polling-unit adequacy (77.0%).

3.5 Security Agencies

Item	N	% Agree/Strongly Agree	Mean (1–5)
Aggressive and excessive use of force	669	90.7%	4.25
Partiality of security agents	669	88.8%	4.18
Poor training and low professionalism of security agents	669	87.7%	4.16
Lack of synergy among security agents	669	85.2%	4.07
Problems associated with the deployment of security agents	669	84.5%	4.05
Poor synergy between INEC and security agencies	669	83.3%	4.03
Inadequate or excessive presence of security agents	669	82.4%	4.04
Problems associated with the welfare of security agents	669	76.4%	3.92




Security agencies attract the highest concern levels of any battery in the survey: aggressive/excessive use of force (90.7%) and partiality of security agents (88.8%) are rated as risk drivers by nearly nine in ten respondents.

3.6 Media & Information

Item	N	% Agree/Strongly Agree	Mean (1–5)
Hate speech, including its broadcast or publication by the media	669	88.9%	4.18
Abuse of social media	669	87.9%	4.14
Misinformation of the public by the media (fake news)	669	87.4%	4.07
Partisanship, favouritism, partiality, and sensationalism	669	87.1%	4.1

Item	N	% Agree/Strongly Agree	Mean (1–5)
Failure of regulatory bodies to ensure media adherence to established rules	669	85.4%	4.08
Unequal access to media	669	77.9%	3.89




Hate speech (88.9%) and social media abuse (87.9%) are seen as the most potent media-related risk factors, consistent with concerns about rapid, hard-to-moderate spread of inciting content.

3.7 Reassurance Items (Reverse-Worded)

These three items are worded positively, so a higher % agree reflects greater confidence/reassurance rather than risk.

Item	N	% Agree/Strongly Agree	Mean (1–5)
Do you agree that the election in this area will be peaceful? (R)	669	73.1%	3.78
INEC has adequately prepared for a peaceful election in this LGA. (R)	669	70.7%	3.86
Security agents in this area are well trained and adequately prepared to manage election-related risks. (R)	669	70.3%	3.91




Around seven in ten respondents express confidence that the election will be peaceful (73.1%), that INEC is adequately prepared (70.7%), and that security agents are well trained and prepared (70.3%) — indicating cautious institutional confidence sits alongside strong endorsement of specific risk factors elsewhere in the survey.

4. LGA-Level Risk Hotspots

4.1 LGAs Nominated as Highest-Risk (up to 3 picks per respondent) — All 30 LGAs

LGA	Nominations
Osogbo	160
Ede North	111
Irewole	93
Boripe	92
Ife Central	88
Ede South	82
Iwo	71
Ilesa East	69
Ilesa West	61
Egbedore	59
Olorunda	51
Ejigbo	49
Ila	47
Obokun	44
Oriade	44
Ife North	41
Ife East	41
Aiyedire	41
Boluwaduro	40
Ifelodun	39
Orolu	38
Atakunmosa West	37
Ife South	37
Isokan	34
Odo Otin	34
Atakunmosa East	32
Aiyedaade	30
Irepodun	28
Ifedayo	21
Ola Oluwa	13




Osogbo (160 nominations), Ede North (111), Irewole (93), Boripe (92) and Ife Central (88) are the most frequently nominated highest-risk LGAs. Note this reflects statewide perception of risk (each respondent could nominate up to 3 LGAs, not necessarily their own), and differs from Section 1's "LGA of residence" — comparing the two is useful: some LGAs (e.g. Osogbo) are both well represented in the sample and heavily nominated as high-risk, while others (e.g. Ejigbo, Ola Oluwa) are well represented in the sample but rarely nominated as high-risk. Ola Oluwa is the least-nominated LGA (13), consistent with its relatively upbeat outlook profile in Section 5.

4.2 Reasons Nominated LGAs Are Considered Risky

Reason	Mentions
History of past election violence	355
Presence of armed groups/thugs	239
Hate speech or inciting rhetoric circulating	210
Weak or absent security presence	158


Reason	Mentions
Known vote-buying hotspot	151
Contested candidate nomination/primary dispute	130
Land/boundary/chieftaincy dispute	76
Communal/ethnic/religious tension	64



A documented history of past election violence (355 mentions) is by far the most cited reason an LGA is seen as risky, followed by the presence of armed groups/thugs (239) and circulating hate speech/inciting rhetoric (210). This suggests risk perception is heavily anchored in precedent — LGAs with a violent electoral history carry that reputation forward regardless of current conditions.

5. Views Suggesting the Election Will Be Violent, by LGA

137 of 669 respondents (20.5%) said they expect the election to be "Violent" (84) or "Very Violent" (53). The chart below shows the full outlook split for reference, followed by where these violence-expecting responses are concentrated geographically.




5.1 Count of Violent/Very Violent Views, by LGA of Residence


LGA	Violent + Very Violent (n)	LGA sample size	% of that LGA's respondents
Egbedore	18	40	45%
Irewole	16	37	43.2%
Oriade	14	35	40%
Ila	12	32	37.5%
Irepodun	10	19	52.6%
Atakunmosa West	10	16	62.5%
Ede South	8	18	44.4%
Isokan	7	28	25%
Obokun	7	29	24.1%
Ejigbo	6	58	10.3%
Ife North	5	20	25%

LGA	Violent + Very Violent (n)	LGA sample size	% of that LGA's respondents
Ifedayo	5	12	41.7%
Ede North	5	34	14.7%
Ifelodun	3	44	6.8%
Ife South	2	22	9.1%
Boripe	2	22	9.1%
Osogbo	2	34	5.9%
Boluwaduro	1	21	4.8%
Ilesa West	1	1	100%
Ife Central	1	19	5.3%
Olorunda	1	2	50%
Ola Oluwa	1	46	2.2%

Rates based on very small LGA samples (e.g. Ilesa West, n=1; Olorunda, n=2) are unstable and should be read with caution — they are included for completeness, not for ranking.



In raw counts, Egbedore (18), Irewole (16), Oriade (14), Ila (12), Irepodun (10) and Atakunmosa West (10) contribute the most violence-expecting responses. When expressed as a share of each LGA's own respondents (restricted to LGAs with at least 8 respondents to avoid small-sample noise), Atakunmosa West (62.5%), Irepodun (52.6%), Egbedore (45.0%), Ede South (44.4%) and Irewole (43.2%) stand out as the LGAs where the largest proportion of local respondents personally expect violence.



Read together with Section 4.1, there is a partial but incomplete overlap between "LGAs most often nominated statewide as high-risk" (Osogbo, Ede North, Irewole, Boripe, Ife Central) and "LGAs whose own residents most expect violence" (Atakunmosa West, Irepodun, Egbedore, Ede South, Irewole). Irewole and Ede appear on both lists, reinforcing them as priority areas; others (e.g. Atakunmosa West, Irepodun) surface strongly in local sentiment without yet being widely flagged by the rest of the state — worth flagging to field teams as an early-warning blind spot.


6. Interpreting the "Not Sure" Segment

157 respondents (23.5% of the sample) answered "Not Sure" when asked directly whether the election will go peacefully or violently. This is a substantial swing segment — nearly a quarter of the sample — and it is worth unpacking rather than treating as a simple "no opinion" response.

6.1 "Not Sure" respondents are not neutral on the underlying peace question

When the same respondents are asked the more specific, directly-worded question "Do you agree that the election in this area will be peaceful?" — their answers split unevenly rather than clustering at "Undecided":

Response to "election will be peaceful"	N	%
1 Strongly Disagree	9	5.7%
2 Disagree	22	14%
3 Undecided	42	26.8%
4 Agree	63	40.1%
5 Strongly Agree	21	13.4%



Only 26.8% of "Not Sure" respondents chose "Undecided" on the direct peace question — the rest lean one way or the other. A slim majority (53.5%) actually agree or strongly agree the election will be peaceful, while 19.7% disagree or strongly disagree. This suggests "Not Sure" on the general outlook question often reflects genuine ambivalence about a specific, harder judgement "will it go well or badly overall" — rather than a lack of view on the narrower question of peacefulness. In practice, a "Not Sure" respondent is more likely than not to hold a cautiously positive view when pressed, but a meaningful one-in-five lean negative.

6.2 "Not Sure" respondents are split on whether there is a history of violence

Response to "history of electoral violence"	N	%
1 Strongly Disagree	9	5.7%
2 Disagree	39	24.8%

Response to "history of electoral violence"	N	%
3 Undecided	18	11.5%
4 Agree	60	38.2%
5 Strongly Agree	31	19.7%

57.9% of "Not Sure" respondents agree or strongly agree that their area has a history of electoral violence, versus 30.5% who disagree or strongly disagree. Uncertainty about the coming election therefore coexists with a fairly firm, mostly negative, read on past experience — the ambivalence is about whether this election repeats that pattern, not about whether the pattern exists.

6.3 Who is more likely to say "Not Sure"?

Men are somewhat over-represented among "Not Sure" respondents (58.0% vs 54.3% male share of the full sample), and the 36-45 age band is the single largest contributor (28.0% of "Not Sure" respondents, in line with its 28.0% share of the full sample — i.e., no real age skew). Geographically, "Not Sure" responses are concentrated in Ifelodun (19), Ede North (18), Irewole (12) and Ife North (12) LGAs that also feature among the higher-uncertainty areas in Section 7's crosstabulation.

7. Crosstabulations for the Main Questions


This section cross-tabulates the two central perception questions — overall election outlook, and the direct belief that the election will be peaceful — against sex, age, and LGA of residence.

7.1 Overall Election Outlook

By Sex:

Sex	Very Peaceful	Peaceful	Not Sure	Violent	Very Violent
Female	75 (24.5%)	109 (35.6%)	66 (21.6%)	38 (12.4%)	18 (5.9%)
Male	59 (16.3%)	132 (36.4%)	91 (25.1%)	46 (12.7%)	35 (9.6%)


$\chi^2 = 9.51$, $df = 4$, $p = 0.0495$ — statistically significant ($p < 0.05$). Women lean more "very peaceful" (24.5% vs 16.3%); men lean more "very violent" (9.6% vs 5.9%).



By Age Band:

Age	Very Peaceful	Peaceful	Not Sure	Violent	Very Violent
18-25	23 (25.0%)	28 (30.4%)	25 (27.2%)	10 (10.9%)	6 (6.5%)
26-35	32 (21.5%)	52 (34.9%)	33 (22.1%)	22 (14.8%)	10 (6.7%)
36-45	29 (15.5%)	70 (37.4%)	44 (23.5%)	22 (11.8%)	22 (11.8%)
46-55	30 (20.0%)	63 (42.0%)	28 (18.7%)	18 (12.0%)	11 (7.3%)
56 Above	20 (22.0%)	28 (30.8%)	27 (29.7%)	12 (13.2%)	4 (4.4%)

$\chi^2 = 16.55$, $df = 16$, $p = 0.415$ — not statistically significant. Outlook does not vary meaningfully by age.




By LGA of Residence (top 10 + all others combined):

LGA	Very Peaceful	Peaceful	Not Sure	Violent	Very Violent
Ejigbo	29 (50.0%)	23 (39.7%)	0 (0.0%)	6 (10.3%)	0 (0.0%)
Ola Oluwa	12 (26.1%)	24 (52.2%)	9 (19.6%)	0 (0.0%)	1 (2.2%)
Ifelodun	5 (11.4%)	17 (38.6%)	19 (43.2%)	2 (4.5%)	1 (2.3%)
Egbedore	7 (17.5%)	6 (15.0%)	9 (22.5%)	11 (27.5%)	7 (17.5%)
Irewole	0 (0.0%)	9 (24.3%)	12 (32.4%)	13 (35.1%)	3 (8.1%)
Oriade	8 (22.9%)	7 (20.0%)	6 (17.1%)	7 (20.0%)	7 (20.0%)
Osogbo	4 (11.8%)	20 (58.8%)	8 (23.5%)	0 (0.0%)	2 (5.9%)
Ede North	2 (5.9%)	9 (26.5%)	18 (52.9%)	5 (14.7%)	0 (0.0%)
Ila	0 (0.0%)	13 (40.6%)	7 (21.9%)	3 (9.4%)	9 (28.1%)
Obokun	10 (34.5%)	10 (34.5%)	2 (6.9%)	6 (20.7%)	1 (3.4%)
Other (18 LGAs)	57 (20.4%)	103 (36.8%)	67 (23.9%)	31 (11.1%)	22 (7.9%)

$\chi^2 = 185.82$, $df = 40$, $p < 0.0001$ — highly statistically significant. Geography is the strongest driver of variation in outlook of the three variables tested.

Overall Election Outlook by LGA of Residence (Top 10 + Other)



7.2 Belief the Election Will Be Peaceful (reverse-worded item)

By Sex:

Sex	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Undecided	Agree	Strongly Agree
Female	19 (6.2%)	34 (11.1%)	31 (10.1%)	145 (47.4%)	77 (25.2%)
Male	11 (3.0%)	38 (10.5%)	47 (12.9%)	176 (48.5%)	91 (25.1%)

$\chi^2 = 4.98$, $df = 4$, $p = 0.2896$ — not statistically significant. Unlike the general outlook question, direct agreement that the election "will be peaceful" does not differ meaningfully by sex.

By Age Band:

Age	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Undecided	Agree	Strongly Agree
18-25	8 (8.7%)	11 (12.0%)	9 (9.8%)	40 (43.5%)	24 (26.1%)
26-35	4 (2.7%)	13 (8.7%)	12 (8.1%)	78 (52.3%)	42 (28.2%)
36-45	6 (3.2%)	24 (12.8%)	23 (12.3%)	95 (50.8%)	39 (20.9%)
46-55	8 (5.3%)	12 (8.0%)	18 (12.0%)	72 (48.0%)	40 (26.7%)
56 Above	4 (4.4%)	12 (13.2%)	16 (17.6%)	36 (39.6%)	23 (25.3%)

$\chi^2 = 18.12$, $df = 16$, $p = 0.3167$ — not statistically significant.

By LGA of Residence (top 10 + all others combined):

LGA	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Undecided	Agree	Strongly Agree
Ejigbo	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	57 (98.3%)	1 (1.7%)
Ola Oluwa	9 (19.6%)	1 (2.2%)	0 (0.0%)	19 (41.3%)	17 (37.0%)
Ifelodun	2 (4.5%)	1 (2.3%)	12 (27.3%)	17 (38.6%)	12 (27.3%)
Egbedore	0 (0.0%)	1 (2.5%)	2 (5.0%)	26 (65.0%)	11 (27.5%)
Irewole	0 (0.0%)	15 (40.5%)	0 (0.0%)	19 (51.4%)	3 (8.1%)
Oriade	0 (0.0%)	7 (20.0%)	4 (11.4%)	18 (51.4%)	6 (17.1%)
Osogbo	1 (2.9%)	1 (2.9%)	10 (29.4%)	15 (44.1%)	7 (20.6%)
Ede North	1 (2.9%)	5 (14.7%)	7 (20.6%)	15 (44.1%)	6 (17.6%)
Ila	0 (0.0%)	6 (18.8%)	2 (6.2%)	15 (46.9%)	9 (28.1%)
Obokun	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	2 (6.9%)	12 (41.4%)	15 (51.7%)
Other (18 LGAs)	17 (6.1%)	35 (12.5%)	39 (13.9%)	108 (38.6%)	81 (28.9%)

$\chi^2 = 204.79$, $df = 40$, $p < 0.0001$ — highly statistically significant, confirming LGA of residence is the dominant source of variation across both main perception questions, far more than sex or age.

8. Summary of Key Findings

- Net-positive but uneasy outlook: 56% expect a peaceful election, but nearly a quarter (23.5%) are unsure and one in five (20.5%) expect violence.
- Security agency conduct is the single most-flagged risk domain — aggressive/excessive use of force and partiality of security agents each drew agreement from roughly 9 in 10 respondents.
- Armed non-state actors and youth unemployment/thug recruitment are the top-rated core drivers of election violence (82.5% and 80.0% agreement respectively).
- Enforcement gaps matter as much as the underlying behaviour: failure of security agencies to act against vote buying (84.8%) outranks vote buying itself (78.5%) as a concern.
- Risk perception is history-driven at the LGA level: a documented history of past violence is cited far more often than any other single factor (355 mentions) in explaining why an LGA is seen as high-risk.
- Osogbo, Ede North, Irewole, Boriye and Ife Central are the five most frequently nominated highest-risk LGAs statewide; Atakunmosa West, Irepodun, Egbedore, Ede South and Irewole are where the largest share of local residents personally expect violence — Irewole and the Ede LGAs appear on both lists.
- The "Not Sure" segment (23.5% of respondents) is not neutral: when pressed on the specific peace question, a slim majority (53.5%) still lean positive, but a meaningful 19.7% lean negative — this is a genuine swing segment, not a "no opinion" group, concentrated in Ifelodun, Ede North, Irewole and Ife North.