Abuja
18.08.26

STATEMENT ON THE CONDUCT OF SECURITY OFFICIALS AT THE CLOSE OF POLLS:

OSUN 2026: SECURITY CONDUCT OFFERS A BLUEPRINT FOR 2027 — HOWEVER, BVAS AUDITS AND ELECTORAL REFORMS CANNOT WAIT

CLEEN Foundation deployed trained election observers to monitor the conduct of security officials at the close of polls during the 2026 Osun State election. Conduct at the close of polls including whether officers remained at post, whether force was used, and how the ballot box was secured for transmission is a critical determinant of the credibility of the results that follow. It is against this backdrop that CLEEN Foundation issues this statement. As at the end of the Election Day Poll, CLEEN Foundation observers had submitted structured report(s) from polling units across 30 local government area(s) Aiyedaade, Aiyedire, Atakunmosa East, Atakunmosa West, Boluwaduro, Boripe, Ede North, Ede South, Egbedore, Ejigbo, Ife Central, Ife East, Ife North, Ife South, Ifedayo, Ifelodun, Ila, Ilesa East, Ilesa West, Irepodun, Irewole, Isokan, Iwo, Obokun, Odo Otin, Ola Oluwa, Olorunda, Oriade, Orolu, Osogbo. This statement organises CLEEN Foundation’s findings under sustained deployment and adequacy; professional conduct and order; use of force and threat incidents; ballot box security and accountability; BVAS performance and accreditation irregularities; and a supplementary heatmap of election-day, media-reported violence followed by a polling-unit-level summary and CLEEN Foundation’s overall assessment.

Background & Methodology

CLEEN Foundation has monitored the conduct of security agencies during elections and other public order events across Nigeria for over two decades. Its closing-of-poll observation protocol extends the opening-of-poll methodology to focus specifically on sustained presence, discipline under pressure as voting concludes, and the security of the ballot box in the sensitive window between the close of voting and the transmission of results—a period that observation research consistently identifies as carrying elevated risk of disputes, intimidation, or interference. For the Guber election, CLEEN Foundation trained and deployed a network of accredited observers who submitted structured, real-time reports via KoboToolbox at the close of polls. Each report captures officer adequacy and continuity of presence, orderliness and impartiality, whether force was used and if so whether it was proportionate, and whether the ballot box was secured for safe transportation alongside the names of officers whom observers wish to recommend for commendation or reprimand. This statement is based on the closing-of-poll report(s) received to date.

As with the opening-of-poll statement, these findings reflect the specific polling units where CLEEN Foundation observers were present and reporting at the time of analysis, not a statistically randomised sample of all polling units in Osun State, and will be updated as further reports are received.

1. Sustained Deployment & Adequacy

Security presence was sustained through the close of polls in the large majority of monitored locations. 100% of reports rated the number of officers present as adequate or better throughout the day. However, officers were reported to have left the polling station for some period during the day in 6% of reports and the polling station was reported left entirely unattended by security in 2% of cases.

Continuity of presence through to the close of polls matters as much as, if not more than, presence at the opening: it is in the final hours of voting and the immediate post-close period when queues are cleared, results are collated at the unit level, and the ballot box is prepared for movement that opportunistic interference is most likely. CLEEN Foundation treats any report of officers leaving post or a station being left unattended as warranting individual follow-up, regardless of how small a share of the overall total it represents.

1. Professional Conduct & Order

Observers’ assessments of professionalism at the close of polls remained strongly positive. Officers were rated approachable or very approachable in 100% of reports, and polling centres were described as orderly or very orderly in 100% of reports.

Officers were rated impartial or very impartial in 97% of reports, and were reported to have followed the Presiding Officer’s instructions in 100% of reports. Overall conduct was rated good or very good in 89% of monitored locations. Deference to the Presiding Officer’s authority is a particularly important indicator at the close of polls, since it is the Presiding Officer, not the security detail, who holds legal responsibility for the conduct of the count and the completion of result sheets; a security presence that respects that chain of authority helps reduce the risk of disputes over the integrity of the process at the unit level.

III. Use of Force & Threat Incidents

Incidents of threat to security at the polling centre were reported in 12% of locations. CLEEN Foundation flags these incidents for individual follow-up.

Security officials were reported to have used force in 2% of locations. CLEEN Foundation notes any use of force at a polling unit as a matter requiring individual review of proportionality and necessity, regardless of the overall share it represents.

Officers were reported visibly armed with firearms in 37% of locations, broadly consistent with standard deployment protocol and noted here for completeness rather than as an indicator of concern on its own.

1. Ballot Box Security & Accountability

Security officials were reported to have provided security for the transportation of the ballot box after voting concluded in 86% of monitored locations. Securing the chain of custody of the ballot box between the polling unit and the collation centre is one of the highest-risk junctures of Election Day, and this figure is a material indicator of process integrity at the units covered. At the remaining 14% of locations, observers either did not confirm ballot box security or were uncertain whether it was provided, underscoring that the handover from polling unit to collation centre is the point in the process observers were least able to verify directly, compared with the deployment and conduct indicators reported at the polling unit itself.

1. BVAS Performance & Accreditation Irregularities

CLEEN Foundation observers flagged reports of BVAS (Bimodal Voter Accreditation System) malfunction or related accreditation irregularities at the close of polls, compiled directly by observers outside the structured Kobo reporting forms. These are CLEEN Foundation-verified reports, not media claims, and are recorded here because BVAS performance is central to the credibility of the accreditation process that underlies the results now being collated. Where BVAS facial or fingerprint verification failed, INEC officials at several units were reported to have deployed their technical team to resolve the fault, in some cases provoking brief unrest among waiting voters while the issue was being worked on. It is also worth noting that at several of the polling units observed with large numbers of accredited voters, INEC had provided only a single BVAS unit, which slowed accreditation independently of any device fault. CLEEN Foundation recommends that INEC publicly clarify the technical support and fallback protocol used at each affected unit, confirm that accreditation at those units otherwise met legal requirements, and ensure that future elections provide multiple BVAS units at polling units with large registered voter populations.

1. Reports of Election-Related Violence by Local Government Area

In addition to the Foundations accredited observer network, CLEEN Foundation reviewed election-day coverage from several Nigerian news outlets to build a supplementary picture of where reports of election-related violence emerged on Election Day itself. This is a distinct and lower-confidence data layer from CLEEN Foundation’s own Violence Observer Log: it combines police-confirmed incidents, an outlet’s own on-the-ground reporting, and in several cases allegations made by political parties that have not been independently confirmed by police or INEC. These figures are presented as media-reported and unconfirmed, not as CLEEN Foundation-verified findings, and are set alongside CLEEN Foundation’s own data below so the two layers can be read together without being conflated. CLEEN Foundation’s own Violence Incident Log recorded 7 verified incident report(s) in this reporting window. Two reports came from Ola Oluwa, and one each from Ifelodun, Ede South, Ilesa East, Iwo, Irewole and Modakeke. All were rated low-severity verbal or physical intimidation without a weapon, or vote-buying with no deaths or injuries recorded, and voting was reported disrupted at only two of these locations, Ede South and Modakeke.

Separately, election-day media and party-sourced reports of violence were identified in 6 location(s)  Ilesa East, Ejigbo, Boripe, Odo-Otin, Irewole, and Atakumosa spanning alleged shootings, gunfire near a traditional ruler’s palace, disrupted voting, and claims of vandalised residences. With the exception of the palace incident at Iree (Boripe), which was independently confirmed by the monarch involved, and thug-related disruption at Aregbesola’s polling unit in Ilesa East reported directly by journalists on the ground, these reports originate from party allegations that police and INEC have not yet confirmed.

10 local government area(s) had at least one report of either kind of election-related violence in this reporting window: Atakumosa, Boripe, Ede South, Ejigbo, Ifelodun, Ilesa East, Irewole, Iwo, Odo-Otin, Modakeke, Ola Oluwa. Ilesa East, Modakeke and Irewole each appear in both CLEEN Foundation’s own verified log and the media-reported layer, which CLEEN Foundation considers a modest corroboration signal for those three locations specifically, though the nature of the incidents reported at each differs between sources.

VII. Polling Unit-Level Summary

Across several polling-unit closing reports received, overall conduct ratings broke down as follows: Very Good: 63%; Good: 26% ; Fair: 8%; Poor:  2%; Condemnable:  2%. CLEEN Foundation draws particular attention to 12 polling unit(s) that either scored below the otherwise strongly positive norm, reported use of force, or reported a threat incident, and which merit closer follow-up: Atakumosa West, 10 Osunjela/ unit 7 (rating “Fair”); Ede North, Sabo Agbongbe 2, Alabi Junction/ 007 (rating “Fair”); Osogbo, 4 FOMWAN junction Ogo-Oluwa area, PU 027. (rating “Poor”, threat incident reported); Ifelodun,Ikirun, 06 ADEYEMI ST/NUD PRY.SCH I/II (rating “condemnable”); Atakumosa West, 7 Araromi kajola unit 6, (rating “Good”, threat incident reported); Boluwaduro, Oke Otan, Ejemu Ororo (rating “Very Good”, threat incident reported); Irewole, 05 Rural Health Care Centre (rating “Fair”, threat incident reported); Irewole, 05 Rural Health Care Centre Ikire (rating “Fair”, threat incident reported); Atakunmosa East, 002 Town Hall Iperindo (rating “Good”, force used); Irewole, 05 Rural Health Care Centre / 06 (rating “Fair”, threat incident reported); Ifelodun, 06 Adeyemi st NUD PRY SCHOOL 11 (rating “Very Good”, threat incident reported); Ifelodun, 06 Adeyemi st /Nud nur/pry schoolII (rating “Very Good”, threat incident reported).

VIII. Recommendations

Arising from the findings above, CLEEN Foundation makes the following recommendations to three sets of actors whose actions will shape the credibility of the remainder of this electoral process:

To the Federal and State Governments

• We urge the expedited passage and implementation of legislation that establishes a distinct and expedited judicial process for prosecuting electoral offenders. This would address the current climate of impunity and serve as a more potent deterrent against malpractice.
• Investment in and deployment of public communication systems to proactively counter disinformation and fake news during elections is crucial.
• To prevent last-minute operational and logistical disruptions towards elections, a strict statutory timeframe must be imposed for resolving all electoral matters.

To Law Enforcement Agencies, Especially the Nigeria Police Force

• Urgently and transparently investigate every incident recorded in this statement, both from CLEEN Foundation’s own Violence Observer Log and from credible media and `other CSO reports, and publicly disclose the outcome of those investigations rather than allowing credible allegations to go unaddressed.
• Sustain, rather than relax, officer presence and vigilance through collation and the transmission of results, given that risk to voters, party agents, and observers historically rises in this post-voting window.
• Review and act on the specific names and force numbers of officers recommended for commendation or reprimand, which CLEEN Foundation will transmit separately to agency leadership, as a concrete mechanism for reinforcing the professionalism observed at most polling units while addressing the exceptions.
• CLEEN Foundation recommends the CRU’s state desk publish a widely publicised, dedicated hotline and case-tracking reference for each complaint received from this and future election cycles, so that observers, party agents, and the public can follow a complaint to resolution rather than submitting it into a process with no visible outcome.
• Work with the judiciary and INEC to activate or expand mobile courts stationed at or near collation centres for the summary trial of electoral offences including vote buying, underage voting, and obstruction of electoral officials so that arrests the Force does make can be prosecuted within the election period itself. A same-day or near-same-day arrest-to-arraignment pathway is a materially stronger deterrent than a case that stalls in the ordinary court backlog, and its absence likely contributes to the enforcement gap noted above.
• Institutionalise the post-election review of officer conduct recommendations (commendation and reprimand), CRU case outcomes, and mobile-court prosecution rates gathered through this and future so that lessons from the 2026 Osun election inform training, deployment, and enforcement decisions ahead of 2027 rather than being addressed only after the fact.
• Security agencies in coordination with the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) must strengthen intelligence gathering and enforcement around polling environments to deter and penalize vote trading on Election Day.
• We urge the expansion of continuous, scenario-based pre-election training focused explicitly on election-specific ethics, the legal limits of use of force, and the practical application of neutrality. This training should be mandatory and include all ranks deployed for election security.

To the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC)

• Publicly clarify the fallback accreditation protocol used at each polling unit where BVAS facial-capture or fingerprint verification failed, and confirm that accreditation at those units otherwise met legal requirements, to pre-empt disputes over their results.
• Conduct a technical review of the BVAS malfunctions reported in this statement concentrated around facial-capture and fingerprint failures to determine whether they reflect isolated device faults or a broader pattern warranting extensive review.
• Ensure the chain of custody for ballot boxes and result sheets between polling units and collation centres is documented and independently verifiable, given the centrality of this step to public confidence in the declared outcome.
• As we prepare for the 2027 General Election, INEC should further strengthen reporting channel(s) available to all stakeholders.
• The just concluded Osun governorship election has clearly shown the critical importance of the IREV portal in boosting credibility; hence INEC must ensure the effective and efficient functioning of the IREV portal during the General Election slated for January of 2027.
• Begin, well ahead of the 2027 General Election, a structured audit and, where warranted, phased replacement or refurbishment of BVAS units at polling units with a documented history of facial-capture or fingerprint failure, rather than redeploying the same devices without review.
• Publish a post-election technical and procedural report on the 2026 Osun election covering BVAS performance, accreditation timing, and collation on a timeline that allows its findings to inform 2027 planning, procurement, and poll-worker training, rather than being released too close to the next election cycle to act on.

To Members of the Public

• Members of the public, media organizations, and civil society actors must exercise strict caution before sharing or amplifying casualty figures and security incident claims. Unless information is verified and attributed to named, credible sources, unverified reports should be withheld, as conflicting casualty data can easily trigger public panic and undermine confidence during highly contested elections.
• As stakeholders prepare for the upcoming General Election, the public must actively support the electoral umpire by building upon past successes in peaceful voting, rejecting provocative conduct, and prioritizing conflict resolution to maintain public order.
• Civil society structures, community organizations, and government bodies should transition civic and voter education from an occasional, election-season activity into a continuous, year-round process to build long-term democratic consciousness.

1. Conclusion

CLEEN Foundation commends the security agencies for the professionalism observed throughout the polls and urge continued vigilance, restraint, and strict chain-of-custody discipline for all evidence. Ultimately, the Osun State Governorship Election underscored the critical distinction between peaceful voting processes and genuine electoral credibility. Addressing this divide requires comprehensive structural reforms, specifically bolstering security agencies to tackle vote-trading and financial inducements, enforcing campaign finance transparency, and strengthening independent oversight by civil society and media entities.